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THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

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die 29ª Aprilis, 1929.

THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

OF

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

THE FOURTH BOOK

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY

THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN FATHERS

New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, San Francisco

BENZIGER BROTHERS

PRINTERS TO THE HOLY APOSTOLIC SEE

First published in 1929

Made and Printed in Great Britain

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THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

FOURTH BOOK

CHAPTER I

FOREWORD

Lo, these things are said in part, of his ways: and seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of his word, who shall be able to behold the thunder of his greatness? (Job xxvi. 14).

For as much as the human intellect acquires knowledge in a manner conformable with its nature, it cannot by itself arrive at an intuitive knowledge of the divine substance in itself, since the latter infinitely transcends the whole range of things sensible, nay all other beings whatsoever.

Nevertheless, seeing that man's perfect good consists in his knowing God in some way, lest so noble a creature should seem to be utterly void of purpose, through being unable to obtain its own end, man has been given the means of rising to the knowledge of God. For, since all the perfections of things come down from God the summit of all perfection, man begins from the lowest things and rising by degrees advances to the knowledge of God: thus too, in corporeal movements, the way down is the same as the way up, and they differ only as regards their beginning and end.

Now this descent of perfections from God presents a twofold aspect. In the first we look at it from the viewpoint of the origin of things: since divine wisdom, that there might be perfection in things, established a certain order among them, so that the universe might be made up of the highest as well as the lowest things. The second

aspect is that of the things considered in themselves; for, since causes rank higher than effects, the things caused first fall short of the first cause, namely God, while they transcend their own effects, and so on until we come to those things that are caused last. And because in God, the summit of all things, there is found the most perfect unity; and since the more a thing is one, the greater its power and worth, it follows that the further we recede from the first principle, the more do we find things to be diversified and varied. Consequently the things that proceed from God must needs derive unity from their principle, and multiplicity from the ends to which they are ordained. Accordingly from the diversity of things we consider the diversity of ways, as beginning from one principle and terminating in different things.

Wherefore our intellect is able to mount by these ways to the knowledge of God; and yet by reason of the weakness of our intellect we are unable to know perfectly the very ways themselves. Because, as our senses, wherein our knowledge begins, are directed to exterior accidents, such as colour, smell, and the like, which are by themselves sensible, the intellect is scarcely able through suchlike externals to arrive at the knowledge of what lies within, even in those things whose accidents it grasps perfectly through the senses. Much less, therefore, will it be able to succeed in comprehending the nature of those things, of whose accidents but few can be grasped by the senses, and still less the nature of those things whose accidents cannot be grasped, although it may be partly gathered from certain effects that fall short of those things. But, even though the very natures of things were known to us, nevertheless their order, in so much as by divine providence they are both referred one to another and directed to their end, could be but little known to us, since we cannot succeed in knowing the purpose of divine providence.

Wherefore, if the ways themselves are known by us but imperfectly, how can they serve us as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge of their principle, which transcends them

out of all proportion? Even if we knew those same ways perfectly, not yet should we have perfect knowledge of their principle.

Since then it was but a meagre knowledge of God that man was able to obtain in the above ways by a kind of intellectual insight, God of His overflowing goodness, in order that man's knowledge of Him might have greater stability, revealed to man certain things about Himself which surpass the human intelligence. In this revelation a certain order is observed, in keeping with human nature, so that the imperfect leads to the perfect, as happens in other things subject to movement.

Accordingly, at first, these things are revealed to man, yet so that he understands them not, but merely believes them as things heard by him, because his intellect, in this state of life wherein it is connected with sensibles, is utterly unable to rise so as to behold such things as transcend all proportion to the senses: but, when freed from this connection with the senses, then it will be raised so as to behold the things revealed.

Hence man's knowledge of divine things is threefold. The first is when man, by the natural light of reason, rises through creatures to the knowledge of God. The second is when the divine truth which surpasses the human intelligence comes down to us by revelation, yet not as shown to him that he may see it, but as expressed in words so that he may hear it. The third is when the human mind is raised to the perfect intuition of things revealed.

This threefold knowledge is indicated by the words of Job quoted above.—The words, *These things are said in part of his ways* refer to the knowledge in which our intellect rises to the knowledge of God by the way of creatures. And because we know these ways but imperfectly, he rightly adds *in part:* since *we know in part,* as the Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 9). The words that follow, *And seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of his word,* refer to the second knowledge, wherein divine things are revealed to our belief by way of speech: because *faith,* as it is said, *is*

by hearing, and hearing is by the word of Christ,[1] of which it is also said (Jo. xvii. 17): *Sanctify them in truth. Thy word is truth.* Wherefore, since the revealed truth in divine things is offered not to our sight but to our belief, he rightly says *we have heard.* And whereas this imperfect knowledge flows from that perfect knowledge whereby the divine truth is seen in itself, when revealed to us by God by means of the angels who *see the face of the Father,* the expression *drop* is appropriate: hence it is said (Joel iii. 18): *In that day the mountains shall drop down sweetness.* But since not all the mysteries which the angels and blessed know through seeing them in the first truth, are revealed to us, but only a certain few, he says pointedly *a little.* For it is said (Ecclus. xliii. 35, 36): *Who shall magnify him as he is from the beginning? There are many things hidden from us, that are greater than these: for we have seen but a few of his works.* Again the Lord said to his disciples (Jo. xvi. 12): *I have yet many things to say to you: but you cannot bear them now.* Moreover these few things that are revealed to us are proposed to us figuratively and obscurely, so that only the studious can succeed in understanding them, while others revere them as things occult, and so that unbelievers are unable to deride them. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 12): *We see now through a glass in a dark manner;* wherefore Job adds significantly the word *scarce,* to indicate difficulty.—When he goes on to say, *Who shall be able to behold the thunder of his greatness?* he is referring to the third knowledge, whereby the first truth shall be known as an object not of belief but of vision, for *we shall see him as he is* (1 Jo. iii 2), wherefore he says *behold.* Nor shall a small portion of the divine mysteries be perceived, but the divine majesty itself shall be seen, and the entire perfection of good things: hence the Lord said to Moses (Exod xxxiii. 19): *I will show thee all good;* wherefore he says rightly *greatness.* Nor will the truth be revealed to man obscurely, but made clearly manifest: wherefore our Lord said to His

[1] Rom. x. 17.

disciples (Jo. xvii. 25): *The hour cometh when I will no more speak to you in proverbs, but will show you plainly of the Father;* hence the word *thunder* is significant as indicating manifestation.

Now the passage quoted is suitable to our purpose: because hitherto we have spoken of divine things, in as much as natural reason is able to arrive at the knowledge of them through creatures; imperfectly however and as far as its own capacity allows, so that we can say with Job: *Lo, these things are said in part, of his ways.*

It remains then for us to speak of those things that God has proposed to us to be believed, and which surpass the human intelligence. In what manner we are to proceed in this matter we are taught by the words quoted above. For seeing that we scarce hear the truth in the words of Holy Writ, coming down to us like a little drop, and since, in this state of life, no man is able to behold the thunder of His greatness, we must proceed in such sort that the things delivered to us in the words of Holy Writ shall serve as principles. Thus we shall endeavour in some fashion to grasp what is delivered to us in a hidden manner by the aforesaid words, and to defend them from the attacks of unbelievers; yet so as not to presume that we understand them perfectly. For such things are to be proved by the authority of Holy Writ, and not by natural reason: and yet we must show that they are not opposed to natural reason, so as to defend them from the attacks of unbelievers. This manner of procedure has in fact already been decided on at the outset of this work. And since natural reason rises to the knowledge of God through creatures, while on the other hand the knowledge of God by faith comes down to us by divine revelation, and since the way of ascent is the same as that of descent, we must needs proceed by the same way in those things above reason which are an object of faith, as that which we followed hitherto in those matters concerning God which we investigated by reason.

Accordingly we shall treat in the first place of those

things concerning God which are above reason and are proposed to our belief, such as belief in the Trinity (Ch. ii.-xxvi.).

Secondly we shall treat of those things above reason that have been done by God, such as the work of the Incarnation and things that follow in sequence thereto (Ch. xxvii.-lxxviii.).

Thirdly we shall treat of those things above reason to which we look forward in man's last end, such as the resurrection and glory of the body, the eternal happiness of souls, and matters connected therewith (Ch. lxxix.-xcvii.).

CHAPTER II

THAT IN GOD THERE ARE GENERATION, PATERNITY, AND FILIATION

Let us then commence our treatise with the mystery of divine generation, and lay down first of all what we must hold according to the teaching of Holy Writ: after which we shall put forward the arguments set up by unbelievers in opposition to the truth of faith; by answering which we shall ensure the purpose of this treatise.

Accordingly Holy Writ delivers to us the names of paternity and filiation in God, when it declares Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, and this occurs very often in the New Testament. For it is said (Matth. xi. 17): *No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son.* Again Mark begins his gospel with the words: *The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, Son of God:* and John the Evangelist says this frequently: for it is said (iii. 35): *The Father loveth the Son, and he hath given all things into his hand,* and (v. 21): *As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life; so also the Son giveth life to whom he will.* Again the Apostle Paul frequently makes use of similar expressions: thus he says (Rom. i. 1-3): *Separated unto the gospel of God, which*

he had promised before by his prophets in the holy scripture, concerning his Son, and (Heb. i. 1-2): *God who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by his Son.* This is also expressed, albeit less frequently, in the writings of the Old Testament, for it is written (Prov. xxx. 4): *What is his name, and what is the name of his Son if thou knowest?* and we read (Ps. ii. 7): *The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my son,* and again (Ps. lxxxviii. 27): *He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father.* And though some would twist the last two passages into a different meaning, so that the words *The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my son* be referred to David himself; and the words *He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father* be ascribed to Solomon, the context in each passage shows the case to be wholly otherwise. For neither are the succeeding words applicable to David, *This day have I begotten thee,* nor again the words that follow, *I will give thee the Gentiles for thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for thy possession,* since his kingdom did not extend to the utmost parts of the earth, as attested by the story of the Books of Kings. Nor again can the words *He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father* be applied to Solomon, since the text goes on (verse 30): *I will make his seed to endure for evermore, and his throne as the days of heaven.* Hence we are given to understand that since in the passages quoted certain things may apply to David and Solomon, and some things not at all, these words are said of David and Solomon, according to the custom of Scripture, as figures of someone else in whom the whole passage is fulfilled.

And seeing that the names *Father* and *Son* are consequent to some sort of generation, Scripture has not failed to mention the name of the divine generation. For in the psalm, as we have remarked, we read: *This day have I begotten thee,* and it is also written (Prov. viii. 24, 35): *The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived . . . before the hills I was brought forth,* or, according to

another reading,[1] *Before the hills, the Lord begot me.* It is also said (Isa. lxvi. 9): *Shall not I that make others to bring forth children, myself bring forth? saith the Lord. Shall I that give generation to others, be barren? saith the Lord thy God.* And though one might say that this should be referred to the multiplication of the children of Israel after their return from captivity into their own land, seeing that it was said before (verse 8): *Sion hath been in labour and hath brought forth her children,* yet this does not conflict with our purpose. For in whatever sense the text be taken, the argument that is quoted as urged by God remains firm and stable, namely, that if *He gives generation to others,* He himself should not be barren. Nor would it be becoming that He who makes others to beget in reality, Himself should beget, not really, but figuratively; since a thing should be more excellent in the cause than in the effect, as we have proved above.[2] Moreover it is said (Jo. i. 14): *We have seen his glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father,* and again (verse 18): *The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.* Again Paul says (Heb. i. 6): *When he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith: Let all the angels of God adore him.*

CHAPTER III

THAT THE SON OF GOD IS GOD

We must also observe that Holy Writ employs the aforesaid expressions to denote the creation of things: for it is said (Job xxxviii. 28, 29): *Who is the father of rain? or who begot the drops of dew? Out of whose womb came the ice? and the frost from heaven, who hath gendered it?* Lest, therefore, the words paternity, filiation, and generation should convey nothing but the idea of the efficacy of

[1] πρὸ δὲ πάντων βουνῶν γεννᾶ με (Sept. Version, Prov. viii, 25).
[2] Bk. I., ch. xxiii.

the creation, the authority of Scripture does not omit to declare the Godhead of Him whom it describes as son and begotten, so that the aforesaid generation denotes something more than creation. For it is said (Jo. i. 1): *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.* And that the name Word designates the Son is shown from what follows, for he adds: *And the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us: and we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father.* Again Paul says (Tit. iii. 4): *When the goodness and kindness of God our Saviour appeared.* Nor did the Scripture of the Old Testament leave this unsaid, since it calls Christ by the name of God: for it is said (Ps. xliv. 7, 8): *Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: the sceptre of thy kingdom is a sceptre of uprightness. Thou hast loved justice, and hatedst iniquity:* and that these words refer to Christ is clear from what follows: *Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.* It is also written (Isa. ix. 6): *For a child is born to us, and a son is given to us: and the government is upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called, Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of peace.* Accordingly we are taught from Holy Writ that the Son of God, begotten of God, is God. And Peter confessed that Jesus Christ is the Son of God when he said (Matth. xvi. 16): *Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.* Therefore He is not merely the only-begotten, but is also God.

CHAPTER IV

THE OPINION OF PHOTINUS CONCERNING THE SON OF GOD: AND ITS REFUTATION

CERTAIN perverse men have presumed to measure the truth of the above doctrine according to their own ideas, and have devised various inept opinions about the aforesaid

matter. Some of these observed that Scripture is wont to call sons of God those who are sanctified by grace, according to the words of Jo. i. 12: *He gave them the power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in his name,* and of Rom. viii. 16: *The Spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God,* and of 1 Jo. iii. 1: *Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed on us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God.* Moreover Scripture declares the like to be born of God, for it is said (James i. 18): *For of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth,* and (1 Jo. iii. 9): *Whosoever is born of God committeth no sin: for his seed abideth in him.* Again, what is more remarkable still, the divine name is ascribed to them: thus the Lord said to Moses (Exod. vii. 1): *Behold I have appointed thee the God of Pharao,* and (Ps. lxxxi. 6): *I have said: You are gods, and all of you sons of the most High:* and as the Lord said (Jo. x. 35): *He called them gods, to whom the words of God were spoken.* Thus then, in their opinion, Jesus Christ was a mere man born of the Virgin Mary, and through the merits of His holy life was accorded, above all others, the honour of the Godhead; and they reckoned that, like other men, He was a son of God by the spirit of adoption, and begotten of Him by grace, and that the Scriptures call Him God by reason of His being in some way like to God; not by nature, but by a kind of fellowship in the divine goodness: even as it is said of the saints (2 Pet. i. 4): *That . . . you may be made partakers of the divine nature, flying the corruption of that concupiscence which is in the world.*

They strove to strengthen their position by the authority of Holy Writ. For the Lord said (Matth. xxviii. 18): *All power is given to me in heaven and on earth:* since had He been God before time, He would not have received power in time.

Again, it is said of the Son that He *was made to him* (*i.e.*, to God) *of the seed of David according to the flesh* and that He *was predestinated the Son of God in power;*

and that which is *predestinated* and *made* is seemingly not eternal.

Again the Apostle says (Philip. ii. 8, 9): *He became*[1] *obedient unto death; even to the death of the cross. For which cause God also hath exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above all names.* Whence it would seem to follow that it was through the merit of His obedience and passion that He was crowned with divine honour and exalted above all things. Again Peter says (Acts ii. 36): *Therefore let all the house of Israel know most certainly that God hath made both Lord and Christ this same Jesus whom you have crucified.* Seemingly, therefore, He was made God in time, and not born so, before time. Moreover, in confirmation of their opinion they quote those passages of Scripture which would seem to imply defects in Christ; for instance that He was borne in a woman's womb, that He advanced in age, that He suffered from hunger and was overcome with fatigue, and subject to death, that He was ever making progress, that He confessed His ignorance of the day of judgement, and was stricken with the fear of death, and the like, all of which are incompatible in one who is God by nature. Hence they conclude that He was graced with the divine honour through His merits, and that He was not God by nature.

This position was taken up first by certain of the early heretics, Cerinthus and Ebion, was renewed by Paul of Samosata, and later on adopted by Photinus: wherefore those who followed his teaching were called Photinians. Nevertheless it is clear to those who weigh carefully these passages of Holy Writ that they do not admit of the interpretation favoured by the opinion of these men.

For Solomon by saying (Prov. viii. 24): *The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived* clearly shows that this conception took place before the existence of anything corporeal. Hence, it follows that the Son begotten of God did not receive from Mary the beginning of His existence. And though they endeavoured to distort these

[1] Vulg., *becoming.*

and other like passages with a false interpretation, by saying that they should be referred to predestination, namely that before the creation of the world it was decreed that the Son of God should be born of the Virgin Mary, but that He was not the Son of God before the creation of the world; yet it is clear from what follows that He was before Mary not only in predestination but also in reality. For after the words of Solomon quoted above it is added (verses 29, 30): *When he balanced the foundations of the earth, I was with him forming all things;* whereas had He existed merely as predestinated, He could not have been doing anything.

The same is to be gathered from the words of the evangelist John: for after saying, *In the beginning was the Word,* whereby we are to understand the Son of God, as we have shown; lest anyone should take this in the sense of predestination, he adds (verse 3): *All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing:* which could not be true had He not existed in reality before the world.

Again, it is said of the Son of God (Jo. iii. 13): *No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven;* and again (Jo. vi. 38): *I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me.* It is, therefore, clear that He existed before He came down from heaven.

Moreover, according to the above opinion, He advanced by merit from manhood to *Godhead:* whereas the Apostle shows on the contrary that, being already God, He became man. For he says (Philip. ii. 6, 7): [*Who*] *Being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God; but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit formed as a man.* The above opinion, therefore, is irreconcilable with the words of the Apostle.

Again. Among those who received the grace of God, Moses was copiously endowed: for it is said of him (Exod. xxxiii. 11) that *the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a*

man is wont to speak to his friend. If, then, Jesus Christ is to be called God merely on account of the grace of adoption, like other saints, Moses might be called the son of God for the same reason as Christ, although Christ was endowed with more abundant grace: since even among the other saints one is filled with greater grace than another, and yet all are equally to be called sons of God. But Moses is not called son of God for the same reason as Christ: since the Apostle distinguishes Christ from Moses as son from servant, for he says (Heb. iii. 5, 6): *Moses indeed was faithful in all his house as a servant, for a testimony of those things which were to be said: but Christ as a Son in his own house.* It is, therefore, clear that Christ is not called the Son of God by the grace of adoption, as other saints are. The same may be gathered from several other passages of Scripture which call Christ the Son of God in a special way above others: sometimes indeed by singling Him out from others and calling Him son, as when the voice of the Father was heard from heaven: *This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased* (Matth. iii. 17); sometimes by calling Him the Only Begotten; for instance (Jo. i. 14): *We have seen his glory, the glory, as it were, of the Only Begotten of the Father;* and again (Jo. i. 18): *The Only-Begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him;* whereas were He called son in common with the others, He could not be called the Only Begotten: and sometimes by calling Him the First-Born, so as to imply a sonship derived by others from Him, according to Rom. viii. 29, *Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son; that he might be the first-born amongst many brethren,* and (Gal. iv. 4, 5), *God sent his Son . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons.* Therefore He is Son in a different way from those who are called sons through a likeness to His sonship.

Moreover. Certain works in Holy Writ are ascribed to God so exclusively that they are inapplicable to another, such as the sanctification of souls and the remission of

sins: for it is said (Levit. xx. 8): *I am the Lord that sanctify you,* and (Isa. xliii. 25): *I am he that blot out thy iniquities for my own sake.* Now Scripture ascribes both of these to Christ: for it is said (Heb. ii. 11): *Both he that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one,* and (Heb. xiii. 12): *Jesus, that he might sanctify the people by his own blood, suffered without the gate.* Moreover our Lord Himself declared that He had the power to forgive sins, and confirmed His assertion with a miracle (Matth. ix. 6): and the angel foretold this of Him, saying (Matth. i. 21): *He shall save his people from their sins.* Therefore Christ, who both sanctifies us and forgives us our sins, is called God, not as those are called gods who are sanctified and forgiven their sins, but as having both the power and the nature of the Godhead.

Those passages of Scripture whereby they endeavoured to show that Christ is not God by nature are of no avail to prove their contention. For we confess that in Christ the Son of God, after the mystery of the Incarnation, there were two natures, namely the human and the divine: wherefore both those things that are proper to God are said of Him by reason of His divine nature, and those things that would seem to savour of imperfection are said of Him by reason of His human nature, as we shall more fully explain further on.[1] For the present, in the matter of the divine generation, let it suffice that we have shown that, according to the Scriptures, Christ is called the Son of God, and God, not only as a mere man by the grace of adoption, but also on account of His divine nature.

[1] Ch. xxvii. *seqq.*

CHAPTER V

THE OPINION OF SABELLIUS CONCERNING THE SON OF GOD : AND ITS REFUTATION

For as much as all who have a right conception of God are firmly persuaded that there can be but one who is God by nature, some, gathering from the Scriptures that Christ is truly and naturally God and the Son of God, confessed indeed that Christ the Son of God and God the Father are one God; yet that God is not called *Son* by nature or from eternity, but assumed the appellation of Son from the moment that He was born of the Virgin Mary in the mystery of the Incarnation : so that whatever Christ underwent in the flesh was ascribed by them to the Father; for instance, that He was the son of a virgin, conceived by and born of her, that He suffered, died, and rose again, and whatever else Scripture relates of Him in the flesh.

They endeavoured to confirm this contention by the authority of Scripture. For it is said (Deut. vi. 4): *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord:* and (Deut. xxxii. 39): *See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me:* and (Jo. xiv. 9-11): *He that seeth me seeth the Father also . . . the Father who abideth in me, he doth the works. . . . I am in the Father, and the Father in me.* From all these texts they imagined that God the Father Himself is called the Son, after being born of the Virgin.

This was the opinion of the Sabellians, who were also styled Patripassionists, because they contended that the Father suffered, and believed that Christ was the Father Himself.

Now, though this opinion differs from the former in the matter of Christ's Godhead (since the latter confesses that Christ was God in truth and nature, whereas the former denied this), nevertheless as to the question of generation and sonship both opinions agree. Because, just as the former opinion asserts that the sonship and generation, whereby Christ is called Son, did not precede Mary, so

also does the latter. Consequently neither opinion refers generation and sonship to the divine nature, but only to the human. The latter opinion has this also peculiar to it that it asserts that when we speak of the Son of God we do not indicate a subsistent person, but a property adventitious to a pre-existing person: since the Father assumed the appellation of Son by reason of His having taken flesh from the Virgin, not as though the Son were a subsistent person distinct from the Father. The falseness of this position can be clearly proved by the authority of Scripture.

For the Scriptures call Christ not only the son of the Virgin, but also the Son of God, as we have shown above.[1] But it is impossible for a person to be his own son: for, since the son is begotten of his father, and the begetter gives being to the begotten, it would follow that the giver of being would be identified with the receiver, and this is quite impossible. Therefore God the Father is not the Son, but the Father and Son are distinct.

Again. The Lord said (Jo. vi. 38): *I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me:* and (Jo. xvii. 5): *Glorify me thou, O Father, with thyself.* From these and like passages it is clear that the Son is other than the Father.

It might be said, however, according to this opinion, that Christ is called the Son of God the Father in respect only of His human nature, because, to wit, God the Father created and sanctified the human nature that Christ assumed. Accordingly as God He is Father of Himself as man: wherefore there is nothing to prevent the same one as man being distinct from Himself as God.

But, in that case, it would follow that Christ is styled the Son of God even as other men, by reason either of creation or of sanctification. But we have shown that Christ is not called the Son of God for the same reason as other holy men. Therefore it cannot be understood in the aforesaid manner that the Father is Christ and His own Son.

Further. Where there is one subsistent supposit plural

[1] Ch. iv.

predication is inadmissible. Yet Christ spoke of Himself and the Father in the plural, when He said (Jo. x. 30): *I and the Father are one.* Therefore the Son is not the Father.

Again. If the Son is not distinct from the Father, except through the mystery of the Incarnation, before the Incarnation they were not distinct at all. Yet we find from Scripture that the Son was distinct from the Father even before the Incarnation. For it is said (Jo. i. 1): *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.* Hence the Word that was with God was in some way distinct from Him: for we are wont to speak of one person as being with another. The Begotten of God says (Prov. viii. 30): *I was with him forming all things,* and this implies some kind of fellowship and distinction. It is also said (Osee i. 7): *I will have mercy on the house of Juda, and I will save them by the Lord their God,* where God the Father speaks of the people to be saved by God the Son, as by a person distinct from Himself and worthy of the name of God. It is also said (Gen. i. 26): *Let us make man to our image and likeness,* where the plurality and distinction of man's makers are expressly indicated; and Scripture teaches that man was created by God alone. Consequently God the Father and God the Son were two distinct Persons even before Christ became man. Therefore the Father is not called the Son by reason of the mystery of the Incarnation.

Moreover. True sonship refers to the supposit which is called son: for the hand and foot are not properly called sons, but the man whose parts they are. Now the terms paternity and sonship denote distinction in those of whom they are said, even as begetter and begotten. Hence if one is really a son, he must be a distinct person from his father. Now, Christ is truly the Son of God, for it is said (1 Jo. v. 20): *That we may be in his true Son,* Jesus Christ. Consequently Christ must be a supposit distinct from the Father; and therefore the Father is not the Son.

Besides. After the mystery of the Incarnation the Father

bore witness to the Son (Matth. iii. 17): *This is my . . . Son.* Now in pointing Him out thus He referred to the supposit. Therefore Christ is a distinct supposit from the Father.

The arguments whereby Sabellius endeavoured to establish his position do not prove his contention, as we shall show more fully further on.[1] For the fact that God is one, or that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, does not prove that the Father and Son are one supposit: because two things that are distinct supposits may be one in some respect.

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING THE OPINION OF ARIUS ABOUT THE SON OF GOD

WHILE it is inadmissible according to sacred doctrine that the Son of God should have had His origin in Mary, as Photinus said, or that He who was God and Father from eternity should begin to be the Son by taking flesh, as Sabellius contended, there were others who accepted the teaching of Scripture, that the Son of God existed before the mystery of the Incarnation, and even before the creation of the world. And since this Son is distinct from God the Father, they deemed Him not to be of the same nature as God the Father: for they were unable to understand, and unwilling to believe, that any two, distinct in personality, should have one essence and nature. And seeing that, according to the teaching of faith, the nature of God the Father is alone believed to be eternal, they thought that the nature of the Son did not exist from eternity, though He was the Son before other creatures. And since whatever is not eternal is made out of nothing and created by God, they taught that the Son of God was made out of nothing, and a creature.

[1] Ch. ix.

Since, however, they were forced by the authority of Scripture to acknowledge the Son as God, as we have observed above, they said that He was one with God the Father, not indeed by nature, but by a certain unity of mind, and by a participation of the divine likeness surpassing that of other creatures. Wherefore seeing that in the Scriptures the highest creatures, which we call angels, are styled gods and sons of God—for instance (Job xxxviii. 4, 7): *Where wast thou . . . when the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody?* and (Ps. lxxxi. 1): *God hath stood in the congregation of gods,*—it follows that He must be styled God and Son of God, above the others, as being of higher rank than other creatures; so much so that God the Father created all other creatures through Him. They strove to confirm this opinion by the teaching of Holy Writ. For addressing the Father the Son says (Jo. xvii. 3): *This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God.* Therefore the Father is the only true God: so that as the Son is not the Father He cannot be true God.

Again. The Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 14-16): *Keep the commandment without spot, blameless, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Which, in his times, he shall show who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords. Who only hath immortality, and inhabiteth light inaccessible.* In these words we find indicated the distinction between God the Father represented as showing and Christ represented as shown. Therefore God the Father alone, represented as showing, is Mighty, King of kings and Lord of lords, He alone hath immortality and inhabiteth light inaccessible. Therefore only the Father is true God and consequently the Son is not.

Further. The Lord said (Jo. xiv. 28): *The Father is greater than I;* and the Apostle said that the Son is subject to the Father (1 Cor. xv. 28): *When all things shall be subdued unto him, then the Son also himself shall be subject unto him,* namely the Father, *that put all things under him.* If however the nature of the Father and the

Son were one, there would also be one greatness and one majesty; for the Son would not be less than, nor subject to, the Father. In their opinion then it follows from the Scriptures that the Son is not of the same nature with the Father.

Again. The nature of the Father cannot be subject to want. But want is found in the Son; for Scripture declares that He receives from the Father; and to receive is a sign of want. Thus, it is written (Matth. xi. 27): *All things are delivered to me by my Father,* and (Jo. iii. 35): *The Father loveth the Son: and he hath given all things into his hand.* Therefore seemingly the Son is not of the same nature as the Father.

Moreover. To be taught and to be helped are signs of need. Now, the Son is taught and helped by the Father. For it is said (Jo. v. 19, 20): *The Son cannot do anything of himself, but what he seeth the Father doing,* and so *the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things which himself doth.* Again, the Son said to the disciples (Jo. xv. 15): *All things, whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you.* It would seem, therefore, that the Son is not of the same nature as the Father.

Further. To receive a commandment, to obey, to pray, and to be sent are, apparently, signs of subjection. Now, these things are related of the Son. For the Son says (Jo. xiv. 31): *As the Father hath given me commandment, so do I;* and it is said (Philip. ii. 8): *Being made obedient* (to the Father) *unto death:* and (Jo. xiv. 16): *I will ask the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete.* Again, the Apostle says (Gal. iv. 4): *When the fulness of the time was come, God sent his Son.* Therefore the Son is less than the Father and subject to Him.

Again. The Son is glorified by the Father, as He Himself declares (Jo. xii. 28): *Father, glorify my name;* and the text goes on: *A voice . . . came from heaven: I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again.* Also the Apostle says that *God raised Jesus Christ from the dead* (Rom. viii. 11), and Peter declared that He was *exalted by the*

right hand of God (Acts ii. 33). From these texts it would seem to follow that He is less than the Father.

Moreover. There can be no defect in the nature of the Father. But in the Son we find a lack of power; for He says (Matth. xx. 23): *But to sit at my right or left hand is not mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is prepared by my Father.* Also a lack of knowledge: for He says (Mark xiii. 32): *But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father.* We also find in Him a lack of mental composure, since Scripture asserts that He was affected by sorrow, anger, and like passions. Therefore seemingly the Son is not of the same nature as the Father.

Again. It is expressly stated in Scripture that the Son of God is a creature: for it is said (Ecclus. xxiv. 12): *The Creator of all things . . . said to me: and he that made me rested in my tabernacle:* and again (verse 14): *From the beginning and before the world was I created.* Therefore the Son is a creature.

Further. The Son is numbered among creatures, for it is said in the person of Wisdom (Ecclus. xxiv. 5): *I came out of the mouth of the most High, the first-born before all creatures.* Also, the Apostle says that the Son is the *First-Born of all creatures* (Coloss. i. 15). It would seem then that the Son is of the same order as creatures, being placed in the first rank among them.

Moreover. The Son said, when He prayed to the Father for His disciples (Jo. xvii. 22): *The glory which thou hast given to me I have given to them: that they may be one as we also are one.* Hence He wished His disciples to be one, even as the Father and Son are one. Now, He did not wish His disciples to be one in essence. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one in essence: and thus the Son is a creature and subject to the Father.

This is the opinion of Arius and Eunomius; and apparently it arose from the statements of the Platonists, who said that the supreme God is the Father and Creator of all, and that from Him first of all there emanated

a Mind containing the forms of all things, and transcending all: and this mind they called the Paternal Intelligence. Below this they placed the World-Soul, and beneath this other creatures. Accordingly, they referred to this Mind whatever is said in the Scriptures concerning God the Son, especially because Holy Writ calls the Son of God by the names of Wisdom and Word of God. The opinion of *Avicenna* is in agreement with this view; for above the Soul of the first heaven he placed the First Intelligence that moves the first heaven, and higher still above all he placed God. Hence the Arians supposed the Son of God to be a creature transcending all other creatures, and that by His means God created all things. This was especially in keeping with the opinion of certain philosophers who held that things proceeded from the first principle in a certain order, so that by the first creature all other things were created.

CHAPTER VII

REFUTATION OF THE OPINION OF ARIUS

One has only to study carefully the statements of Holy Writ to perceive that this opinion is clearly in opposition to the divine Scriptures. For Holy Scripture gives the name of son of God to Christ in one sense, and to the angels in another. Wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. i. 5): *To which of the angels hath he said at any time: Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee?* affirming that this was said of Christ. But according to the aforesaid opinion the angels would be called sons of God in the same sense as Christ: since the same appellation of sonship would apply to both in respect of the sublime nature wherein they were created by God. Nor does it matter if Christ were of a more exalted nature than the angels, since even among the angels there are various orders, as we have shown above;[1] and yet the same degree of son-

[1] Bk. III., ch. lxxix.

ship applies to all. Therefore Christ is not said to be the Son of God in the sense laid down by the aforesaid opinion.

Again. Since, by reason of creation, the appellation of divine sonship applies to many, for it applies to all the angels and saints, it follows that if Christ were called Son for the same reason, He would not be the Only-Begotten, although, on account of the sublimity of His nature, He might be called the First-Born among the others. But Scripture states that He is the Only-Begotten (Jo. i. 14): *We have seen his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-Begotten of the Father.* Therefore He is not called the Son of God by reason of creation.

Further. The name son is aptly and truly given to one born of living beings, among whom the thing begotten proceeds from the begetter: in other cases, the appellation of sonship is applied not literally, but metaphorically, as when disciples or wards are called sons. Hence, if Christ were called Son merely by reason of creation, since what is created by God does not emanate from His substance, Christ would not truly be called Son. But He is called truly Son (1 Jo. v. 20): *That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ.* Therefore He is called Son of God, not as though He were created by God with however sublime a nature, but as begotten of God's substance.

Moreover. If Christ be called the Son by reason of creation, He is not true God, because no creature can be called God, save by reason of a certain likeness to God. Now Jesus Christ is true God. For John, after saying (1 Jo. v. 20): *That we may be in his true Son,* adds: *This is the true God and life eternal.* Therefore Christ is not called the Son of God by reason of creation.

Further. The Apostle says (Rom. ix. 5): *Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever, Amen,* and (Tit. ii. 13): *Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ.* Moreover it is said (Jerem. xxiii. 5, 6): *I will raise up to David a just branch,* and

immediately afterwards: *And this is the name they shall call him: The Lord, our just one;* where the Hebrew has the tetragrammaton, the name that is certainly applied to God alone. Wherefore it is clear that the Son of God is truly God.

Moreover. If Christ is the true Son, it follows of necessity that He is true God: because he who is born of another cannot truly be called his son, even if begotten of the latter's substance, unless he issue from him in likeness of species: for the son of a man must needs be a man. Accordingly, if Christ be the true Son of God, He must needs be true God: therefore He is not a creature.

Again. No creature receives the whole fulness of divine goodness, because, as we have already made clear, perfections come from God to creatures by a kind of descent. Now, in Christ is the whole fulness of divine goodness: for the Apostle says (Coloss. ii. 9): *In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead.* Therefore Christ is not a creature.

Besides. Although an angel's intelligence has more perfect knowledge than a man's, it is far below the divine. Now, Christ's intelligence is not inferior to the divine: for the Apostle says (Coloss. ii. 3) that in Christ *are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.* Therefore Christ, the Son of God, is not a creature.

Moreover. As we have proved above,[1] whatever God has in Himself is His essence. Now, the Son has whatever the Father has: for the Son said (Jo. xvi. 15): *All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine:* and addressing the Father (Jo. xvii. 10): *All my things are thine, and thine are mine.* Therefore Father and Son have the same essence and nature: and consequently the Son is not a creature.

Further. The Apostle says (Philip. ii. 6, 7) that the Son was *in the form of God,* before *He emptied Himself.* Now the *form of God* can have no other meaning but the nature of God, even as the *form of a servant* means the nature of man. Therefore the Son is of divine nature, and consequently He is not a creature.

[1] Bk. I., Chs. xxi., xxii.

Again. Nothing created can be equal to God. Now, the Son is equal to the Father, for it is said (Jo. v. 18): *The Jews sought to kill him, because he did not only break the sabbath, but also said God was his father, making himself equal to God.* Thus the evangelist, whose testimony is true, tells us that Christ said He was the Son of God, and equal to God, and that for this reason the Jews persecuted Him. Nor can any Christian doubt that what Christ said of Himself was true, since also the Apostle declares that it was not robbery that He deemed Himself equal to God (Philip. ii. 6). Hence the Son is equal to the Father, and therefore He is not a creature.

Moreover. We read that there is none like to God, not even among the angels, who are called the sons of God: *Who,* says the Psalmist (Ps. lxxxviii. 7) *among the sons of God shall be like to God?* and (Ps. lxxxii. 2): *O God, who shall be like to thee?* Now this must be taken as referring to perfect likeness, as is proved from what has been said in the First Book.[1] But Christ declares His perfect likeness to the Father, even as living, for He said (Jo. v. 26): *As the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son also to have life in himself.* Therefore Christ must not be reckoned among the created sons of God.

Further. No created substance resembles God in His essence: for any perfection found in any creature whatsoever is less than what God is: so that it is impossible to know through any creature what God is. Now, the Son resembles the Father: for the Apostle says (Coloss. i. 15) that He is *the image of the invisible God.* And lest we should think this to mean an imperfect image, that does not reflect the essence of God, so that it would not be possible to know by it what God is—as when a man is said to be God's image (1 Cor. xi. 7)—the Apostle shows that He is a perfect image reflecting the very substance of God when he says (Heb. i. 3): *Being the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance.* Therefore the Son of God is not a creature.

[1] Ch. xxix.

Again. Nothing contained in a genus is the universal cause of the things contained in that genus; thus, the universal cause of mankind is not a man, because nothing is its own cause; whereas the sun, which is outside the human genus, is the universal cause of human generation, and still more so is God.

Now, the Son is the universal cause of creatures: for it is said (Jo. i. 8): *All things were made by him;* and Begotten Wisdom says (Prov. viii. 30): *I was with him forming all things:* and the Apostle says (Coloss. i. 16): *In him were created all things in heaven, and on earth.* Therefore He is not of the genus of creatures.

Besides. From what has been proved in the Second Book,[1] it is clear that the incorporeal substances called angels cannot be formed otherwise than by creation: and it has also been proved that no substance but God can create.[2] Now Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is the cause of the angels, by giving them their being: for the Apostle says (Coloss. i. 16): *Whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers. All things were created by him and in him.* Therefore the Son is not a creature.

Further. Since the action of a thing is consequent to its nature, the proper action of A cannot be assigned to B, if the nature of A is not proper to B: thus a thing that has not human nature, cannot produce a human action. Now, actions proper to God are also proper to the Son, such as to create, as we have already proved, to uphold and conserve all things in being, and to wash away sins. And these things are proper to God, as we have shown above. Now, it is said of the Son (Coloss. i. 17) that *by him all things consist,* and (Heb. i. 3): *Upholding all things by the word of his power, making purgation of sins.* Therefore the Son of God is by nature divine, and not a creature. An Arian indeed might say that the Son does these things, not as the principal agent, but as the latter's instrument, and that He acts, not by His own power, but only by that of the principal agent; but this view is precluded by the

[1] Ch. lxxxvii. [2] Bk. II., ch. xxi.

words of our Lord (Jo. v. 19): *What things soever he doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.* Thus even as the Father works of Himself and by His own power, so too does the Son.

We may further conclude from this that Father and Son have the same might and power. For not only does He say that the Son works in like manner as the Father, but that He does the same things in like manner. Now, if the same work proceed from two agents in like manner, this can happen either when they have dissimilar parts in the action—thus the same work proceeds from the principal agent and the instrument—or when they have similar shares in the action, and then they must combine together in one power: and this power sometimes results from the combined forces of the various agents at work, as when many hands row a boat; for all row alike, and while each one is not strong enough to produce the required result, their combined strength suffices to urge the boat forward. But this cannot be said of the Father and the Son, for the Father's power is not imperfect but infinite, as we have proved.[1] Therefore the power of Father and Son must be identical. And, since power is consequent to nature, it follows that nature and essence must be identical in Father and Son.

This follows also from what we have said above. For if the Son is divine in nature, as we have proved in many ways, since the divine nature cannot be manifold, as we proved above,[2] it follows of necessity that the nature and essence of Father and Son are numerically the same.

Again. Our ultimate happiness is in God alone, who must be the sole object of our hope and worship.[3] Now our happiness is in God the Son: for He said (Jo. xvii. 3): *This is eternal life: That they may know thee,* namely the Father, *and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.* It is also said (1 Jo. v. 20) of the Son, that He is *true God and life eternal.* And it is certain that by eternal life Holy Writ means final beatitude: for Isaias, quoted by the Apostle

[1] Bk. I., ch. xliii. [2] Bk. I., ch. xlii. [3] Bk. III., ch. cxx.

(Rom. xv. 12), says: *There shall be a root of Jesse, and he that shall rise up to rule the Gentiles: in him the Gentiles shall hope.* Again, it is said (Ps. lxxi. 11): *All kings of the earth shall adore him: all nations shall serve him;* and (Jo. v. 23): *That all men may honour the Son, as they honour the Father;* and (Ps. xcvi. 7): *Adore him, all you his angels,* which words the Apostle applies to the Son (Heb. i. 6). Therefore it is evident that the Son of God is true God.

Moreover this same conclusion follows from the arguments adduced above to prove against Photinus, that Christ is God, not by creation but in very truth.

Accordingly the Catholic Church, taught by the foregoing and like texts of Holy Writ, confesses that Christ is in truth and by nature the Son of God, co-eternal with and equal to the Father, true God having the same essence and nature with the Father, born, neither created nor made. Hence it is clear that the Catholic faith alone confesses true generation in God, since it refers the generation of the Son to the Son's receiving His divine nature from the Father. On the other hand, heretics refer this generation to some extraneous nature; Photinus and Sabellius referring it to the human nature, while Arius refers it not to the human nature, but to a created nature, of higher rank than other creatures. Arius differs also from Sabellius and Photinus, in that he asserts this generation to have been anterior to the world, while the latter deny that it was before the Virgin-Birth. Sabellius differs too from Photinus, in that he confesses Christ to be God in truth and by nature, while this is denied by Photinus and Arius, the former holding Christ to be a mere man, while the latter contends that He was a most excellent creature combining together the divine and human natures in a kind of fusion. These allow a distinction of person between Father and Son, whereas Sabellius denies it. Accordingly the Catholic faith, taking the middle way, confesses with Arius and Photinus, and against Sabellius, that Father and Son are distinct Persons, and that the Son is

begotten, but the Father unbegotten: and with Sabellius, but against Photinus and Arius, that Christ is God in truth and by nature, and of the same nature with the Father, yet distinct from Him in person. Even from such things may we gather the Catholic truth: since, as Aristotle says, even error bears witness to truth: and error is at variance, not only with truth, but also with itself.

CHAPTER VIII

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED BY ARIUS IN SUPPORT OF HIS VIEW

SINCE then truth cannot be opposed to truth, it is evident that the texts of the Written Truth which the Arians quote in support of their error cannot be in agreement with their opinion. For, as we have shown from the divine Scriptures, that Father and Son have but one identical divine essence and nature, in respect of which each of them is true God, it follows that Father and Son are not two Gods, but only one God. Because, if they were two Gods, it would follow that the divine essence is shared between them, just as in two men there are two numerically distinct human natures: especially seeing that the divine nature and God are not distinct, as we have proved above:[1] whence it follows of necessity, since there is one divine nature in Father and Son, that Father and Son are one God. Accordingly, though we confess both the Father to be God, and the Son to be God, we do not abandon the position that there is but one God, which we proved in the First Book,[2] by both reason and authority. Therefore, although there is but one God, we confess that this may be predicated of both Father and Son.

When, then, our Lord, addressing the Father, said (Jo. xvii. 3): *That they may know thee, the only true God*, we must not gather that the Father alone is true God, as

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxi. [2] Ch. xlii.

though the Son were not true God—because the authority of Scripture clearly proves that the Son is true God—but that the one only true Godhead belongs to the Father, yet in such a way that it belongs also to the Son. Wherefore our Lord said significantly: *That they may know thee, the only true God,* not as though (the Father) were the only God; but: *That they may know thee,* and then added, *the only true God,* to show that the Father, whose Son He declared Himself to be, is God, because in Him is the only true Godhead. And since the true Son must needs have the same nature with the Father, it follows that the only true Godhead belongs to the Son, rather than that it should be excluded from Him. Hence John, as though expounding these words of our Lord, ascribes to the true Son both of these things which our Lord here ascribes to the Father, namely, that He is true God, and that in Him is eternal life (1 Jo. v. 20): *That we may know the true God, and may be in his true Son. This is the true God and eternal life.* Even though the Son had confessed that the Father alone was true God, He must not for that reason be understood to exclude Himself from the Godhead: because, as Father and Son are one God, as we have proved, whatever is predicated of the Father, by reason of His Godhead, amounts to the same as though it were said of the Son, and vice versa. For when our Lord said (Matth. xi. 27): *No one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son,* we are not to conclude that knowledge of Himself is denied to either the Father or the Son.

Whence it is evident that true Godhead is not excluded from the Son by the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. vi. 15): *Which in his time he shall shew, who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords.* For the Father is not named in these words, but only something common to Father and Son. For it is explicitly stated that the Son also is King of kings and Lord of lords (Apoc. xix. 13), where it is said: *He was clothed with a garment sprinkled with blood, and his name is called The Word of*

God, and afterwards (verse 16): *And he hath on his garment, and on his thigh written: King of kings and Lord of lords.* Nor is the Son excluded by the words that follow: *Who alone hath immortality* (1 Tim. vi. 16), since He clothes with immortality them that believe in Him, hence it is said (Jo. xi. 26): *He that . . . believeth in me shall not die for ever.* It is also certain that the subsequent words also may apply to the Son: *Whom no man hath seen, nor can see* (1 Tim. vi. 16), because our Lord said (Matth. xi. 27): *No one knoweth the Son but the Father.* Nor would it avail to object that He appeared visibly, for this happened in the flesh: since He is invisible as to His Godhead, even as the Father: wherefore the Apostle says in the same epistle (iii. 16): *Evidently great is the mystery of godliness, which was manifested in the flesh.* Nor does it affect the issue to say that the above text refers to the Father only, because the text implies a distinction between the one who shows and the one shown, since the Son also shows Himself, for He says (Jo. xiv. 21): *He that loveth me, shall be loved of my Father; and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him:* wherefore we say to Him (Ps. lxxix. 20): *Show thy face, and we shall be saved.* As to our Lord's words (Jo. xiv. 28), *The Father is greater than I,* the Apostle teaches how they should be understood. For seeing that a comparison is made between greater and less, the words must be understood of the Son in respect of His abasement. The Apostle, however, ascribes this abasement to His assuming the form of a servant, yet so that He is equal to the Father in respect of the form of God. For he says (Philip. ii. 6, 7): *Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God: but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant.* Nor must we wonder that, for this reason, He is called less than the Father, seeing that the Apostle declares Him to have been made lower than the angels: *We see,* he writes, *Jesus who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour* (Heb. ii. 9).

Hence too it is evident, that the Son is stated to be

subject to the Father in the same sense, namely in respect of His human nature: this is clear from the context. For the Apostle had said before (1 Cor. xv. 21): *By a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead:* and afterwards (verses 23, 24) he had added that *everyone* shall rise *in his own order,* first of all Christ, and *then they that are of Christ,* and then: *Afterwards the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father.* Then, having declared the nature of this kingdom, namely that all things must be made subject to Him, he goes on to say (verse 28): *When all things shall be subdued unto him, then the Son also himself shall be subject unto him that put all things under him.* Therefore the context shows that this is to be understood of Christ as man: for as such He died and rose again: because, as God, since He does all that the Father does, as we have shown, He also subdued all things to Himself. Wherefore the Apostle says (Philip. iii. 20, 21): *We look for the Saviour, our Lord Jesus Christ, who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of his glory, according to the operation whereby also he is able to subdue all things to himself.*

The fact that in the Scriptures the Father is said to give to the Son, whence it follows from Scripture that the Son receives from the Father, does not prove that He is in want of anything. In fact this is requisite in order that He be the Son. For He could not be called Son, were He not begotten of the Father, and whatever is begotten receives from the begetter the latter's nature. When therefore, we read that the Son receives from the Father, nothing else is indicated but the Son's generation, whereby the Father gave His nature to the Son. This can be gathered from the thing given, for He says (Jo. x. 29): *That which my Father hath given me, is greater than all.* Now, that which is greater than all is the divine nature, whereby the Son is equal to the Father. This is proved by our Lord's very words. For He had said that no man would be able to pluck His sheep from His hand: and in proof of this He utters the words quoted, namely that what

His father had given Him, is greater than all. And because, as He concludes, no one can wrest from the hand of His Father, it follows that neither can anyone wrest from the hand of the Son: and this would not follow, unless by that which the Father had given Him, He were equal to the Father. Accordingly in order to express this more clearly He says (verse 30): *I and the Father are one.* In like manner the Apostle says (Philip. ii. 9, 10): *And* (God) *hath given him a name which is above all names: that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.* Now, the name that is above all names, and which every creature reveres is none other than the name of the Godhead. Therefore this giving by begetting signifies the begetting itself, whereby the Father gave the Son true Godhead. The same conclusion follows from the statement that all things were given Him by the Father: since all things could not have been given to Him, unless the whole fulness of the Godhead that is in the Father were also in the Son. Accordingly by saying that the Father had given to Him, He declares Himself to be the true Son; and this is against Sabellius: and from the greatness of the thing given, He declares Himself to be equal to the Father; and this is against Arius.

It is clear, then, that this giving is no indication of want in the Son: for the Son was not before He received, since in Him to be begotten and to receive were one and the same: and the fulness of that which was given was incompatible with want in Him who received. Nor can it be objected against what we have said, that Scripture asserts the Son to have received from the Father in course of time. Thus our Lord after His resurrection, said to His disciples (Matth. xxviii. 18): *All power is given to me in heaven and in earth:* and the Apostle says (Philip. ii. 8, 9) that for this cause *God hath exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above all names,* because He became *obedient unto death:* as though He had not this name from eternity. For Scripture is wont to describe

things as being or made, when they come to our knowledge. Now, that the Son received from eternity universal power and the divine name, was made known to the world by the preaching of the disciples. This is shown by the words of God Himself, for our Lord said (Jo. xvii. 5): *Glorify thou me, O Father, with thyself, with the glory which I had before the world was:* for He asks that His glory, which from eternity, as God, He received from the Father, should be manifested in Him now that He was made man.

Hence it is clear how the Son is taught, whereas He is not ignorant. For it has been shown[1] that in God intelligence and being are one and the same. Wherefore communication of divine nature is also communication of intelligence. Now, communication of intelligence may be called showing, speaking, or teaching. Therefore, since by His birth the Son received the divine nature from the Father, we may speak either of Him as hearing from the Father, or of the Father as showing to Him, or employ other like expressions of Scripture: not as though the Son were previously ignorant or nescient, and was afterwards taught by the Father. For the Apostle declares (1 Cor. i. 24) that *Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God:* and it is impossible for wisdom to be ignorant, or power to be weak.

Therefore the words: *The Son cannot do anything of himself* (Jo. v. 19) do not argue weakness of action in the Son: but, as in God to act is the same as to be, and action is identified with essence, as we have proved above,[2] so the Son is said to be unable to act of Himself, but to act with the Father, even as He cannot be of Himself, but only of the Father. For were He of Himself, He would not be the Son. Accordingly, even as it is impossible for the Son not to be the Son, so is it impossible that He act of Himself. But since the Son receives the same nature as that which the Father has, and consequently the same power, although the Son is not of Himself (*a se*) nor works

[1] Bk. I., ch. xlv. [2] *Ibid.*

of Himself, yet He is by Himself (*per se*) and works by Himself: because, even as He is by His own nature which He received from the Father, so does He work by His proper nature received from the Father. Wherefore after our Lord had said: *The Son cannot do anything of himself,* in order to show that although the Son works not of Himself, yet does He work by Himself, He added: *What things soever he doth*—namely, the Father—*these the Son also doth in like manner.*

From the foregoing it is also clear in what sense the Father commands the Son, and the Son obeys the Father, or prays to the Father, or is sent by the Father. For all these things are ascribed to the Son as subject to the Father, and this is only in respect of the human nature which He had assumed, as we have shown. Wherefore the Father commands the Son as subject to Him in His human nature. The very words of our Lord declare this. For when He said (Jo. xiv. 31), *That the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given me commandment, so do I,* what this commandment was is indicated by the words that follow, *Arise, let us go hence.* For He said this when He was going to His Passion: and it is clear that the command to suffer applied to the Son in respect only of His human nature. Likewise, when He said (Jo. xv. 10), *If you keep my commandments you shall abide in my love; as I also have kept my Father's commandments, and do abide in his love,* it is clear that these commandments regarded the Son, in so far as He was, as man, beloved of His Father; just as He loved His disciples as men. The Apostle shows that the Father's commandments to the Son are to be referred to the human nature assumed by the Son, when he teaches that the Son was obedient to the Father in things appertaining to human nature. For he says (Philip. ii. 8) that he became *obedient* to the Father, *unto death.* The Apostle also shows that prayer becomes the Son in respect of His human nature, for he says (Heb. v. 7) that *in the days of his flesh with a strong cry and tears, offering up prayers and supplica-*

tions to him, that was able to save him from death, (He) *was heard for his reverence.* The Apostle shows in what respect He is said to be sent by the Father, when he says (Gal. iv. 4): *God sent his Son, made of a woman:* wherefore He is said to be sent by reason of His being made of a woman: and it is certain that this applies to Him in respect of the flesh which He assumed.

It is therefore clear that none of these texts proves that the Son was subject to the Father, except as regards His human nature.

We must however observe that the Son as God is also said to be sent by the Father invisibly, without prejudice to His equality with the Father. We shall prove this farther on, when we treat of the mission of the Holy Ghost. It is likewise clear that from the Son being glorified, raised up, or exalted by the Father, we cannot argue that the Son is less than the Father, save in respect of His human nature. For the Son needs not to be glorified as receiving glory anew, since He declares that He had it from the beginning of the world: but it was fitting that His glory, which was concealed beneath the weakness of His flesh, should be made manifest, through the glorification of His body and the working of miracles, in the faith of believers. Wherefore it is said of this concealment (Isa. liii. 3): *His look was, as it were, hidden and despised; whereupon we esteemed him not.* In like manner Christ was raised from the dead, in as much as He suffered and died, that is, according to the flesh; for it is said (1 Pet. iv. 1): *Christ having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought.* And it behoved Him to be exalted for as much as He was humbled: for the Apostle says (Philip. ii. 8, 9): *He humbled himself, being made obedient unto death . . . for which cause God also hath exalted him.*

Accordingly, by the fact that the Father glorifies, raises up, and exalts the Son, the Son is not proved to be less than the Father, except in His human nature: because, in His divine nature whereby He is equal with the Father, there is but one power, and one operation of both Father

and Son. Wherefore the Son by His own power not only exalts Himself, according to the words of the Psalmist (Ps. xx. 14): *Be thou exalted, O Lord, in thy own strength;* but also raises Himself from the dead, as stated in His own words (Jo. x. 18): *I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it up again.* Moreover He glorifies not only Himself, but also the Father, for He says (Jo. xvii. 1): *Glorify thy Son, that thy Son may glorify thee;* not that the Father is concealed under the veil of assumed flesh, but by the invisibility of His nature. In this way the Son also is concealed in respect of His divine nature: since the words of Isaias (xlv. 15), *Verily thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour,* apply to Father and Son in common. And the Son glorifies the Father, not by bestowing glory on Him, but by manifesting Him to the world: for He says (Jo. xvii. 6): *I have manifested thy name to men.*

We must not believe that there is any lack of power in the Son of God, since He says (Matth. xxviii. 18): *All power is given to me in heaven and in earth.* Hence His words (Matth. xx. 23): *To sit on my right hand, is not mine to give you, but to them for whom it is prepared by my Father,* do not prove that the Son has not the power of distributing the heavenly seats, since these seats signify the participation in eternal life, the bestowal of which He declares to belong to Him, when He says (Jo. x. 27, 28): *My sheep hear my voice: and I know them, and they follow me; and I give them life everlasting.* It is also said (Jo. v. 22) that *the Father . . . hath given all judgement to the Son:* and it is a part of judgement to bestow eternal life on certain persons for their merits. Wherefore it is said (Matth. xxv. 33) that the Son of Man *shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on his left.* Therefore it is in the power of the Son to set a man either on His right or on His left, whether both be referred to different participations of glory, or one to glory and the other to punishment. Accordingly the passage quoted must be interpreted according to the foregoing. For we are told in the first place

(Matth. xx. 20 *seqq.*) that the mother of the sons of Zebedee came to Jesus, begging of Him that one of her sons might sit at His right hand, and the other at His left: and she seems to have been urged to make this request through relying on her blood relationship with the man Christ. Accordingly our Lord by His answer denied, not that He had the power to give what was asked, but that it was His to give to them for whom the request was made. For He did not say: "To sit on My right or left hand is not mine to give to any man"; rather does He declare that it was His to give to them for whom it was prepared by His Father. For this belonged to Him, not as the son of the Virgin, but as the Son of God. Consequently, to give to this or that one was not in His power on account of His relationship as son of the Virgin; whereas it was His to give to them for whom it was prepared by His Father in eternal predestination; because He was the Son of God.

Moreover our Lord Himself declares that even this preparation is in the power of the Son of God, when He says (Jo. xiv. 2): *In my Father's house there are many mansions; if not, I would have told you, that I go to prepare a place for you.* Now, these many mansions are the various degrees of participation in heavenly bliss, which God has prepared in His eternal predestination. When then our Lord says: *If not*—that is, if there were not sufficient mansions prepared for those who were to be taken up into heaven—and adds: *I would have told you that I go to prepare a place for you,* He shows that this preparation lies in His power.

Nor can it be admitted that the Son knew not the day of His coming, seeing that *in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,* as the Apostle says (Coloss. ii. 3), and that He knows perfectly something greater, namely the Father. But this means that the Son, as a man living among men, conducted Himself as an ignorant man, by not revealing the matter to His disciples. For Scripture is wont to describe God as knowing something, when He makes others know it, for instance (Gen. xxii. 12): *Now*

I know that thou fearest God; that is, "I have caused thee to know": and thus contrariwise, the Son is said not to know that which He does not make us know.

As to sorrow, fear, and the like, it is clear that such things were in Christ as man: so that they argue no depreciation in the Son's Godhead.

When wisdom is described as created, in the first place this may refer, not to that Wisdom which is the Son of God, but to the wisdom which God has bestowed on creatures. For it is said (Ecclus. i. 9, 10): *He created her* —namely, wisdom—*in the Holy Ghost . . . and he poured her out upon all his works.* It may also refer to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense would be: *From the beginning and before the world, was I created;* that is, *I was predestined to be united to a creature* (*ibid.* xxiv. 14). Or again wisdom is said to be both created and begotten, so as to insinuate the manner of divine generation. Because, when a thing is begotten, it receives the nature of its begetter, and this savours of perfection: whereas when a thing is generated here below, the begetter itself is changed, and this savours of imperfection: while in creation, the Creator undergoes no change, but the creature does not receive the nature of the Creator. Accordingly, the Son is said to be both created and begotten, so that from creation we gather the unchangeableness of the Father, and from generation the identity of nature in Father and Son. Thus did the Council expound Scripture, as may be gathered from the works of Hilary.[1]

When the Son is said to be the First-Born of creatures, this does not imply that the Son is to be reckoned among creatures, but that the Son proceeds from the Father, and receives from the Father from whom creatures proceed and receive. The Son however receives identity of nature, whereas creatures do not: wherefore the Son is called not only the *First-Born,* but also the *Only Begotten,* on account of the singular mode of that reception.

The words of our Lord to His Father in reference to His

[1] Hilary, *De Synodis.*

disciples, *That they may be one, as we also are one* (Jo. xvii. 22), prove that Father and Son are one in the same way as it behoves the disciples to be one, namely, by love. But this manner of union does not exclude unity of nature, rather does it prove it. For it is said (Jo. iii. 35): *The Father loveth the Son: and he hath given all things into his hand:* and this shows that the fulness of the Godhead is in the Son, as we have already stated. Hence it is clear that the authority of Scripture invoked by the Arians in support of their view is in no way opposed to the truth as declared by the Catholic Faith.

CHAPTER IX

EXPLANATION OF THE TEXTS QUOTED BY PHOTINUS AND SABELLIUS

In sequence to the foregoing animadversions it is clear that the texts also of Holy Scripture quoted by Photinus and Sabellius fail to support their errors.

For our Lord's words after His resurrection, *All power is given to me in heaven and in earth* (Matth. xxviii. 18), do not imply that He received this power then for the first time, but that the power which the Son of God had received from eternity began to be manifested in Him after He had become man, through His victory over death in His resurrection.

When the Apostle says in reference to the Son (Rom. i. 3), *Who was made to him of the seed of David,* the sense is clear from the words that follow, *according to the flesh.* For he did not say that the Son of God was made absolutely, but that He was made of the seed of David, according to the flesh, by taking human nature: even so it is said (Jo. i. 14): *The Word was made flesh.* Wherefore it is plain that the words that follow (verse 4), *Who was predestinated the Son of God,* refer to the Son in His human nature. Because it was not of human merits, but of the

grace of God predestinating, that human nature was united to the Son of God, so that a man could be called the Son of God.

Likewise when the Apostle (Philip. ii. 8) says that God exalted Christ on account of the merits of His Passion, we must refer this to His human nature, in which was the abasement of His Passion. Consequently the subsequent words, *He gave him a name, which is above all other names,* refer to the fact that the name appropriate to the Son from His eternal birth was to be manifested, in the faith of the multitude, as appropriate to the Son incarnate.

Wherefore again, it is evident that Peter's statement that God made Jesus both Christ and Lord (Acts ii. 36) must be referred to the human nature, wherein Christ began to have in course of time, that which He had from eternity in His divine nature.

Again, the passages invoked by Sabellius in support of the unity of the Godhead (Deut. vi. 4), *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord,* and, *See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me* (*ibid.* xxxii. 39), are not opposed to the view of the Catholic Faith, which declares that Father and Son are not two Gods, but one God, as we have said.

Likewise the words *The Father, who abideth in me, he doth the works,* and, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me* (Jo. xiv. 10), prove not unity of person, as Sabellius pretended, but of essence, which Arius denied. For if Father and Son were one person, it would not be right to say that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, since, properly speaking, a supposit is not said to be in itself, but only by reason of its parts. Because, as the parts are in the whole, and that which is proper to the parts may be ascribed to the whole, sometimes a whole is spoken of as being in itself. But this manner of speaking does not apply to things appertaining to God, in whom there are no parts, as we have proved.[1] Consequently, since the Father is said to be in the Son, and the Son in

[1] Bk. I., ch. xx.

the Father, the Father and Son are not one in person: but it follows that they are one in nature. For this being once granted, it is quite evident how the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father. Because, as the Father is His own essence, since in God there is no distinction between the essence and the one who has the essence, as proved above,[1] it follows that whoever has the essence of the Father, is the Father, and in like manner, that whoever has the essence of the Son, is the Son. Hence, as the essence of the Father is in the Son, and the essence of the Son is in the Father, since both have the same essence, as the Catholic Faith teaches, it clearly follows that the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father. Thus the same text refutes the errors of both Sabellius and Arius.

CHAPTER X

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DIVINE GENERATION AND PROCESSION

Now that we have considered the whole question carefully, we see clearly that Holy Writ requires us to believe that the Father and Son, though distinct in Person, are nevertheless one God, having one essence or nature. Since however, it is far removed from the nature of creatures, that any two things should be distinct supposits and yet have but one essence, human reason, which takes its principles from the properties of creatures, encounters many difficulties in this mystery of the divine generation.

For, seeing that the generation which comes under our observation, is a kind of change, and that corruption is contrary thereto, seemingly there can scarcely be generation in God who is unchangeable, incorruptible, and eternal, as we have proved above.[2]

Again. If generation is a change, then whatever is generated must be changeable. Now, that which is

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxii. [2] Bk. I., Chs. xii., xv.

changed passes from potentiality to act, because movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such. Accordingly, if the Son of God is begotten, seemingly He is not eternal, for He would pass from potentiality to act: neither would He be God, because He would not be pure act, but something with an admixture of potentiality.

Further. That which is begotten receives its nature from the begetter. Therefore, if the Son is begotten of God the Father, it follows that He receives His nature from the Father. But it is impossible that He received from the Father a nature numerically distinct from the Father's, yet specifically the same, as happens in univocal generations, for instance, when man begets man, or fire generates fire. For it has been shown above[1] that there cannot be several Godheads in number. Seemingly also it is impossible that He received a nature numerically the same as the Father's, since if He received a part thereof, it would follow that the divine nature is divisible; and if He received the whole, seemingly it would follow, if the divine nature were wholly transfused into the Son, that it would cease to be in the Father, who in begetting would therefore be corrupted. Nor could it be said that the divine nature overflows from the Father into the Son by way of superabundance, as the spring water flows into the stream, and yet the spring does not run dry, because the divine nature not only cannot be divided but also cannot increase. It would seem to follow therefore, that the Son received from the Father a nature neither numerically nor specifically the same as the Father's, but altogether different in kind: as happens in equivocal generation—for instance, when animals begotten of putrid matter are engendered by the power of the sun, without attaining to the specific nature of the sun. It follows, then, that God's Son is neither His true Son, since He has not His Father's nature, nor true God, since He receives not the divine nature.

Besides. If the Son receives His nature from God the Father, we must distinguish in Him the receiver and the

[1] Bk. I., ch. xlii.; Bk. IV., ch. ix.

nature received: for nothing receives itself. Therefore the Son is not His own essence or nature: and consequently, He is not true God.

Moreover. If the Son of God is not distinct from the divine essence, since the divine essence is subsistent, as we have proved[1] (meanwhile it is clear that the Father is the divine essence), it would seem to follow that Father and Son are identical with the same subsistent thing. Now a person is a subsistent intellectual nature. Therefore, if the Son is the divine nature, it follows that Father and Son are identical in person. On the other hand, if the Son is not the divine essence, He is not true God: for we have proved that God is the divine essence.[2] Seemingly then, either the Son is not true God, as Arius stated, or He is not personally distinct from the Father, as Sabellius asserted.

Again. That which is the principle of individuality in A cannot be in B, if A and B are individually distinct from each other; since what is common to many things cannot be a principle of individuality. Now it is by His own essence that God is individualized: because it is not a form in matter, so that it could be individualized by matter. Consequently there is nothing in God the Father to individualize Him, except His essence. Therefore His essence cannot be in any other supposit. Either then it is not in the Son, and consequently the Son is not true God, as Arius asserts: or the Son is not personally distinct from the Father, and both are the same person, as Sabellius contends.

Further. If Father and Son are two supposits or persons, and nevertheless one in essence, there must be in them, besides the essence, something whereby they are mutually distinct: for the essence is stated to be common to both, and what is common cannot be a principle of distinction. Hence, that whereby Father and Son are distinct must be distinct from the divine essence. Consequently the Person of the Son is composed of two things,

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxii. [2] Bk. I., ch. xxi.

and likewise the Person of the Father, namely, the common essence and a principle of distinction. Both, therefore, are composites, and neither of them is true God.

Someone, however, might say that they are distinguished by sole relation, because one is the Father, and the other, the Son; and that relative predication seemingly implies, not some other thing in the subject, but only a relation; and consequently that we cannot conclude that there is composition in the divine persons. But this reply would seem insufficient to solve the above objection.

For there can be no relation without something absolute: because in every relative term there must be an absolute foundation besides the notion of relativity: thus a servant is something absolute besides his relationship to his master. Accordingly, the relation whereby Father and Son are mutually distinct, must be founded on something absolute. Either then this absolute something is one only, or there are two absolute things. If there is but one, it cannot be the foundation of a twofold relation, unless we except the relation of identity, which cannot cause a distinction: thus A is the same as A. If then the relation be such as to require distinction, we must presuppose a distinction of absolutes. Therefore it would seem impossible for the Persons of Father and Son to be distinguished by relations alone.

Moreover it must be admitted that the relation which distinguishes Father from Son is either real or merely logical. If it be real, it is not, seemingly, to be identified with the divine essence, since this is common to Father and Son. Consequently there will be something in the Son, that is not His essence, and so He will not be truly God; because we have proved[1] that there is nothing in God besides His essence. On the other hand, if this relation be merely logical, it cannot effect a personal distinction between Son and Father, since distinction of persons implies a real distinction.

Again. Every relative depends on its correlative. But

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxiii.

that which depends on another cannot be true God. Consequently, if the Persons of Father and Son are distinguished by their relations, neither will be true God.

Further. If the Father be God, and if the Son be God, it follows that *God* is predicated substantially of Father and Son, since the Godhead cannot be an accident. Now, a substantial predicate is truly that about which it is predicated: because, when I say: *Man is an animal,* the thing that is truly a man is an animal; so, too, when I say: *Socrates is a man,* that which is really Socrates is a man. Hence it would seem to follow that there cannot be plurality of subjects, since there is unity on the part of the substantial predicate: for Socrates and Plato are not one man, though they are one in point of human nature, nor are man and ass one animal, though they are one in animality. Therefore if Father and Son are two Persons, it is seemingly impossible that they be one God.

Moreover. Opposite predicates indicate plurality of the things about which they are predicated. Now, opposites are predicted of God the Father and God the Son; thus the Father is God unbegotten and begetting, whereas the Son is God begotten. Therefore seemingly, it is not possible that Father and Son be one God.

From these and similar arguments certain men, presuming to measure the mysteries of God by their own reasoning, endeavour to impugn the doctrine of divine generation. Since, however, truth is mighty in itself, and is not weakened by any assault, we must proceed to show that the truth of faith cannot be overthrown by reason.

CHAPTER XI

THE MEANING OF GENERATION IN GOD, AND OF THE SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES TO THE SON OF GOD

To carry out this purpose we must begin by observing that where things differ in nature, we find different modes of emanation, and further, that from the higher nature things proceed in a more intimate way. Now, of all things the inanimate obtain the lowest place, and from them no emanation is possible except by the action of one on another: thus, fire is engendered from fire when an extraneous body is transformed by fire, and receives the quality and form of fire.

The next place to inanimate bodies belongs to plants, whence emanation proceeds from within, for as much as the plant's intrinsic humour is converted into seed, which being committed to the soil grows into a plant. Accordingly, here we find the first traces of life: since living things are those which move themselves to act, whereas those which can only move extraneous things are wholly lifeless. It is a sign of life in plants that something within them is the cause of a form. Yet the plant's life is imperfect because, although in it emanation proceeds from within, that which emanates comes forth by little and little, and in the end becomes altogether extraneous: thus the humour of a tree gradually comes forth from the tree and eventually becomes a blossom, and then takes the form of fruit distinct from the branch, though united thereto; and when the fruit is perfect it is altogether severed from the tree, and falling to the ground, produces by its seminal force another plant. Indeed if we consider the matter carefully we shall see that the first principle of this emanation is something extraneous: since the intrinsic humour of the tree is drawn through the roots from the soil whence the plant derives its nourishment.

There is yet above that of the plants a higher form of life, which is that of the sensitive soul, the proper emana-

tion whereof, though beginning from without, terminates within. Also, the further the emanation proceeds, the more does it penetrate within: for the sensible object impresses a form on the external senses, whence it proceeds to the imagination and, further still, to the storehouse of the memory. Yet in every process of this kind of emanation, the beginning and the end are in different subjects: for no sensitive power reflects on itself. Wherefore this degree of life transcends that of plants in so much as it is more intimate; and yet it is not a perfect life, since the emanation is always from one thing to another. Wherefore the highest degree of life is that which is according to the intellect: for the intellect reflects on itself, and can understand itself. There are, however, various degrees in the intellectual life: because the human mind, though able to know itself, takes its first steps to knowledge from without: for it cannot understand apart from phantasms, as we have already made clear.[1] Accordingly, intellectual life is more perfect in the angels whose intellect does not proceed from something extrinsic to acquire self-knowledge, but knows itself by itself. Yet their life does not reach the highest degree of perfection because, though the intelligible species is altogether within them, it is not their very substance, because in them to understand and to be are not the same thing, as we have already shown.[2] Therefore, the highest perfection of life belongs to God, whose understanding is not distinct from His being, as we have proved.[3] Wherefore the intelligible species in God must be the divine essence itself. By intelligible species I mean that which the intellect conceives within itself of the thing understood. Now, in us, this is neither the thing itself that is understood, nor the substance of the intellect, but is an intelligible image of the thing understood, and is expressed by external speech. Wherefore the intelligible species is known as the inner word, that is signified by the outward word. That this same intelligible species is not the thing which we understand, is evident from the fact that

[1] Bk. II., ch. xx. [2] Bk. II., ch. lii. [3] Bk. I., ch. xlv.

to understand a thing is quite distinct from understanding its intelligible species; and the intellect does this when it reflects on its action: for which reason sciences that treat of things are distinct from those that treat of ideas.

Again, it is clear that in us the intelligible species is not the intellect itself, because the being of the idea as understood consists in an act of understanding, whereas the being of our intellect does not, seeing that its being is not its act. Hence as in God to be is to understand, the intelligible species in Him is His act of understanding; and since in Him the act of understanding is the thing understood (for by understanding Himself He understands all other things, as we have proved[1]), it follows that in God understanding Himself, understanding, the thing understood, and the intelligible species are all one and the same.

With these principles before our eyes, we can to some extent understand the meaning of generation in God. For it is clear that in God generation cannot possibly have the same meaning as in inanimate beings, where the generator impresses its likeness on extraneous matter. Because as our faith declares the Son begotten of God must have true Godhead and be true God: and the Godhead is not a form adhering to matter, nor is God a material being, as we have proved.[2]

Again, generation in God cannot be of the same kind as that which we observe in plants; or again in animals, which in common with plants have the powers of nutrition and generation: because something that was in the plant or animal is severed so as to engender a being of like species and, when finally engendered, is wholly extraneous to the generator. But nothing can be severed from God, since He is indivisible; and the Son begotten of God is not extraneous to the Father who begets Him, but is in Him, as proved by the authorities quoted above. Nor again can the divine generation be taken to signify an emanation such as we find in the sensitive soul: for God does not receive from without the ability to cause an impression on another

[1] Bk. I., ch. xlix.

[2] Bk. I., ch. xvii.

thing, since otherwise He would not be the first agent. Again, the operations of the sensitive soul are performed by means of bodily instruments; whereas God is manifestly incorporeal. Consequently generation in God must be understood to indicate an intellectual emanation. It behoves us to explain this as follows.

It is evident from what has been already proved[1] that God understands Himself. Now every understood thing, as such, must be in the one who understands: because to understand means the apprehension of the object understood by the intellect: wherefore our intellect in understanding itself, remains within itself, not only as essentially one with itself, but as understanding the object of its apprehension. Therefore God must needs be within Himself as the understood object is in the one who understands. Now the understood object in the one who understands is the intelligible species and word. Accordingly, in God understanding Himself is God's word, or God understood, even as in the intellect the idea of a stone is a stone understood. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 1): *The Word was with God.* But since the divine intellect does not pass from potentiality to act, but is always in act, as we proved above,[2] it follows of necessity that God has always understood Himself. Now for the very reason that He understands Himself His Word must be in Him, as we have shown. Therefore God's Word must have been in Him always: and consequently His Word is co-eternal with Him, and does not come to Him in course of time, as the word that we conceive within ourselves—namely, the intelligible species—comes into our intellect in course of time. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 1): *In the beginning was the Word.* And since the divine intellect is not only always in act, but is also pure act, as we have proved,[3] it follows that the very substance of the divine intellect is its own understanding, or act of the intellect. Now the being of the word conceived within the mind, otherwise of the intelligible species, consists in its being understood. Therefore the same being is

[1] Bk. I., ch. xlvii. [2] Bk. I., ch. lvi. [3] Bk. I., ch. xvi.

that of the divine Word and of the divine Intellect, and therefore of God Himself, since He is His own act of intelligence. Now God's being is His essence or nature, which is God Himself, as we proved above.[1] Therefore the Word of God is the divine Being and Essence, and God in very truth.

It is not so with the word of the human intellect. For when our intellect understands itself, the being of the intellect is not identified with its act of understanding; because the substance of the intellect was in potentiality to the act of understanding, ere it understood actually. Consequently the being of the intelligible species is distinct from the act of understanding, since its being consists in its being understood. Therefore in the man who understands himself, the inwardly conceived word is not a real man, having the natural being of a man, but is merely a man understood, that is, the likeness of a true man, apprehended by the intellect. Whereas the Word of God, for the very reason that it is God understood, is true God having by nature the divine being, because the natural being of God is not distinct from His act of understanding, as we have already stated. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 1): *The Word was God:* which shows, since the statement is absolute, that the Word of God signifies God in very truth. For man's word cannot be called a man simply and absolutely, but only with a qualification, namely a man understood. Hence this statement would be untrue, *The word is a man,* whereas this may be true, *The word is a man understood.* Accordingly when it is stated, *The Word was God,* this shows that the divine Word is not merely an intelligible species as our word is, but that it is indeed a real and subsistent being: because the true God is subsistent, since He is supremely *per se* being. Nevertheless the Godhead is not in the Word so as to be the same in species and distinct numerically; because the Word has the nature of God, in as much as God's understanding is His being, as we have said. Now understanding is the very

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxii.

being of God. Therefore the Word has the divine essence itself, identical not merely in species, but even in number. Again, a nature that is one specifically is not divided numerically save by reason of matter. But the divine nature is wholly immaterial. Wherefore it is impossible that the divine nature be one in species and be differentiated in number. Consequently the divine Word has the one identical nature in common with God: so that the Word of God, and God whose Word He is are not two Gods, but one God. That with us, two having human nature are two men, is because human nature is divided numerically in two subjects. Now it was shown above[1] that things which in creatures are divided, in God are one simply: thus in creatures essence and existence are distinct; and in some, that which subsists in its essence is distinct from its essence or nature: for an individual man is neither his humanity nor his existence, whereas God is His essence and His existence.

And, though these two in God are one, yet whatever pertains to His subsistence, essence, or existence, is most truly in God: for it befits Him not to be in another, in as much as He is subsistent; to be a particular thing, in as much as He is an essence; and to be in act, by reason of His existence. Consequently as in God intelligent being, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species, which is His Word, are all one and the same thing, whatever pertains to the intelligent subject, or to the act of intelligence, or to the intelligible species or Word must be most truly in God. Now it belongs to the interior word or intelligible species, to proceed from the intelligent being through the latter's act of intelligence, since it is the term of its intellectual operation; for the intellect by understanding conceives and forms the understood species or idea which is the interior word. Therefore God's Word must needs proceed from Him by reason of His act of intelligence. Hence God's Word stands in relation to God understanding, whose Word He is, as to Him from whom He proceeds; for such

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxxi.

a relation is implied by the very nature of a word. Since then in God the intelligent subject, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species or word, are essentially one, and since for this reason each one of these must needs be God, it follows that there is only a distinction of relation between them, for as much as the Word is referred to the cause of His conception, as to the source whence He proceeds. Hence John the Evangelist, lest the phrase *The Word was God* should seem to remove any distinction whatsoever between the Word and God the speaker and conceiver of the Word, added (verse 2): *The same was in the beginning with God,* as though to say: "This same Word, whom I have stated to be God, is in some way distinct from God the speaker of the Word, and thus may be described as being with God."

Now the inwardly conceived word is a kind of form and image of the thing understood: for when the likeness of a thing exists in something else, it is either an exemplar, if it is by way of being a principle; or else it is an image, if it be compared to the thing of which it is a likeness, as to its principle. We have an example of both cases in our own intellect: because in the mind of the craftsman there is the image of his handiwork. This image is the principle of the operation that produces the handiwork, and is compared to that handiwork as the exemplar to the exemplate. On the other hand the image which our mind conceives of a natural thing is compared to the thing of which it is an image as to its principle, because our act of intelligence takes its principle from the senses, which are impressed by natural things. Now since God understands both Himself and other things, as we have shown,[1] His act of understanding is the principle of the things understood by Him, because they are caused by Him through His intellect and will: whereas to that intelligible being, which is Himself, He is compared as a thing to its principle: since this intelligible being is identical with the intellect understanding it, and the Word conceived is an emanation thereof. Con-

[1] Bk. I., ch. xlix.

sequently the Word of God is compared to other things understood by God as their exemplar, and to God Himself whose Word He is, as His image. Hence it is said of the Word of God that He is *the image of the invisible God* (Coloss. i. 15).

There is however this difference between intellect and sense, that the latter apprehends the external accidents of things, such as colour, taste, quantity, and the like, whereas the former penetrates within: and since all knowledge is effected by reason of a likeness between knower and known, it follows that there must be in the senses a likeness of the accidents of the sensible object, and in the intellect a likeness of the essence of the object understood. Hence the word conceived in the intellect is the image or exemplar of the substance of the thing understood. And as the Word of God is the image of God, as we have shown, He must needs be God's image in respect of the essence. Wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. i. 3) that he is the *figure of his substance*. Now the image of a thing is twofold. There is the image that has not the same nature as that which it represents; whether it represent it as to its external accidents—thus a bronze statue is the image of a man, yet it is not a man—or whether it represent it as to its substance, for the intellect's idea of a man is not a man, because the Philosopher says (3 *De Anima*, text. 38): *Not a stone, but its image, is in the soul.* But an image that has the same nature as the thing it represents, is like the king's son, in whom we see his father's image, and who has the same nature as his father. Now it has been shown that God's Word is the image of the Speaker in His very essence, and that He has the same nature in common with Him. Consequently God's Word is not only His image but also His Son: because it is not possible to be both the image of another and of the same nature as that other without being this other's son, so long as we speak of living beings: because that which proceeds from a living being in likeness of nature is said to be its son. Hence it is said (Ps. ii. 7): *The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my Son.*

Since then the Word of God is called the Son of God, we must also observe, seeing that in every nature the procession of son from father is natural, that the Son of God is begotten of and proceeds from the Father naturally: and this is in keeping with what we have been saying, and may be understood from the operation of our own intellect. For our intellect knows certain things naturally, such as the first principles of matters intelligible, whereof the intelligible concepts, or interior words, exist therein and proceed therefrom naturally. There are also certain intelligible matters which our intellect does not know naturally, but comes to know by reasoning. The concepts of these things are not in our intellect naturally, and it has to make an effort to seek them. Now it is evident that God understands Himself naturally, even as He exists naturally: since His act of intelligence is His being, as we have proved.[1] Hence the Word spoken by God understanding Himself, proceeds from Him naturally; and as the Word of God is of the same nature with God speaking and is His image it follows that the term of this natural procession is the image of that from which it proceeds in identity of nature. Now the essence of true generation in living things is that the thing begotten proceeds from the begetter as its image and with the same nature. Therefore God's Word is truly begotten of God's utterance; and His procession may be called a *begetting* or *birth*. Hence it is said (Ps. ii. 7): *This day have I begotten thee;* that is to say, "in eternity," which is ever present, and contains no trace of past or future. It is therefore clear how false was the assertion of the Arians that the Father begot the Son by His will; because that which is done voluntarily is not natural. Since however what God understands of Himself is not less than what is in Him (else He would not understand Himself perfectly, nor would His being be His act of intelligence), the Word of God must needs be essential to God. Now this Word is the Son of God. Therefore the Son of God is essential to the Father.

[1] Bk. I., ch. xlv.

This is also clear, because since the Son of God is His true Son, He has the species and nature of the Father. Now a certain quantity is due to every nature; wher fore here below a son is brought to equality with his fat..er at the term of generation and growth, unless some defect occur through indisposition of matter and weakness of the active force in generation. That at first the son is born less than his father, is because animal generation passes from potentiality to act, and the animal is brought gradually from imperfection to perfection. Now none of these things can occur in the divine generation, because it is not a generation from matter, nor does it involve a process from potentiality to act, nor can there be a defect in the power of God generating, since His power is infinite. Hence the Son of God must be equal to the Father.

Again. If the Son be not equal to the Father, His greatness must be numerically distinct from the Father's: because the same identical quantity cannot be greater or less than itself. Now God's greatness is not distinct from His essence, as we made clear in the First Book.[1] Consequently the essence of the Son will be numerically distinct from the Father's: and we have proved the contrary to be the case. We must therefore say that the Son is equal to the Father. Hence it is said (Jo. v. 18) that Jesus *said God was his Father, making himself equal to God:* and (Philip. ii. 6) that He *thought it not robbery to be equal to God.*

We must also take note that the thing begotten, so long as it remains in the begetter, is said to be conceived. Now, God's Word is begotten of God in such wise that He does not depart from God but abides in Him, as stated above. Rightly therefore may God's Word be described as conceived of God. Hence the Wisdom of God says (Prov. viii. 24): *The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived.*

There is however a difference between the conception of God's Word and the material conception which we

[1] Chs. xxii., xxiii.

observe in animals: because the offspring, during the period of conception and gestation, is as yet imperfect, and unable to subsist by itself apart from its begetter: wherefore when an animal's body is begotten, the conception of the offspring is distinct from its birth, when it is severed from its begetter by being brought forth from the womb. On the other hand, God's Word, abiding in God the Speaker, subsists perfectly in Himself, and distinct from God the Speaker: for no distinction of place is needed where, as stated above, there is only a distinction of relationship. Accordingly in the generation of the Word of God conception is the same as birth: wherefore after Wisdom had said: *I was already conceived,* the text, after a few words, continues (verse 25): *Before the hills I was brought forth.*

Yet because conception and birth in corporeal beings include movement and consequently some kind of succession—since the term of conception is the existence in the conceiver of that which has been conceived, and the term of birth, the separate existence of the offspring apart from the parent—it follows that in corporeal beings what is being conceived is not as yet, and that the offspring while in the womb is not distinct from the parent. On the other hand, when an intelligible word is conceived and brought forth, there is no movement or succession; hence it exists as soon as it is conceived, and it has a separate existence as soon as it is brought forth: thus the illuminated object is lit up as soon as there is light, since there is no succession in the diffusion of light.[1] And if this is the case with our intelligible word, much more does it apply to the Word of God, not only because His conception and birth are in the intelligible order, but also because both are in eternity, where there can be no yesterday nor morrow. Hence after the words of Wisdom (Prov. viii. 25): *Before the hills I was brought forth,* lest this might seem to imply that he did not exist until he was brought forth, the text

[1] At the time of St Thomas it was thought that the movement of light was instantaneous.

continues (verse 27): *When he prepared the heavens, I was present.* Accordingly whereas in the carnal generation of animals there is first conception, then gestation and association without separate existence, of offspring with parent, in the divine generation all these things are simultaneous: since the Word of God is at once conceived, begotten, and present. And seeing that what is begotten is brought forth from the womb; even as the generation of God's Word is called birth, in order to indicate His perfect distinction from His begetter, so in like manner it is called generation from the womb, according to Ps. cix. 3, *From the womb, before the day-star, have I begotten thee.* Yet because the distinction between word and speaker is not such as to hinder the word from being in the speaker, as already stated, just as the Word is said to be begotten or brought forth from the womb, so as to indicate distinction, so is He said to be *in the bosom of the Father* (Jo. i. 18), to show that this distinction does not prevent the Word being in the speaker.

Now we must observe that the carnal generation of animals is effected by an active and a passive function: the father takes an active part, while the mother's part is passive: so that the begetting of offspring belongs to the father as regards certain conditions, and to the mother as regards others. It belongs to the father to give his offspring its nature and species, while conception and gestation belong to the mother, whose part is passive and receptive. Accordingly since, as we have stated, the procession of the Word lies in the fact that God understands Himself (and God understands Himself, not by a passive power, but by an active power, so to speak, because the divine intellect is not in potentiality but in act only), it follows that in the generation of God's Word, there is no place for a mother but only for a father. Consequently the parts which belong severally to father and mother in carnal generation, are all ascribed by Scripture to the Father in the generation of the Word: thus the Father is said to give life to the Son, and to conceive and beget Him.

CHAPTER XII

HOW THE SON OF GOD IS CALLED THE WISDOM OF GOD

SEEING that we have applied to the generation of the Word the things that are said of divine Wisdom, it remains to be shown how divine Wisdom, in whose person those things are said, may be taken to be the Word of God. And that we may obtain knowledge of things divine from human things, it behoves us to observe that in man wisdom is a habit perfecting our mind in the knowledge of the highest—namely divine—things. And when, through the habit of wisdom there arises in our intellect an idea of divine things, this very idea or inward word is wont to be called wisdom, by that figure of speech whereby acts and species are denominated from the habits from which they proceed: thus sometimes a just action is called justice, a brave action bravery, and a virtuous action is commonly called virtue: and in this way a man's wise conceptions are called wisdom. Now in God wisdom must be referred to the fact that He knows Himself. But since He knows Himself not by an intelligible species but by His essence—indeed His very act of intelligence is His essence—therefore God's wisdom cannot be a habit, but is the divine essence. Now it is evident from what has been said, that the Son of God is the Word and concept of God understanding Himself. Wherefore the Word of God is rightly called conceived or begotten Wisdom, as being the wise conception of the divine mind: hence the Apostle calls Christ *the wisdom of God* (1 Cor. i. 24). Now the word of wisdom conceived in the mind is a manifestation of the understander's wisdom, even as all our habits are revealed by their acts. Since then divine Wisdom is called light, because it consists in a pure act of knowledge (for the manifestation of light is its refulgence, which proceeds from it), the Word of divine Wisdom is fittingly called the splendour of light, according to the words of the Apostle, who says of the Son (Heb. i. 3): *Being the brightness of*

his glory. Hence the Son ascribed to Himself the manifestation of the Father, when He said (Jo. xvii. 5, 6): *O Father . . . I have manifested thy name to men*. Yet though the Son who is God's Word is rightly called begotten Wisdom, the name Wisdom taken absolutely must needs be common to Father and Son, since the Wisdom that shines through the Word is the essence of the Father, as we have said above, and the Father's essence is common to Him and the Son.

CHAPTER XIII

THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE SON IN GOD

SINCE God by understanding Himself understands all other things, as we proved in the First Book;[1] and since He understands Himself in one simple glance, for His act of understanding is His being: it follows of necessity that there is only one Word of God. And as in God the generation of the Son is nothing else but the conception of the Word, it follows that there is but one generation in God, and but one Son begotten of the Father. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 14): *We saw his glory, the glory, as it were, of the only-begotten of the Father,* and again (verse 18): *The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him to us*.

It would seem however to follow from the foregoing that there is yet another word of the divine Word, and another son proceeding from the Son. For we proved that the Word of God is true God: consequently whatever belongs to God belongs to the Word of God. Now God of necessity understands Himself: therefore the Word of God also understands Himself. If then, because God understands Himself, there is in God the Word begotten of Him, it would seem to follow that we must ascribe to the Word also, yet another word, in as much as He under-

[1] Chs. xlix., l.

stands Himself : and thus there will be a word of the Word, and a son of the Son. And this other Word, if it be God, will also understand Himself, and will have another Word, so that there will be an infinite process of divine generations.

This objection may be solved from what has already been said. For while we have proved that the Word of God is God, we have also shown that He is not another God distinct from the God whose Word He is, but is wholly one with Him, and distinct only as the Word proceeding from Him. Now as the Word is not another God, so neither is He another intellect, nor consequently has He another act of understanding. And yet it does not follow that the Word has His own word by reason of His understanding Himself : because, as stated above, the Word is distinct from the Speaker solely in that He proceeds from Him. Wherefore all other things must be ascribed in common to God who speaks—that is, the Father —and to the Word who is the Son, because the Word also is God. This alone is to be ascribed to the Father exclusively, that the Word proceeds from Him, and to the Son exclusively, that He proceeds from God speaking. Hence we gather that the Son is not impotent, though unable to beget a son, whereas the Father does beget a Son : because Father and Son have the same power, even as they have the same Godhead. And since in God generation is the intelligible conception of the Word, according as God understands Himself, it follows that in God the power of begetting is identical with His power of understanding Himself. And since in God the act of understanding Himself is one and simple, it follows that also His power of understanding Himself, which is identical with His act, is but one. By the same power therefore, both the Word is conceived, and the Speaker of the Word conceives; and consequently by the same power the Father begets and the Son is begotten. Therefore the Father has no power that the Son has not; yet the Father has the generative power for the purpose of begetting, but the Son for the

purpose of being begotten : and these differ but relatively, as already explained.

Seeing however that the Apostle ascribes a word to the Son, whence it would seem to follow that the Son has a son, and that the Word has a word, we must inquire into the meaning of the Apostle when he makes this statement. For he says (Heb. i. 2, 3) that God *in these days hath spoken to us by his Son,* and afterwards : *Who being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power,* etc. Now we must gather the meaning of this passage from what we have been saying. For we said that the concept of Wisdom, namely, the Word, is rightly called Wisdom. We may go yet further so as to see that even the external effect, which results from the concept of Wisdom, may itself be called wisdom : in the same way as an effect may assume the name of its cause. Thus we call it wisdom not only when a man thinks wisely, but also when he works wisely : and therefore the manifestation of divine wisdom in creatures is called the Wisdom of God, according to Ecclus. i. 9, 10, *He created her*—that is, Wisdom—*in the Holy Ghost;* and afterwards adds : *and he poured her out upon all his works.* Accordingly the effect of the Word receives the name of word : for even with us the vocal expression of the inward word is called a word, being as it were the word of a word, because it indicates the inward word. Wherefore not only is the concept of the divine intellect called the Word, which is the Son, but also the revelation of the divine concept in visible works is called the Word's word. In this way are we to understand that the Son *upholds all things by the word of his power,* as also the passage in Ps. cxlviii. 8, *Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfil his word;* because, to wit, the effects of the divine concept are accomplished in the world by created forces.

Now since God in understanding Himself, understands all other things, as stated above, it follows that the Word conceived in God through His understanding Himself, is

the only word expressing all things. Yet He is not in the same way the Word of God, as of other things : because He is the Word of God as proceeding from God, whereas He is the word of other things, not as proceeding from them, because God does not acquire knowledge from things, but rather brings things into being by His knowledge,[1] as we have proved above. Consequently the Word of God must needs be the perfect type of all the things that have been made. In what way He can be the proper type of each single thing is plain from our treatise in the First Book,[2] where it was shown that God has proper knowledge of all things. Now whosoever makes a thing with intelligence, works by means of the idea which he has of that thing as made : thus the material house is made by the builder from the idea of a house that is in his mind. And we have shown above that God brings things into being, not by natural necessity, but as an intellectual and voluntary agent. Wherefore God made all things by His Word, who is the type of things made by Him. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 3) : *All things were made by him:* also in accord with this, Moses in his account of the creation uses such expressions of each of the works as : *God said: Be light made, and the light was made . . . and God said: Let there be a firmament* (Gen. i. 3, 6), and so on. All this is expressed in the words of the Psalmist (Ps. cxlviii. 5) : *He spoke, and they were made.* For to speak is to utter a word. Accordingly the statement that *God spoke, and they were made* means that He spoke the Word whereby He brought things into being, as by the perfect idea of them.

And since the same cause conserves and brings things into being, as all things were made by the Word, so are they conserved in being by God's Word : wherefore the Psalmist says (Ps. xxxii. 6) : *By the word of the Lord the heavens were established,* and the Apostle says that the Son *upholds all things by the word of his power* (Heb. i. 3) : and we have already stated how this is to be understood.

[1] Bk. II., ch. xxiv. [2] Ch. lxv.

There is however a difference to be noted between the Word of God and the idea in the mind of the craftsman. The Word of God is God subsistent, whereas the craftsman's idea of his handiwork is not a subsistent thing, but merely an intelligible form. Now a non-subsistent form is not, properly speaking, competent to act (since to act belongs to that which is perfect and subsistent), but is competent to be acted by, since it is a principle of action whereby the agents act. Hence the craftsman's idea of the house does not make the house, but the craftsman makes the house by it. On the other hand since God's word, who is the idea of things made by God, is subsistent, He acts and is not merely something acted by. Wherefore the Wisdom of God says (Prov. viii. 30): *I was with him forming all things,* and our Lord said (Jo. v. 17): *My Father worketh until now and I work.*

It must also be observed that the thing made with the intelligence pre-exists in the mind even before it exists in itself: thus the house exists in the builder's mind before it is actually built. Now, the Word of God is the type of all things made by God, as we have proved. Therefore all things made by God must have pre-existed in the Word of God, before existing in their own nature. Now, the mode of existence of that which is in another follows the mode of that in which it is, and not its own mode: thus the house in the mind of the builder has an ideal and immaterial existence. Hence things must have pre-existed in the Word of God according to the mode of the Word. And the mode of the Word is that He is one, simple, immaterial; and not merely living, but life itself, since He is His own being. Consequently things made by God, pre-existed in the Word from eternity, in a mode wholly devoid of matter and composition, since in Him they were nothing else but the Word Himself who is life. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 3, 4): *That which was made, was life in him,* namely, in the Word. Now, as he who works by intelligence and the idea that is in him, brings things into being, so too the teacher, by the knowledge that is in him, produces knowledge in his

disciple, for the disciple's knowledge is drawn from the knowledge of his teacher, as a copy thereof. Now, God by His intelligence is the cause not only of all things that subsist in nature, but also of all intellectual knowledge, as proved above.[1] It follows, therefore, that the Word of God, who is the idea of the divine intellect, must be the cause of all intellectual knowledge: hence it is said (Jo. i. 4): *Life was the light of men,* because like a light the Word, who is life, and in whom all things are life, reveals the truth to men. Nor is it the fault of the Word that all men attain not to the knowledge of the truth, but that some remain in the dark. This is due to the fault of men who are not converted to the Word, and are unable to comprehend Him fully: wherefore darkness remains in them, more or less, according as they are more or less converted to the Word and comprehend Him. Hence John, in order to remove all deficiency from the Word's manifestive power, after saying that *he is the light of men,* adds that *he shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it:* because darkness is due, not to the light not shining, but to the fact that some do not comprehend the light of the Word: even so, when the material sun is shining throughout the world, there is no darkness, save to one whose eyes are shut or weak.

This, then, is what to some extent we are able to learn from Holy Writ, concerning the divine generation and power of the Only Begotten Son of God.

CHAPTER XIV

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DIVINE GENERATION

Since then truth excludes all error and banishes all doubt, it will be easy to solve the objections which seemed to raise difficulties in the matter of the divine generation.

[1] Bk. III., ch. lxxvi.

For it is clear from what has been already established that in God we place an intelligible begetting, but not such as obtains in material things, the engendering of which is a kind of change and the antithesis of corruption. Because even the word of our intellect is conceived without change, nor is there a corruption that is antithetical to it: and we have already explained how the begetting of the Son of God is like to the conception of that same word. In like manner the word conceived in our mind does not pass from potentiality to act, except in so far as our intellect passes from potentiality to act; and yet the word is not begotten of our intellect, until the latter is in act, and once it is in act, the conceived word is there. But the divine intellect is never in potentiality, but only in act, as we have proved above.[1] Therefore it begets the Word without passing from potentiality to act; just as one act gives rise to another; as, for example, light to brightness, and the intellect in act to the idea. Wherefore it is clear also that by being begotten the Son of God is none the less true God or eternal; rather in fact must He needs be coeternal with God whose Word He is, since the intellect in act is never without its word.

And because the Son of God is not begotten materially but intelligibly, it is foolish to doubt whether the Father gave Him His nature wholly or in part. For it is evident that if God understands Himself, the whole fulness of Him must be contained in the Word. And yet the substance given to the Son ceases not to be in the Father, for even with us the thing understood does not cease to have its proper nature, although the idea is the intelligible image of the very nature of the object understood. From the fact that the divine begetting is not material, it is clear that there is no need to distinguish in the Son of God the recipient and the nature received. In material generations it must be otherwise, inasmuch as the matter of the being begotten receives the form of the begetter. It is not so, however, with intelligible generations: because the word does not

[1] Bk. I., ch. lv.

arise from the intellect in such a way that a part thereof be presupposed as receiving, while a part flows out of the intellect: but it originates entirely from the intellect, even as in us one word wholly arises from another, as a conclusion from principles. Now, when a thing in its entirety arises from another, it is impossible to indicate a recipient and a thing received, because all that arises issues from the source whence it arises. In like manner it is plain that the unity of the divine begetting is not destroyed, because there cannot be a distinction of several subsistent beings. For the divine essence, though subsistent, cannot be severed from the relation that we must needs ascribe to God for as much as the conceived Word of the divine mind proceeds from the divine utterance; because both the Word is the divine essence, as we have proved, and God who speaks the Word that proceeds from Him, is also the divine essence, nor are they distinct but identical. Moreover these relations are not accidents in God but subsistent; for nothing can be accidental to God, as we have proved above.[1] Accordingly there are several subsistent beings, if we consider the relations; but one subsistent being if we consider the essence. Hence we say that there is one God, because there is one subsistent essence; and that there are three persons on account of the distinction between the subsistent relations. In human beings the distinction of persons regards not the specific essence, but certain things that are in addition to the specific nature; because in all human persons there is one specific nature, and yet there are many persons, since men are distinguished by things that are in addition to the nature. In God, therefore, we must not say that there is but one person by reason of the unity of the subsistent essence, but that there are several on account of the relations.

Hence it is clear that whatever is the principle of individuality in one is not necessarily in another: since neither is the divine essence in another God, nor paternity in the Son. And although two persons, namely Father and Son,

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxiii.

are distinct not in essence but by relation, nevertheless this relation is not really distinct from the essence, seeing that relation in God cannot be an accident. Nor shall we find this impossible if we consider carefully our conclusions in the First Book,[1] where we proved that in God are the perfections of all things, not by a kind of agglomeration, but by the unity of His simple essence. For the various perfections which in the creature are manifold in form, in God are one owing to the simplicity of His essence: thus man, as an animal, is by one form a living being, by another is wise, and by another, just: while all these things belong to God by His essence. Hence as wisdom and justice are accidents in man, whereas in God they are identified with the divine essence, so a relation such as paternity or sonship though an accident in man, in God is the divine essence.

Now we assert that God's wisdom is His essence, while our wisdom is something additional to the essence, not as though the divine wisdom falls short of ours, but because God's essence so transcends ours, that such things as wisdom and justice which in us are not essential to our being, belong to God perfectly by reason of His essence. Consequently whatever belongs to us in respect of our essence and wisdom as mutually distinct, must be ascribed to God in respect of His essence as identical: and the same applies to other matters. Accordingly, since the divine essence is identical with the relations of paternity or sonship, it follows that whatever belongs to paternity must belong to God, although paternity is in the essence. Now it is proper to paternity to be distinguished from sonship: because a father is related to his son as to some other man, and the notion of father is that he is the father of a son. Although then, God the Father is the divine essence, and so too is God the Son, He is distinct from the Son in so much as He is the Father, although He is one with Him, in so much as each is the divine essence. Whence also it is evident that though in God relation is not apart from

[1] Ch. xxviii.

something absolute, yet in God it is compared to the absolute otherwise than in creatures. Relation in creatures is compared to the absolute as accident to its subject; this is not so in God, in whom they are identical, even as in other things that are predicated of God. Now the same subject cannot have in itself contrary relations; for instance, a man cannot be both father and son in the same respect. The divine essence, however, on account of its absolute perfection, is identical with wisdom, justice, and other like things which in us belong to various species. And so nothing hinders the one essence being identical with both paternity and sonship, and Father and Son being one God, although the Father is not the Son: because it is the same essence that has being naturally, and its own intelligible Word.

From what has been said we may also conclude that relations in God are real and not merely logical. Because every relation which results from a thing's proper operation, power, quantity, or the like, exists in that thing really, otherwise it would be merely a logical relation. Take for example knowledge and the thing known. The relation of knowledge to the thing known results from the action of the knower, and not from any action of the thing known: because the object known is unchanged in itself when it is understood and when it is not understood. Consequently the relation is really in the knower, and only logically in the object known: because that which is understood is said to be known in relation to knowledge, as a consequence of the relation which knowledge bears to it. The same is to be observed in right and left hand: for in animals there are distinct functions from which arise the relations of right to left. Wherefore that relation is really in the animal; so that whichever way the animal turns, the relation always remains the same: for its right side can never be called its left side. On the other hand, inanimate beings which are devoid of such functions, have no such relationship really in them; the relationship of right and left is ascribed to them in reference to some

animal; thus the same pillar is said to be now on the right, now on the left, according to the different positions of the animal. Now the relation of the Word to God speaking, whose Word He is, is in God, for as much as God understands Himself; and this operation is in God, or rather is God Himself, as we have proved.[1] It follows, then, that the aforesaid relations are really and truly in God, and not only according to our way of thinking.

Although there is relationship in God, it does not follow that in God there is something having a dependent existence. In us relations have a dependent existence, because their being is distinct from that of substance, wherefore they have their own mode of existence in accordance with their own nature, as other accidents have. For since all accidents are forms superadded to a substance, and caused by the principles of that substance, it follows that their existence is something additional to the existence of the substance and dependent thereon. Moreover each one of them will derive its order of precedence according as, in its proper nature, it is nearer to the substance, or more perfect. Hence a relation that is really adventitious to a substance, in point of existence comes last and is most imperfect. It comes last, because it presupposes not only the existence of the substance, but also that of other accidents, by which the relation is caused: thus oneness in quantity causes equality, and oneness in quality causes likeness. It is also most imperfect, because the proper notion of a relation consists in a habitude to something else: so that its proper being, which it adds to the substance, depends not only on the being of the substance, but also on the being of something extraneous. Now this cannot occur in God, because in Him there is no other being besides His substance: since all that is in God is substance. Accordingly, as in God the being of wisdom is not dependent on the substance, because it is the being of His substance, so the being of relation is dependent neither on His substance nor on something extraneous,

[1] Bk. I., ch. xlvii.

because even the being of relation is the being of His substance. Therefore, the fact that there are relations in God does not argue the presence of dependent being in Him, but only of a certain habitude, wherein the essence of relationship consists: thus because we ascribe wisdom to God, it does not follow that this is something accidental in Him, but only that it is a perfection, corresponding to our notion of wisdom.

Hence it is also evident that, although created relations are found to involve imperfection, it does not follow that the divine Persons, who are distinguished by relations, are imperfect, but it follows that this distinction is the least of all.

From what has been said, it is also manifest that, although God is predicated of Father and Son substantially, it does not follow, if Father and Son are two persons, that they are two Gods: for they are two by reason of the distinction of subsistent relations, yet they are one God on account of the unity of the subsistent essence. But among men it is not the case that several are one man, because the essence of human nature is not numerically one in both, nor is the essence of human nature subsistent so that human nature be called man. Since then in God there is unity of essence and distinction of relations, it clearly follows that there is no reason why there should not be opposites in the one God, but only such as result from the distinction of relations: such as *Begetter* and *Begotten,* which are mutually opposed relatively; and *Begotten* and *Unbegotten,* which are mutually opposed as affirmation and negation. For wherever there is distinction, there must needs be opposition of affirmation and negation: since there is no distinction, where there is no difference of affirmation and negation: because in all respects one must be the same as the other, and thus they are absolutely the same, and in no way distinct.

We have now treated sufficiently of the divine generation.

CHAPTER XV

OF THE HOLY GHOST: THAT HE IS IN GOD

THE authority of Holy Writ not only reveals the existence in God of Father and Son, but also numbers the Holy Ghost with them. Thus our Lord says (Matth. xxviii. 19): *Going, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost:* and John declares (1 Jo. v. 7): There are three who give testimony in heaven, the *Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost.* Moreover, Holy Writ witnesses to a kind of procession of this same Holy Spirit: for it says (Jo. xv. 26): *When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father, he shall give testimony of me.*

CHAPTER XVI

REASONS FOR WHICH CERTAIN MEN HAVE DEEMED THE HOLY GHOST TO BE A CREATURE

SOME have deemed the Holy Ghost to be a creature, higher than other creatures: and they appealed to the authority of Scripture to confirm this assertion. For it is said (Amos iv. 13) according to the Septuagint version: *Behold he that formeth the mountains and createth the Spirit, and declareth his word to man.* Again it is said (Zach. xii. 1): *Thus saith the Lord, who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man in him.* Therefore it would seem that the Holy Spirit is a creature.

Again. Our Lord says, speaking of the Holy Ghost (Jo. xvi. 13): *He shall not speak of himself: but what things soever he shall hear, he shall speak.* Whence it would seem to follow that He never speaks on His own authority, but only in obedience to the commands of a master; for to speak

what is heard seems to pertain to a minister. Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is a creature subject to God.

Further. To be sent would seem to be the mark of an inferior: since authority is implied in one who sends. Now the Holy Ghost is sent by the Father and the Son: for our Lord said (Jo. xiv. 26): *The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things:* and (Jo. xv. 26): *When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father.* Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is less than both Father and Son.

Also. Where Holy Scripture associates the Son with the Father in things pertaining to the Godhead, it makes no mention of the Holy Ghost; as when our Lord says (Matth. xi. 27): *No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son,* without mentioning the Holy Ghost. Again it is said (Jo. xvii. 3): *This is eternal life: That they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent:* and here again there is no mention of the Holy Ghost. Again, the Apostle says (Rom. i. 7): *Grace to you, and peace from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ: and* (1 Cor. viii. 6): *To us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him: and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him:* and here again nothing is said of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is not God.

Moreover. Whatsoever is in motion is a creature: for it was proved in the First Book[1] that God is immovable. Now, Holy Scripture ascribes movement to the Holy Spirit: for it is said (Gen. i. 2): *The spirit of God moved over the waters,* and (Joel ii. 28): *I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh.* Therefore, apparently, the Holy Ghost is a creature.

Further. Whatsoever can be increased or divided is changeable and created. Now this would seem to be ascribed to the Holy Ghost in the sacred writings. Thus the Lord said to Moses (Num. xi. 16, 17): *Gather unto me seventy men of the ancients of Israel . . . and I will take*

[1] Ch. xiii.

of thy spirit, and give to them. It is also stated that Eliseus besought Elias (4 Kings ii. 9, 10): *I beseech that in me may be thy double spirit,* and Elias answered: *If thou see me when I am taken from thee, thou shalt have what thou hast asked.* Seemingly then, the Holy Ghost is subject to change, and is not God.

Again. There can be no sorrow in God, since it is a passion. But God is impassible. The Holy Ghost, however, is affected by sorrow; wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. iv. 30): *Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God.* It is also said (Isa. lxiii. 10): *They provoked to wrath and afflicted his Holy Spirit.*[1] Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is not God.

Besides. It is not fitting that God should pray, but rather that prayer should be addressed to him. Now prayer is becoming to the Holy Ghost, for it is said (Rom. viii. 26): *The Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings.* Therefore the Holy Ghost is, seemingly, not God.

Moreover. No one gives fittingly that over which he has no dominion. But God the Father gives the Holy Ghost, and so too does the Son: for our Lord says (Lk. xi. 13): *Your Father in heaven will give the good Spirit to them that ask him:* and Peter says that God gives the Holy Ghost *to them that obey him* (Acts v. 32). Wherefore it would seem that the Holy Ghost is not God.

Again. If the Holy Ghost be true God, He must needs have the divine nature: and so, since He proceeds from the Father (Jo. xv. 26) it follows of necessity that He receives the divine nature from Him. Now, he that receives the nature of the one that produces him, is begotten by him: since it is proper to the one begotten to be brought forth in specific likeness to his principle. Therefore the Holy Ghost would be begotten, and consequently He would be the Son: and this is surely contrary to Faith.

Again. If the Holy Ghost receives the divine nature from the Father, and is not begotten, it follows that the divine nature is bestowed in two ways, namely by way of

[1] Vulg., *the Spirit of his Holy One.*

generation, as the Son proceeds, and by the way in which the Holy Ghost proceeds. Now, seemingly, it is inconsistent with unity of nature to be bestowed in two ways: as can be proved by a review of the various natures. Seeing then that the Holy Ghost does not receive the (divine) nature by way of generation, it must follow, apparently, that He does not receive it at all: and consequently that he is not God.

This was the opinion of Arius, who maintained that the Son and Holy Ghost are creatures: but that the Son is greater than the Holy Ghost, and that the Holy Ghost is subservient to the Son: even as he maintained that the Son is less than the Father. As regards his teaching about the Holy Ghost, he was followed by Macedonius, who rightly held the Father and Son to be of one and the same substance, but refused to believe this about the Holy Ghost, and contended that He is a creature. Hence by some the Macedonians are called *Semi-arians*, because they partly agree with the Arians, and partly disagree.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS TRUE GOD

It can be clearly shown by the authority of Holy Writ that the Holy Ghost is God.

No temple is consecrated save to God alone: wherefore it is said (Ps. x. 5): *The Lord is in his holy temple.* Now, temples are dedicated to the Holy Ghost: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. vi. 19): *Know you not that your members are temples of the Holy Ghost?* Therefore the Holy Ghost is God. This argument is enhanced by the fact that our members, which the Apostle declares to be the temple of the Holy Ghost, are also the members of Christ. For he had already said (verse 15): *Know you not that your bodies are the members of Christ?* And it would be unfitting, since Christ is true God, as we have proved above, if

Christ's members were the temple of the Holy Ghost, unless the Holy Ghost were God also.

Again. The service of *latria* is given by the saints to God alone: for it is said (Deut. vi. 13): *Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and thou shalt serve him only.* Now the saints serve the Holy Ghost: for the Apostle says (Philip. iii. 3): *We are the circumcision, who serve the divine spirit:*[1] and although some codices read: *Who serve in the spirit of the Lord,* the Greek and older Latin codices have: *Who serve the divine Spirit:*[2] also, from the Greek, it is plain that the text refers to service of *latria,* which is due to God alone. Therefore the Holy Ghost is true God, and the worship of *latria* is due to Him.

Further. The sanctification of man is a work belonging exclusively to God: for it is said (Levit. xxii. 9): *I am the Lord who sanctify them.* Now, it is the Holy Ghost who sanctifies: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. vi. 11): *You are washed . . . you are sanctified . . . you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the spirit of our God;* and (2 Thess. ii. 12): *For that God hath chosen you first fruits unto salvation, in sanctification of the Spirit, and faith of the truth.* Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. As the body derives natural life from the soul, so does the soul derive the righteous life from God: wherefore our Lord says (Jo. vi. 58): *As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth me, the same also shall live by me.* Now, this latter life comes to us through the Holy Ghost: hence it is added (*ibid.* 64): *It is the Spirit that quickeneth:* and the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 13): *If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.* Therefore the Holy Ghost is of divine nature.

Also. In order to prove His divinity against the Jews, who could not bear that He should make Himself equal to God, our Lord claimed the power of raising the dead to life. Here are His words (Jo. v. 21): *As the Father raiseth up the dead, and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life*

[1] Vulg., *who in spirit serve God.* [2] οἱ πνεύματι θεῷ λατρεύοντες.

to whom he will. Now the power of raising the dead to life belongs to the Holy Ghost: for the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 11): *If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you.* Therefore the Holy Ghost is of divine nature.

Again. Creation is the work of God alone, as we have proved above.[1] Now creation belongs to the Holy Ghost, for it is said (Ps. ciii. 30): *Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit and they shall be created;* and (Job xxxiii. 4): *The Spirit of God made me.* Also it is said of God (Ecclus. i. 9) that *he created her,* namely Wisdom, *in the Holy Ghost.* Therefore the nature of the Holy Ghost is divine.

Further. The Apostle says (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11): *The Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God.* Now, no creature is able to comprehend all the depths of God. This is manifest from the words of our Lord (Matth. xi. 27): *No one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son.* It is also said in the person of God (Isa. xxiv. 16): *My secret to myself.* Therefore the Holy Ghost is not a creature.

Also. According to the foregoing comparison of the Apostle, the Holy Ghost is to God as the spirit of man is to man. Now man's spirit is within him, and is not of a different nature from him: but is a part of him. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not of a different nature from God.

Moreover. If we compare the above words of the Apostle with the words of the prophet Isaias, we shall see clearly that the Holy Ghost is God. For it is said (Isa. lxiv. 4): *The eye hath not seen, O God, besides thee, what things thou hast prepared for them that wait for thee.* Now, the Apostle after quoting these words says, as quoted above,

[1] Bk. II., ch. xxi.

that *the Spirit searcheth the deep things of God.* Hence it is evident that the Holy Ghost knows those depths of God, which God has prepared for them that wait for Him. Wherefore, if none but God hath seen these things, as Isaias says, it is clear that the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. It is said (Isa. vi. 8, 9): *I heard the voice of the Lord, saying: Whom shall I send? and who shall go for us? And I said: Lo, here am I, send me. And he said: Go, and thou shalt say to this people: Hearing hear, and understand not.* Now, Paul ascribes these words to the Holy Ghost: wherefore it is related that Paul said to the Jews (Acts xxviii. 25, 26): *Well did the Holy Ghost speak to our fathers by Isaias the prophet, saying: Go to this people and say to them: With the ear you shall hear, and you shall not understand.* Therefore manifestly the Holy Ghost is God.

Further. It is clear from the Holy Scriptures that God spoke through the prophets: for it is declared by God Himself (Num. xii. 6): *If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream,* i.e. by my Spirit. It is also said (Ps. lxxxiv. 9): *I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.* Now it is quite evident that it was the Holy Ghost who spoke through the prophets: for it is said (Acts i. 16): *The scripture must needs be fulfilled, which the Holy Ghost spoke before by the mouth of David.* Again our Lord (Matth. xxii. 43, 44) asked the Scribes why they said that Christ is the Son of David, since the latter said, inspired by the Holy Ghost: *The Lord said to my Lord: Sit on my right hand.* Again, it is said (2 Pet. i. 21): *Prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.* Therefore it is clearly proved from Holy Writ that the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. Scripture declares that the revelation of mysteries is a work peculiar to God: thus it is said (Dan. ii. 28): *There is a God in heaven that revealeth mysteries.* Now the revelation of mysteries is shown to be the work of the

Holy Ghost: for it is said (1 Cor. ii. 10): *To us God hath revealed them by his Spirit;* and (*ibid.* xiv. 2): *The Spirit speaketh mysteries.* Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Further. To teach inwardly is a work proper to God: for it is said of God (Ps. xciii. 10): *He that teacheth man knowledge:* and (Dan. ii. 21): *He . . . giveth wisdom to the wise, and knowledge to them that have understanding.* Now clearly this is the work of the Holy Ghost: for our Lord said (Jo. xiv. 26): *The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things.* Therefore the Holy Ghost is of divine nature.

Moreover. Those that have the same operation must have the same nature. Now the Son and the Holy Ghost have the same nature. For the Apostle declares (2 Cor. xiii. 3) that Christ speaks in the saints: *Do you seek a proof of Christ that speaketh in me.* And clearly this is also the work of the Holy Ghost: for it is said (Matth. x. 20): *It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you.* Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost have the same nature, and consequently the Father also: seeing that we have shown that the Father and Son have one nature.[1]

Moreover. It is proper to God to dwell in the souls of the saints: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. vi. 16): *You are the temple of the living God: as God saith: I will dwell in them.* And the same Apostle ascribes this to the Holy Ghost: for he says (1 Cor. iii. 16): *Know you not that you are the temple of God; and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?* Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. It is proper to God to be everywhere: for he says (Jerem. xxiii. 24): *Do I not fill heaven and earth?* And this also belongs to the Holy Ghost: for it is said (Wis. i. 7): *The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world:* and (Ps. cxxxviii. 7): *Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I fly from thy face?* and (*ibid.* 8): *If I ascend into heaven thou art there,* etc. Also, our Lord said to his disciples (Acts i. 8): *You shall receive the*

[1] Bk. IV., ch. xi.

power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses to me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost parts of the earth. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is everywhere, since he dwells in men in every part of the world. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Further. The name of God is expressly given to the Holy Ghost in Holy Writ. Thus Peter says (Acts v. 3): *Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart, that thou shouldst lie to the Holy Ghost?* and afterwards (verse 4): *Thou hast not lied to men, but to God.* Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. It is said (1 Cor. xiv. 2): *He that speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God: for no man heareth. Yet the Spirit*[1] *speaketh mysteries.* Hence we are given to understand that the Spirit spoke in those who spoke in divers tongues. And further on (verse 21) he says: *In the law it is written: In other tongues and other lips I will speak to this people: and neither so will they hear me, saith the Lord.* Therefore the Holy Ghost, who speaks mysteries in various lips and tongues, is God.

Again. The above text continues further on (verses 24, 25): *If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all. The secrets of his heart are made manifest, and so, falling down on his face, he will adore God, affirming that God is among you indeed.* Now, it is clear from what had been said previously, viz., that *the Spirit speaketh mysteries,* that the revelation of the secrets of the heart is the work of the Holy Ghost. And this is a sign proper to the Godhead: for it is said (Jerem. xvii. 9, 10): *The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable, who can know it? I, the Lord, who search the heart, and prove the reins.* Wherefore, even an unbeliever is led by this sign to conclude that he who speaks these secrets of hearts, is God. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. Further on the text continues (verses 32, 33):

[1] Vulg., *By the Spirit he speaketh mysteries.*

The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. For God is not the God of dissension, but of peace. Now, the graces of the prophets, indicated by the spirits of the prophets, are from the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Holy Ghost who distributes these graces so that they cause not dissension but peace, is shown to be God, from the words: *He is the God, not of dissension, but of peace.*

Moreover. It is the work of God alone, to adopt anyone as a son of God: for no spiritual creature is the son of God by nature, but only by the grace of adoption. Hence the Apostle (Gal. iv. 4, 5) ascribes this work to the Son of God, who is true God: *God sent his Son . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons.* Now, the Holy Ghost is the cause of this adoption: for the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 15): *You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).* Therefore the Holy Ghost is not a creature, but is God.

Again. If the Holy Ghost be not God, He must be a creature. Now, it is plain that He is neither a corporeal nor a spiritual creature. For no creature is infused into a spiritual creature, since it is impossible to participate in a creature, and rather it is the creature that participates. Now the Holy Ghost is infused into the souls of the saints, so that they participate in Him as it were: for we read that Christ,[1] and also the Apostles,[2] were filled with the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God, and not a creature.

If, however, anyone say that the aforesaid works which are proper to God, are ascribed to the Holy Ghost, not as though they were exercised by him authoritatively, as God, but ministerially, as a creature, we reply that this is clearly shown to be untrue, from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. xii. 6): *There are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all:* and afterwards having enumerated the various divine gifts, he continues (verse 11): *All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will.* In these words

[1] Isa. xi. 2, 3. [2] Acts ii. 4.

he clearly indicates that the Holy Ghost is God, both by ascribing to Him works which previously he had ascribed to God, and by stating that the Holy Ghost does those works *according as He will*. Therefore it is evident that the Holy Ghost is God.

CHAPTER XVIII

THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS A SUBSISTENT PERSON

Some have denied that the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person. Of these some have contended that He is the Godhead of Father and Son; an opinion ascribed to certain followers of Macedonius. Others maintained that He is merely some accidental perfection bestowed by God on our souls; for instance, wisdom, charity, or the like, in which we participate, as in any other created accidents. Against this view we must show that the Holy Ghost is nothing of the kind.

For, properly speaking, accidental forms have no operation; it is their subject that operates, according as he will: thus a wise man uses his wisdom when he chooses. Now, the Holy Ghost works according as He will, as we have shown.[1] Therefore the Holy Ghost must not be reckoned an accidental perfection of the soul.

Again. The Scriptures teach us that the Holy Ghost is the cause of all the perfections of man's soul. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. v. 5): *The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us:* and (1 Cor. xii. 8): *To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit:* and so on. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not to be reckoned a mere accidental perfection of the human soul, since He is Himself the cause of all such perfections.

[1] Ch. xvii.

The teaching of Holy Writ is also opposed to the contention that the name of the Holy Ghost signifies the essence of Father and Son, so that in consequence He would be personally distinct from neither. For it is stated that the Holy Ghost *proceeds from the Father* (Jo. xv. 6), and that He receives from the Son (Jo. xvi. 14): neither of which can be referred to the divine essence, seeing that the divine essence does not proceed from the Father, nor does it receive from the Son. Therefore we must infer that the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person.

Again. Holy Writ clearly speaks of the Holy Ghost as of a subsistent divine person. Thus it is said (Acts xiii. 2): *As they were ministering to the Lord, and fasting, the Holy Ghost said to them: Separate me Saul and Barnabas for the work whereunto I have taken them:* and further on (verse 4): *So they, being sent by the Holy Ghost, went.* Again (Acts xv. 28) the Apostles said: *It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost, to lay no further burden upon you,* etc. Now, these things would not be said of the Holy Ghost, were He not a subsistent person. Therefore the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person.

Moreover. Seeing that the Father and the Son are subsistent divine persons, the Holy Ghost would not be numbered together with them, unless He also were a subsistent divine person. Now He is clearly numbered together with them, when our Lord says to His disciples (Matth. xxviii. 19): *Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.* Again it is said (2 Cor. xiii. 13): *The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communication of the Holy Ghost, be with you all:* and (Jo. v. 7): *There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost.* These texts show clearly that He is not only a subsistent person, even as the Father and the Son, but also that He has the one same essence with them.

Someone might endeavour to evade the foregoing arguments by drawing a distinction between the Spirit of God

and the Holy Spirit: since some of the above quotations speak of the Spirit of God, and some, of the Holy Ghost.

Nevertheless the identity of the Spirit of God with the Holy Spirit is clearly indicated by the words of the Apostle in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, where after saying: *To us God hath revealed them by the Holy Spirit,*[1] in confirmation of this he adds: *For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God,* and then concludes: *So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of God.* Hence it clearly follows that the Holy Ghost and the Spirit of God are one and the same.

Again, this is clear from our Lord's words (Matth. x. 20): *It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh within you:* in place of which Mark has (xiii. 11): *It is not you that speak, but the Holy Ghost.* Hence it is clear that the Holy Ghost and the Spirit of God are one and the same.

Accordingly, since it is evident in many ways from the foregoing passages that the Holy Ghost is not a creature, but is true God, it follows that we must not conclude that when we speak of the Holy Ghost filling the souls of holy persons and dwelling therein, the sense is the same as when we describe the devil as filling and inhabiting certain persons. Thus we read of Judas (Jo. xiii. 27) that *after the morsel, Satan entered into him.* Again, Peter, according to some versions, said (Acts v. 3): *Ananias, why hath Satan filled*[2] *thy heart?* For, since the devil is a creature, as we have seen above,[3] he cannot fill a man as though a man could participate of the devil; nor can he dwell in a man's soul participatively or substantially. But he is said to fill some men by the effect of his wickedness: wherefore Paul said to a certain man (Acts xiii. 10): *O full of all guile, and of all deceit, child of the devil!* Whereas the Holy Ghost, being God, dwells in the soul by His substance, and makes us good by participation of

[1] Vulg., *by his Spirit.*
[2] The Greek followed by the A.V. reads ἐπλήρωσεν.
[3] Bk. III., ch. x.

Him: for He is His own goodness, since He is God: which cannot be true of any creature. This, however, does not hinder Him from filling the souls of holy men by the effect of His power.

CHAPTER XIX

THE MEANING OF STATEMENTS THAT ARE MADE ABOUT THE HOLY GHOST

For as much as we are taught by the authority of Holy Scripture, we firmly hold that the Holy Ghost is true God, subsistent and personally distinct from the Father and the Son. We must now consider how this truth is to be understood in both respects, so that we may be able to defend it against the attacks of unbelievers.

For greater clearness, we must begin by observing that in every intellectual nature there is a will: because the intellect is actuated by an intelligible form, in as much as it actually understands: even as a natural thing acquires the actuality of natural being, by its own form. Now, a natural thing, by the form that perfects it in its species, has an inclination to its proper operations, and to the proper end to which it attains by its operation: since, such as a thing is, such is its operation, and such the end to which it tends. Hence from the intelligible form there results in the intelligent being an inclination to its proper operations and end. This inclination of the intellectual nature is the will, and is the principle of those operations that are in our power, and whereby the intellect operates for the sake of an end: because the end and the good are the object of the will. Consequently in every intelligent being there is a will.

Now, since several acts are seen to belong to the will, such as desire, delight, hate, and so forth, we find that the one principle and root of all is love. This may be explained as follows:—The will, as stated above,[1] is in in-

[1] Bk. III., ch. lxxxviii.

tellectual beings, what the natural inclination is in natural beings: and this inclination is known as the natural appetite. Now the natural inclination arises from the natural thing having through its form (which we have stated to be the principle of its inclination) an association with or aptitude for the thing to which it is moved; for instance, a heavy body in reference to a lower position. Wherefore this too is the source of every inclination of the will, for as much as by the intelligible form something is apprehended as suitable or attractive. Now, to be attracted towards a thing, as such, is to love it. Wherefore every inclination of the will, as well as of the sensitive appetite, has its origin in love. Thus through loving a thing, we desire it if it be absent, we rejoice in it when it is present; we grieve when we are parted from it; whatever parts us from the object loved is to us an object of hate and anger. Consequently that which is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but also in his will: yet not in the same way. For it is in his intellect by its specific likeness: whereas it is in his will, as the term of a movement is in its proportionate motive principle, by reason of the proportion and aptitude of the principle to that term. Thus, in a sense, the higher place is in the flame, because fire is volatile, and consequently is proportionate and apt for such a place: and the kindled fire is in the kindling fire by the likeness of its form.

Since, then, we have proved that there is a will in every intellectual nature, and since God is an intelligent being, as we have shown,[1] it follows that there is a will in Him: not that His will is something over and above His essence, as neither is His intellect, as we have proved above:[2] but that His will is His very substance:[3] and seeing that God's intellect also is His very substance, it follows that in God intellect and will are one and the same. It has been sufficiently explained in the First Book[4] how things that elsewhere are many are one in God.

[1] Bk. I., ch. xliv.
[2] Bk. I., ch. xlv.
[3] Bk. I., ch. lxxiii.
[4] Bk. I., ch. xxxi.

And since we have proved[1] that God's operation is His very essence, and that His will is His essence,[2] it follows that in God will is not power or habit, but act. Now we have shown that every act of the will springs from love. Therefore there is love in God. Also since, as we proved in the First Book,[3] the proper object of the divine will is the goodness of God, it follows that He Himself and His goodness are the first and principal object of His love. Now it has been shown that the beloved object must be, in a sense, in the lover's will. Therefore, since God loves Himself, it follows that God is in His own will as the object loved is in the lover. Now the beloved object is in the lover, in as much as it is loved, and love is an act of the will: and the act of God's will is His being. Therefore God's being by way of love in His will is not accidental being, as in us, but essential being. Consequently God considered as existing in His will is truly and substantially God.

Moreover, the fact that a thing is in the will as a beloved object in a lover, bears a certain relation to the idea conceived by the intellect, and to the thing itself the idea of which is called the word: because a thing would not be loved, were it not known in some way: nor is it the mere idea of the beloved object that is loved, but the object in as much as it is a good in itself. Hence the love, whereby God is in His own will as the beloved in the lover, must proceed both from the Word of God, and from God who utters the Word.

And seeing that we have proved that the object loved is not in the lover as to its specific likeness, as the object understood is in an intelligent being: and, since whatever proceeds from another as begotten, proceeds from its begetter as to its specific likeness: it follows that the procession of a thing to its being in a will as the beloved object in the lover is not by way of generation, while the procession of a thing to its being in an intellect is by way of

[1] Bk. I., ch. xlv.
[2] Bk. I., ch. lxxiii.
[3] Bk. I., ch. lxxx.

generation, as we have shown above. Therefore God proceeding by way of love, does not proceed as begotten: and consequently cannot receive the name of Son. Since however the beloved object exists in the lover as inclining and, as it were, inwardly impelling the lover to the thing loved, and since the breath (*spiritus*) is a living being's impulse from within itself, it is becoming that God, proceeding by way of love, should receive the name of *Spirit*, because with God to breathe is to love.[1] Hence the Apostle ascribes a certain impulse to spirit and love: thus he says (Rom. viii. 14): *Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God*, and (2 Cor. v. 14): *The charity of Christ presseth us*. And as every intellectual movement is denominated from its term, and as the aforesaid love is that by which God Himself is loved, it is becoming that God, proceeding by way of love, be called the Holy Spirit: because things consecrated to God are wont to be called holy.

CHAPTER XX

OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED BY SCRIPTURE TO THE HOLY GHOST IN RESPECT OF ALL CREATURES

In the light of what has already been said, we must now consider the effects ascribed by Scripture to the Holy Ghost.

We have already shown[2] that God's goodness is the reason for His willing other things to exist, and that by His will He brought things into being. Therefore the love whereby He loves His own goodness is the cause of things being created. Hence, as stated at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*,[3] certain philosophers of old said that the love of the gods was the cause of all things. Dionysius also says[4] that *God's love did not allow him to be fruit-*

[1] Ejus spiratione quasi quadam aspiratione existente: literally, *His Spiration being a kind of aspiration.*

[2] Bk. I., ch. lxxxvi.

[3] Bk. I., lect. v.

[4] *Div. Nom.* iv.

less. Now we established in the foregoing chapter that the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love whereby God loves Himself. Hence the Holy Ghost is the cause of the creation: and this is indicated (Ps. ciii. 30): *Send forth thy Spirit and they shall be created.* Also, seeing that the Holy Ghost proceeds by way of love, and that love is an impelling and moving force, any movement that God causes in things is rightly appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Now the first change wrought by God in things is that whereby he produced the various species out of formless created matter. Wherefore Holy Scripture ascribes this work to the Holy Ghost: thus it is said (Gen. i. 2): *The Spirit of God moved over the waters.* For Augustine would have *the waters* to signify the primary matter over which the Spirit of the Lord is said to move, not as being in motion, but as the principle of movement.

Again. God's government of the world is understood to be a kind of movement, forasmuch as God directs and moves all things to their respective ends. Accordingly if impulse and movement belong to the Holy Ghost as love, it is fitting that government and increase be ascribed to the Holy Ghost. Hence it is said (Job xxxiii. 4): *The Spirit of God made me;* and (Ps. cxlii. 10): *Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land.* And, since to govern subjects is the proper function of a lord, it is fitting that lordship be ascribed to the Holy Ghost: thus the Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 17): *Now the Lord is a Spirit:* and we say in the Creed: *I believe in the Holy Ghost, Lord.*

Again. Life is revealed especially in movement: for we say that a thing lives when it moves itself, and in a general way we ascribe life to all things that move themselves to action. If then impulse and movement are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as love, life also is fittingly ascribed to Him. Thus it is said (Jo. vi. 64): *It is the Spirit that quickeneth:* and (Ezech. xxxvii. 6): *I will give you Spirit and you shall live.* Also, in the Creed we

confess our belief *in the Holy Ghost, the life-giver.* This is in harmony with the name *spirit:* for an animal's body lives by the vital spirit which is diffused throughout its members by the principle of life.

CHAPTER XXI

OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED TO THE HOLY GHOST, AS REGARDS THE GIFTS BESTOWED BY GOD ON THE RATIONAL CREATURE

With regard to the effects wrought by God in the rational nature exclusively, it is to be observed that in whatsoever way we become like to a divine perfection, that particular perfection is said to be given to us. Thus God gives us wisdom, according as in any way we become like the divine wisdom. Hence, since the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love whereby God loves Himself, as we have shown;[1] forasmuch as we become like this love, by loving God, the Holy Ghost is said to be given to us by God. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. v. 5): *The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.* It is however to be noted that things which we receive from God, must be referred to God as their efficient and exemplary cause. He is their efficient cause, in as much as an effect is produced in us by His operative power: and He is their exemplary cause, in as much as what we receive from Him, reflects Him in some way. Since then Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have one same power and one same essence, it follows that whatever God works in us, is wrought by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost together as its efficient cause. But the word of wisdom, whereby we know God, and which God implants in us, properly speaking, reflects the Son: and, in like manner, the love whereby we love God, properly reflects the Holy Ghost. Thus although the charity that is in us is the effect of Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost; in a

[1] Ch. xvi.

special way it is said to be in us from the Holy Ghost. Now, the divine effects not only have their beginning in the divine operation, but also are upheld in their being thereby, as proved above.[1] Again, nothing can work where it is not, because worker and work must needs be actually together, even as the mover and the thing moved. Hence, wherever we find a divine effect, God must be there as its efficient cause. Therefore, since charity whereby we love God, is in us from the Holy Ghost, it follows that the Holy Ghost is in us, so long as charity remains in us. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. iii. 16): *Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?* Seeing then that by the Holy Ghost we are made lovers of God, and that every beloved object is in its lover as such, it follows that by the Holy Ghost, the Father and Son also dwell in us. Hence our Lord said (Jo. xiv. 23): *We will come to him,* that is to him that loves God, *and will make our abode within him:* and (1 Jo. iii. 24): *In this we know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us.*

Again. It is clear that God must love very much those whom He makes lovers of Himself by giving them the Holy Ghost: for He would not bestow so great a good except through love. Hence it is said in the Lord's Person: *I love them that love me* (Prov. viii. 17), *not as though we had first*[2] *loved God, but because he hath first loved us* (1 Jo. iv. 10). Now everything that is loved is in its lover. Consequently the effect of the Holy Ghost is that not only is God in us, but also that we are in God. Hence it is said (1 Jo. iv. 16): *He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him:* and again (*ibid.* 13): *In this we know that we abide in him, and he in us; because he hath given us of his Spirit.*

Now, it is proper to friendship that a man reveals his secrets to his friend: because friendship unites their affections, and of two hearts makes one; and consequently when a man reveals something to his friend, he would

[1] Bk. III., ch. lxv. [2] The Vulgate omits *first.*

seem not to have taken it out of his own heart. Hence our Lord said to His disciples (Jo. xv. 15): *I will not now call you servants . . . but I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you.* Since then we are made the friends of God by the Holy Ghost, it is fittingly said that the divine mysteries are revealed to men by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. ii. 9, 10): *It is written: That eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him: but to us God hath revealed them by his Spirit,* etc.

Again, man's speech is based on the things he knows: and therefore it is fitting that man should speak divine mysteries by the Holy Ghost, according to the texts (1 Cor. xiv. 2): *By the Spirit he speaketh mysteries:* and (Matth. x. 20): *For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you.* Also, it is said of the prophets (2 Pet. i. 21) that *the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.* Hence the words about the Holy Ghost in the Creed: *Who spoke by the prophets.*

Now it is part of friendship not only that a man share his secrets with his friend, on account of the union of hearts, but the same union requires that he should share his belongings with him; because, since a man regards his friend as his other self, it follows that he will succour him as he would succour himself, by sharing his goods with him. Hence it is said to be a mark of friendship that a man in both will and deed should seek the good of his friend. Thus it is said (1 Jo. iii. 17): *He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?* This is especially true of God, whose will is efficacious in the production of its effect: and therefore all God's gifts are fittingly stated to be given us by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. xii. 8: *To one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge, according to the*

same Spirit, and after enumerating many others, the text continues: *All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will.*

Again, it is manifest that in order to reach the place of fire, a body needs to be assimilated to fire and become light so as to acquire the movement of fire: so too, man in order to reach the happy state of divine fruition, which belongs to God by nature, needs first to be assimilated to God by spiritual perfections, and then to perform works in accordance with those perfections, and thus at length to reach the aforesaid state of happiness. Now spiritual gifts are bestowed on us by the Holy Ghost, as we have shown: and thus by the Holy Ghost we are conformed to God; by Him we are enabled to perform good works; and by Him the way is prepared to heaven. These three are insinuated by the Apostle (2 Cor. i. 21, 22): *God hath anointed us, and hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts:*[1] and (Eph. i. 13, 14): *You were sealed*[2] *with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance.* This sealing apparently alludes to the likeness of conformity; the anointing, to man's being enabled to perform works of perfection; and the pledge, to the hope which spurs us on to our heavenly inheritance, which is perfect bliss.

And, since a man adopts another as his son because he wishes him well, so that the latter becomes his heir, the adoption of the sons of God is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 15: *You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).*

Now, if a man becomes another's friend, by this very fact all offence is removed: since friendship is opposed to offence: hence it is said (Prov. x. 12): *Charity covereth all sins.* Wherefore as we are made the friends of God by the Holy Ghost, it follows that God forgives us our sins through Him: hence our Lord said to His disciples

[1] The text of the Vulgate differs slightly, but the sense is the same.
[2] Douay, *signed.*

(Jo. xx. 22, 23): *Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them;* and for this reason those who blaspheme against the Holy Ghost are denied forgiveness of their sins (Matth. xii. 31), because they have not that through which man receives forgiveness. Hence too, we are said to be renewed, and cleansed or washed by the Holy Ghost: *Send forth thy Spirit, and they shall be created: and thou shalt renew the face of the earth* (Ps. ciii. 30), and: *Be renewed in the Spirit of your mind* (Eph. iv. 23), and: *If the Lord shall wash away the filth of the daughters of Sion, and shall wash away the blood of Jerusalem out of the midst thereof, by the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning* (Isa. iv. 4).

CHAPTER XXII

OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED TO THE HOLY GHOST, ACCORDING AS HE MOVES THE CREATURE TO GOD

Now that we have considered the works of God in us which the Scriptures ascribe to the Holy Ghost, it remains for us to consider how the Holy Ghost moves us to God. In the first place mutual intercourse would seem to belong to friendship in a very special manner. Now, man's intercourse with God consists in contemplating Him: thus the Apostle says (Philip. iii. 20): *Our conversation is in heaven.* Since, then, the Holy Ghost makes us to be lovers of God, it follows that by Him we are made contemplators of God. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 18): *But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord.*

It also belongs to friendship that a man delight in the presence of his friend, and rejoice in his words and deeds: also that he find in him consolation in all his troubles: hence it is especially to our friends that we have recourse for comfort in time of sorrow. Since then the

Holy Ghost makes us to be friends of God, and causes Him to live in us, and us in Him, as we have proved, it follows that it is through the Holy Ghost that we rejoice in God, and are comforted in all the hardships and afflictions of the world. Hence it is said (Ps. l. 14): *Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation, and strengthen me with thy*[1] *perfect Spirit,* and (Rom. xiv. 7): *The Kingdom of God . . . is justice, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost,* and (Acts ix. 31): *The church had peace . . . and was edified, walking in the fear of the Lord, and was filled with the consolation of the Holy Ghost.* For this reason our Lord calls the Holy Ghost by the name of Paraclete or Consoler (Jo. xiv. 26): *But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost,* etc.

It also belongs to friendship that a man consent to the things which his friend wills. Now God's will is made known to us in His commandments. Therefore it belongs to our love for God, that we fulfil His commandments, according to Jo. xiv. 15: *If you love me, keep my commandments.* Wherefore, as the Holy Ghost makes us lovers of God, it is He also who leads us to fulfil the commandments of God, according to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. viii. 14): *Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.*

We must observe, however, that the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost, not as though they were slaves, but as being free. For, since to be free is to be cause of one's own actions, we are said to do freely what we do of ourselves. Now this is what we do willingly: and what we do unwillingly, we do, not freely but under compulsion. This compulsion may be absolute, when the cause is wholly extraneous, and the patient contributes nothing to the action, for instance, when a man is compelled to move by force: or it may be partly voluntary, as when a man is willing to do or suffer that which is less opposed to his will, in order to avoid that which is more opposed thereto. Now, the Holy Ghost inclines us

[1] The Douay translation has *a perfect spirit.*

to act, in such a way as to make us act willingly, inasmuch as He causes us to be lovers of God. Hence the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost to act freely and for love, not slavishly and for fear: wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 15): *You have not received the Spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons.*

Now the will is directed to that which is truly good: so that when, either through passion or through an evil habit or disposition, a man turns away from what is truly good, he acts slavishly, in so far as he is led by something extraneous, if we consider the natural direction of the will; but if we consider the act of the will, as inclined towards a seeming good, he acts freely when he follows the passion or evil habit, but he acts slavishly if, while his will remains the same, he refrain from what he desires through fear of the law which forbids the fulfilment of his desire. Accordingly, when the Holy Ghost, by love inclines the will to the true good to which it is naturally directed, He removes both the servitude whereby a man, the slave of passion and sin, acts against the order of the will, and the servitude whereby a man acts against the inclination of his will, and in obedience to the law, as the slave and not the friend of the law. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 17): *Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty,* and (Gal. v. 18): *If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law.* For this reason the Holy Ghost is said to mortify the deeds of the flesh, in as much as the sufferings of the flesh do not turn us from the true good, to which the Holy Ghost leads us by love, according to Rom. viii. 13: *If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.*

CHAPTER XXIII

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN ABOVE,[1] AGAINST THE DIVINITY OF THE HOLY GHOST

It remains for us to reply to the arguments given above, whereby it was contended that the Holy Ghost is not God, but a creature.

Here we must remark in the first place that the word *spirit* is apparently derived from the *respiration* of animals, which is a certain movement of the air by inhalation and exhalation. Hence the name *spirit* is given to any impulse or movement of an aerial body. Thus the wind is called a spirit (Ps. cxlviii. 8): *Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy spirits,*[2] *which fulfil his word.* Thus too the subtle vapour diffused throughout the members of the body to facilitate movement is called spirit. Again, since air is invisible, the name *spirit* is applied also to any kind of motive power or invisible substance. Hence both the sensitive and the rational soul, as well as angels and God Himself, are called spirits: and in a special way God proceeding by way of love, because love implies a certain motive power. Thus when Amos says (iv. 13): *He that createth the spirit,* he refers to the wind, as our translation more clearly expresses it: and this is in keeping with the context: *He that formeth the mountains.* When Zacharias says of God (xii. 1) that *he formeth the spirit of man,* he is speaking of the human soul: wherefore we cannot conclude that the Holy Ghost is a creature.

In like manner the words of our Lord in reference to the Holy Ghost (Jo. xvi. 13), *He shall not speak of himself: but what things soever he shall hear, he shall speak,* do not prove that the Holy Ghost is a creature. For we have proved[3] that the Holy Ghost is God proceeding from God: whence it follows that He receives His essence from another, even as we have shown in reference to the Son.[4] Wherefore since, in God, knowledge, power and operation are the

[1] Ch. xvi. [2] Douay, *winds.* [3] Ch. xvii. [4] Ch. xiv.

divine essence, all knowledge, power, and operation of the Son and Holy Ghost are from another; but in the Son they are from the Father alone, whereas in the Holy Ghost, they are from Father and Son. Since, then, one of the operations of the Holy Ghost is to speak in holy men, as we have shown,[1] for this reason He is said not to speak of Himself, because He does not work of Himself. In Him, to hear is to receive knowledge, even as He receives His essence, from Father and Son. Thus we acquire knowledge by hearing: and Scripture is wont to speak of divine things after the manner of human. Nor need we stress the use of the future tense when he says: *He shall hear,* because, in the Holy Ghost, to receive is eternal: for verbs of any tense can apply to eternity, since eternity embraces all time.

For the same reason it is clear that the mission whereby the Holy Ghost is said to be sent by the Father and the Son, is no proof that He is a creature. For it has been said[1] that the Son of God is said to be sent in as much as He appeared to men by taking visible flesh: so that He began to be in the world after a manner in which He was not there hitherto, that is to say visibly, whereas He was always there invisibly as God. Now, it was owing to the Father that the Son did this: wherefore in this respect He is said to have been sent by the Father. Now, the Holy Ghost also appeared visibly, both in the form of a dove over Christ at the Baptism, and under the form of fiery tongues over the Apostles. And, though He did not become a dove or fire, as the Son became man, nevertheless He appeared under these visible forms as signs of Himself. Hence He also was in the world in a new way, that is to say, visibly: and this was owing to the Father and Son; for which reason He is said to be sent by the Father and the Son: and this does not indicate subjection in Him, but procession.

There is also another way in which both the Son and Holy Ghost are said to be sent, but invisibly. For it is clear from what has been said that the Son proceeds from the Father, as the Father's knowledge of Himself, and that

[1] Ch. xvii.

the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son, as God's love for Himself. Hence, as we have already said, when by the Holy Ghost a man becomes a lover of God, the Holy Ghost dwells in Him; and thus is in man in a new way, namely by dwelling in him in respect of a new effect. That the Holy Ghost produces this effect in a man is owing to the Father and the Son: and for this reason He is said to be sent invisibly by them. In like manner the Son is said to be sent invisibly into a man's mind, when through his knowledge of God, a man comes to love God. Wherefore it is clear that neither does this kind of mission in the Son imply subjection on the part of the Holy Ghost, but only procession from another.

Nor does it argue against the divinity of the Holy Ghost, that Father and Son are sometimes associated without mention of the Holy Ghost, as neither is it an argument against the divinity of the Son, that the Father is sometimes spoken of without mention being made of the Son. For thus Scripture insinuates tacitly that when anything pertaining to the Godhead is said of one of the Three, it is to be referred to all of them, because they are one God. Nor indeed can God the Father be understood apart from His Word and Love, nor *vice versa;* and for this reason, in any one of the Three, all Three are implied, so that sometimes the Son is mentioned alone, in reference to that which is common to the Three, for instance (Matth. xi. 27): *Neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son:* and yet both Father and Holy Ghost know the Father. In the same way it is said (1 Cor. ii. 11) of the Holy Ghost: *The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God:* and yet it is certain that both Father and Son have this knowledge.

It is also evident that it cannot be proved that the Holy Ghost is a creature, from the fact that Holy Writ ascribes to Him things that savour of movement. Such things are to be taken metaphorically since Holy Writ sometimes ascribes movement to God: for instance (Gen. iii. 8): *When they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise;* and (Gen. xviii. 21): *I will go down and see*

whether they have done according to the cry. Hence, the words, *The Spirit of the Lord moved over the water,* must be taken as stated above, as when we say that the will inclines to its object, or that love pursues the beloved. Some however refer these words, not to the Holy Ghost, but to the air, the natural place of which is above the waters: wherefore to indicate the manifold changes of the air, it is said that it *moved above the waters.*—The words, *I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh* (Joel ii. 28), must be taken as referring to the sending of the Holy Ghost by Father and Son, of which we have spoken above. The expression *pour out* indicates the abundant effect of the Holy Ghost, in that it will not confine itself to one person, but will reach many, from whom it will flow forth, as it were, on to others, as may be seen when corporeal things are poured forth.

In like manner the words (Num. xi. 17), *I will take of thy spirit, and will give to them* refer, not to the essence or person of the Holy Ghost, since He is indivisible, but to His effects whereby He dwells in us, for they can increase and decrease in man. Yet the sense is not that the identical effect taken from one person is bestowed on another, but that the effect which is increased on the one hand is similar to that which is decreased on the other. Nor does this necessitate subtraction from one person, if another receive an addition, because a spiritual thing can be shared by several at once, without detriment to any one of them. Consequently it does not follow that Moses must have been deprived of any of his spiritual gifts, in order that they might be bestowed on others: this bestowal refers to the act or office, because the Holy Ghost accomplished through several persons, that which previously He had effected through Moses alone. Thus again Eliseus did not ask that the essence or person of the Holy Ghost might be doubled in him, but that he might receive the Holy Ghost's twofold effect bestowed on Elias, namely prophecy and the working of miracles. Yet it is not unreasonable that one man should have a more abundant share of the Holy Ghost's gifts than another, whether twice as much or in any other proportion

of excess, since every man's power is measurable and finite: but Eliseus would not have presumed to ask that he might surpass his master in a supernatural effect.

It is also plain that, as is customary in Holy Writ, human passions are ascribed to God metaphorically. Thus it is said (Ps. cv. 40): *The Lord was exceedingly angry with his people:* for God is said to be angry, by reason of a likeness in the effect: because he punishes, and angry people do this: wherefore it is said (*ibid.* 41): *And he delivered them into the hands of the nations.* In the same way the Holy Ghost is said to grieve, on account of a likeness in the effect: because He abandons sinners, even as men who are grieved abandon those who grieve them.

It is also a usual mode of expression in Holy Writ, to ascribe to God that which God works in man, according to Gen. xxii. 12: *Now I know that thou fearest God,* that is, *I have made thee know.* In this sense it is said that the Holy Ghost asks, because He makes us ask: since He causes the love of God in our hearts so that we desire to enjoy Him, and through desire, we ask.

Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love with which God loves Himself; and with the same love God loves Himself and other things for the sake of His own goodness; wherefore it is evident that the love with which God loves us pertains to the Holy Ghost: also the love with which we love God, since it is he who makes us lovers of God, as proved above.[1] As regards both of these, it is fitting that the Holy Ghost be given to us. As to the love with which God loves us, it is in keeping with our usual mode of speaking, when we say that a man gives his love to another when he begins to love him. It is true indeed that God does not begin to love anyone in time, if we consider the divine will with which He loves us: but the effect of His love is caused in us in time, when He draws us to Himself. As to the love with which we love God, it is fitting, because the Holy Ghost causes this love in us. Hence in respect of this love He dwells in us, as we have shown, and thus we possess

[1] Ch. xx.

Him as one in whose wealth we share. And because it is owing to the Father and the Son, that the Holy Ghost dwells in us and is possessed by us, through the love which He causes in us, He is fittingly said to be given to us by the Father and the Son. Nor does this prove Him to be less than the Father and the Son, but that He proceedeth from them. He is also said to give Himself to us, in as much as the love, by which He dwells in us, is caused in us by Him as well as by the Father and the Son.

Now, though the Holy Ghost is true God, and has the true divine nature from Father and Son, it does not follow that He is a Son. For a man is a son because he is begotten; and consequently if one thing receive from another the latter's nature, otherwise than by being begotten, the conditions of sonship would be lacking. Thus if by a power granted him by God, one man were to fashion another from some part of his body, or from some extraneous matter like a work of art, the result would not be called his son, since he would not be born of him. Now, the procession of the Holy Ghost does not satisfy the conditions of birth, as we have shown.[1] Therefore, although the Holy Ghost derives the divine nature from Father and Son, He cannot be called their Son. And it is reasonable that in God alone can the divine nature be communicated in several ways: because in God alone is operation identified with being. Hence, since in Him, as in every intellectual nature, there is intelligence and will, it follows that what proceeds in Him by way of intelligence, as a word does, and by way of love and will, as love does, must have divine being, and must be God. Consequently both Son and Holy Ghost are true God.

We have said enough about the divinity of the Holy Ghost. Any other difficulties touching His procession must be considered in the light of what we have said about the nativity of the Son.

[1] Ch. xix.

CHAPTER XXIV

THAT THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS FROM THE SON

Now some are in error about the procession of the Holy Ghost, and hold that He does not proceed from the Son. Accordingly, we must show that the Holy Ghost does proceed from the Son.

It is evident from Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son : for it is said (Rom. viii. 9) : *If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not his.* And, lest anyone say that the Spirit proceeding from the Father is distinct from the Spirit of the Son, it is plain from the words of the same Apostle that the same Holy Spirit is the Father's and the Son's. For the words quoted above, *If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not his,* are preceded by these : *If so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you.* Now, the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of Christ, merely because Christ possessed Him as man, according to Lk. iv. 1 : *Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan;* since it is said (Gal. iv. 6) : *Because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying: Abba (Father).* Accordingly, the Holy Ghost makes us to be sons of God in as much as He is the Spirit of the Son of God. Now, we become sons of God by adoption, through being conformed to Him who is Son of God by nature, according to Rom. viii. 29 : *Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son: that he might be the first-born* among many brethren. Hence the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Christ in as much as He is the natural Son of God. But the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of Christ by reason of any other relationship, save that of origin, since this is the only distinction to be found in God. Therefore we must say that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Christ, in the sense that He proceeds from Him.

Again. The Holy Ghost is sent by the Son, according to Jo. xv. 26 : *When the Paraclete shall come, whom I will*

send from the Father. Now, the sender has a certain authority in respect of the person sent. Hence we must say that the Son has a certain authority in respect of the Holy Ghost; not an authority of dominion or greatness, but only in point of origin. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.—But someone might say that the Son also is sent by the Holy Ghost, because our Lord declares that in Himself was fulfilled the saying of Isaias (Lk. iv. 18): *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me: . . . to preach the Gospel to the poor he hath sent me.* To this we reply that the Son is sent by the Holy Ghost in respect of His human nature. Now, the Holy Ghost did not assume a created nature in such wise that in respect of that nature He could be said to be sent by the Son, or that the Son has authority in relation to Him. It follows therefore that with regard to the eternal Person, the Son has authority over the Holy Ghost.

Moreover. The Son says of the Holy Ghost (Jo. xvi. 14): *He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine, and shall show it to you.* Now, He cannot be said to receive what is the Son's, unless He receive from the Son—for example, if He be said to receive the divine essence (which is the Son's) from the Father. Hence the text continues: *All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine; therefore I said that he shall receive of mine.* For if whatsoever the Father has, is the Son's, it follows that the Father's authority, in as much as He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, must be the Son's also. Consequently as the Holy Ghost receives from the Father of what is the Father's, so from the Son He receives of what is the Son's.

Besides, we can quote the authority of the Doctors of the Church, even of the Greeks. Thus Athanasius says (*Symbol. Fid.*): *The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.* Cyril also in his epistle received by the Council of Chalcedon says: *He is called the Spirit of Truth,*[1] *and is the Spirit of Truth: for he proceeds therefrom, as also from*

[1] Jo. xv. 26.

God the Father. And Didymus says (*De Spir. Sancto*): *Neither is the Son distinct, save in those things which he receives from the Father, nor is the Holy Ghost of another substance, besides what is conceded,* namely that He is from the Son and proceeds from Him. For this word *procession,* among all those that indicate origin, is the widest in its signification. Thus, in whatever way anything is from anything else, it is said to proceed therefrom: and since divine things are better expressed in general than in special terms, the word *procession* as denoting the origin of the divine Persons is to be specially noted. Hence, if it be granted that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, or flows from the Son, it follows that He proceeds from Him.

Again. We read in the decree of the Fifth Council:[1] *In all things we follow the teaching of the holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church, of Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, Cyril, Leo, Probus: and we subscribe to all that they taught concerning the true faith, and the condemnation of heresies.* Now, it is clear from many of Augustine's works, especially the *Book on the Trinity* and his *Commentary on John,* that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. Therefore it must be granted that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

The same may be evidently proved by reason.

Apart from the distinction of matter, which can have no place in the divine Persons, there can be no distinction in things except by way of opposition: since things which are in no way distinct from one another can be together in the same subject, so that they cannot be a cause of distinction: thus *white* and *triangular,* albeit diverse, yet, because they are not opposed to each other, can be in the same subject. Now, according to the teaching of the Catholic Faith, we must grant a distinction between the Son and the Holy Ghost: otherwise there would not be three, but two Persons. Consequently, this distinction must result from some kind of opposition. But, it cannot be the opposition of affirma-

[1] II Constantinople, sess. i.

tion and negation, since such is the distinction between being and non-being. Nor can it be the opposition of privation and habit, since such is the distinction between perfect and imperfect. Nor can it be the opposition of contrariety, since such is the distinction between things having different forms: for contrariety is difference of form, as the philosophers teach: and such a difference is incompatible in the divine Persons, in as much as they have one form, even as they have one essence: thus the Apostle speaking of the Son, says (Philip. ii. 6): *Who, being in the form of God,* namely of the Father. It follows, therefore, that one divine Person is not distinct from another save by relative opposition: thus the Son is distinct from the Father in respect of the relative opposition between a father and his son. For there can be no other relative opposition in God, save that which is according to origin: since relative opposition is founded either on quantity, as *double* and *half,* or on action and passion, as *master* and *servant, mover* and *moved, father* and *son.*

Again, of those relatives that are founded on quantity, some are based on difference in quantity, as *double* and *half, more* and *less;* some on unity itself—*e.g., same,* which signifies one in substance, and *equal,* which signifies one in quantity, and *like,* which signifies one in quality.

Accordingly, the divine Persons cannot be distinguished by relations based on diversity of quantity, because this would destroy the equality of the three Persons; nor by relations based on unity; because such relations do not cause distinction; in fact they are more akin to conformity, although it may be that one or the other of them presupposes distinction. But in all the relations based on action and passion, one of them is always subject and unequal in power; except only in relations of origin, where no inferiority is indicated, because in their case something produces its like and equal in nature and power. Wherefore it follows that the divine Persons cannot be distinguished save by relative opposition of origin. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost is distinct from the Son, He must proceed from

Him: since it cannot be said that the Son proceeds from the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son, and is given by Him.

Again. Both Son and Holy Ghost proceed from the Father. Consequently the Father must be related to both Son and Holy Ghost as the principle is related to that which proceeds from it. Now He is related to the Son by reason of *paternity*, but not so to the Holy Ghost, since then the Holy Ghost would be His Son: for paternity is a relation to none but a son. Therefore there must be another relation in the Father, whereby He is related to the Holy Ghost; and this is called *spiration*. In like manner, since there is a relation in the Son, whereby He is related to the Father, and which is called *filiation*, there must also be in the Holy Ghost another relation whereby He is related to the Father, and which is called *procession*. Thus there are two relations corresponding to the origin of the Son from the Father, one in the Person who is the origin, and one in the Person originated, namely paternity and filiation; and again two relations corresponding to the origin of the Holy Ghost, namely spiration and procession. Hence paternity and spiration do not constitute two persons, but belong to the one Person of the Father, because they are not opposite to each other. Neither, therefore, would filiation and procession constitute two Persons, but would belong to one Person, unless they were opposed to one another. Now, no other opposition is possible, save that of origin. Therefore there must be opposition of origin between the Son and the Holy Ghost, so that the one proceeds from the other.

Further. Things that have something in common, if they be distinct from each other, must be distinguished by *per se* differences, and not by differences accidentally belonging to what they have in common. Thus man and horse agree in animal nature, and are differentiated, not by black and white which are accidental to animal, but by rational and irrational which belong to animal *per se:* because, since animal means that which has a soul (*anima*),

it follows that it must be differentiated in the point of its having this or that kind of soul; for instance, rational or irrational. Now it is manifest that the Son and the Holy Ghost agree in the point of proceeding from another, since each is from the Father: and, accordingly, the Father is fittingly distinguished from both, in that he is innascible. If, then, the Holy Ghost is distinct from the Son, this must be by distinctions which divide *per se* the fact of being from another: and such distinctions must needs be of the same kind, that is distinctions of origin, so that one of them proceed from the other. It follows, therefore, that the Holy Ghost must proceed from the Son, in order to be distinct from Him.

Moreover. Someone might say that the Holy Ghost is distinct from the Son, not because He proceeds from Him, but on account of the difference in the origin of each from the Father: but this comes to the same. For if the Holy Ghost is other than the Son, their respective origins or processions must differ. Now, two origins cannot differ save as to term, principle, or subject: thus the origin of a horse differs from the origin of an ox as regards the term, for as much as these two origins terminate in specifically distinct natures. On the part of the principle—thus in the same animal species, there may be some animals engendered by the active force of the sun alone, while others are engendered by the same force co-operating with the active power of seed. On the part of the subject, the engendering of one horse differs from that of another, for as much as the specific nature is received into a different matter. Now, this distinction on the part of the subject cannot be ascribed to the divine Persons, since they are utterly devoid of matter. Again, on the part of the term, if one may use the expression, there can be no difference in the processions, because the Holy Ghost by proceeding, receives one and the same divine nature as the Son receives by being born. Consequently the distinction of their respective origins can only be on the part of the principle. Now, it is plain that the Father alone is the principle of the Son's origin. Therefore, if the Father alone

be the principle of the procession of the Holy Ghost, the procession of the Holy Ghost will not be distinct from the generation of the Son, and so the Holy Ghost will not be distinct from the Son. Consequently, if there is a distinction of processions and of Persons proceeding, we must conclude that the Holy Ghost is not from the Father alone, but from the Father and the Son.

Again, someone might say that the processions differ as to the principle, in as much as the Father produces the Son as the Word proceeding from His intellect; and the Holy Ghost, as the love proceeding from His will: and then we shall have to say that the two processions and the two proceeding Persons are distinct by reason of the difference between will and intellect in God the Father. But will and intellect are not really distinct in God the Father, but only logically, as we have proved.[1] Consequently, there will only be a logical distinction between the two processions, and the two proceeding Persons. Now, things that differ only logically are predicated of one another: for it is true that God's will is His intellect and *vice versa*. Hence it will be true that the Holy Ghost is the Son, and *vice versa:* which is the impious statement of Sabellius. Therefore, to account for the distinction between the Holy Ghost and the Son, it is not enough to say that the Son proceeds by way of the intelligence, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will, unless we add that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Further. From the very fact that the Holy Ghost is said to proceed by way of the will, and the Son by way of the intellect, it follows that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son: because love proceeds from the word, since we cannot love a thing unless we first conceive it in the word of our hearts.

Again. If we consider the various species of things, we shall observe a certain order in them, in that living beings are above lifeless things, animals above plants, and man above other animals; and that there are various grades in each one of these, in respect of their various species. Hence

[1] Bk. I., chs. xlv., lxxiii.

Plato said that species are like numbers, which differ specifically by the addition or subtraction of unity. Consequently, in substances devoid of matter, there can be no distinction but by reason of order. Now, the divine Persons are immaterial, and in them there can be no order but that of origin. Therefore two Persons cannot proceed from one, unless one of them proceed from the other: and thus, the Holy Ghost must proceed from the Son.

Again. The Father and Son, as regards the unity of essence, do not differ save in that the one is the Father, and the other the Son. Whatsoever, therefore, is in addition to this, is common to Father and Son. Now, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost is in addition to paternity and filiation: since the relation whereby the Father is father is distinct from that whereby He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, as stated above. Therefore it is common to Father and Son, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost.

Moreover. Whatsoever is not against the nature of a thing, can be ascribed to it, unless there be something accidental in the way. Now, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost is not incompatible in the Son, neither as God (since the Father, who is God, is the principle of the Holy Ghost), nor as Son (since the procession of the Holy Ghost differs from that of the Son): and to proceed from a principle by one kind of procession is not incompatible with being the principle of another's procession. Consequently, it is not impossible for the Son to be the principle of the Holy Ghost. Now, what is not impossible is possible: and in God, what is possible is not different from what is. Therefore the Son is the principle of the Holy Ghost.

CHAPTER XXV

ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THAT THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS NOT FROM THE SON; AND THEIR SOLUTION

SOME men, in their obstinate opposition to the truth, adduce arguments to the contrary: but they scarcely deserve a reply. They say that when our Lord spoke of the procession of the Holy Ghost, He stated that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, and makes no mention of the Son, as when He says (Jo. xv. 26): *When the Paraclete shall come, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of Truth, who proceeds from the Father.* Therefore, as we must not believe anything about God save what we are taught by the Scriptures, we must not say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Now this is utter nonsense. By reason of the unity of essence, whatsoever the Scripture says about one Person, must be understood to apply to another Person, even though an exclusive term be employed, unless it be incompatible with the latter Person's personal property. For, though it is said (Matth. xi. 27): *No one knoweth the Son, but the Father*, neither the Son Himself, nor the Holy Ghost is excluded from knowledge of the Son. Hence, even were it said in the Gospel that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone, this would not imply that He does not proceed from the Son, since this is not incompatible with the Son's property, as we have proved.[1] Nor need we wonder if our Lord said that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, without mentioning Himself, because He is wont to refer all things to the Father, from whom He has whatsoever He has. Thus He says (Jo. vii. 16): *My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me;* that is, the Father's: and we find many such utterances of our Lord, stressing the Father's authority as principle. And yet, in the passage quoted above, He does not wholly omit to say that He is

[1] Ch. xxiv.

the principle of the Holy Ghost, for He calls Him the *Spirit of Truth,* and He had previously called Himself *the Truth.*[1]

They also object that in some Councils it was forbidden, under pain of anathema, to make any addition to the Creed approved by the Councils: and that in this Creed no mention is made of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son. Wherefore they argue that the Latins who made this addition to the Creed are anathematised.

But this avails nothing: because it is stated in the decree of the Council of Chalcedon,[2] that when the Fathers assembled at Constantinople confirmed the doctrine of the Council of Nicea, *they did not imply that the previous Council contained less doctrine, but their object was to explain the mind of the Fathers* by quoting the authority of Scripture against those who denied that the Holy Ghost is the Lord. In like manner we must say that the procession of the Holy Ghost is implicitly recognized in the Creed of Constantinople, in as much as it states that He proceeds: because what applies to the Father, applies also to the Son, as we have said above. Moreover the authority of the Roman Pontiff suffices to make this addition: by which authority the early Councils were confirmed.

They also argue that since the Holy Ghost is simple, He cannot proceed from two Persons; and that if He proceed from the Father perfectly, He does not proceed from the Son; and adduce many similar arguments, which can easily be solved even by those who are not far advanced in theology.

For the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, on account of the unity of the divine power, and by one productive act produce the Holy Ghost. Thus too the three Persons are one principle of the creature, and create by one action.

[1] John xiv. 6.
[2] Cf. *Summ. Theol.,* P. I., Q. xxxvi., A. 2, *ad* 2.

CHAPTER XXVI

THAT THERE ARE NO MORE THAN THREE PERSONS IN GOD, NAMELY, THE FATHER, THE SON, AND THE HOLY GHOST

We gather from what has been said in the preceding chapters that in the divine nature there subsist three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and that these three are one God, being distinct in relations alone. The Father is distinct from the Son by the relation of *paternity*, and by *innascibility:* the Son from the Father, by the relation of *sonship:* the Father and the Son from the Holy Ghost by *spiration*, as it may be called: and the Holy Ghost from Father and Son, by the *procession* of love, whereby He proceeds from both.

Besides these three Persons there is no fourth in the divine nature.

Since the divine Persons agree in essence, they cannot be distinct save by relations of origin, as we have already made clear.[1] Now these relations of origin do not arise from a procession tending to external things (for thus the thing that proceeds is not of the same essence as its principle), but from a procession that remains within. And it is only in the working of the intellect and will that a thing is found to proceed so as to remain within its principle, as we have explained.[2] Wherefore the divine Persons cannot be multiplied except in so far as this is necessitated by the processions of intellect and will in God. Now in God there can be only one procession according to the intellect, because His act of intelligence is one, simple and perfect; since in understanding Himself, He understands all things else, so that in God there can be but one procession of the Word. In like manner there can be but one procession of love, since the divine volition is one and simple: because in loving Himself, He loves all other things. Consequently in God there can be no more than two proceeding Persons: one by way of intelligence, as word, namely the Son; the

[1] Ch. xxiv. [2] Ch. xi.

other by way of love, namely the Holy Ghost. There is also one Person who does not proceed, namely the Father. Therefore there are but three Persons in the Trinity.

Again. The Persons are distinguished according to procession. Now in respect of procession, there are but three modes possible in a Person : either He proceeds not at all, like the Father; or, as the Son, He proceeds from one that does not proceed; or, like the Holy Ghost, He proceeds from one who proceeds. Therefore there cannot be more than three Persons. And although, in other living beings, relations of origin can be multiplied—thus in human nature there can be many fathers, and many sons—in the divine nature this is quite impossible. For since in one nature filiation is of one species, it cannot be multiplied except in respect of its matter or subject, as in the case of other forms. Hence, as in God there is no matter or subject, and as the very relations are subsistent, as we have proved,[1] there cannot be several filiations in God. The same applies to the other relations: and thus in God there are but three Persons.

Someone may object that since the Son is perfect God, He has perfect intellectual power, and consequently He can produce a Word; and in like manner, as there is infinite goodness in the Holy Ghost, whereby He is the principle of the communication of goodness, He will be able to bestow the divine nature on another.

To this we reply that the Son is God, as begotten, and not as begetting: wherefore the intellectual power is in Him as in one proceeding by way of word, and not as in the one producing the word: and, in like manner, since the Holy Ghost is God as proceeding, infinite goodness is in Him as the recipient, and not as communicating the infinite goodness to another. For they are not distinguished from one another except by the relations alone, as we have shown. Hence the whole fulness of the Godhead is in the Son, identically the same as that which is in the Father; but in the Son it is with the relation of

[1] Ch. xiv.

birth; in the Father, with the relation of active generation: so that were the Father's relation ascribed to the Son, there would no longer be any distinction between them: and the same applies to the Holy Ghost.

We may now consider the likeness to the divine Trinity in the human mind. The mind, by actually understanding itself, produces its word within itself: this word is the intelligible reflection of the mind, and is called the idea, existing in the soul: and when it loves itself, it reproduces itself in the will as loved. Further than this it does not proceed within itself, but completes the circle, when by love it returns to the very substance whence the procession began in the idea: there is however a procession towards external effects, when through love of self one proceeds to action. Thus there are three things in the mind; the mind itself in its natural existence, which is the starting-point of the procession; in the intellect, the conception of the mind; and in the will, the mind loved. Yet these three are not one nature, since the mind's act of intelligence is not its being; and its volition is neither its being nor its act of intelligence. For this reason the mind understood and the mind loved are not persons, since they are not subsistent: nor is the mind, in its natural existence, a person, for it is not the whole subsistence, but only part of the subsistence, that is to say, of man. Accordingly, in our mind there is a likeness to the divine Trinity, as regards the processions which multiply the Persons. For we have sufficiently shown that in the divine nature there is God unbegotten, namely the Father, who is the principle of the whole divine procession: God begotten, as the word is conceived in the intellect, and this is the Son: and God proceeding as love, namely, the Holy Ghost. There are no further processions within the divine nature, but only those that terminate in external effects. This likeness, then, falls short of being a representation of the divine Trinity, in that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are of one nature, and each of them is a perfect Person, since God's very being

is intelligence and will, as we have shown. Hence the divine likeness is reproduced in man, as the likeness of Hercules is reproduced in stone, in respect of the form represented, but not by community of nature: wherefore God's image is stated to be in the human mind (Gen. i. 26): *Let us make man to our own image and likeness.*

In other things also there is a likeness to the Trinity, inasmuch as each thing is one in its substance, informed by a certain species, and has a certain order. Now, as we have already clearly stated, the intellectual concept in intelligible being is like the information of the species in natural being: and love is like the inclination or order of a natural thing. Hence in natural things species represents the Son remotely, and order represents the Holy Ghost. Hence, on account of the likeness in irrational things being remote and obscure, we say that there is in them a trace but not an image of the Trinity, according to Job xi. 7: *Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly.*

We have now said enough about the Trinity.

CHAPTER XXVII

OF THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD, AS HANDED DOWN IN HOLY SCRIPTURE

In speaking of the divine generation we observed that certain things are befitting the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, in respect of His divine nature, and others in respect of His human nature, by taking which in time the eternal Son of God wished to become incarnate. Wherefore we must now proceed to treat of the mystery of the Incarnation. Of all the divine works this surpasses reason more than any: since one cannot imagine God doing anything more wonderful, than that God the Son, true God, should become true man. And because it is the most wonderful of all, it follows that all other wonders

are directed to faith in this the greatest of all wonders: since in every genus, what is greatest is the cause of the rest.

Our faith in the Incarnation is based on divine authority. For it is said (Jo. i. 14): *And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt amongst us:* and speaking of the Son of God, the Apostle says (Philip. ii. 6, 7): *Who, when he was in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.* The same is clearly indicated by the words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, since at times He ascribes to Himself lowly and human things that belong to Him in His assumed human nature, for instance, *The Father is greater than I* (Jo. xiv. 28), *My soul is sorrowful unto death* (Matth. xxvi. 38): while sometimes He says of Himself sublime and divine things, such as certainly belong to Him in His divine nature: for instance, *I and the Father are one* (Jo. x. 30), and, *All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine* (Jo. xvi. 15).

The same is shown by the very things He is related to have done. That He feared, grieved, hungered, died, are things pertaining to His human nature: that by His own power He healed the sick, raised the dead, commanded the obedience of the earth's elements, that He cast out devils, forgave sins, raised Himself from the dead when He willed, that at last He ascended into heaven—all these things point to a divine power in Him.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE ERROR OF PHOTINUS ABOUT THE INCARNATION

Some, through abuse of the words of the Scriptures, have conceived false notions about the divine and human natures of our Lord Jesus Christ.

For instance Ebion and Cerinthus and, after them, Paul

of Samosata and Photinus, said that Christ was a mere man: and they ascribed divinity to Him not as though He were God by nature but because by His deeds He had merited to surpass others in His share of divine glory, as we stated above.[1] Now this view, in addition to what we have already said about it, destroys the mystery of the Incarnation.

In this view, God would not have taken flesh, and become man: but fleshly man would have become God: and consequently there would have been no truth in the sentence of John (i. 14): *The Word was made flesh,* but rather should he have said that *Flesh was made the Word.* In like manner the Son of God would not have come down and *emptied* Himself, but man would have been raised and glorified, so that the Apostle could not say truly, *Who, when he was in the form of God . . . emptied himself, taking the form of a slave* (Philip. ii. 6, 7): and it would have been only the man that was raised to divine glory; of which it is said (verse 9): *For which cause God also hath exalted him.*

Nor would our Lord's words be true (Jo. vi. 38), *I came down from heaven,* but only His words (Jo. xx. 17), *I ascend to my Father:* and yet Scripture unites these two statements (Jo. iii. 13) where our Lord says: *No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, who is in heaven:* and (Eph. iv. 10): *He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens.* Again, in this case, it could not be said that the Son was sent by the Father, nor that He came out from the Father, in order to come into the world, but only that He went to the Father: and yet He unites both together (Jo. xvi. 5): *I go to him that sent me:* and (*ibid.* 28): *I came out from the Father, and came into the world: again I leave the world, and go to the Father;* and both of these bear witness to the human and divine natures.

[1] Ch. iv.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE ERROR OF THE MANICHEANS CONCERNING THE INCARNATION

OTHERS there were who denied the true doctrine of the Incarnation, and invented a fictitious imitation of it. The Manicheans, in fact, said that the Son of God assumed not a real but an imaginary body: so that He could not be a real man, but only seemed to be one. They pretended that whatever He did as man—for instance, that He was born, that He ate, drank, walked, suffered, and was buried—was all unreal, though having some semblance of reality. Consequently they reduced the whole mystery of the Incarnation to a work of fiction. Now in the first place this view entirely sets at nought the authority of Scripture. For since the likeness of flesh is not flesh, and the likeness of walking is not walking, and so on; the Scripture lies when it says, *the Word was made flesh,* if it were but imaginary flesh: it lies again when it says that Jesus walked, ate, died, and was buried, if these things happened to a mere imaginary apparition. Now, if the authority of Scripture be allowed to suffer in the slightest degree, our faith loses all its stability, for it is based on Holy Writ, according to Jo. xx. 31, *These things are written that you may believe.*

Someone, however, might say that Holy Scripture is not lacking in truth, if it records apparitions as though they were real facts: because the likenesses of things are equivocally and metaphorically called by the names of the things themselves; thus the picture of a man is called a man: and Holy Writ is wont to speak in this way, for instance (1 Cor. x. 4): *The Rock was Christ.* Thus in Scripture many corporeal terms are applied to God for no other reason but likeness: for instance, He is called a lamb, a lion, and so forth.

Yet, though it be true that the likenesses of things are

sometimes called by the names of the things they represent: it is not becoming for Holy Scripture to relate an entire incident with such a double meaning, unless one were able to elucidate the truth from other passages of Scripture: because this would lead men, not to knowledge, but to deception: and yet the Apostle says (Rom. xv. 4) that *whatsoever things were written, were written for our learning,* and (2 Tim. iii. 16): *All scripture, inspired of God, is profitable to teach . . . and to instruct.* Moreover the whole Gospel story would be a poem and a fable, if imaginary things were portrayed as being real: whereas it is said (2 Pet. i. 16): *We have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known to you the power . . . of our Lord Jesus Christ.*

Moreover, whenever Scripture relates apparitions and not realities, this is quite clear from the manner of the narrative. Thus it is said (Gen. xviii. 2): *And when he* (that is, Abraham) *had lifted up his eyes, there appeared to him three men:* whereby we are given to understand that they were men in appearance only. Hence he adored God among them, and witnessed to his Godhead, saying (verse 27): *I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes;* and again (verse 25): *Thou who judgest all the earth, wilt not make this judgment.* When Isaias, Ezechiel, and other prophets describe their visions, we are not led into error, because such things are set down, not as an historical narrative, but as descriptive of the prophecy; moreover they always use some expression to indicate an apparition: for instance (Isa. vi. 1), *I saw the Lord sitting upon a high throne,* (Ezech. i. 3, 4), *The hand of the Lord was there upon him: and I saw, and behold a whirlwind came out of the north,* etc., and (*ibid.* viii. 3), *The likeness of a hand was put forth, and took me . . . and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem.*

Again, we ought not to be led into error, if Scripture uses metaphors in speaking of divine things. In the first place, these metaphors are taken from things of so little account, that it is clear that the statements are to be taken

metaphorically and not literally. Secondly, what is hidden inside metaphors in one part of Scripture, is stated elsewhere in Scripture in proper terms, which express the truth clearly. Now this does not apply to the case in point: because Scripture nowhere affords authority for denying the reality of what it relates of Christ's human nature.

Yet it might be said that Scripture does this implicitly when the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 3): *God, sending his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh,* or when he says (Philip. ii. 7): *Being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.* But such an interpretation is forbidden by the context. For he does not say simply: *In the likeness of flesh,* but of *sinful flesh,* because Christ had real flesh—not sinful flesh, since there was no sin in Him, but like sinful flesh, since He had passible flesh, and such as man's flesh had become through sin. In like manner, a fictional interpretation of the words, *being made in the likeness of men* is excluded by the addition of the words, *taking the form of a servant:* because it is clear that *form* here means *nature* and not *semblance,* since the Apostle had said, *Who, being in the form of God;* for it is not suggested that Christ was a semblance of God. The fictional sense is also excluded by the subsequent words, *Becoming obedient unto death.* Therefore likeness here does not indicate the likeness of simulation, but true likeness of species, just as all men are said to be like in species.

Still more emphatically does Holy Scripture exclude any suspicion of a ghostly apparition. For it is related (Matth. xiv. 26) that the disciples, *seeing* Jesus *walking upon the sea, were troubled, saying: It is an apparition; and they cried out for fear.* Our Lord took the right way to undeceive them; for thus the narrative continues: *And immediately Jesus spoke to them saying: Be of good heart, it is I, fear not.* Yet it hardly seems reasonable to suppose that the disciples would be unaware of it, if He had assumed only an imaginary body, seeing that He had chosen them that they might bear witness to the truth from what they saw and heard; and, if they were aware of it, then the

thought that it was an apparition should not have made them afraid.

And still more did our Lord, after His resurrection, remove from the minds of His disciples any doubt of the reality of His body. Thus (Lk. xxiv. 37-39) it is related that the disciples *being troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit,* when they saw Jesus : *and He said to them: Why are you troubled, and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? See my hands and feet, that it is I myself. Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have.* For it would have been useless to tell them to feel, if He had but an imaginary body.

Again. The apostles show themselves to be suitable witnesses of Christ. Thus Peter says (Acts x. 40, 41): *Him,* that is, Jesus, *God raised up the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God, even to us, who did eat and drink with Him after He arose again from the dead:* and the Apostle John says at the beginning of his epistle (1 Jo. i. 1, 2): *To that which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life . . . we bear witness.* Now it is impossible for a valid witness of the truth to be afforded by things that happen not really but only in appearance. Consequently, if Christ's body was but imaginary, if He did not really eat and drink, if He was not really seen and handled, but only in imagination, it follows that the apostles' witnessing of Christ was unfitting; and thus that their *preaching was vain, and vain* also our *faith,* as Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 14).

Moreover, if Christ had not a real body, He did not really die. Therefore He did not really rise again. Consequently, the apostles are false witnesses, since they preached to the world that He had risen again : wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 15): *We are found false witnesses of God: because we have given testimony against God; that he hath raised up Christ, whom he hath not raised up, if the dead rise not again.*

Further. Falsehood is not the right way to the truth,

according to Ecclus. xxxiv. 4, *What truth can come from that which is false?* Now Christ came into the world in order to manifest the truth: for He said (Jo. xviii. 37): *For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth.* Therefore there was nothing false in Christ. Yet there would have been, if what is related of Him was only imaginary: since that which is not what it seems to be, is false. Therefore all the things related about Christ happened in reality.

Again. It is stated (Rom. iii. 24, 25) that we are justified in Christ's blood, and (Apoc. v. 9) it is said: *Thou hast redeemed us to God, in thy blood.* Consequently, if Christ had not real blood, neither did He really shed it for us, and we are neither truly justified nor truly redeemed. Therefore it is useless for us to be in Christ.

Again. If Christ's coming into the world was nothing but imaginary there was nothing new in His coming: since even in the Old Testament, God appeared to Moses and the prophets, under many figures, as the New Testament frequently declares. But this would void the entire teaching of the New Testament. Therefore the Son of God assumed a real, and not an imaginary, body.

CHAPTER XXX

THE ERROR OF VALENTINE ABOUT THE INCARNATION

THE opinion of Valentine about the mystery of the Incarnation was somewhat akin to the foregoing. He said that Christ's body was not earthly but brought by Him from heaven: and that He received nothing from His Virgin Mother, but merely passed through her as water through an aqueduct.

He seems to have been led into this error by certain passages of Holy Scripture. Thus it is said (Jo. iii. 13 and 31): *No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that*

descended from heaven, the son of man, who is in heaven. . . . He that cometh from above, is above all. And our Lord said (Jo. vi. 38): *I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me.* And (1 Cor. xv. 47): *The first man was of the earth, earthly: the second man, from heaven, heavenly.* They take all these texts to mean that we must believe Christ to have come down from heaven even as regards His body.

Now this opinion of Valentine, like that of the Manicheans mentioned above, comes from a false principle: for they believed that all earthly things were created by the devil. Wherefore, since *the Son of God appeared that he might destroy the works of the devil* (1 Jo. iii. 8), it was not fitting that He should take a body formed from a creature of the devil. In fact Paul says (2 Cor. vi. 14, 15): *What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial?* And, since like fruits come from the same root, this view leads to the same false issue as the preceding.

Every species has fixed essential principles, namely its matter and form, which go to constitute the specific nature in things composed of matter and form. Now, just as human flesh and bone and the like are matter proper to a man, so fire, air, water, earth, and like objects of the senses, are the matter of flesh and bone and the parts thereof. Hence, if Christ's body were not earthly, neither had He real flesh and bone, and He was wholly an imaginary being: and consequently He was not a real, but an imaginary man. And yet, as we have observed, He said: *A spirit hath not flesh and bone, as you see me to have* (Lk. xxiv. 39).

Again. A heavenly body is naturally incorruptible and unchangeable, and cannot be moved from its connatural position. Now it was unbecoming that the Son of God should detract from the dignity of the nature He assumed, nay, rather was it becoming that He should raise it. Therefore He did not bring down from heaven a heavenly or incorruptible body, nay, rather was it an earthly and pas-

sible body which He assumed, and rendered incorruptible and heavenly.

Again. The Apostle says (Rom. i. 3) that the Son of God *was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh*. Now David's body was of the earth. Therefore Christ's body was also.

Moreover. The same Apostle says (Gal. iv. 4) that *God sent his Son, made of a woman;* and it is said (Matth. i. 16) that *Jacob begot Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ.* But He would not be described as made or born of her, if He only came through her as through a channel, taking nothing from her. Therefore He took His body from her.

Further. Mary could not be called His mother, as the Evangelist declares her to have been, unless He had received something from her.

Again. The Apostle says (Heb. ii. 11, 12): *Both he that sanctifieth,* namely Christ, *and they who are sanctified,* namely Christians, *are all of one. For which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying: I will declare thy name to my brethren;*[1] and further on (verse 14): *Therefore, because the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner hath been partaker of the same.* Now, if Christ had but a heavenly body, it is plain that, since we have an earthly body, we are not *all of one* with Him: and consequently we cannot be called His brethren, nor was He a partaker of flesh and blood. For it is well known that flesh and blood are composed of the lower elements, and are not of a heavenly nature. Clearly, therefore, this opinion is opposed to the statement of the Apostle.

As to the arguments on which that view is based, they are evidently absurd. For Christ came down from heaven, not as to His body and soul, but as God. We may gather this from our Lord's very words. Thus, after saying (Jo. iii. 13): *No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven,* He added, *the Son of Man, who*

[1] Ps. xxi. 28.

is in heaven: thereby showing that He came down from heaven in such wise as not to cease to be there. Now it is proper to God to be on earth and yet fill heaven also, according to the saying of Jeremias (xxiii. 24), *I fill heaven and earth.* Therefore the Son of God did not, as God, come down from heaven by local movement: since that which is moved locally approaches one place in such a way as to leave another place. Consequently, the Son of God is said to come down from heaven, in as much as He united an earthly substance to Himself: even so the Apostle says that He emptied Himself, in as much as He took the form of a servant, although He did not forfeit His Godhead by so doing.

As to the principle on which this view is based, we have already proved it to be erroneous: for it has been shown,[1] that bodies were created not by the devil, but by God.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE ERROR OF APOLLINARIS CONCERNING CHRIST'S BODY

More absurd still was the error of Apollinaris concerning the mystery of the Incarnation. He agreed with the above-mentioned errors, in that he asserted that Christ's body was not taken from the Virgin: but his impiety went so far as to contend that Christ's flesh was formed from some part of the Word. He was led into this error by the text (Jo. i. 14), *And the Word was made flesh,* which he understood to mean that the Word was transformed into flesh: just as the text (Jo. ii. 9), *When the chief steward had tasted the water made wine* indicates that the water was transformed into wine. It is easy to see how impossible this is, if we take note of what was proved above.[2]

For we proved that God is utterly unchangeable. Now it is evident that whatsoever is transformed is changed.

[1] Bk. II., chs. vi., xv.

[2] Bk. I., chs. xiii., xv.

Since, then, the Word of God is true God, as we have proved,[1] it was impossible for the Word of God to be transformed into man.

Again. Since the Word of God is God, He is simple: for it was proved[2] that there is no composition in God. Accordingly, if some part of the Word was changed into flesh, it follows that the whole Word was changed. Now that which is changed into something else, ceases to be what it was before: thus water, changed into wine, is no longer water, but wine. Therefore, according to this view, after the Incarnation, the Word of God would utterly cease to be. But this is impossible, both because the Word of God is eternal, according to Jo. i. 1, *In the beginning was the Word;* and because, even after the Incarnation, Christ is called the Word, according to Apoc. xix. 13, *He was clothed with a garment sprinkled with blood: and his name is called, the Word of God.*

Further. Things that have not common matter and genus cannot be changed one into the other: you cannot change a line into whiteness, because they differ generically: and a body fashioned from the elements cannot be changed into a heavenly body, or into an incorporeal substance, or *vice versa,* since they are not of the same matter. Now, since the Word of God is God, He agrees neither in genus nor in matter with anything else: for God is not in a genus, and is void of matter. Therefore it was impossible for the Word of God to be changed into flesh or into anything else.

Again. Flesh, bones, and blood and the parts thereof are essentially composed of some determinate matter. Hence, if according to the above view the Word of God was changed into flesh, it would follow that in Christ there was no real flesh or anything else of the kind; and so He would not be a real, but only an imaginary man. Other equally absurd consequences would follow, all of which we have exposed when refuting Valentine.[3]

Accordingly it is evident that the text of John, *And the*

[1] Ch. iii. [2] Bk. I., ch. xxviii. [3] Ch. xxx.

Word was made flesh, does not mean that the Word was transformed into flesh : but that He took flesh in order to live among men and appear to them visibly. Hence the text continues, *And dwelt amongst us, and we saw his glory,* etc. Baruch too says of God (iii. 38) that *he was seen upon earth, and conversed with men.*

CHAPTER XXXII

THE ERROR OF ARIUS AND APOLLINARIS CONCERNING CHRIST'S SOUL

THERE have been false views not only about Christ's body, but also concerning His soul.

Arius asserted that Christ had no soul, and that He assumed only a body, the Godhead supplying the place of a soul. Apparently he was forced to hold this view, through maintaining that the Son of God is a creature and less than the Father. For, in order to prove this latter statement, he chose those texts of Scripture that stress human weakness in Christ; and lest any one should refute his argument, by saying that these texts refer to Christ not in His divine, but in His human nature, he wickedly denied that Christ had a soul. Thus when things were said of Christ which could not be said of the human body, for instance, that He marvelled, feared, prayed, it was necessary to conclude that the Son of God was an inferior being. In support of his view he quoted the above text of John : *The Word was made flesh;* which, according to him, proved that the Word took flesh alone, and not a soul. In this particular point Apollinaris followed him.

From what we have already said it is clear that we cannot hold this opinion.

For we have proved[1] that God cannot be the form of a body. Since then the Word of God is God,[2] it is impossible for Him to be the form of a body, so as in a body to take

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxvii. [2] Chs. iii., xi., xiv.

the place of a soul. This argument avails against Apollinaris, who confessed that the Word of God is God: and, though Arius denied this, still the same argument avails against him, since it is impossible not only for God to be the form of a body, but also for any of the supercelestial spirits, supreme among whom Arius placed the Son of God—except according to the opinion of Origen, who held human souls to be of the same species as the supercelestial spirits, an opinion which we have refuted already.[1]

Again, if you subtract what is essential to man, that which remains is not a real man. Now evidently the soul especially is essential to man, since it is his form. Hence, if Christ had no soul, He was no real man. And yet the Apostle says (1 Tim. ii. 5): *There is one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.*

Further. The essence not only of man, but of each of his parts depends on the soul: wherefore, when the soul has departed, the eyes, flesh, and bones of a dead man are so called equivocally, like an eye in a picture or statue. Accordingly, if Christ had no soul, it follows that neither His flesh nor any of His human parts were real. And yet our Lord witnesses to the contrary (Lk. xxiv. 39): *A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have.*

Further. That which is engendered of a living being cannot be called its son, unless it be produced thereby in the same species: thus a worm is not the son of the animal in which it is engendered. Now, if Christ had no soul, He would not be of the same species as other men: because difference of form causes difference of species. Consequently, we would be unable to say that Christ is the son of the Virgin Mary, or that she is His mother: and yet this is asserted in the Gospels.

Moreover. It is explicitly stated in the Gospel that Christ had a soul: for instance (Matth. xxvi. 38), *My soul is sorrowful even unto death,* and (Jo. xii. 27), *Now is my soul troubled.* And, should they say that by *soul* is meant the Son of God, because in their opinion He takes the place

[1] Bk. II., ch. xcv.

of soul and flesh, we refer them to the words of our Lord (Jo. x. 18): *I have power to lay it* (namely, *my soul*[1]) *down, and I have power to take it up again.* From these words we gather that in Christ, besides His soul, there was something that had the power to lay down that soul, and to take it up again. But it was not in the power of His body to be united to the Son of God, or to be separated from God, since this surpasses the power of nature. Therefore we are given to understand that Christ's soul was distinct from the Godhead of the Son of God, to whom rightly that power is ascribed.

Again. Sorrow, anger, and the like are passions of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher asserts.[2] Now these things were in Christ, as the Gospels declare. Therefore in Christ there was a sensitive soul, which evidently differs from the divine nature of the Son of God.

Since, however, it might be said that the Gospels ascribe human things to Christ metaphorically, even as Holy Scripture in many places ascribes such things to God, we must needs refer to something that must be taken in its proper sense. For just as we must understand literally and not metaphorically the other bodily things which the Evangelists relate about Christ, so must we not give it a metaphorical interpretation when we read that He ate, or as a consequence, was hungry. Now hunger is only in one having a sensitive soul, since hunger is the appetite for food. Therefore Christ had a sensitive soul.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE ERRORS OF APOLLINARIS, WHO SAID THAT CHRIST HAD NOT A RATIONAL SOUL, AND OF ORIGEN, WHO SAID THAT CHRIST'S SOUL WAS CREATED BEFORE THE WORLD

CONVINCED by the authority of Scripture, Apollinaris confessed that there was in Christ a sensitive soul, but one without mind or intellect; so that the Word supplied the

[1] Douay, *life*.

[2] 7 *Phys.*

absence of mind and intellect in that soul. But neither does this suffice to avoid the absurdities mentioned above.

For man takes his human species from his having a human mind and reason. Accordingly, if Christ had no such thing, He was not really a man, nor of the same species as we are: because a soul devoid of reason belongs to a different species from that to which a rational soul belongs: since, according to the Philosopher,[1] in definitions and species, the addition or subtraction of an essential difference changes the species, as unity in numbers. Now *rational* is a specific difference. Therefore, if in Christ the soul was sensitive, but not rational, it was of a different species from ours which is possessed of reason. Consequently Christ would not have been of the same species as we are.

Again. There are various species among irrational sensitive souls; as evidenced by irrational animals that differ specifically, each one of which is specified by its own soul. Hence the irrational sensitive soul is a genus containing many species. Now a thing cannot be in a genus without being in one of its species. Consequently, if Christ's soul belonged to the genus of irrational sensitive souls, it must have belonged to one of the species of that genus, such as the soul of a lion, or horse, or some other beast: which is utterly absurd.

Further. The body stands in relation to the soul as matter to form, and as an instrument to the principal agent. Now matter must needs be proportionate to the form, and the instrument to the principal agent. Consequently there must be a diversity of bodies corresponding to the diversity of souls. Our very senses bear witness to the fact that various animals are provided with a variety of members according to the requirements of their respective souls. Hence if Christ had not a soul like ours, His body would not have been provided with the same members as ours.

Moreover. Apollinaris admits that the Word of God is truly God, therefore he must also admit that the Word of

[1] 8 *Metaph.*

God cannot be astonished; since those things astonish us, the cause of which we know not. Now no astonishment could affect a sensitive soul, since it belongs not to a sensitive soul to trouble about knowing the causes of things. Yet Christ was astonished, as can be proved from the Gospels: for it is stated (Matth. viii. 10) that *Jesus hearing* the words of the centurion, *marvelled*. Therefore in Christ, besides the divinity of the Word and a sensitive soul, there was something else which made it possible for Him to marvel: and this is a human mind. Hence it is clear from all that has been said, that Christ had a real human body, and a real human soul.

Accordingly, the text of John, *The Word was made flesh*, does not mean that the Word was changed into flesh: nor that the Word assumed flesh alone, or a sensitive and not a rational soul. According to the wonted manner of Scripture, the part is put for the whole: so that *The Word was made flesh* is the same as *The Word was made man*. In the same way *soul* is sometimes used by Scripture to indicate *man*. Thus (Exod. i. 5) it is said: *All the souls that came out of Jacob's thigh were seventy:* and *flesh* also, thus (Isa. xl. 5) it is said: *All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken*. Accordingly, in the text in question, *flesh* stands for the whole man, and indicates the assumption by the Word of the weakness of human nature.

Now if, as we have shown, Christ had human flesh and a human soul, it is evident that His soul did not exist before the conception of His body. For it has been proved[1] that human souls do not exist before their respective bodies. Consequently it is clear that the teaching of Origen is false, in asserting that in the beginning and before the creation of the material world, Christ's soul was created at the same time as all other spiritual creatures, and assumed by the Word: and that at length towards the end of time it was clothed with flesh for the salvation of mankind.

[1] Bk. II., ch. lxxxiv.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE ERROR OF THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA CONCERNING THE UNION OF THE WORD WITH MAN

It is clear then from what has been said, that neither was the Godhead lacking in Christ, as Ebion, Cerinthus and Photinus contended; nor a true human body, as the Manicheans with Valentine erroneously maintained; nor again a human soul, as Arius and Apollinaris asserted. Accordingly, since these three, viz. Godhead, human soul, and a real human body, were united in Christ, it remains for us to seek from the teaching of the Scriptures, what we are to hold in regard to this union.

Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius his follower explained this union in the following manner. They said that in Christ a human body and a human soul were joined together in a natural union, so that they formed a man of the same species as we are, and that God dwelt in this man as in His temple, that is to say by His grace, as in other men. Hence the words of Christ to the Jews (Jo. ii. 19), *Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up,* which words the Evangelist expounds by saying (verse 21): *But he spoke of the temple of his body.* Hence too the Apostle says (Coloss. i. 19) that *in him, it hath well-pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell.* As a result there was between that man and God, a further union of affection, in that the man adhered to God by His good will, and God in His will accepted Him, according to Jo. viii. 29: *He that sent me is with me; and he hath not left me alone: for I do always the things that please him.* Hence we may take the union between that man and God, to be the union of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. vi. 17): *He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.* And just as, by reason of this union, names which properly belong to God are applied to men, so that in various

passages of Scripture they are said to be gods, and sons of God, also lords, Saints, and Christs: so too, divine names may be applied to this man, so that, by reason of God dwelling in Him and being united to Him in a bond of affection, He may be called God, the Son of God, Lord, the Holy One, and Christ. Yet, since there was a greater fulness of grace in this man than in other holy men, He was the temple of God more than the rest of men, and more closely united to God in the bond of affection, and by a special privilege shared in the divine names. For this reason, on account of the excellence of His grace, He received a share of divine honour and dignity, and was adored together with God.

It follows from all this that the Person of the Word of God is distinct from the person of this man who is adored together with God's Word. And if we speak of them as being one person, this is on account of the aforesaid union of affections, so that this man and the Word of God would be called one person, as man and wife are said to be no longer two, but one flesh. Now a union of this kind does not allow of our saying of the one what we say of the other (for not all that is true of the husband is also true of the wife, or *vice versa*). And so, with regard to the union of the divine Word with this man, they think it necessary to observe that whatsoever is proper to that man, as being part of human nature, cannot be said truly of the divine Word or of God: for instance it is proper to that man to be born of the Virgin, that He suffered, died, and was buried, and so on: all such things, they assert, cannot be said of God or the Word of God.

Since, however, certain names, though belonging chiefly to God, are nevertheless applied to men, such as, Christ, Lord, Holy, and even Son of God, there is no reason why the aforesaid predicates should not be applied to them. Thus, according to them, it is quite correct to say that Christ, the Lord of glory, or the Holy of Holies, or the Son of God, was born of the Virgin, suffered, died, and was buried: wherefore they contend that the Blessed

Virgin should be called, not the Mother of God or of the divine Word, but the Mother of Christ.

Careful consideration, however, will show that this view excludes the truth of the Incarnation. According to this view, the Word of God was united to that man merely by the indwelling of grace, resulting in a union of wills. Now the Word of God by dwelling in man does not become incarnate: for the divine Word, and God Himself, has dwelt in all holy men from the creation of the world, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. vi. 16): *You are the temple of the living God, as the Lord saith: I will dwell in them.* Such an indwelling cannot be styled incarnation, else God would have often become incarnate since the beginning of the world. Nor is the idea of incarnation realized by the divine Word, or God, dwelling in that man with a greater plentitude of grace, since *more* or *less* makes no difference in the kind of union. Seeing then that the Christian religion is based on faith in the Incarnation, it is clear that this view destroys the very foundation of the Christian religion.

Moreover. The falseness of this view is evident from the very terminology of Scripture. For Scripture is wont to indicate the indwelling of the divine Word in holy men, in the following manner: *The Lord spoke to Moses,* or *The Lord said to Moses,* or *The Word of the Lord came to Jeremias,* or some other prophet, *The Word of the Lord came*[1] *by the hand of Aggeus the prophet.* But never is it said that the Word of God was made either Moses, or Jeremias, or any other. Yet it is in this singular way that the Evangelist describes the union of the divine Word with Christ's flesh, when he says: *The Word was made flesh,* as we have observed above. Hence it is manifest that, according to the teaching of Scripture, the Word of God was not in the man Christ merely by dwelling in Him.

Again. That which has been made so-and-so, is whatever it has been made: thus that which has been made a

[1] Vulg., *factum est*—i.e., *was made.*

man, is a man; and that which has been made white, is white. Now, the Word of God was made man, as stated above. Therefore the Word of God is man. But when two things are distinct in person, hypostasis, or supposits, one of them cannot be predicated of the other. Thus when I say, *Man is an animal,* the very same thing that is an animal is a man; and when I say, *Man is white,* the man himself is declared to be white, albeit whiteness is extraneous to the notion of humanity. Consequently by no means can I say that Socrates is Plato, or any other individual of the same or of another species. Accordingly, if the Word was made flesh, that is to say man, as the Evangelist declares, it is impossible for the divine Word and that man to be two persons, hypostases, or supposits.

Further. Demonstrative pronouns refer to a person, hypostasis, or supposit: for no one would say, *I run,* meaning that another runs, except metaphorically, if this other runs in his stead. Now this man, Jesus by name, says of Himself (Jo. viii. 58): *Before Abraham was, I am,* and: *I and the Father are one* (Jo. x. 30), and many similar statements, which clearly refer to the divinity of the Word. Therefore it is manifest that the person and hypostasis of Him who said these things is the Person of the Son of God.

Moreover. It is evident from what has been said that neither did Christ's body come down from heaven, which was the error of Valentine; nor His soul, as Origen erroneously asserted: wherefore it follows that it was the Word who is said to have come down from heaven, not by local movement, but in reference to His union with a lower nature, as we have already stated.[1] Now this man speaking in His own person said that He came down from heaven (Jo. vi. 51): *I am the living bread, which came down from heaven.* Therefore that man's person or hypostasis must be the Person of the Word of God.

Again. It is evident that ascent into heaven applies

[1] Ch. xxx.

to the man Christ who, *while* the Apostles *looked on, was raised up* (Acts i. 9): while descent from heaven applies to the Word of God. Now, the Apostle says (Eph. iv. 10), *He that descended is the same also that ascended.* Therefore that man's person and hypostasis is the Person and hypostasis of the Word of God.

Again. One whose origin is from the world, and who was not in existence before the world, cannot be said to come into the world. Now, the man Christ, as to His flesh, had His origin from the world, since He had a real human and earthly body, as we have proved:[1] and as to His soul He was not in existence before the world, since He had a real human soul which, by its nature, does not exist before its union with the body. It follows then that it is not by reason of His human nature that this man is said to come into the world. Yet He says that He Himself came into the world (Jo. xvi. 28): *I came forth from the Father,* He says, *and am come into the world.* Thus then it is clear that something pertaining to the Word of God is truly said of this man: since it belongs to the divine Word to come into the world, as John the Evangelist expressly declares (Jo. i. 10, 11): *He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. He came unto his own,* etc. Therefore the person and hypostasis of the man who said the words quoted above, must be the Person and Hypostasis of the Word of God.

Again. The Apostle says (Heb. x. 5): *When he cometh into the world, he saith: Sacrifice and oblation thou wouldest not: but a body thou hast fitted to me.* Now He that cometh into the world is the Word of God, as we have shown.[2] Therefore it is to the Word of God that a body is fitted, in such wise to wit, that it was His own body. But this could not be said, unless the hypostasis of the Word of God were also the hypostasis of that man. Therefore the Word of God and this man have the one and the same hypostasis.

Moreover. Any change or suffering affecting the body of

[1] Ch. xxvii. [2] Ch. xi.

a man, can be ascribed to the person to whom that body belongs: thus if Peter's body be wounded, scourged, or dies, it can be said that Peter is wounded, scourged, or dies. Now the body of this man was the body of God's Word, as we have shown. Hence whatsoever that body suffered, the Word of God may be said to have suffered. Rightly, therefore, may we say that the Word of God, or God, suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried: whereas those men denied this.

Again. The Apostle says (Heb. ii. 10): *It became him, for whom are all things, who had brought many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation, by his passion.* From this we gather that He *for whom* are all things, who *brings* men *into glory,* and who is the *author* of *man's salvation,* suffered and died. Now these four things belong exclusively to God, and are ascribed to no one else. For it is said (Prov. xvi. 4): *The Lord hath made all things for himself:* and of God's Word it is said (Jo. i. 3): *All things were made by him:* and (Ps. lxxxiii. 12): *The Lord will give grace and glory:* and elsewhere (Ps. xxxvi. 39): *But the salvation of the just is from the Lord.* Therefore it is evidently right to say that God, the Word of God, suffered and died.

Moreover. Though a man may be called a lord, by reason of his sharing in the divine lordship; no man, nor indeed any creature, can be called the Lord of glory: because God alone by nature possesses the glory of the happiness to come; while others possess it by the gift of grace. Hence it is said (Ps. xxiii. 10): *The Lord of hosts, he is the king of glory.* Now the Apostle says (1 Cor. ii. 8) that the Lord of glory was crucified: *For if they had known it, they never would have crucified the Lord of glory.* Therefore it may be truly said that God was crucified.

Further. The Word of God is the Son of God by nature, as we have shown:[1] and man, by reason of God dwelling in him, is called a son of God by the grace of adoption. Hence, according to the opinion aforesaid, we shall find in

[1] Chs. xi., xiv.

our Lord Jesus Christ both kinds of sonship: because the indwelling Word is God's Son by nature, and the man in whom He dwells is God's son by the grace of adoption. Consequently that man cannot be called God's own, or only-begotten, Son, but only God's Word, who by reason of the special manner of His birth, was the only offspring of the Father. Now Scripture ascribes passion and death to God's own and only-begotten Son. For the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 32): *God spared not even his own Son but delivered him up for us all.* Again it is said (Jo. iii. 16): *God so loved the world, as to give his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting.* That he is speaking of being delivered up to death is clear from his using the same terms in relation to the crucified Son of Man (*ibid.* 14, 15): *As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up: that whosoever believeth in him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting.* Again the Apostle declares Christ's death to be a sign of God's love for the world (Rom. v. 8, 9): *God commendeth his charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us.* Rightly, therefore, may we say that God, the Word of God, suffered and died.

Again. A man is said to be his mother's son, because he derives his body from her, although he does not receive his soul from her, but from another source. Now the body of this man was taken from the body of His Virgin Mother: and it has been shown that the body of this man is the body of God's natural Son, that is, of the Word of God. Therefore it is right to call the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God's Word, and even the Mother of God, although the Word's Godhead is not from her: because it is not necessary for a son to receive his entire substance from his mother, but only his body.

Moreover. The Apostle says (Gal. iv. 4): *God sent his Son, made of a woman.* Now from these words we are able to gather the sense in which the Son of God was sent. For we are told that He was sent in as much as He was

made of a woman: and this would not be true unless the Son of God had been in existence before He was made of a woman: since what is sent into something must exist before being in that thing. Now, according to Nestorius, this man who is an adopted son, was not in existence before being born of a woman. Hence the words, *God sent his Son,* cannot refer to an adopted son, but to His Son by nature, namely God, the divine Word. But it is through being made of a woman, that a man is said to be the son of a woman. Therefore God, the divine Word, is the Son of a woman. Perhaps, however, someone might object that the saying of the Apostle means, not that the Son of God was sent to be the son of a woman, but that the Son of God, who was made of a woman and under the Law, was sent to redeem those who were under the Law: in which case the words *his Son* refer, not to His Son by nature, but to this man who is son by adoption. But this interpretation is excluded by the very words of the Apostle. For no one can absolve from a law, except he be above the law, that is, the author of the law. Now the Law was given by God: and therefore God alone can free anyone from the bondage of the Law. But the Apostle ascribes this to the Son of God, of whom He is speaking. Therefore the Son of God, of whom he is speaking, is God's Son by nature. Therefore it is true to say that God's Son by nature, namely, the divine Word of God, was made of a woman.

Moreover. The same conclusion follows from the fact that the redemption of mankind is ascribed to God Himself (Ps. xxx. 6): *Thou hast redeemed me, Lord, God of truth.*

Again. The adoption of the sons of God is the work of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 15, *You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons.* Now the Holy Ghost is not a gift of man, but of God. Therefore the adoption of sons is effected, not by a man, but by God. Now it is the work of the Son of God, sent by God, made of a woman: as evidenced by the Apostle continuing the text (Gal. iv. 5), *That we might receive the adoption of*

sons. Therefore the text of the Apostle (Gal. iv. 4) refers to God's Son by nature: and consequently God, the Word of God, was made of a woman, that is to say, of the Virgin Mother.

Further. John says (i. 14): *And the Word was made flesh*. Now He did not take flesh except of a woman. Therefore the Word was made flesh of a woman, that is to say, of the Virgin Mother. Therefore the Virgin is the Mother of the Word of God.

Moreover the Apostle says that *Christ is* from the fathers *according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever*. But He is not from the fathers except through the Virgin. God therefore who is over all things is from the Virgin according to the flesh. The Virgin therefore is the Mother of God according to the flesh.

Moreover. The Apostle, speaking of Jesus Christ, says (Philip. ii. 6, 7): *Who being in the form of God . . . emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men*. From these words it is clear that if, with Nestorius, we distinguish in Christ two persons, namely the man, who is a son by adoption, and the Word of God, who is God's son by nature, these words cannot refer to this man. For if this man were a mere man He was not first *in the form of God*, and afterwards *made in the likeness of men;* on the contrary, after being a man, He became a participator in the Godhead; whereby He was not *emptied* but exalted. Therefore the text means that the Word of God who first was from eternity *in the form of God*, namely in the nature of God, afterwards *emptied himself, being made in the likeness of men*. Nor can this kenosis mean simply the indwelling of God's Word in the man Christ Jesus: because from the beginning of the world, God's Word has dwelt in all holy men by grace, and yet He did not empty Himself by so doing. For God in giving a share of His own goodness to creatures suffers no loss, but in a sense is exalted, for as much as the height of His perfection is manifest by the goodness of creatures; and the greater the creature's goodness, the

more is God exalted. Hence, if the Word of God dwelt with greater plenitude in the man Christ than in other holy persons, he emptied Himself less in Him than in the others. Consequently it is clear that the union of the Word with human nature, does not merely mean, as Nestorius contended, that God's Word dwelt in that man, but that the Word of God was truly made flesh. For there can be no kenosis, save in the sense that the Word of God emptied, *i.e.*, lowered Himself, not by putting away His own greatness, but by putting on human lowliness: thus if the soul existed before the body, we might say that it becomes a corporeal substance, namely man, not by a change in its own nature, but by being united to a corporeal nature.

Again. It is evident that the Holy Ghost dwelt in the man Christ: since it is said (Lk. iv. 1) that *Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan.* Consequently, if the Incarnation of the Word means nothing more than that the Word of God dwelt with the greatest plenitude in that man, we shall have to say that the Holy Ghost also became incarnate: which is utterly contrary to the teaching of faith.

Further. It is certain that the Word of God dwells in the holy angels; for they are filled with understanding, by participating in the Word. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. ii. 16): *Nowhere doth he take hold of the angels; but of the seed of Abraham he taketh hold.* It clearly follows then that the assumption of human nature by the Word does not merely mean His dwelling therein.

Again. If, as Nestorius contended, there are two distinct personalities in Christ, namely the Word of God, and the man, the Word of God cannot possibly be given the name of Christ. This is evident, both from the way of speaking, usual in Scripture, where, before the Incarnation of our Lord, God or His Word is never given the name of Christ, and from the very meaning of that name. For *Christ* is so called because He is *anointed* with *the oil of gladness, i.e.*, with the Holy Ghost, as Peter expounds

it (Acts x. 38). Now it cannot be said that the Word of God was anointed by the Holy Ghost, since then the Holy Ghost would be greater than the Son, as the sanctifier is greater than the sanctified. Consequently this name *Christ* can only indicate the man. When therefore the Apostle says (Philip. ii. 5): *Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus,* he is referring to the man. Now he continues: *Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God.* Therefore we may say with truth that this man is *in the form,* that is to say, in the nature, *of God,* and *equal with God.* And, though men are called gods, or children of God, on account of God dwelling in them, they are never said to be equal with God. Therefore the man Christ is called God, not merely because God dwelt in Him.

Moreover. Though the name of God is applied to holy men, on account of indwelling grace, none of the things that belong to God alone, such as the creation of heaven and earth, and the like, are ever ascribed to any saint by reason of the grace dwelling in him. Yet the creation of all things is ascribed to the man Christ. For it is said (Heb. iii. 1, 2): *Consider the apostle and high-priest of our confession, Jesus* Christ, *who is faithful to him that made him, as was also Moses in all his house.* Now these words refer to the man, and not to the Word of God, both because as we have shown, the Word of God, according to the view of Nestorius, cannot be called Christ, and because the Word of God was not *made,* but begotten. And the Apostle continues: *This man was counted worthy of greater glory than Moses, by so much as he that hath built the house, hath greater honour than the house.* Hence the man Christ built the house of God: wherefore the Apostle goes on to prove this: *For every house is built by some man: but he that created all things is God.* Accordingly, the Apostle proves that the man Christ built the house of God, from the fact that God created all things. But this argument would prove nothing unless Christ were God the Creator of all. Thus then the creation of all

things, which is the work of God alone, is ascribed to this man. Therefore the man Christ is God in Person, and not merely by God dwelling in Him.

Further. It is quite clear that the man Christ ascribes many divine and supernatural attributes to Himself. For instance (Jo. vi. 40), *I will raise him up in the last day:* and (Jo. x. 28), *I give them life everlasting*. And it would indicate the highest degree of pride, if the man who spoke thus were not God in Person, and merely had God dwelling in Him. But this accusation cannot be brought against the man Christ, who says (Matth. xi. 29): *Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart*. Therefore this man and God are one and the same Person.

Moreover. Just as the Scriptures state that this man was *exalted: Being exalted . . . by the right hand of God* (Acts ii. 33), so do they say that God was *emptied: He emptied himself* (Philip. ii. 7). Wherefore, even as sublime things may be ascribed to the man by reason of the union—for instance, that He is God, that He raises the dead to life, and so forth—so may lowly things be attributed to God, for instance that He was born of the Virgin, that He suffered, died, and was buried.

Again. Relative terms, nouns or pronouns, relate to the same supposit. Now the Apostle, speaking of the Son of God, says (Coloss. i. 16): *In him were all things created, in heaven, and on earth, visible and invisible,* and afterwards he adds: *And he is the head of the body, the Church, who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead*. Now it is clear that the words, *In him were all things created,* refer to the Word of God; and the words, *the first-born from the dead,* to the man Christ. Consequently the Word of God and the man Christ are one suppositum, and, therefore, one Person: and whatsoever is said of that man may be ascribed to the Word of God, and *vice versa*.

Further. The Apostle says (1 Cor. viii. 6): *One Lord, Jesus Christ, by whom are all things*. Now *Jesus Christ,* the name of that man, *by whom are all things,* evidently

is the name of the Word of God. Accordingly, the Word of God and this man, are *one Lord,* neither two lords nor two sons, as Nestorius maintained: and hence it follows too, that the Word of God and this man are one Person.

Now, if we consider the matter carefully, this opinion of Nestorius, as regards the Incarnation, differs but little from the opinion of Photinus, since both of them asserted that this man was God solely by reason of indwelling grace. Photinus, however, asserted that this man merited to be called God and to be raised to glory, through His Passion and good works: whereas Nestorius admitted that He had this name and glory from the moment of His conception, by reason of the singular fulness of God dwelling in Him. But as regards the eternal generation of the Word, they differed utterly, since Nestorius admitted it, whereas Photinus denied it altogether.

CHAPTER XXXV

AGAINST THE ERROR OF EUTYCHES

We have proved in many ways that the mystery of the Incarnation is to be understood in such a way that God's Word, and man, are united in one and the same Person. Nevertheless, there still remains a difficulty in the study of this truth. The divine nature is necessarily accompanied by its personality. And the same would seem to apply to human nature: since that which subsists in an intellectual or rational nature is the definition of a person. Hence seemingly it is impossible that there be one person with two natures, divine and human.

In order to solve this difficulty, various explanations have been offered. Eutyches, in order to safeguard against Nestorius, the unity of Person in Christ, contended that there was also but one nature in Christ, so that, although before the union there were two distinct natures, divine

and human, in the very union they coalesced into one. Hence he said that Christ's Person was of two natures, but not subsisting in two natures. On this account he was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.

The falseness of this view may be shown in many ways.

We have proved above[1] that in Jesus Christ there was a body, a rational soul, and the Godhead. It is moreover evident that Christ's body, even after the union, was not the Godhead of the Word; since that body, even after the union, was passible, visible to the eye, and confined within the lines of its members: all of which is foreign to the divine nature of the Word; as we have sufficiently proved above.[1] Likewise Christ's soul, after the union, was distinct from the divine nature of the Word, since, even after the union, it was affected by the passions of sorrow, fear, and anger, which in no way can be ascribed to the Godhead of the Word, as we have shown.[2] Now the human soul and body constitute the human nature. Wherefore, even after the union, the human nature in Christ was distinct from the Godhead of the Word, which is the divine nature. Therefore, after the union, there were two natures in Christ.

Again. A thing is said to be natural in reference to nature. Now a thing is said to be natural by reason of its having a form, even as that which is made by art: for we do not call the building a house, until it has the form designed by art; nor is a thing a horse until it has the form pertaining to that nature. Accordingly, the form of a natural thing is its nature. Hence we must say that there were two forms in Christ, even after the union. Thus, speaking of Jesus Christ, the Apostle says (Philip. ii. 6, 7) that *when he was in the form of God . . .* He took *the form of a servant*. Now we cannot say that the form of God is the same as the form of a servant. For nothing takes what it has already; so that, if the form of God and the form of a servant are the same, since He already had the form of God, He would not have taken the form of a servant. Nor can it be said that, through the union, the form of God in

[1] Bk. I., ch. xx. [2] Bk. I., ch. lxxxix.

Christ was destroyed; because then, after the union, Christ would not be God. Nor again can it be said that the form of a servant was destroyed in the union, because then He would not have taken the form of a servant. But neither can it be said that the form of a servant was mixed with the form of God, because when things are made into a mixture, they lose their integrity, and each is partly destroyed; wherefore it could not be said that He took the form of a servant, but a part thereof. Therefore, according to the words of the Apostle, we must say that, after the union, there were two forms in Christ, and consequently two natures.

Further. The word *nature* was first employed to signify the coming into being of things by nativity, and thence it was transferred to indicate the principle of this kind of generation; and then further still to signify the intrinsic principle of movement in a movable thing: and since this principle is matter or form, nature also stands for the form or matter of a natural thing having within itself the principle of its movement. And, seeing that form and matter constitute the essence of a natural thing, the meaning of the word nature is made to extend to the essence of anything existing in nature; so that the nature of a thing is its essence indicated by its definition. It is in this sense that we are using the term now, and in which we say that there are a divine and a human nature in Christ. Accordingly if, as Eutyches maintained, the human and the divine nature were two before the union, and if through the union they combined together to form one nature, this must have been by one of the ways in which one thing is made out of many. This happens, first of all, by mere co-ordination: thus many houses make a town, and many soldiers make an army. Secondly, by co-ordination and composition: thus a house is made of many conjoined parts co-ordinated and bound together. These two ways, however, do not suffice to form one nature out of several. Accordingly, things that are formed by co-ordination or composition are not natural things; and their unity is not unity of nature. The third

way in which one thing is made of several, is by mixture: thus a mixed body is formed from the four elements. Yet neither does this way apply to the case in point. First, because only those things can be mixed together which agree in matter, and which are of such a nature as to be active or passive in relation to one another. Now this does not apply to our case: since it has been proved[1] that God is immaterial and wholly impassible. Secondly, because it is impossible to mix together two things, one of which far exceeds the other: thus if one were to put a drop of wine into a thousand gallons of water, there will be no mixture; but destruction of the wine. Thus again logs placed on a furnace are not said to be mixed with the fire; they are consumed by it, on account of its exceeding power. Now the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature of man, because God's power is infinite, as we have proved.[2] Therefore a mixture of the two natures is quite impossible. Thirdly, because granted that such a mixture were made, neither nature would retain its integrity: because the ingredients do not remain entire in a real mixture. Consequently, after the two natures, namely the divine and human, have been mixed together, neither nature would remain, but a *tertium quid:* and so Christ would be neither God nor man. Therefore we cannot admit the explanation of Eutyches that, whereas there were two natures before the union, there was but one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ after the union, through the fusion of the two natures into one. Consequently it must be explained by saying that only one of the natures remained after the union. Either then in Christ there was only the nature of God, and what in Him seemed human was purely imaginary, as the Manicheans said; or the divine nature was changed into the human, as Apollinaris maintained: both of which views we have already refuted.[3] Therefore it is impossible that there were two natures before, and only one after, the union.

[1] Bk. I., Chs. xvi., xvii. [2] Bk. I., ch. xliii.
[3] Chs. xxviii. *seqq.*

Further. Two complete natures never combine together to form one, because each is a whole in itself; whereas when one thing is made out of several, these come under the heading of parts. Hence, since one thing is made out of a soul and a body, neither soul nor body can be called a nature, in the sense in which we are now speaking; because neither has a complete species, but each is a part of a nature. Accordingly, as the human nature is a complete nature, and so likewise is the divine nature, they cannot possibly combine together to form one nature, unless both or one of them be corrupted. But this is impossible, since we have shown that the one Christ is both true God and true man.[1] Therefore it is impossible that there be but one nature in Christ.

Again, one nature may result from two permanent things—either as from bodily parts; for instance an animal is made of various members: and this does not apply to the case in point, since the divine nature is not corporeal: —or as one thing is made from matter and form; for instance, an animal from soul and body: and neither does this apply to the case, since God is neither matter, nor can He be the form of anything, as proved above.[2] Accordingly, if Christ is true God and true man, as we have proved,[3] it is impossible that there be but one nature in Him.

Further. Subtraction or addition of an essential principle diversifies the species of a thing, and therefore changes the nature, which is nothing but the essence as indicated by the definition, as we have stated.[4] For this reason we observe that a specific difference added to or subtracted from a definition causes a difference of species; thus a rational and an irrational animal differ in species: even so, in numbers, the addition or subtraction of unity gives us various species of numbers. Now the form is an essential principle. Hence every additional form makes another species and another nature, in the sense in which

[1] Chs. xxviii. *seqq.*
[2] Bk. I., chs. xvii., xxvii.
[3] Chs. xxviii. *seqq.*
[4] Ch. xxxiii.

we speak of nature now.[1] Therefore if the divine nature of the Word be added to the human nature as a form, another nature will be the result: and consequently Christ's will be not a human nature, but some other: even as an animate body is of another nature from that which is a body only.

Moreover. Things that have not a common nature are not alike in species; as, for instance, man and horse. Now if Christ's nature is composed of the divine and human natures, it is evident that other men will not have the same nature as Christ. Therefore He will not be like us in species: and this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. ii. 17): *It behoved him, in all things, to be like unto his brethren.*

Again. Form and matter always make together one species, which can be predicated of many individuals, actually or potentially, as far as the specific ratio is concerned. If then the divine nature be added, like a form, to the human nature, from this combination there must needs result some common species that can be predicated of several individuals. But this is clearly false: since there is but one Jesus Christ, God and man. Therefore the divine and human natures did not constitute one nature in Christ.

Moreover. The statement of Eutyches, that before the union there were two natures in Christ, is also seemingly against faith. For, since human nature is composed of soul and body, it follows that either Christ's body, or Christ's soul, or both, existed before His Incarnation: and this is shown to be false, by what we have said above. It is, therefore, against faith to say that there were two natures in Christ before the union, and that after the union, there was one.

[1] Ch. xxxiii.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE ERROR OF MACARIUS OF ANTIOCH, WHO SAID THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE WILL IN CHRIST

THE opinion of Macarius[1] of Antioch, who said that there were but one operation and will in Christ, seemingly amounts to the same as the foregoing. Each nature has its proper operation: because the form, which gives each nature its particular species, is the principle of operation: wherefore, as various natures have their respective forms, so have they their respective actions. Consequently, if in Christ there be but one action, it follows that He has but one nature: and this is the heresy of Eutyches. Therefore it is false that there is only one operation in Christ.

Again. In Christ the divine nature is perfect, whereby He is consubstantial with the Father; also a perfect human nature, whereby He is of the same species as we are. Now it belongs to the perfection of the divine nature to have a will, as we have proved.[2] Likewise it belongs to the perfection of human nature to have a will, whereby a man is free. Therefore there are two wills in Christ.

Moreover. The will is a power of the soul even as the intellect. Therefore if Christ had no other will besides that of the Word, for the same reason, He had no other intellect besides the Word's: and so we come back to the error of Apollinaris.

Further. If Christ had but one will, He must have had the divine will alone: because the Word could not lose the divine will which was His from all eternity. Now merit does not pertain to the divine will: since it belongs to one tending to perfection. Accordingly, by His passion, Christ would not have merited, either for Himself or for us: the contrary of which is taught by the Apostle (Philip. ii. 8, 9) who says that Christ was *made obedient* to the Father, *unto death . . . for which cause God hath exalted him.*

[1] Seventh century.

[2] Bk. I., ch. lxxii.

Again. If there was not a human will in Christ, it follows that there would have been no free-will in Him in respect of the nature assumed: for by His will man is free, so that the man Christ would have acted not in the manner of a man, but in the manner of other animals that are void of free-will. Consequently His actions were neither virtuous nor worthy of praise or imitation. Therefore there was no point in His saying (Matth. xi. 29): *Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart;* and (Jo. xiii. 15): *I have given you an example that, as I have done to you, so you do also.*

Again. Even an ordinary man, though he has but one personality, has several appetites and operations corresponding to his various natural principles. Thus in his rational faculty he has a will; in the sensitive faculty he has a concupiscible and an irascible appetite; and besides these he has a natural appetite resulting from the natural forces in him. Again, with his eyes he sees, with his ears he hears, with his mind he understands: and all these are different operations. The reason of this is that operations are differentiated not only according to the various operative subjects, but also according to the various principles of operation in one and the same subject, from which principles these various operations take their species. Now the divine nature is much further removed from human nature than the various principles of human nature are from one another. Therefore the divine and human natures in Christ have each their respective distinct will and operation, although Christ in the two natures is one Person.

Again. It is clearly proved by the authority of Holy Scripture that there were two wills in Christ. Thus He says (Jo. vi. 38): *I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me;* and (Lk. xxii. 42): *Not my will, but thine be done.* Hence, it is clear that in Christ there was His own will, besides the will of His Father. Now there certainly was in Him a will common to Him and His Father: since, as Father

and Son have the one nature, so have they the one will. Therefore there are two wills in Christ.

It is the same with His operations. Christ had one operation common to Him and the Father: for He says (Jo. v. 19): *What things soever* the Father *doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.* There is also in Him another operation that is not becoming to the Father, as, for instance, sleep, hunger, eating, and so forth, all of which both actions and passions are ascribed by the Evangelist to the man Christ. Therefore there was not only one operation in Christ.

Apparently this opinion originated through its authors being unable to distinguish between simple unity and unity of order. They observed that the human will in Christ was subordinate to the divine will, so that every act of the human will of Christ was in accordance with the disposition of His divine will. In like manner all Christ's human operations, whether of action or of passion, were in accordance with the disposition of His divine will, as He says Himself (Jo. viii. 29): *I do always the things that please him.* Besides, Christ's human operation derived a certain divine efficacy through His union with the Godhead, even as the action of the secondary agent acquires efficacy from the principal agent. Consequently His every action or passion was salutary: for which reason Dionysius (*De Div. Nom.*, ii.) calls Christ's human operations *theandric—i.e., God-man-like;* as well as because it is the action of God and man. And so, observing that in Christ human will and operation are infallibly subordinate to the divine, they concluded that Christ has but one will and operation; although, in fact, unity of order and simple unity are not the same.

CHAPTER XXXVII

REFUTATION OF THOSE WHO MAINTAINED THAT CHRIST'S BODY AND SOUL WERE NOT UNITED TOGETHER

In the foregoing chapters we have refuted the opinions of Nestorius and Eutyches, by proving that as laid down by our Faith, there is but one Person in Christ, and two natures. Seeing, however, that this would seem to be in contradiction with natural reason, certain later writers propounded the following view of the union. Man consists of a soul and body united together: and this particular soul together with this particular body constitutes this particular man, which signifies not only a hypostasis or a person, but a hypostasis and a person. Wherefore, lest they should have to admit in Christ a hypostasis or Person of the Word, they maintained that His body and soul were not united, so as to form one substance: and in this way they hoped to avoid the heresy of Nestorius. Again, it would seem impossible for that which was not part of a thing's nature to become part of its substance, without a change taking place in that thing. Now the Word is altogether unchangeable. And so, lest they should be constrained to admit that the assumed body and soul belonged to the nature which the Word had from all eternity, they contended that the Word assumed a human soul and body accidentally, just as a man puts on his clothes. In this way they wished to avoid the error of Eutyches. This view, however, is utterly contrary to faith.

Soul and body, by being united, constitute a man, because the form, when added to the matter, makes the species. Consequently, if soul and body were not united in Christ, He was not a man: whereas the Apostle says (1 Tim. ii. 5): (*One*) *mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.*

Again. Each one of us is said to be a man, in the sense that a rational soul forms part of our being. Hence, if Christ is said to be a man, not in that sense, but merely because He had a soul and body, without their being united,

it would be an equivocation to call Him a man, and He would not belong to the same species as we do: which is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. ii. 17) that *it behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren.*

Further. Not any kind of body, but only a human body, belongs to human nature. Now a body is not human unless it be quickened by union with the soul: and it is an equivocation to speak of eyes, hands, feet, flesh, and bone when they are no longer united to the soul. Consequently it would not be true to say that the Word assumed human nature, if He assumed a body and soul that were not united together.

Again. The human soul is naturally disposed to be united to the body. Hence a soul that is never united to a body, so as to constitute a being, is not a human soul: because that which is natural must be always. Hence, if Christ's soul is not united to the body, so as to constitute a being, it follows that it is not a human soul, and that human nature was not in Him.

Further. If the Word was accidentally united to the soul and body, as though it were clothed with them, human nature was not the nature of the Word. Consequently, after the union, the Word did not subsist in two natures, as neither does a man, when clothed, subsist in two natures: and Eutyches, for saying this, was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.

Moreover. That which happens to a man's clothes does not happen to him: thus he is not said to be born, when he puts his clothes on, nor to be wounded, if his coat is torn. If then the Word donned a soul and body, as a man puts on his clothes, we cannot say that God was born, or suffered, by reason of the body He assumed.

Again. If the Word took human nature merely as a cloak, so as to be seen by human eyes, it was useless for Him to take a soul, which is naturally invisible.

Moreover. According to this view, the Son would have taken human flesh, in the same way as the Holy Ghost assumed the form of a dove, under which He appeared.

Now, this is clearly false: since neither do we say that the Holy Ghost was made a dove, nor that He is less than the Father in respect of the nature assumed.

Again. If we regard the matter carefully, it is evident that this view leads to the absurdities involved in various heresies. For as much as it asserts that the Son of God was accidentally united to soul and flesh, as a man to his clothes, it agrees with the opinion of Nestorius who held this union to signify the indwelling of the Word of God in man: since God could not clothe man by bodily contact, but only by His indwelling grace. For as much as it holds the union of the Word with human soul and flesh to be accidental, it follows that, after the union, the Word was not subsistent in two natures, which was the opinion of Eutyches: since a thing does not subsist in that which is united to it accidentally. For as much as it maintained that soul and flesh were not united so as to constitute a being, this view agrees partly with Arius and Apollinaris, who said that Christ's body was not animated by a rational soul; and partly with the Manicheans, who contended that Christ was not a real man, but only an imaginary one. For if the soul be not united to the body, so as to constitute a being, whatever appeared in Christ to make Him like other men, made of soul and body, was merely imaginary.

This view seems to have been based on the words of the Apostle (Philip. ii. 7), *In habit found as a man*: for they did not realize that this was said metaphorically. Now we must not look for likeness in every detail in metaphorical expressions. Accordingly the assumed human nature bears a certain resemblance to a man's clothes, in so far as the Word was made visible in the flesh, as man is seen in his clothes. But the comparison does not imply that in Christ the union of the Word with human nature was accidental.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

REFUTATION OF THOSE WHO HOLD THAT IN THE PERSON OF CHRIST THERE ARE TWO HYPOSTASES OR SUPPOSITS

In order to avoid the absurdities involved in the foregoing opinion, some others held that in our Lord Jesus Christ one substance resulted from the union of soul and flesh, a man namely, of the same species as other men. They say that this man is united to the Word of God, not indeed in nature, but in person: so that there would be one person of God's Word and of this man. But, since this man is an individual substance, that is to say a hypostasis and supposit, they draw a distinction between this hypostasis and the Word of God, although they admit that both are but one person. On account of this unity, they admit that we say that this man is the Word of God, or that the Word of God is this man, the sense being: The Word of God is a man—*i.e.*, the person of the Word of God is the person of the man and *vice versa*. For this reason they state that whatever may be predicated of the Word of God, may be predicated of this man, and *vice versa:* but with a qualification, so that when it is said: *God suffered,* the sense is: *The man who is God, by reason of the unity of person, suffered:* and when it is said: *A man created the stars,* the sense is: *He who is a man,* etc.

This opinion, however, must necessarily fall into the error of Nestorius.

If we observe the difference between hypostasis and person, we shall see that they do not differ altogether; in fact, person is a kind of hypostasis, since it is a hypostasis of a particular nature, namely rational. This may be seen from the definition given by Boethius: *Person is an individual substance of rational nature.* Hence, though not every hypostasis is a person, every hypostasis of rational nature is a person. Accordingly, if from the mere union of soul and body there resulted in Christ a particular substance which is a hypostasis, namely this man, it follows

that from this union there resulted a person. Consequently there would be two persons in Christ—the newly constituted person of this man, and the Person of the Eternal Word: and this is the error of Nestorius.

Again. Even though the hypostasis of this man were not a person, still the hypostasis of the Word of God is the same as His Person. Hence, if the hypostasis of the Word of God is not the hypostasis of this man, neither will the Person of the Word be the person of this man; and so it will be false that, as they say, the person of this man is the Person of the Word of God.

Moreover. Granted that there be a distinction between the Person and the hypostasis of the Word of God, or of this man, the only conceivable difference would be that the person adds some property to the hypostasis. For it cannot add anything of the genus of substance, since hypostasis is the chief thing in the genus of substance, being called a *first substance*. Accordingly if the union be effected in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that it is effected in an accidental quality: and this again is the error of Nestorius.

Further. Cyril says in a letter to Nestorius that was approved in the Council of Ephesus:[1] *If anyone does not confess that the Word of God the Father was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with his flesh is one, the same person being both God and man, let him be anathema.* In fact nearly all the decrees of the councils declare that this savours of the error of Nestorius, who said that there were two hypostases in Christ.

Again. Damascene says:[2] *We acknowledge the union of two perfect natures,* united not only in the προσῶπον, *i.e.* person, as Nestorius the enemy of God maintained, but hypostatically. Whence it is clear that Nestorius maintained that there was one person, but two hypostases.

Further. Hypostasis and supposit must needs be the same: since, according to the Philosopher,[3] all the other

[1] P. I., ch. xxvi., can. 2.
[2] 3 *De Fid. Orthod.* iv.
[3] *De Praedic.*, cap. *De Substantia.*

things are predicated of the first substance, that is to say hypostasis, namely both universals in the genus of substance, and accidents. Consequently, if there are two hypostases in Christ, there are also two supposits.

Moreover. If the Word and this man have different supposits, neither supposit presupposes the other. Now, if the supposits be distinct, things predicated of them are also distinct: since divine predicates do not apply to the supposit of the man, except by reason of the Word, nor *vice versa*. Consequently we must make a distinction in the things that Scripture says of Christ, that is to say between divine and human predicates. Now this is against the declaration of Cyril, which was confirmed in the Council:[1] *If anyone ascribe to two persons or subsistences, such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by himself of himself, and applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and others (as though they were true of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema.*

Again. According to this view, things that are applicable to the Word of God by reason of His nature could not be predicated of the man, save on account of their being associated in one Person. And this they indicated by inserting a qualifying phrase, where they explain the sentence, *This man created the stars,* thus, *The Son of God who is this man,* etc. And so on in like manner with other such sentences. So that when we say, *This man is God,* the sense is, *The Word of God, who is this man, is God.* Now Cyril condemns these expressions:[2] *If anyone dare to say that the assumed humanity is to be co-adored, and co-glorified, and co-named God, together with the Word of God, as one with another (since the prefix "co-" always signifies this) instead of giving one and the same adoration and one and the same glory to the Emmanuel, as the Word made flesh, let him be accursed.*

Further. If this man differs in supposit from the Word

[1] Council of Ephesus, P. I., ch. xxvi., can. 4. [2] *Ibid.*, can. 8.

of God, He can have no association with the Person of the Word, except through the fact of His being assumed by the Word. But this is foreign to the right sense of faith. Thus Felix, Pope and martyr, is quoted in the Council of Ephesus,[1] as saying: *We believe that Jesus our God, born of the Virgin Mary, is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there be another besides him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there was another besides him; but while he remained perfect God, he became a perfect man, and took flesh of the Virgin.*

Again. Things that differ in supposit are several simply, and they are not one except relatively. If then in Christ there are two supposits, it follows that He is simply two, and not one, except relatively. In that case Jesus would be no more, since a thing exists in so far as it is one: so that whatsoever is not one simply is simply non-existent.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE TEACHING OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ON THE INCARNATION OF CHRIST

From the foregoing chapters it is plain that according to the tradition of Catholic faith we must confess that in Christ there is one perfect divine nature, and a perfect human nature composed of a rational soul and human flesh. Also that these two natures are united in Christ, not by mere indwelling, nor accidentally as a man to his clothes, nor by mere personal habitude and property, but in one hypostasis and one supposit. In this way alone can we safeguard the teaching of the Scriptures about the Incarnation.

We have already observed that Holy Scripture, without making any distinction, ascribes divine things to the man; and to God, things pertaining to the man:

[1] P. II., Act. i.

wherefore in both cases it is the same one to whom reference is made. But, seeing that opposite statements cannot be true about the same subject in the same respect, and whereas the divine and human things that are said about Christ are opposed to one another,—for instance, that He suffered and was impassible, that He died and was immortal, and so on,—it follows that divine and human things must be said of Christ in different respects. Accordingly, as regards the subject of which these things are predicated, we must make no distinction, and hold to unity; but as regards the things in respect of which these predications are made, a distinction is to be observed. Natural properties are attributed to a thing in respect of its nature: thus, a stone falls down in respect of its nature as a heavy body. Accordingly, since divine and human things are attributed to Christ in different respects, it follows that in Christ there are two distinct unmixed natures. Now natural properties are attributed to something that belongs by its own nature to the genus of substance, and this is a hypostasis or supposit of that nature. And, since human and divine things predicated of Christ are attributed to one undivided subject, it follows that Christ is one hypostasis and one supposit subsisting in the human and divine natures. In this way divine things are truly and properly attributed to that man, in as much as that man indicates a supposit of both natures, human and divine: while, *vice versa,* human things are attributed to the Word, in as much as He is a supposit of human nature. Hence also it is clear that although the Son took flesh, it does not follow that either Father or Holy Ghost became incarnate, since the Incarnation was effected by union, not in the nature common to the three Persons, but in the hypostasis or person, wherein the three Persons are distinct; and thus, even as in the Trinity there are several Persons subsisting in one nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation is there one Person subsisting in two natures.

CHAPTER XL

OBJECTIONS AGAINST FAITH IN THE INCARNATION

THIS view of the Incarnation, as laid down by the Catholic Faith, is beset with a number of difficulties which have led the enemies of the Faith to impugn this mystery. It has been proved[1] that God is neither a body nor a force in a body. But, if He took flesh, it follows that, after the Incarnation, either He was transformed into a body, or that He became a force in a body. Therefore it would seem impossible for God to be incarnate.

Again. Whatsoever acquires a new nature, is subject to substantial change: because when a thing is generated, it acquires a nature. Hence, if the Person of the Son of God became subsistent in human nature, it would seem that He was substantially changed.

Further. No hypostasis extends beyond the nature in which it subsists; rather does nature extend beyond the hypostasis, seeing that it includes many hypostases. And thus, if by the Incarnation the hypostasis of the Son of God became a hypostasis of human nature, it would follow that, after the Incarnation, the Son of God was not everywhere, since human nature is not everywhere.

Moreover. One and the same thing has only one quiddity, for this is its essence, which is one in each one thing. Now the quiddity of a thing is its nature, because its nature is indicated by its definition. Therefore, seemingly, one hypostasis cannot subsist in two natures.

Again. In things devoid of matter, the quiddity is not distinct from the thing, as we proved above:[2] and this is especially true of God, who is not only His own quiddity, but also His own being. Now human nature cannot be the same as a divine hypostasis. Therefore, seemingly, a divine Person cannot subsist in human nature.

Again. Nature is more simple and more formal than the hypostasis that subsists in it: since the common nature

[1] Bk. I., ch. xx. [2] Bk. I., chs. xxi., xxii.

is confined to a particular hypostasis by the addition of something material. If then a divine hypostasis subsists in human nature, it would appear to follow that human nature is more simple and more formal than the divine hypostasis: and this is altogether impossible.

Further. It is only in things composed of matter and form that the singular differs from its quiddity, in that the singular is individualized by signate matter, which is not included in the quiddity and specific nature: for this or that matter is included in the designation of Socrates, but not in the definition of human nature. Consequently every hypostasis that subsists in human nature is constituted by signate matter: and this cannot be said of a divine hypostasis. Therefore it would seem impossible for the hypostasis of the Word of God to subsist in human nature.

Moreover. In Christ the soul and body were not less effective than in other men. Now by their union, in other men, they constitute supposit, hypostasis, or person. Hence, in Christ also, a supposit, hypostasis, or person results from the union of soul and body. But this is not the supposit, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God, because this is eternal. Therefore in Christ there is, seemingly, another supposit, hypostasis, or person besides the supposit, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God.

Further. As human nature in general consists of a soul and body, so do this soul and this body make this man, or a human hypostasis. Now in Christ there were this soul and this body. Therefore from their union apparently there resulted a hypostasis: and so the same conclusion follows as above.

Again. This man Christ considered as formed merely of soul and body, is a substance. But He is not a substance in general. Therefore He is a particular substance; and consequently a hypostasis.

Moreover. If in Christ there is but one supposit of both human and divine natures, it follows that the divine hypostasis is included in the definition of this man Christ. But it is not included in the definition of other men.

Therefore *man* is predicated equivocally of Christ and of other men : so that He would not be of the same species as we are.

Further. We have proved[1] that in Christ are these three, body, soul, and divinity. Now the soul, being a more noble thing than the body, is not the body's supposit but its form. Neither, therefore, is something divine a supposit of human nature; but rather ought we to say that it informs human nature.

Further. Whatsoever accrues to a thing that is already complete in being, is accidental thereto. Now, since the Word of God is eternal, it is clear that the flesh assumed by Him, accrued to Him when He was already complete in being. Therefore He came by it accidentally.

CHAPTER XLI

HOW WE ARE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SON OF GOD WAS INCARNATE

In order to reply to these objections, we must begin by going into the question a little more deeply. While Eutyches maintained that the union of God with man was effected in the nature, whereas Nestorius held that it was effected neither in the nature nor in the person, the Catholic Faith teaches that it was effected in the person, and not in the nature. And so it would seem necessary to know first of all what is meant by being united in the nature, and by being united in the person.

The word *nature* has various meanings. It may mean either the birth of a living being, or the principle of generation and movement, or matter and form. It is also sometimes used to signify a thing's essential definition, which contains all that belongs to the species of that thing; thus we say that human nature is common to all men, and so on. Accordingly, those things are united in nature

[1] Chs. xxviii. *seq.*

which go to form the complete species of a thing; thus, for instance, the soul and body are united together to form the species of an animal; and, generally speaking, whatsoever things are the parts of a species. Now it is impossible for anything extraneous to be united in unity of nature to a species that is already complete, without doing away with the species. For, since species are like numbers, in which either the addition or the subtraction of unity changes the species, if any addition be made to an already complete species, the result must needs be another species. Thus, if you add sensibility to a substance that is only animate, you have another species: because animal and plant are different species. On the other hand something not belonging to the integrity of the species may be found in an individual of another species; for instance *white* or *clothed* in Socrates or Plato, or a sixth finger, and so forth. Consequently nothing hinders things from being united in an individual, that are not united in one complete species: for instance, human nature, whiteness, and music in Socrates, and whatsoever things may be united together in one subject. And, since an individual substance is called a hypostasis, and an individual rational substance is called a person, it is reasonable to say that all these are united together in the hypostasis, or person. Hence it is possible for things not to be united in the nature, and yet united in the hypostasis or person.

Accordingly, taking the union of God and man in Christ as a fact, heretics, disregarding the path of truth, have explained this fact in various ways. Some deemed this union to be like the union of things in one nature. Such were Arius and Apollinaris, who contended that the Word supplied, in Christ's body, the place of the soul or mind. Such also was Eutyches, who held the existence of the two natures of God and man before the Incarnation, but of only one after the Incarnation. But their view involves an utter impossibility. For it is evident that the nature of the Word, from all eternity, was most perfectly complete, and wholly incorruptible and unchangeable. Therefore it is impossible for anything extraneous to the divine nature,

such as human nature or a part of it, to be joined to the Word in unity of nature.

Others, realizing the impossibility of this view, adopted the contrary position. For when a thing of a certain nature receives the addition of something that does not belong to the integrity of its nature, this would seem either to be an accident, such as whiteness or music, or to bear an accidental relationship to that thing, such as a ring, clothes, a house, and the like. Seeing then that human nature is joined to the Word of God, and yet does not belong to the integrity of His nature, they concluded that human nature was united to the Word accidentally. And since it is evident that it cannot be an accident in the Word of God, both because in God there cannot be any accidents, as we have proved,[1] and because human nature, through being in the genus of substance, cannot be the accident of anything; it seemed to follow that human nature was joined to the Word, not as an accident, but as bearing an accidental relationship thereto. Wherefore Nestorius maintained that Christ's human nature was, as it were, the temple of the Word, so that the union of the Word with human nature would be reduced to a kind of indwelling. And since a temple is individually distinct from one who dwells in it, and since individuality in human nature is personality, he concluded that human nature and the Word had distinct personalities: so that the Word and the man were two persons.

In order to avoid this difficulty, others imagined that human nature was so assumed that properly speaking, it could have no personality. They said, in effect, that the soul and body, in which the integrity of human nature consists, were assumed by the Word in such a way, that the soul was not united to the body so as to form a substance: and they said this lest they should be forced to admit that the substance thus formed was a person. They maintained that the Word is united to the soul and body, as though these were related

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxiii.

to it accidentally, even as clothes are related to the one who is clothed: thus somewhat following in the footsteps of Nestorius.

Since all this has been refuted above,[1] we must hold that the union of the Word with man is such that neither are the two natures fused into one; nor does the Word stand related accidentally to human nature, as a substance—a man for instance—to something extraneous, as, for instance, his house or his clothes. But we hold that the Word subsists in human nature, as made His own nature by the Incarnation, so that the body is truly the body of the Word of God, and the same with the soul: and that the Word of God is truly man. And though man cannot perfectly explain this union, we shall nevertheless endeavour as best we can to say something for the building up of faith, so as to defend the Catholic Faith from the attacks which unbelievers direct at this mystery.

In all created things nothing bears so great a resemblance to this union, as the union of soul and body. Greater still would be the resemblance, as Augustine says (*Contra Felician.*), were there but one intellect in all men, as some indeed have maintained. If this were true we should have to say that the already existing intellect would become united to the human concept in such a way that the two together would form one person, just as we say that the already existing Word was joined to human nature in one person. Hence, on account of this resemblance between the two unions, Athanasius says in his Creed: *As a rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ.* Now the body is united to the rational soul, both as the matter and as the instrument of the soul. But the above resemblance does not regard the former mode of union. For thus there would be one nature made of God and man, since matter and form are the proper constituents of the specific nature. The resemblance, therefore, regards the union of soul with the body as its instrument. In fact, the statements of the early

[1] Ch. xxxiv.

Doctors are in agreement with this, who considered the human nature in Christ to be an instrument of the Godhead, even as the body is the instrument of the soul. For the body and its parts are the instruments of the soul otherwise than extraneous instruments: thus a man's spade is not so much his own instrument as his hand is, since many can work with that spade, whereas that hand is employed for the special work of that man's mind. Hence a man's hand is an instrument united and proper to him, whereas the spade is distinct from him and common to many. Now let us apply this to the union of God with man. All men in comparison with God are instruments of His works, *for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will,* as the Apostle says (Philip. ii. 13). Now other men are employed by God as extraneous and separate instruments, so to speak, since He moves them not only to their own proper operations, but also to those that are common to all rational creatures, such as understanding the truth, loving what is good, doing what is right. But human nature was assumed by Christ, that it might be an instrument in works belonging to God alone, such as cleansing from sins, enlightening our minds by grace, and perfecting us unto eternal life. Accordingly Christ's human nature is compared to God as a proper and united instrument, as the hand is compared to the soul.

Nor is it out of keeping with the usual course of nature, that a thing be naturally the proper instrument of that which is not its form. Thus the tongue, as the instrument of speech, is the proper instrument of the understanding, and yet, as the Philosopher proves (3 *De Anima*), the understanding is not the form of any part of the body. In like manner, there may be an instrument that does not belong to the specific nature, and yet belongs to the individual on the part of the matter, as, for instance, a sixth finger, or something of the kind. In this way, therefore, nothing prevents our saying that human nature by its union with the Word became, as it were, the Word's instrument, not

separate but united: and yet human nature does not belong to the nature of the Word, nor is the Word its form; but it does belong to the Person of the Word.

We must not, however, look for perfect resemblance in the above examples. We must realize that the Word of God was able to unite Himself to human nature in a manner far more sublime and penetrative than that of the union of the soul with any proper instrument whatsoever: especially seeing that He is united to the whole human nature through the intellect. And, although the Word of God by His power penetrates all things, as preserving and upholding them, it is possible for Him to be united in a much more sublime and ineffable manner with intellectual creatures, in as much as they are able properly to enjoy Him and participate in Him.



CHAPTER XLII

THAT IT WAS MOST BECOMING TO THE WORD OF GOD THAT HE SHOULD TAKE HUMAN NATURE

From what has been said it is clear that it was most becoming that the Person of the Word should assume human nature.

Since the assumption of human nature was directed to the salvation of mankind, and since the ultimate salvation of man is that man should be perfected in his intellectual faculty by the contemplation of the First Truth, it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word who proceeds from the Father by an intellectual emanation.

Again. There would seem to be a certain affinity between the Word and human nature: since man derives his species from his being rational. Now the Word is akin to reason; hence the Greek λόγος stands for word or reason. Therefore the Word was most fittingly united to the rational nature: since it is also on account of this affinity that Holy Scripture ascribes the expression *image* both to the Word and to

man. Thus the Apostle says that the Word is *the image of the invisible God* (Coloss. i. 15), and that *man . . . is the image and glory of God* (1 Cor. xi. 7).

Moreover. The Word bears a certain affinity not only to rational nature, but also to all creatures in general: because the Word contains the types of all things created by God, just as the craftsman has in his mind the types of all his handiwork. Accordingly, all creatures are just the real expression and reproduction of the types contained in the concept of the divine Word: for which reason all things are said to have been made by Him. It was fitting, therefore, that the Word should be united to a creature, namely human nature.

CHAPTER XLIII

THAT THE HUMAN NATURE ASSUMED BY THE WORD DID NOT EXIST BEFORE IT WAS ASSUMED, BUT WAS ASSUMED BY THE WORD AT THE MOMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION

SINCE the Word assumed human nature into unity of Person, as we have proved,[1] it follows that human nature did not exist before it was united to the Word.

For, if it was already in existence, there must have existed, before the union, an individual with that human nature; because a nature cannot exist except in an individual. Now an individual of human nature is a hypostasis and a person. Consequently we shall have to say that the human nature to be assumed by the Word pre-existed in some hypostasis or person. Therefore if this already existing hypostasis or person remained after the nature was assumed, there would have been two hypostases or persons, one of the Word, the other, of a man: so that the union would not have taken place in the hypostasis or person: and this is against faith. On the other hand, if that hypostasis or person did not remain in the nature wherein it

[1] Ch. xli.

existed before being assumed by the Word, it must have been destroyed: for no individual can cease to be what it is, without being corrupted. Hence this man who was in existence before the union, must have been destroyed: and consequently the human nature in Him must have been destroyed also. Therefore it was impossible for the Word to assume an already existing man, in unity of person.

Moreover. It would derogate from the perfection of the Incarnation of the Word of God, if He lacked any of those things that are natural to man. Now it is natural to man to be born in human fashion: and the Word of God would not have been born in human fashion if He had assumed an already existing man. For this man would have been a perfect man from his birth: and consequently his birth could not be ascribed to the Word of God, nor would the Blessed Virgin be called the mother of the Word. Now our faith holds that He was like us in all natural things save sin; and that the Son of God, as the Apostle declares, was made and born of a woman, and that the Virgin is the Mother of God. Therefore it was not fitting that He should assume an already existing man.

Hence it follows that He united human nature to Himself from the first moment of His conception. Just as it behoved the Word of God to have a human birth, in order to be a real natural man, like us in all natural things, so was it fitting that He should have a human conception: since in the order of nature a man is conceived before he is born. Now, if the human nature about to be assumed had existed in any state whatever before being united to the Word, that conception could not be ascribed to the Word of God, so that He might be said to have a human conception. Therefore it behoved the Word of God to be united to human nature from the very beginning of its conception.

Again. In the generation of a human being, the active form aims at completing human nature in a definite individual. But, if the Word of God did not assume human nature at the very beginning of its conception, the active

force, before the union, would have been directed to the formation of another human individual, that is a human hypostasis or person; and, after the union, it would have directed the whole process of generation to another hypostasis or person, namely the Word of God, who was being born in human nature. Accordingly, there would not have been one generation, since it would have been directed to two persons; nor would the whole process have been uniform, and this would seem foreign to the order of nature. Therefore it was fitting that the Word of God should assume human nature, not after conception, but at the moment of conception.

Further. The order of human generation would seem to demand that the same one should be born as was conceived, and not another: seeing that conception is directed to birth. Consequently, if the Son of God had a human birth, it was fitting that He should have a human conception, and not assume an already existing man.

CHAPTER XLIV

THAT THE HUMAN NATURE ASSUMED BY THE WORD WAS PERFECT IN BODY AND SOUL AT THE MOMENT OF CONCEPTION

HENCE it follows that the rational soul was united to the body at the very beginning of the conception.

The Word of God assumed the body through the medium of the rational soul: because the human body is not more adapted to be assumed by God than other bodies, except on account of the rational soul. Therefore the Word of God did not assume a body without a rational soul. Since then the Word of God assumed the body at the very moment of its conception, it follows that at that very moment the rational soul was united to the body.

Again. Given that which comes later in the process of generation, we must grant what comes before in that pro-

cess. Now the last thing in the process of generation is a complete being, and this complete being is the individual thing generated, which in human generation is a hypostasis or person for the completion of which both a soul and body are required. Given, then, the personality of the man that is begotten, both rational soul and body must be in existence. Now the personality of the man Christ is no other than the personality of the Word of God: and the Word of God took to Himself a human body in the very moment of conception. Therefore the personality of that man was there: and consequently the rational soul must have been there also.

It would, moreover, have been unbecoming for the Word, who is the fount and origin of all perfections and forms, to be united to that which lacked form and natural perfection. Now a body in the making is, before animation, without form and natural perfection. Therefore it was unfitting for the Word of God to be united to a body without a soul: and consequently it behoved that soul to be united to the body from the very beginning of conception.

From this we may also conclude that the body assumed, was formed from the very beginning of its conception, since it was not meet for the Word of God to assume anything unformed. Now the soul, like any natural form, requires its proper matter: and the proper matter of the soul is a body with organs, since the soul is the active principle of a physical, organic body that is potentially a living being. Hence if, as already proved,[1] the soul, from the first moment of conception, was united to the body, it follows that this same body had limbs and form from the first moment of conception. Even in the order of generation the body is limbed before the advent of the rational soul: so that if this latter has taken place, the former must have taken place already. Nor is there any reason why the body should not continue to grow until it has reached its appointed stage of development, even after the advent of the soul. Accordingly, with regard to the man assumed, we must

[1] Ch. xliii.

hold that at the first moment of His conception, His body was limbed and formed, though it was not yet fully developed.

CHAPTER XLV

THAT IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE BORN OF A VIRGIN

HENCE it follows that it behoved this man to be born of a virgin mother, without natural seed.

The seed of the male is required as the active principle in human generation, on account of the active power it contains. Now, according to what has been said, the active power, in the generation of Christ, could not be natural, since the natural power does not instantly cause the entire formation of the body, but needs time for that purpose: and the body of Christ was formed and limbed from the first moment of its conception, as we have proved.[1] Therefore the human generation of Christ was without natural seed.

Again. In the generation of any animals whatsoever the seed of the male draws to itself the matter provided by the female: as though the power therein contained aimed at its own perfection as the end of the whole process of generation: hence, as soon as this process is complete, the seed itself, developed and complete, is the offspring that is born. Now, in the human generation of Christ, the ultimate term of generation was union with the divine Person, but not the formation of a human person or hypostasis, as proved above.[2] Therefore, in this generation, the active principle could not be the seed of a man, but the power of God alone, so that even as, in the ordinary generation of man, the seed of the male attracts to itself the matter provided by the female, so, in the generation of Christ, the Word of God took the same matter into union with Himself.

In like manner it is clear that even in the human genera-

[1] Ch. xliv. [2] Ch. xli.

tion of God's Word, there should be evidence of some property of the spiritual generation of the Word. Now a word, as produced by the utterer, whether by interior concept, or by outward speech, causes no detriment to the utterer, rather indeed does it perfect him. Therefore it was fitting that, in the process of His human generation, the Word of God should be so conceived and born, that the integrity of His Mother should remain intact. Besides it clearly behoved the Word of God, by whom all things were made and preserved in their integrity, to be born in such a manner that His Mother's integrity remained wholly unimpaired. Consequently it was fitting that He should be born of a virgin.

Nor is this manner of generation derogatory to the true and natural human nature of Christ, although He was begotten otherwise than other men. For, seeing that God's power is infinite, as proved above,[1] and that all causes derive from it their power of producing an effect, it is evident that any effect whatsoever that is produced by any cause can, in the same species and nature, be produced by God, without the aid of that cause. Wherefore, just as the natural power in human seed produces a real man, having the human species and nature, so too the divine power which endowed the seed with that power, can produce the effects of that power, without its assistance, by forming a real man, having the human species and nature.

Someone, however, may object that, to be begotten naturally, a man's body must be fashioned naturally from the seed of a man, and from whatever it is that the woman supplies; and therefore Christ's body was not of the same nature as ours, if it was not begotten of a man's seed. But this objection is easily answered according to Aristotle's opinion,[2] who held that the seed of the male does not form a substantial part of the embryo, but is merely the active principle; and that the whole matter of the body is supplied by the mother. Accordingly, as regards

[1] Bk. I., ch. xliii. [2] I *De Gener. Animal.*

its matter, Christ's body differs not from ours: because our bodies also are formed from the material supplied by the mother.

But even if one were not to admit this opinion of Aristotle, the above objection would not stand. For likeness or unlikeness, as regards matter, depends not on the condition of the matter at the beginning of generation, but on its condition when generation is terminated: thus air generated from earth does not differ from air generated from water, because though earth and water differ at the beginning of the process, the action of the generator brings them to a same state of being. Accordingly, the material that is taken from the woman only, can by God's power be brought to the same state, when the process of generation is terminated, as would result were the material taken from both man and woman. Consequently there will be no unlikeness through difference of material, between Christ's body which was formed by God's power, from material taken from His mother only, and our bodies which are formed by Nature's power, although the material from which they are fashioned is taken from both parents. Thus the slime of the earth from which God formed the first man (who without doubt was a real man, and like us in every way) surely differs more from the material taken from both parents, than does the material taken from the woman only, from which Christ's body was formed.

Consequently Christ's birth of a virgin is nowise derogatory either to the reality of His human nature, or to His likeness to us. For, although the forces of nature require definite material for a definite effect to be produced therefrom, the power of God, that can produce all things out of nothing, is not confined, in His action, to definite material. Neither does it derogate from the dignity of Christ's Mother, that she was a virgin both in conceiving and in giving birth, so as to forbid us to hail her as the true and natural Mother of God's Son. Through the agency of the divine power she supplied the natural matter

for the generation of Christ's body: and this is all that is required on the mother's part. Whereas all that conduces to the loss of virginity in other mothers is directed, not to motherhood, but to fatherhood, its purpose being that the seed of the male may reach the place adapted for generation.

CHAPTER XLVI

THAT CHRIST WAS CONCEIVED BY THE HOLY GHOST

ALTHOUGH every divine work that has its effect among creatures is common to all the Trinity, as we have shown above,[1] the fashioning of Christ's body by divine power, although common to the three Persons, is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.

This is, seemingly, becoming to the Incarnation of the Word. For, just as our word, which is conceived in our mind, is invisible but becomes perceptible to the senses when it is spoken; so the Word of God is invisible as regards His eternal generation in the bosom of the Father, but became visible to us through the Incarnation. Wherefore the Incarnation of God's Word is like the vocal utterance of our word. Now we give expression to our word by means of the breath (*per spiritum*) whereby we form words expressive of our thoughts. It is therefore fitting that the flesh of the Son of God should be formed by His Spirit. This is also in keeping with human generation. For the active power of human seed is actuated by the spirit in drawing to itself the material provided by the mother; the same power being derived from the spirit whose purity accounts for the whiteness of the foam-like semen. Accordingly, when the Word of God took to Himself a body from a virgin, it was fitting that this body should be fashioned by the Holy Ghost.

This was also fitting, as indicating the motive of the

[1] Bk. IV., ch. xxi.

Incarnation of God's Word. For this motive could be no other but God's love for man whose nature He wished to unite to Himself in unity of person. Now, in God, it is the Holy Ghost who proceeds as love, as proved above.[1] Therefore the work of the Incarnation is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.

Moreover, Holy Scripture is wont to ascribe all graces to the Holy Ghost; because that which is freely given would seem to be bestowed through the love of the giver. Now no grace has been bestowed on man greater than his union with the divine Person. Therefore this work is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.

CHAPTER XLVII

THAT CHRIST WAS NOT THE SON OF THE HOLY GHOST ACCORDING TO THE FLESH

ALTHOUGH we speak of Christ as having been conceived by the Holy Ghost and the Virgin, the Holy Ghost cannot be called His father, in respect of His human generation, as the Virgin is called His Mother.

For the Holy Ghost did not produce the human nature in Christ out of His own substance, but by His power alone was He the active principle in its production. Consequently the Holy Ghost cannot be called Christ's father in respect of His human generation.

Moreover we should be led to a false conclusion if Christ were called the son of the Holy Ghost. For it is clear that the Word of God has a distinct personality in as much as He is the Son of God the Father. Hence, if He were called son of the Holy Ghost, according to his human nature, we might conclude that Christ was two sons: since the Word of God cannot be the son of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, since sonship refers to the person and not to the nature, it would follow that there are two persons in Christ, which

[1] Ch. xix.

is contrary to the Catholic Faith. It would also be unfitting if the Father's authority and name were transferred to another Person: and this would be the case if the Holy Ghost were called the Father of Christ.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THAT WE MUST NOT SAY THAT CHRIST IS A CREATURE

It is also evident that, although the human nature assumed by the Word is a creature, it cannot be said, without qualification, that Christ is a creature.

To be created is to be made. Now, since being made terminates in being simply, it belongs to that which has substantial being, and this is the complete individual substance, which, if it be of intellectual nature, is called a person or again a hypostasis. On the other hand forms, accidents, even parts are not said to be made, save in reference to something, because they are not self-subsistent, but subsist in something else; hence, when a thing is made white, it is said to be made, not simply, but relatively. Now in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person besides that of the Word of God, who is uncreated, as proved above.[1] Therefore we cannot say simply that Christ is a creature; although we can say so, with a qualification; for instance, that He is a creature, as man, or in respect of His human nature. Now, although the statement that an individual substance is made one of its proper attributes—accidents, for instance, or parts—cannot be made simply, but only relatively; nevertheless we can predicate of a subject simply whatever results naturally and appropriately from its accidents or parts: thus *seeing* is predicated of a man simply, as a consequence of his having eyes: curly haired, by reason of his hair, and visible, because he is coloured. Hence whatsoever results properly from human nature can be predicated simply of Christ; for instance, that He is a

[1] Ch. xxxviii.

man, that He is visible, that He walked, and so on : whereas, whatsoever is proper to the Person cannot be attributed to Christ in reference to His human nature, except with a qualification, expressed or implied.

CHAPTER XLIX

REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS GIVEN ABOVE AGAINST THE INCARNATION

BEARING these things in mind, we can now easily reply to the above objections[1] against faith in the Incarnation.

We have shown that the Incarnation of the Word does not mean that the Word was changed into flesh, or united to the body as its form.[2] Therefore from the fact that the Word became incarnate, it does not follow, as the first objection maintained, that God is really a body, or a bodily power.

Likewise, from the fact that the Word assumed human nature, we cannot conclude that He was substantially changed. No change took place in God's Word Himself, but only in the human nature assumed by the Word. It was in reference to that nature that the Word was both begotten and born in the course of time, but not in reference to Himself.

The third objection proves nothing. A hypostasis does not extend beyond the nature from which it has its subsistence. Now the Word of God does not derive subsistence from human nature; nay rather He draws human nature to His own subsistence or personality : since He subsists, not through it, but in it. Hence nothing prevents the Word of God from being everywhere, although the human nature assumed by the Word of God is not everywhere.

This helps us to reply to the fourth objection. Every subsistent thing must have but one nature, through which it has being simply : wherefore the Word of God has being

[1] Ch. xl. [2] Ch. xli.

simply, through the divine nature alone, and not through human nature. It is owing to the latter that He has a particular kind of being, namely that He is a man.

The fifth objection is solved in the same way. It is impossible that the nature through which the Word subsists, be other than the Person of the Word. Now He subsists through the divine and not through the human nature: drawing the latter to His own subsistence, so as to subsist therein, as we said before. It does not follow, then, that the human nature is identified with the Person of the Word.

Wherefore the sixth objection also is answered. For the hypostasis is less simple, either in reality or as existing in the mind, than the nature whereby it has being;—in reality, when the hypostasis is not its own nature; in the mind only, in those things where the hypostasis is identical with the nature. Now the hypostasis of the Word is not constituted simply by human nature, so as to exist by it: by it, the Word had this only, that He was a man. Hence it does not follow that the human nature is more simple than the Word, considered as Word, but only in as much as the Word is this man.

Hence follows the reply to the seventh objection. It does not follow that the hypostasis of God's Word is simply constituted by signate matter: but only in as much as He is this man. For it is only in this sense that He is constituted by human nature, as stated above.

That the human soul and body in Christ were drawn into the personality of the Word, without constituting another person besides the Person of the Word proves, not that they were less effective, but that they had greater excellence. For a thing has better being, when united to its betters, than when it is by itself: thus the sensitive soul has better being in man than in other animals: in these it is the principal form, but not in man.

Hence again we gather the reply to the ninth objection. This soul and this body were truly in Christ, and yet they did not give Him another personality from that of the Word of God, since they were assumed into the personality

of the divine Word. Even so the body, when it is without the soul, has its own species: but when it is united to the soul, it takes its species from the soul.

Hereby is indicated the reply to the tenth objection. It is clear that this man Christ is a substance, not a universal but a particular, substance: also that He is a hypostasis, and yet not a distinct hypostasis from that of the Word: because human nature was assumed by the hypostasis of the Word, that the Word might subsist in the human as well as in the divine nature. Now that which subsists in human nature is an individual man. Therefore, when we say, *This man,* the Word is indicated.—If however someone were to apply this same argument to human nature, so as to say that it is a substance, not universal, but particular, and consequently a hypostasis, he would clearly be in the wrong. For human nature, even in Socrates or Plato, is not a hypostasis: it is that which subsists in human nature that is a hypostasis. When it is said that it is a substance, and a particular substance, the sense is not the same as when we say that a hypostasis is a particular substance. According to the Philosopher,[1] substance has a twofold signification. In the first place it may indicate a subject in the genus of substance, namely a hypostasis; secondly, it may mean *what a thing is,* namely its nature. Nor are the parts of a substance called particular substances as though they subsisted of themselves: but they subsist in the whole. Hence they cannot be called hypostases, seeing that none of them is a complete substance: otherwise there would be as many hypostases in a man as there are parts.

The eleventh objection is answered thus. Equivocation consists in applying the same name to various forms, but not to different supposits. Thus there is no equivocation if *man* stands at one time for Plato, at another time for Socrates. Accordingly, the term *man,* whether applied to Christ or to other men, always indicates the same form, namely human nature, and consequently the predication here is univocal. The only way in which it has a different

[1] 5 *Metaph.*, viii.

signification is that when it is applied to Christ, it stands for the uncreated hypostasis, whereas when it is applied to other men, it stands for the created hypostasis.

And yet the hypostasis of the Word is not said to be the supposit of the human nature, as though it were the subject, and the latter were its form, as the twelfth objection suggested. This would indeed be necessary, if the hypostasis of the Word were constituted in being simply, by the human nature, which we have shown to be false. The hypostasis of the Word is said to be the supposit of human nature, as drawing it to His own subsistence; even as a thing is drawn to something better, to which it is united.

From the fact that the Word already existed from eternity, it does not follow that human nature is joined to the Word accidentally, as the last objection concluded. The Word assumed human nature in order to be truly man. Now to be a man is to be a kind of substance. Since then the hypostasis of the Word is a man through being united to human nature, this nature is not joined to Him accidentally: for accidents do not give substantial being.

CHAPTER L

THAT ORIGINAL SIN IS TRANSMITTED BY OUR FIRST PARENT TO HIS POSTERITY

In the preceding chapters we have shown there is nothing impossible in what the Catholic Faith affirms concerning the Incarnation of the Son of God: and consequently we must now show that it was fitting for the Son of God to take to Himself human nature. Seemingly, the Apostle assigns as a reason of this fittingness, original sin which was contracted by all men. Thus he says (Rom. v. 19): *As by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just.* Since, however, the Pelagian heretics denied original sin, we must

prove that men are born in original sin. In the first place we must quote the words of Gen. ii. 15, 17: *The Lord God took man, and put him into paradise . . . And he commanded him saying: Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat: but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat. For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.* Seeing, however, that Adam did not actually die on the very day on which he ate, the words, *Thou shalt die the death* must be understood to mean, *Thou shalt be under the ban of death.* Now there would be no purpose in saying this if man were created with the necessity of dying. Consequently we must say that death and the necessity of dying is a punishment inflicted on man for sin. Now a punishment is not inflicted justly except on those who are guilty. Therefore in all who are thus punished there must be some guilt. Now all men are punished thus, even from the moment of their birth: for as soon as he is born man is under the ban of death, so that some die as soon as they are born, and are taken from the womb to the grave. Therefore some kind of sin is in them. But this is not actual sin, for infants have not the use of free-will, without which no sin is imputed to a man, as appears from what we have stated above.[1] We must conclude, then, that they have contracted original sin.

This is expressly indicated in the words of the Apostle (Rom. v. 12): *As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.* Now it cannot be said that by one man sin entered into the world by way of imitation, because in that case sin would only enter into those who, by sinning, imitate the first man; and since through sin death entered into the world, only those would die who sin in imitation of the first man. But the Apostle excludes this interpretation when he goes on to say (verse 14): *Death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them who have not sinned, after the similitude of the transgression of*

[1] Bk. III., chs. cxxix. *seq.*

Adam. Hence the Apostle did not mean that by one man sin entered into the world by way of imitation, but by way of origin. Moreover, if the Apostle were speaking of the entrance of sin into the world by mere imitation, he would have said that sin had entered into the world by the devil rather than by one man. Thus it is said explicitly (Wis. ii. 24, 25): *By the envy of the devil, death came into the world: and they follow him that are of his side.*

Again. David says (Ps. l. 7): *Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me.* Now this cannot refer to actual sin, seeing that David was conceived and born of lawful wedlock. Therefore his words must refer to original sin.

Moreover. It is said (Job xiv. 4): *Who can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only art?* Whence it is clearly to be gathered that man contracts uncleanness through being conceived of seed. And this must refer to the uncleanness of sin, for which alone is man brought into judgement: because the preceding verse reads: *And dost thou think it meet to open thy eyes upon such an one, and to bring him into judgement with thee?* Therefore man from his very origin contracts a guilt that is called original sin.

Again. Baptism and the other sacraments of the Church are remedies for sin, as we shall prove further on. Now it is the universal custom of the Church to give baptism to children soon after birth. Consequently there would be no purpose in doing so unless they were stained with some sin. But this is not actual sin, because they have no free-will without which no one is accounted guilty of sin. Therefore, since God and the Church do nothing without a purpose, we must conclude that they have contracted original sin. Someone, however, may say that infants are baptized, not that they may be cleansed from sin, but that they may enter the kingdom of heaven. For they cannot enter the kingdom of heaven, unless they are baptized: since our Lord said (Jo. iii. 5): *Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot*

enter into the kingdom of heaven. But this objection is futile. No one is excluded from the kingdom of God, save on account of sin. For the end of every rational creature is to obtain beatitude, which is nowhere but in God's kingdom. And this kingdom is the orderly society of those who enjoy the vision of God, wherein true beatitude consists, as proved above.[1] Now nothing fails to obtain its end except through some sin. Therefore, if children before being baptized, cannot enter into the kingdom of God, we must admit that there is some sin in them: and consequently, according to the teaching of Catholic faith, we must hold that men are born with original sin.

CHAPTER LI

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ORIGINAL SIN

THERE are, however, some points that would seem to be in contradiction with the truth. One man's sin is not imputed to others: wherefore it is said (Ezech. xviii. 19): *The son beareth not the iniquity of his father.*[2] The reason for this is that we are neither praised nor blamed for that which is not in our power. Now those things are in our power, that we do freely. Therefore the sin of the first man is not imputed to all mankind.

Someone, however, might reply that through one man sinning, all men sinned in him, as the Apostle seems to say (Rom. v. 19): and thus it is not a case of one man's sin being imputed to another. Yet, seemingly, this reply is not conclusive; because when Adam sinned, those who were born of him were not yet in existence; they only existed virtually as in their first origin. Now only one who is actually in existence can sin, since to sin is to act. Therefore we did not all sin in Adam. And if it be said that we sinned in Adam, in the sense that he transmitted

[1] Bk. III., chs. xxxvii. *seqq.*
[2] Vulg., *Why hath not the son borne,* etc.

his sin to us together with our nature; this again is apparently impossible. An accident does not pass from one subject to another, and therefore it cannot be transmitted, unless its subject be transmitted. Now the subject of sin is the rational soul, which is not transmitted to us from our first parent, but is created by God for each one separately, as we have proved.[1] Therefore sin cannot be transmitted to us from Adam through our origin.

Again. If other men contract sin from their first parent, because they trace their origin to him, it would seem that Christ must have been subject to original sin, seeing that He also traces His origin to him: and this is contrary to faith.

Moreover. That which a thing receives through its natural origin, is natural to it: and that which is natural to a thing is not its fault: thus it is not a mole's fault that it is blind. Therefore sin could not be contracted from the first man by other men. If someone reply that sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity through their origin, considered not as natural but as vitiated; this reply will not stand. A fault does not occur in nature's work, except through a fault in a natural principle: thus a defect in the seed of animals leads to the birth of monstrosities. Now we cannot assign any defect of a natural principle in human seed. Consequently a vitiated origin cannot account for the transmission of original sin from our first parent to his posterity.

Again. Faults in the works of nature, due to a defective principle, do not occur always or even frequently, but in the minority of cases. Therefore, if sin is transmitted by the first parent to his posterity through a vitiated origin, it will be contracted, not by all, but by a few.

Further. If a vitiated generation occasions the transmission of a defect to the offspring, this defect must be of the same kind as the fault in the origin, because like effects have like causes. Now the origin or generation of man is an act of the generating power, which has no part in the

[1] Bk. II., ch. lxxxvi.

reason; and consequently it cannot be the subject of a fault of a sinful kind, since virtue and vice can only be in acts that are to some extent subject to reason: thus a man is not blamed if, on account of a vitiated generation, he is born a leper or blind. Therefore it is quite impossible for a culpable fault to be transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, through a vitiated generation.

Again. Sin does not destroy the good of nature: wherefore natural good remains even in the demons, according to Dionysius (*De Div. Nom.* iv.). Now generation is an act of nature. Therefore human generation could not be vitiated by the first man's sin, in such a way that his sin would be transmitted to his posterity.

Moreover. Man begets his like in species. Hence a son is not necessarily like his parents in things that are not connected with the nature of the species. Now sin has no connection with the specific nature, since it is not according to nature; in fact, it is a corruption of the natural order. Therefore it does not follow that, because the first man sinned, other sinners should be born of him.

Again. Children take after their proximate rather than their remote progenitors. Now it may happen that the immediate progenitors are sinless, and commit no sin in the act of procreation. Therefore all men are not born sinners on account of the sin of their first parent.

Besides, if sin was transmitted by the first man to his posterity, since good is more effective in its action than evil, as we have proved,[1] much more were Adam's repentance and righteousness transmitted by him to others.

Moreover. If the sin of the first man is transmitted to his posterity by generation, for the same reason the sins of other parents are transmitted to their children. Thus the burden of sin would be greater in the later descendants than in the first. And this would be the case all the more if sin were transmitted from parent to child, whereas repentance cannot be transmitted.

[1] Bk. III., ch. xii.

CHAPTER LII

REPLY TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS

We must, in the first place, observe that there are certain probable signs of original sin in the human race. For since God watches over men's actions, so as to assign rewards to good deeds, and punishments to evil deeds, as we have already shown,[1] we can conclude that where there is punishment, there has been sin. Now the whole human race suffers various punishments, both bodily and spiritual. Of bodily punishments the chief is death, to which all others are conducive and subordinate, such as hunger, thirst, and so on. Of spiritual punishments, the principal is weakness of reason, the result being that man encounters difficulty in acquiring knowledge of the truth, and easily falls into error; also that he is unable wholly to overcome his animal propensities, which sometimes even obscure his mental vision. Someone however might reply that these defects, whether of body or of soul, are not penalties but natural defects, and a necessary consequence of the conditions of matter. For the human body, being composed of contrary elements, must needs be corruptible; and the sensitive appetite must needs incline to things in which the senses delight, and which at times are contrary to reason. Again, the possible intellect is in potentiality to all things intelligible, and has none of them actually, but has by its very nature to acquire them through the senses, and therefore with difficulty acquires the knowledge of truth, and is easily led astray by the imagination.

Nevertheless, if we look at the matter rightly, it will appear sufficiently probable that, divine providence having fitted each perfection to that which is to be perfected, God has united a higher to a lower nature in order that the former might dominate the latter, and, should any obstacle to this dominion arise through a defect of nature, God by a special and supernatural act of kindness would remove it.

[1] Bk. III., ch. cxl.

Wherefore, since the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, we believe that it was united to the body under such conditions, that there can be nothing in the body to oppose the soul whereby the body lives: and in like manner, if reason in man is united to his sensual appetite and his other sensitive powers, that reason is not hindered by the sensitive powers, but, on the contrary, dominates them. Hence, according to the teaching of faith, we affirm that man was, from the beginning, so fashioned that as long as his reason was subject to God, not only would his lower powers serve him without hindrance; but there would be nothing in his body to lessen its subjection; since whatever was lacking in nature to bring this about God by His grace would supply. Whereas no sooner did his reason turn away from God than his lower powers rebelled against his reason, and his body became subject to sufferings that counteract the life it receives from the soul. Accordingly, although these defects seem natural to man absolutely, if we consider his nature from its lower side, nevertheless, if we consider divine providence, and the dignity of the higher part of man's nature, it can be proved with sufficient probability that these defects are penal, and consequently that the human race was originally infected with sin. Having made these remarks, let us now turn our attention to the objections.

It is not unreasonable, as the first objection affirmed, to say that because one man sinned all men have contracted sin through their origin, although each one is praised or blamed for his own actions. For we must not speak in the same way of things that regard the individual, as of things that regard the nature of the whole species: because, as Porphyry says,[1] by sharing the same species, many men are like one man. Accordingly, a sin belonging to one individual or person, is not imputed to the fault of any other but the sinner, because they are different persons. But if there be a sin that pertains to the whole specific nature, it is not unreasonable that it be transmitted from

[1] *Praedicab.* ch. *De specie.*

one man to another, even as the specific nature is. Now sin is an evil of the rational nature, and evil is the privation of good, and, consequently, if we are to judge whether a certain sin pertains to the common nature or to a particular person, we must see what good it deprives one of. Accordingly, actual sins which are committed by mankind in general, deprive the person of the sinner of a good, such as grace and the right order among the parts of the soul: consequently they are personal sins, and when one man sins, another is not blamed. On the other hand, the first sin of the first man deprived the sinner not only of his own personal good—namely, grace and due order in the soul, but also of the good belonging to the common nature. For, as we said above,[1] human nature was so fashioned when it was first brought into being that the lower powers were perfectly subject to the soul, the reason to God, and the body to the soul, God supplying by grace that which nature lacked for the purpose. Now this boon, which some call original justice, was bestowed on the first man in such wise that he was to transmit it together with human nature to his posterity. But when the first man sinned, his reason rebelled against God, and the consequence was that his lower powers ceased to be perfectly subject to reason, and his body to his soul. And this, not only in the first man that sinned, but also in his posterity, who were to have inherited the aforesaid original justice. Hence the sin of the first man, from whom all others are descended, according to the teaching of faith, was not only a personal sin, in so far as it deprived the first man himself of his own good, but also a sin of nature, in as much as the result of that sin was that both he and his posterity were deprived of a gift bestowed on the entire nature. Wherefore this defect transmitted by our first parent to others, is culpable also in those others, in as much as all men are reckoned as one man, through sharing in one common nature. And this sin proves to be voluntary in reference to the will of our first parent, just as the hand's deed may be sinful, on

[1] Bk. III., ch. lxxxi.

account of the will of the first mover—namely, the reason: so that in reference to the sin of nature we look upon the members of the human race as being parts of the common nature, just as in the case of a personal sin there are various parts in one man.

Accordingly, it is true to say with the Apostle (Rom. v. 19) that, because one man sinned, all others sinned in him, as the second argument[1] stated: not that other men were actually in him, but virtually, as in their first origin. Nor are they said to have sinned in him by their own deed, but as sharing in his nature which was corrupted by sin.

The third objection argued thus: If sin is transmitted by our first parent to his posterity, seeing that the rational soul is the subject of sin, it follows that the rational soul is transmitted together with the semen. But this does not follow. This sin of nature, which we call original sin, is transmitted in the same way as the specific nature, and although the rational soul completes that nature, it is not transmitted with the semen: the body alone is thus transmitted, being naturally adapted to receive such a soul, as proved above.[2]

Although, according to the flesh, Christ was descended from our first parent, he did not contract the stain of original sin, as the fourth objection argued: because from our first parent he received only the matter of a human body, and the power which fashioned his body was not derived from our first parent, but from the Holy Ghost, as we have proved.[3] Consequently he received human nature from Adam, not as from its efficient cause, but as from its material principle.

We must also note that the reason why these defects are transmitted to us through our natural origin, is that our nature is deprived of the assistance of grace, bestowed on it in our first parent, and destined, together with nature, to be transmitted to his posterity: and since this privation was the consequence of his deliberate sin, the defects resulting therefrom took the form of sin. Accordingly, these

[1] Ch. l. [2] Bk. II., ch. lxxxvi. [3] Ch. xlvi.

defects are both culpable in reference to their first principle, which was Adam's sin, and natural, in reference to nature already destitute: wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. ii. 3): *We were by nature children of wrath.* Thus the fifth objection is answered.

Thus it is clear that the vicious origin which is the cause of original sin, is due to the lack of a principle—namely the gratuitous gift bestowed on human nature in its creation. In a sense this gift was natural, not because it resulted from the principles of nature, but because it was bestowed on man in such a way that it was to be transmitted by him together with his nature: the sixth objection took *natural* as signifying that which results from natural principles.

In the same sense the seventh objection speaks of the defect of a natural principle as belonging to the specific nature: and it is true that whatever results from this defect occurs in the minority of cases. But the defect of original sin results from our being deprived of a principle that is additional to the principles of the species, as stated above.

We must also observe that the act of the generative power cannot be an actual sin, for this depends on the will of the individual, whereas the act of the generative power is not obedient to reason or the will, as the eighth objection argued. But original sin pertains to nature; so that there is nothing to prevent its being in the act of the generative power, seeing that such acts are said to be natural.

The ninth objection can easily be solved from what has been said. By sin man is not deprived of the natural good which belongs to his specific nature: but he could, by the sin of his first parent, be deprived of the gratuitous good bestowed on his nature, as already stated.

Again, from what we have been saying, we can easily reply to the tenth objection. Since being deprived and being in want are correlatives, it follows that children resemble their parents as regards original sin, in as much as the gift bestowed on nature in the beginning would have been transmitted by parents to their posterity.

Although this gift was not included in the species, nevertheless, it was given by God gratuitously to the first man, that he might transmit it to the entire species. In the same way the sin which caused man to lose that good is transmitted to the whole species. We must also observe that although a man is cleansed from original sin by the sacraments of grace, so that it ceases to be imputed to him as a sin, this cleansing regards him personally; nor is he entirely healed: whereas original sin is transmitted to posterity by an act of nature. Accordingly, even though there be no original sin in the one who generates, considered as an individual, and though there may be no sin in the act of generation, as the eleventh objection suggested, nevertheless, original sin, through infecting the nature, infects both the generator, who is nature's principle of generation, and the act whereby he generates.

Again we must note that the actual sin of the first man affected the whole nature, because on account of the gift bestowed on it this nature was still perfect: but when this nature, through his sin, was deprived of that gift, his act became simply natural. Hence by his act he could neither satisfy for the whole nature, nor restore the gift of nature: but he could only make satisfaction, to a certain extent, for himself. This suffices as a reply to the twelfth objection.

In like manner the thirteenth objection is solved. When subsequent parents sin, nature is already deprived of the gift originally bestowed on it: and consequently their sin does not cause a defect to be transmitted to their posterity, but only one that affects them personally.

Accordingly, it is neither unfitting nor unreasonable that men should have contracted original sin, as the Pelagian heresy which denied original sin declared.

CHAPTER LIII

ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO SHOW THAT IT WAS NOT FITTING THAT GOD SHOULD BE INCARNATE

SINCE unbelievers look upon the doctrine of the Incarnation as folly, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. i. 21), *It pleased God by the foolishness of our preaching to save them that believe,* and whereas it is foolish to preach not only what is impossible, but also what is unfitting, they attack the Incarnation not only on the ground that Catholic faith teaches what is impossible, but also because it is unreasonable and unbecoming the divine goodness. It becomes the divine goodness that all things should retain their order. Now the order of things requires that God should be exalted above all, and that man's place should be among the lower creatures. Therefore it becomes not the divine majesty to be united to human nature.

Again. If it were fitting that God should become man, this must have been on account of some consequent benefit. But whatever this benefit was, God, since He is almighty, could have brought it about by His mere will. Seeing then that whatever is done fittingly, should be done as quickly as possible, it was not fitting that God should unite human nature to Himself, for the sake of that benefit.

Further. Since God is the universal cause of all, it behoves Him especially to seek the good of the universe. But the assumption of human nature pertains only to the good of man. Therefore, if it behoved God to take some other nature, it was not fitting that He should take human nature only.

Moreover. The more things are like to each other, the more fittingly are they united together. Now the angelic nature is more like and akin to God than human nature is. Therefore it was not fitting that God should pass over the angelic nature and be united to human nature.

Again. If God took human nature, this would seem to

provide an obstacle to man's understanding of the truth, which in him is a principle of knowledge. For he would be liable to fall into the error of those who deny that God is exalted above all bodies. Therefore it was of no profit to human nature that it should be assumed by God.

Moreover. We know by experience that many errors have arisen concerning the Incarnation. Therefore it would seem that it was not good for man's salvation that God should become incarnate.

Again. Of all God's works the Incarnation is apparently the greatest. Now one would expect that the greatest work would be productive of the greatest benefit. Hence if the Incarnation of God was directed to the salvation of all, it would seem fitting that He should have saved the whole human race: in fact, the salvation of all men would seem a fitting result to expect from so great a work.

Further. If God took human nature in order to save mankind, it would seem proper that His divine nature should have been made clear to men by adequate signs. Now this apparently was not the case, since other men, by God's power alone, and without God being united to their nature, worked miracles like those that Christ worked, and even greater. Therefore God's Incarnation seemingly did not provide sufficiently for man's salvation.

Again. If it was necessary for man's salvation, that God should take flesh; seemingly He ought to have taken human nature at the very beginning of the world, and not towards the end of time, seeing that there have been men since the world's beginning: for it would seem that the salvation of all previous men was neglected.

Further. For the same reason He ought to have continued to dwell with men until the end of the world, so as to teach and guide men by His presence.

Moreover. It is most profitable to man that His hope of future bliss should have a strong foundation. Now God incarnate would have inspired man with this hope much more, had He taken an immortal, impassible, and glorious flesh, and shown it to all men. Therefore, seemingly, it

was unfitting that He took a body subject to death and infirmities.

Moreover. It would seem proper that He should have enjoyed an abundance of worldly possessions, and have lived in the midst of wealth and the highest honours in order to show that all the things in the world come from God. Nevertheless we are told that the contrary was the case, that He lived the life of a poor and humble man, and suffered a shameful death. Therefore, the teaching of faith concerning God incarnate would seem to be unbecoming.

Further. By suffering humiliations He hid His divinity very considerably, and yet it was most necessary that men should acknowledge His Godhead, if He was God incarnate. Therefore the teaching of faith is, seemingly, out of keeping with the salvation of mankind.

Someone might reply that the Son of God suffered death out of obedience to His Father; but this does not seem reasonable.

Obedience consists in conforming oneself to the will of one who commands. Now the will of God the Father cannot be unreasonable. Consequently, if it was not becoming for God made man to die, since death is seemingly incompatible with the divinity that is life itself, His death is not sufficiently explained by saying that He died out of obedience to the Father.

Again. God's will is not inclined to the death of men, even of sinners, but rather that they should live, according to Ezech. xxxiii. 11, *I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live.* Much less, therefore, could it be God's will that the most perfect man should die.

Moreover. It seems wicked and cruel to command an innocent man to be put to death, and especially to be put to death for sinners, who deserve themselves to die. Now the man Christ Jesus was innocent. Therefore it would have been wicked, if he had suffered death at the command of God the Father.

Someone might say that this was necessary in order to

show forth His humility: thus the Apostle says (Philip. ii. 8): *He humbled himself being become obedient unto death.* But neither is this reply to the point. In the first place, humility is commended in one who has a superior to whom he can be subject, and this cannot be said of God. Therefore it was unfitting for the Word of God to be humbled unto death. Secondly, men could be sufficiently taught humility by divine words, which they are bound to believe, and by human examples. Therefore it was not necessary, as an example of humility, that the Word of God should either take flesh or submit to die.

And if it be replied again that it was necessary for Christ to suffer death and other ignominies, according to the Apostle, who says that He *was delivered up for our sins* (Rom. iv. 25), and that He *was offered . . . to exhaust the sins of many:* neither is this to the point.

First, because only God's grace cleanses man from sin.

Secondly, if any atonement was required, it was proper for the one who had sinned to atone: since, according to God's just judgement, *every one shall bear his own burden.*[1]

Again, if it was fitting that someone more than a mere man should atone for mankind, it were enough, seemingly, if an angel had taken flesh and offered satisfaction: since an angel has a higher nature than man.

Further. Sin is not expiated by sin; on the contrary, it is aggravated thereby. Hence, if Christ was to atone by His death, His death should have been one in which sin had no part: in other words, He should have died, not a violent, but a natural death.

Again. If it behoved Christ to die for the sins of men, He should have died more than once, since men sin often.

Someone, however, might reply that it was especially on account of original sin that it behoved Christ to be born and to suffer: since that was the sin which had infected the whole of the human race, on account of the first man's sin. But this does not seem possible. For if other men do not suffice to atone for original sin, neither, apparently,

[1] Gal. vi. 5.

was Christ's death sufficient to atone for the sins of mankind, since He died in His human, and not in His divine, nature.

Again. If Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind, it were surely unjust that men should still suffer punishments which Scripture declares to have been inflicted for sin.

Again. If Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind, there would be no need to seek further forgiveness of one's sins. And yet all who have their salvation at heart seek forgiveness. Therefore Christ did not take away the sins of mankind sufficiently. These and like arguments might appeal to some as indicating that the doctrine of the Catholic Faith about the Incarnation is inconsistent with the majesty and wisdom of God.

CHAPTER LIV

THAT IT WAS FITTING FOR GOD TO BE INCARNATE

NEVERTHELESS, if we consider the mystery of the Incarnation carefully and reverently, we shall discover such a depth of divine wisdom, as will surpass all human knowledge; according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. i. 25), *The foolishness of God is wiser than men.* Hence it is that those who study this mystery with reverence discover more and more its marvellous secrets.

In the first place we must note that the Incarnation of God was a most effective assistance to man in his road to heaven. For we have proved[1] that man's perfect happiness consists in seeing God face to face. Now, on account of the immeasurable distance between his nature and God's, a man might deem it impossible for him to reach a state, wherein the human intellect is immediately united to the divine essence, as the intellect is united to its idea. Con-

[1] Bk. III., chs. xxxvii. *seqq.*

sequently he would be discouraged in his search after happiness, and would hold back in despair. But when he knows that God consented to personal union with human nature, he is convinced that he can be united to God by his intellect, so as to see Him face to face. Therefore it was most fitting for God to assume human nature, in order to raise in man the hope of finding happiness; and hence it is that after Christ's Incarnation men began to have greater hopes of obtaining the happiness of heaven, according to His own words (Jo. x. 10), *I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly*. At the same time man is freed of the obstacles that hinder him from gaining happiness. For, since his perfect beatitude consists solely in the enjoyment of God, as we have proved, it follows that whosoever seeks his end in things beneath God, places an obstacle to his obtaining a share in true beatitude. Now, if man remained in ignorance of his own worth, he would easily be led to place his end in things beneath God. For it is through considering themselves in their corporeal and sensitive nature, which they have in common with other animals, that some seek a kind of animal happiness in things pertaining to the body and carnal pleasures. Others, considering the superiority in some respects of certain creatures over man, made such things the object of their religion, by worshipping either the world and its parts, on account of their great size and duration; or spiritual substances, angels and demons, by reason of their surpassing man, both in immortality and intellectual acumen: and so man deemed that his happiness is to be found in such things, for as much as they are above him. Now, though in certain respects man is indeed below some creatures, and in some ways like the very lowest, nevertheless, in the order of the end, nothing is above man, save only God, in whom alone man's perfect happiness consists. Accordingly, man's worth in that he is destined to be blessed with the immediate vision of God, is most fittingly indicated by God, by His taking human nature immediately to Himself. Hence we find that, as a

result of the Incarnation of God, a great number of people gave up the worship of angels, demons, and all manner of creatures, renounced even the pleasures of the flesh and all bodily goods, and gave themselves to the worship of God alone. To Him alone they look for perfect happiness, in accordance with the Apostolic exhortation (Coloss. iii. 1, 2), *Seek the things that are above, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God: mind the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth.*

Again. Whereas man's perfect happiness consists in a knowledge of God, surpassing the faculty of every created intellect, as proved above,[1] it was necessary that man should have a foretaste of this knowledge, so that he might be directed towards that same knowledge in its fulness: and we have shown that this is provided by faith.[2] Now the knowledge whereby man is directed to his last end ought to be most certain, since it is the principle on which all things are directed to the last end: so, too, those principles that we know naturally are most certain. Now we cannot have absolutely certain knowledge about a thing, unless it is either evident in itself, like the first principles of demonstration, or is resolved into self-evident premisses, like the conclusion of a demonstration. Since then faith teaches us to believe concerning God things which cannot be self-evident to us, because they surpass the faculty of the human intellect, it was necessary for these things to be revealed to man by one to whom they are self-evident. And though they are to a certain extent self-evident to all those who see the divine essence, nevertheless, in order that man's knowledge might be absolutely certain, it was necessary that it should be derived from its first principle—namely, God—to whom it is naturally self-evident, and by whom it is manifested to all. Even so, scientific certainty is not attained without recourse to the first indemonstrable principles. Therefore, that man might obtain perfect certitude about the truth of faith, it was fitting that he should be instructed by God made man, so as to receive divine

[1] Bk. III., chs. xxxvii. *seqq.* [2] Bk. III., ch. xl.

instruction in a human way. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 18): *No man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him:* and our Lord Himself says (Jo. xviii. 37): *For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth.* And for this reason we find that, after Christ's Incarnation, men had greater evidence and more certain knowledge of divine things, according to Isa. xi. 9, *The earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord.*

Again. Since man's perfect happiness consists in the enjoyment of God, it was necessary for man's affections to be disposed to desire it, since he has a natural desire for happiness. Now the desire for the enjoyment of a thing is caused by love of it. Hence it was necessary for man, who seeks perfect happiness, to be urged to the love of God. But nothing is a greater incentive to love someone than the experience of his love for us. And God's love for man could not be proved more effectively than by His consenting to personal union with man: since it is peculiar to love that it unites lover and beloved, as far as this is possible. Therefore, since man seeks perfect happiness, it was necessary for God to become man.

Moreover. Friendship is based on a certain equality, and consequently it would seem that those who are very unequal cannot be united in friendship. And so, that friendship between man and God might be more intimate, it was well for man that God should become man—since friendship between man and man is natural—in order that by knowing a God made visible to us, we might be drawn to the love of things invisible.

It is also evident that heaven is the reward of virtue. Consequently those who are on their way to heaven should be disposed by virtue. Now we are incited to virtue by word and example; and a man's example and word incite us to virtue so much the more efficaciously, as we are firmly convinced of his goodness. But it was not possible to be infallibly certain of a mere man's goodness, since even

the most holy men have at times been found wanting. Wherefore, that man might be strengthened in virtue, it was necessary for him to be taught virtue by the word and example of God incarnate. For which reason our Lord said (Jo. xiii. 15): *I have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you do also.*

Again. Just as virtue prepares man for heaven, so sin debars him therefrom. Now sin, which is opposed to virtue, debars man from heaven, not only because it brings disorder into the soul, by leading it away from its due end, but also because it offends God, to whom, as the director of human actions, man looks for this heavenly reward. Moreover, sin is contrary to divine charity, as we have fully proved.[1] Again, when a man is conscious of sin, he loses hope, which he needs in order to go to heaven. Therefore, as sin abounds in the human race, man needs a remedy for it. But none can provide this remedy, save God alone, who is able not only to move man's will to good, so as to bring him back to the right order, but also to condone the offence committed against Himself; since an offence is not forgiven, save by the person offended. In order that man's conscience may be eased of his past sin, he must be certified of God's forgiveness. But he cannot be certified of this except by God Himself. Therefore it was fitting to the human race, and expedient for the obtainment of heavenly bliss, that God should become man, so that man would both receive from God forgiveness of his sins, and be certified of that forgiveness by God made man. Hence our Lord said (Matth. ix. 6): *That you may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins:* and the Apostle says (Heb. ix. 14) that *the blood of Christ . . . shall cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God.*

Again. We are taught by the tradition of the Church that the whole human race is infected with sin. Now it has been proved[2] that the order of divine justice requires that without atonement sin be not forgiven by God. But no

[1] Bk. III., ch. clv. [2] Bk. III., ch. clviii.

mere man was able to atone for the sin of the whole human race, because any single mere man is something less than the whole assembly of the human race. Therefore, in order that the human race might be delivered from the common sin, it was necessary for atonement to be made by one who was both man, from whom atonement was due, and something more than man, so that his merit would suffice to atone for the sin of the whole human race. Now in the order of heavenly bliss nothing is greater than man, save God alone: because the angels, although they are above man, as regards their natural condition, are not above him in the order of the end, since their heaven is the same as his. Consequently, for man to obtain heaven, it was necessary that God should become man, in order to take away the sin of the human race. This is expressed in the words of John the Baptist concerning Christ (Jo. i. 29): *Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who taketh away the sin of the world.* And, again, the Apostle says (Rom. v. 18): *Therefore, as by the offence of one, unto all men unto condemnation, so also by the justice of one, unto justification of life.*

From these and like arguments we may conclude that far from being inconsistent with the divine goodness, it was most expedient for man's salvation that God should become man.

CHAPTER LV

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN ABOVE AGAINST THE FITTINGNESS OF THE INCARNATION

THERE should be no difficulty in solving the objections given above.[1]

It is not contrary to the order of the universe, as the first objection maintained, that God should become man. Although the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature

[1] Ch. liii.

of man, nevertheless, according to the order of his nature, man has God for his end, and is adapted for union with God by his intellect. The personal union of God with man exemplifies and endorses that union, although each nature retains its own property, so that neither did the divine nature lose anything of its excellence, nor was the human nature raised above the limits of its species. We must also note that, by reason of the perfection and unchangeableness of the divine goodness, God suffers no loss of dignity through the approach, however near, of any creature, although this is a gain to the creature: even so, He communicates His goodness to creatures, without any detriment to Himself. Likewise, though God's will suffices to make all things, His wisdom requires that each individual thing, according as it is expedient for it, should be the object of His providence: thus to each thing He has fittingly appointed its appropriate cause. Consequently, although God was able by His will alone to bring about all the benefits that we ascribe to the Incarnation, as the second objection stated, it was nevertheless expedient for human nature that they should be brought about by God made man, as we may gather somewhat from the arguments given above.[1]

The third objection is easily answered. Man is composed of a spiritual and corporeal nature, standing as it were on the boundaries of both, so that whatsoever is done for man's good would seem to affect all creatures. Thus the lower material creatures are employed by man and, to a certain extent, are subject to him: while the higher spiritual creature—namely, the angel—has the same last end to obtain as man, as we have already shown.[2] Accordingly, it would seem fitting that the universal cause of all should assume, in unity of person, the creature in whom, more than in any other, He unites Himself to all creatures.

We must also observe that the rational creature alone acts of itself: for irrational creatures are driven by their own bias, rather than act of themselves: so that they are

[1] Ch. liv. [2] Bk. III., chs. xlvii. *seqq.*

to be regarded as instruments rather than principal agents. Now it was fitting that God should assume a creature capable of acting of itself, as principal agent: because an instrumental agent acts through being moved to action, whereas the principal agent acts itself and of itself. Accordingly, if God were to do anything by means of an irrational creature, all that is required in accordance with that creature's natural condition is that it be moved by God, and there is no need for it to be assumed into personal union, so as to act itself, since this would be inconsistent with its natural condition, and is consistent with the rational nature alone. Hence it was fitting that God should assume not an irrational, but a rational creature—that is to say, either an angel or a man. And though the angelic nature, as regards its natural properties, is more excellent than human nature, as the fourth objection argued, it was nevertheless more expedient for the human nature to be assumed. —First, because in man sin is reparable, in as much as his choice is not set upon a thing unchangeably, but may turn from good to evil, and return from evil to good; and man's reason, gathering the truth from sensible objects and signs, can be led in opposite directions. On the other hand, just as an angel's apprehension is unchangeable, since he has unchangeable knowledge by simple intuition, so too is his choice unchangeable. Consequently he is either not moved at all to evil, or if he is so moved, he is moved unchangeably: and therefore his sin is irreparable. Since then, as we learn from Scripture, the expiation of sins was apparently the chief motive of the Incarnation, it was more fitting that God should assume the human than the angelic nature.—Secondly, because God assumed the creature in unity of person, not of nature, as we have already proved.[1] Hence it was more fitting that He should assume the human than the angelic nature; because, in man, nature and person are distinct, in as much as he is composed of matter and form; whereas, in the angel, they are not distinct because he is immaterial.—Thirdly, because

[1] Ch. xxxiv.

an angel, by a property of his nature, is nearer to knowing God than man, whose knowledge arises from the senses. Hence, for an angel, it was enough that, through his intelligence, he learned divine things from God: whereas man's natural condition required that through his senses he should learn about himself from God: and this was done by the Incarnation. Moreover, the very distance between man and God seemed to make it more difficult for him to arrive at the enjoyment of God; wherefore he needed, more than the angel, to be assumed by God, so that he might conceive the hope of going to heaven. Again, since man was the terminus of creation, as though postulating all other creatures in the natural order of generation, he was fittingly united to the first principle of things, so as to complete the circle of creation.

The assumption of human nature by God does not prove an occasion of error, as the fifth argument suggested. The assumption of human nature, as we have stated,[1] was made in unity of person, and not in unity of nature. Consequently there is no occasion for us to agree with those who held that God is not above all, and said that He is the soul of the world, or something of the kind. It is true, as the sixth objection states, that many errors arose concerning God's Incarnation; yet, surely, many more came to an end after the Incarnation. Even as, in keeping with the defectible nature of the creature, some evils resulted from the creation of things, although it proceeded from the divine goodness; so neither is it a matter for astonishment, if after the manifestation of the divine truth, some errors arose through the defectible nature of the human mind. And yet these errors sharpened the wits of the faithful for a more diligent search of the truth in divine things: even so does God direct to some good the evils that occur among creatures.

Although all created good is small in comparison with the divine goodness, nevertheless nothing among created things can be greater than the salvation of the rational

[1] Ch. xli.

creature, consisting, as it does, in the enjoyment of that same divine goodness. Now the salvation of mankind was the result of God's Incarnation. Therefore, as the seventh objection argued, the world derived no little benefit from the Incarnation. But it does not follow that all men should be saved through God's Incarnation, but only those who would adhere to the Incarnation by faith and the sacraments of faith. The efficacy of the Incarnation is indeed sufficient to save all men: that not all are saved is due to their evil disposition, in that they are unwilling to receive the fruit of the Incarnation, by adhering to God incarnate by faith and love. For man was not to be deprived of his free-will, whereby he can adhere to God incarnate or not adhere to Him: else man's good would be compulsory, and would be rendered unmeritorious and undeserving of praise.

The Incarnation of God was made known to man by adequate signs. The Godhead cannot be better evidenced than by those things that are proper to God. Now it is proper to God to be able to change the laws of nature, by performing a work that is above nature, whose author He is. Hence it is a most appropriate proof of divinity, if works are done that transcend the laws of nature, such as giving sight to the blind, cleansing lepers, raising the dead to life. Now, Christ performed such works as these: hence, when He was asked (Lk. vii. 20), *Art thou he that art to come, or look me for another?* He proved His divinity by these works, replying, *The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are made clean, the deaf hear, the dead rise again,* etc. And there was no need to create another world, for this was neither in the plan of divine wisdom, nor in the nature of things. If, however, it be contended that like miracles are related to have been done by others, as the eighth argument suggested, we must observe that Christ's way of doing them was very different, and more God-like. Others did these things by praying; Christ, by commanding, as acting by His own power. Moreover, not only did He do these things Himself, but

gave the power to do these and greater things still, to others who worked miracles by merely calling on His name. Again, Christ worked miracles not only on men's bodies, but also on their souls : which latter works are much greater. Thus, for instance, through Him and the invocation of His name, the Holy Ghost was given, by Whom men's hearts were kindled with the fire of divine love, their minds suddenly filled with the knowledge of divine things, and the tongues of simple men made eloquent in declaring God's truth to the people. Such works are an evident proof of Christ's divinity, for no mere man could have done them. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. ii. 3, 4) that the salvation of mankind *having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard him: God also bearing them witness by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Ghost.*

Although God's Incarnation was necessary for the salvation of all mankind, there was no need, as the ninth objection states, for God to become incarnate from the very beginning of the world.—In the first place, a God incarnate was necessary that man might have a remedy for sin, as stated above.[1] Now it is not expedient to offer a man a remedy for sin, unless he first acknowledge his fault, so that no longer trusting in himself, he puts his trust in God, who alone can heal him of his sin, as stated above.[2] Now man could presume on himself, in point of knowledge, and in point of strength. Hence it was expedient that he should be left to himself for a time, that he might learn by experience his inability to save his soul. His natural knowledge was insufficient, since, before the time of the written law, he disobeyed the law of nature : and his own strength was inadequate, since even when, by the law, he knew what was sinful, he sinned through weakness. Thus, when at length man no longer presumed either on his knowledge or on his own strength, it was expedient that he should be given an efficacious assistance against sin by Christ's Incarnation : the grace of Christ, to wit, supply-

[1] Ch. liv. [2] *Ibid.*

ing his lack of knowledge, by removing his doubts, and strengthening him against the assaults of temptation, lest he fail through weakness. Hence it is that the human race has experienced three states, before the law, under the law, and under grace.—Secondly, perfect law and doctrine were to be given to man by God incarnate. Now such is the condition of human nature, that it does not reach perfection at once, but is led through a stage of imperfection before it reaches that of perfection. We have an example of this in the education of children: we instruct them at first in very little things, because they cannot grasp the great things from the very beginning. In like manner, if a man were to tell his audience things they have never heard before, or that are above their intelligence, they would not grasp them at once; he must prepare their minds beforehand with things that are less out of the ordinary. Accordingly, it was expedient that in things concerning his salvation, man should receive at first a slight and elementary instruction, through the patriarchs, the law, and the prophets; and that at length in the fulness of time, the perfect teaching of Christ should be published on earth. Hence, the Apostle says (Galat. iv. 4): *When the fulness of the time was come, God sent his Son* into the world: and (*ibid.* iii. 24, 25): *The law was our pedagogue in Christ . . . but . . . we are no longer under a pedagogue.* —It must also be noted that just as the coming of a great king should be preceded by heralds, that his subjects may be ready to receive him with due respect; so was it proper that the coming of God on earth should be heralded by many things, in order that men might be ready to receive God incarnate. This was done by promises and admonitions preceding him, whereby man's mind was prepared to believe the more easily in one who was already announced, and to receive Him the more earnestly on account of the promises made of old.

Although the coming of God incarnate into the world was so necessary for man's salvation, there was no need for Him to live among men until the end of the world, as

the tenth objection contended. This would have been detrimental to the reverence which men owe to the incarnate God, since, seeing Him in the flesh and like the rest of men, they would have esteemed Him no better than others. On the other hand, when He withdrew His presence from among men, after doing wonders on earth, they began to revere Him all the more. For this very reason He did not give His disciples the fulness of the Holy Ghost, while as yet He lived among them, because His absence would make their souls more ready to receive the gifts of the spirit. Hence He said to them (Jo. xvi. 7): *If I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you: but, if I go, I will send him to you.*

It was not expedient for God to take impassible and immortal flesh, as the eleventh objection stated, but rather that He should assume a flesh that was subject to suffering and death.—In the first place, it was necessary for man to know of the blessing bestowed on him through the Incarnation, in order that he might be inflamed with divine love. Now, that the truth of the Incarnation might be evident to man, it was necessary that God should take flesh like that of other men—namely, passible and mortal. For, had He taken impassible and immortal flesh, men who were unacquainted with flesh of that kind would have deemed it to be imaginary and not real.—Secondly, it was necessary for God to take flesh, in order to atone for the sin of mankind. Now, as we have shown,[1] one man can atone for another; on the condition, however, that he take upon himself willingly the punishment due to another and not due to himself. And the punishment resulting from the sin of the human race is death as well as other sufferings of the present life, as indicated above.[2] Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. v. 12) that *by one man sin came into the world, and by sin death.* Hence it was expedient that God should take suffering and mortal flesh without sin, so that by suffering and dying for us He would make atonement and take sin away. This is expressed in the

[1] Bk. III., ch. clviii. [2] Chs. l.-lii.

words of the Apostle (Rom. viii. 3), *God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh*—that is to say, "having flesh like to that of sinners, passible and mortal": and he adds, *that of sin he might condemn*[1] *sin in the flesh*—that is to say, "that by the pain He bore in His flesh for our sins He might take our sins away."—Thirdly, since His flesh was subject to suffering and death, He was the more able to give us an example of virtue, by His fortitude in overcoming the sufferings in the flesh, and by the godly use He made of them.—Fourthly, we are the more raised to the hope of immortality, seeing that He was transformed from the state of suffering and mortal flesh, to that of a flesh that knows neither suffering nor death: and so we also hope that it will be the same with us, who are now clothed in flesh, passible and mortal. Whereas had He taken impassible and immortal flesh from the very first, we who know ourselves to be mortal and corruptible would have had no reason to hope for immortality.—Moreover, the office of Mediator required that He should be a partner with us in suffering and mortal flesh, and with God in power and glory, so that He might take away from us that which He shared with us—namely, suffering and death; and lead us to that which He shared with God: since for this was He Mediator, that He might unite us to God.

In like manner it was not expedient that God incarnate should, in this world, lead a life replete with wealth and the highest honour or dignity, as the twelfth objection argued. —In the first place, seeing that man's mind was given to earthly things, He came to withdraw it from them, and to raise it to heavenly things. Hence it behoved Him, by His example, to draw men to the contempt of riches and of other things on which worldly men set their heart, and that He should lead a poor and hidden life in this world.—Secondly, if He had abounded in riches, and occupied a high position, the works He did as God would have been put down to His worldly power rather than to His Godly might. Hence it was a very strong proof of His divinity that, without the

[1] Vulg., *And of sin he condemned,* etc.

help of the secular arm, He converted the whole world to better things.

Hence, it is plain how the thirteenth objection is to be answered. It is, indeed, far from being untrue that, according to the Apostle's teaching, the incarnate Son of God suffered death in obedience to His Father's command. God's commands to men concern acts of virtue; and according as a man's virtuous acts are more perfect, the more is he obedient to God. Now the greatest of the virtues is charity, to which all the others are referred. Hence Christ, whose act of charity was most perfect, was most obedient to God: for no act of charity is more perfect than that a man die for love of another, as our Lord Himself declared (Jo. xv. 13), *Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.* Therefore Christ, by dying for the salvation of man, and for the glory of God the Father, performed an act of perfect charity, and was most obedient to God.

Nor was this incompatible with His Godhead, as the fourteenth objection averred. For the union was so made in the Person that both natures retained their respective properties, divine, namely, and human, as we have stated above:[1] hence, though Christ suffered even death, besides those things which belonged to His human nature, His Godhead remained impassible, although on account of the unity of person, we say that God suffered and died. This is exemplified in ourselves, since although the body dies, the soul remains immortal.

It must also be observed that although God wills not the death of man, as the fifteenth objection stated, nevertheless He wills the virtue whereby man suffers death with fortitude and braves the danger of death through charity. Thus did God will Christ's death, in as much as Christ accepted death through charity, and bore it with fortitude.

Hence it is clear that it was not wicked and cruel for God the Father to have willed Christ's death, as the six-

[1] Chs. xli., xlvi.

teenth objection argued. For He did not compel Him against His will, but it pleased Him that Christ should accept death through charity: indeed He wrought this charity in Christ's soul.

Likewise there is nothing unseemly in saying that Christ was willing to suffer death on the cross, in order to give an example of humility. It is true, as the seventeenth objection asserted, that humility is not in God: since the virtue of humility consists in this, that a man keeps to his own place, and does not reach out to things above him, but is subject to his superior. Hence it is evident that humility is not becoming to God, who has no superior, but is above all. If however someone out of humility, subject himself at times either to an equal or to an inferior, this is because he looks upon as superior to himself in some respect, one who is simply his equal or inferior. Accordingly, though the virtue of humility is not becoming to Christ in His divine nature, it is becoming to Him in His humanity. And His humility is rendered the more praiseworthy by reason of His divine nature: because personal worth adds to the praise of humility, as for instance when a great man has through necessity to suffer an indignity. Now no man is of greater worth than one who is God: and consequently most praiseworthy was the humility of the Man-God, who suffered the infamies which it behoved Him to suffer for man's salvation. For pride had made men lovers of worldly glory. Wherefore, that He might transform man's mind from the love of worldly glory to the love of divine glory, He was willing to suffer death, not any kind, but the most humiliating death. There are those who, though they fear not death, abhor an ignominious death, and it was that men might despise even this that our Lord heartened men by the example of His death.

Again, although men might have been taught humility by divine discourses, as the eighteenth objection urged, nevertheless deeds incite more to action than words, and all the more effectively, as the goodness of the doer is known with greater certainty. So that however many other

men might be examples of humility, it was still most expedient that we should be incited by the example of a Man-God, who certainly could not err, and whose humility is all the more wonderful as His majesty is the more sublime.

It is also clear from what has been said that it behoved Christ to suffer death, not only that He might give an example of the contempt of death for love of the truth, but also that He might wash away the sins of others. This was done when He who was sinless was willing to suffer the death due to sin, in order that He might take upon Himself the punishment due to others by atoning for them. And, though God's grace alone suffices for the remission of sins, as the nineteenth objection argued, nevertheless when sin is remitted something is required of him whose sin is forgiven—namely, that he offer satisfaction to the one he offended. And seeing that other men were unable to do this for themselves, Christ did so for all, by suffering a voluntary death through charity.

And although in the punishment of sins the sinner himself should be punished, as the twentieth objection urged, nevertheless in the atonement for sin, one man can bear the punishment of another. The reason is that when a punishment is inflicted for sin, we consider the wickedness of the person to be punished: whereas when it is a question of atonement, when a person, in order to placate one whom he has offended, accepts punishment willingly, we look at the charity and good-will of him who atones; and especially when one man atones for another. Consequently one man's atonement for another man is acceptable to God, as we have shown.[1]

No mere man can make satisfaction for all mankind, as proved above:[2] nor could an angel suffice for the purpose, as the twenty-first objection suggested. An angel, though superior to man in certain natural properties of his, in the participation of heavenly bliss, to which man was to be restored by means of atonement, is man's equal. More-

[1] Bk. III., ch. clviii. [2] Ch. liv.

over, man's dignity would not be fully repaired if he were beholden to an angel for his atonement.

It must be borne in mind, however, that Christ's death derived its power of atonement from His charity whereby He accepted death voluntarily, and not from the wickedness of His executioners, who sinned by slaying Him : for, as the twenty-second objection states, sin is not blotted out by sin.

Although Christ's death atoned for sin, there was no need for Him to die as often as men sin, as the twenty-third objection maintained. Christ's death sufficed to expiate the sins of all men ; both by reason of the sublime charity whereby He suffered death, and on account of the dignity of the person who made satisfaction, since He was both God and man. And it is clear that even in human affairs, the higher a person is placed, of so much greater account is the punishment suffered by him, whether in reference to the humility and charity of the sufferer, or to the guilt of the offender.

Christ's death sufficed to atone for the sins of all mankind : because, although He died only in His human nature, as the twenty-fourth objection argued, yet His death was rendered precious by the dignity of the person who suffered, the Person, namely, of God the Son. For, just as it is a greater crime to injure a person of greater dignity,[1] so is it a mark of greater virtue and of greater charity, that a person of higher rank suffer willingly for others.

Yet although by His death Christ made sufficient satisfaction for original sin, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-fifth objection argued, that the penalties resulting from original sin still remain in all, even in those who have become participators in Christ's redemption. It was fitting and profitable that the punishment should remain after the guilt had been removed. In the first place, that the faithful might be conformed to Christ, as members to their head. Wherefore, just as Christ bore many sufferings before entering into everlasting glory, so was it fitting that

[1] Bk. III., ch. cxliv.

His faithful should suffer before attaining to immortality. Thus they bear in themselves the emblems of Christ's suffering, that they may obtain the likeness of His glory; according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. viii. 17), *Heirs indeed of God, and joint-heirs with Christ: yet so if we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him.*—Secondly, if man were to become immune from death and suffering, as soon as he comes to Christ, many would come to Him for the sake of these advantages of the body rather than for the sake of the good of the soul: and this is against Christ's purpose, since He came into the world to draw men away from the love of bodily goods to spiritual things.—Thirdly, if men became impassible and immortal as soon as they came to Christ, they would be compelled, in a sense, to believe in Christ: and this would diminish the merit of faith.

Although Christ, by His death, atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind, as the twenty-sixth objection argued, each one must seek the means of his own salvation. Christ's death is by way of being a universal cause of salvation, just as the sin of the first man was like a universal cause of damnation. Now a universal cause needs to be applied to each individual, that the latter may have its share in the effect of the universal cause. Accordingly, the effect of the sin of our first parent reaches each individual through carnal origin: and the effect of Christ's death reaches each individual through spiritual regeneration, whereby man is united to and incorporated with Christ. Therefore each one must seek to be regenerated by Christ, and to receive the other things in which the power of Christ's death is effective.

Hence it follows that the outflow of salvation from Christ to mankind is not through the channel of natural procreation, but through the endeavour of the good-will whereby a man adheres to Christ; consequently that which each one receives from Christ is his own personal good; so that it is not transmitted by him to his children, as the sin of our first parent is, through having its source

in natural procreation. Hence it is that although parents be cleansed of original sin by Christ, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-seventh objection argued, that their children be born in original sin, and need the sacraments of salvation.

In some measure then we have shown that the teaching of the Catholic faith concerning the mystery of the Incarnation is neither impossible nor unreasonable.

CHAPTER LVI

OF THE NECESSITY OF THE SACRAMENTS

We have already observed[1] that Christ's death is a kind of universal cause of man's salvation, and that a universal cause needs to be applied to each individual effect. Consequently it was necessary for man to be supplied with certain remedies, so that thereby the benefit of Christ's death might be brought to him. These remedies are called the sacraments of the Church : and it was expedient that they should be supplied to man under the guise of visible signs.

First, because God provides for man, as for other things, according to the condition of his nature. Now it is a condition of man's nature that he be naturally led to things spiritual and intelligible by objects of sense. Therefore it was expedient for man to receive spiritual remedies under the guise of sensible signs.

Secondly, Instruments should be proportionate to the first cause. Now the first and universal cause of man's salvation is the incarnate Word, as we have already stated.[2] Wherefore it was fitting that the remedies whereby the power of the universal cause reaches mankind should bear some likeness to that cause—namely, that in them the divine power should work invisibly under visible signs.

[1] Ch. lv. [2] *Ibid.*

Thirdly, man had fallen into sin by adhering to visible things unduly. Lest therefore it might be thought that visible things are evil by nature, and that for this reason it was sinful to adhere to them; it was expedient that by means of visible things man should receive salutary remedies. For thus it was made evident that visible things are by their nature good, as being created by God; and that they become hurtful to man, through his adhering to them inordinately; whereas they are beneficial to him, as long as he makes proper use of them.

Hereby we refute the error of certain heretics, who would remove all such visible elements from the sacraments of the Church. And naturally so, since they deem all visible things to be evil by nature, and to be produced by an evil author. We have refuted this in the Second Book.[1]

Nor is it unreasonable that spiritual well-being be dispensed by means of visible and corporeal things; since these visible elements are, as it were, instruments of God's Incarnation and Passion. Now an instrument is effective not by virtue of its nature, but by virtue of the principal agent, by whom it is applied to act. So too these visible elements effect spiritual well-being, not by any property of their nature, but by Christ's institution, from which they derive their instrumental efficacy.

CHAPTER LVII

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SACRAMENTS OF THE OLD AND OF THE NEW LAW

THE next point to consider is that since these visible sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ's Passion, and in a certain way represent it, they ought to be of such a nature as to be in keeping with the salvation wrought by

[1] Chs. iv. *seqq.*

Christ. Now this salvation, before Christ's Incarnation and death, was indeed promised, but not actually realized: the Word by His Incarnation and Passion wrought this salvation. Accordingly, the sacraments which preceded Christ's Incarnation needed to be such as to signify, and, so to speak, promise salvation: whereas the sacraments that followed Christ's Passion needed to be such as to give salvation to man, and not merely signify it.

Thus we avoid the opinion of the Jews, who believe that the sacraments of the law, as being instituted by God, ought to be observed for ever, since God repents not, neither does He change. But it does not argue change or repentance in a man, if he makes various arrangements to fit various times. Wherefore, even as a father gives certain commands to his son when a child, and others when he is grown up, so too God delivered one kind of sacraments and precepts before the Incarnation, to signify the future, and another kind after the Incarnation, to show forth the present and commemorate the past.

Still more absurd is the error of the Nazarenes and Helonites, who held that the sacraments of the law are to be observed together with (those of) the Gospel: since such an error implies a contradiction. By observing the sacraments of the Gospel they admit that the Incarnation and other mysteries of Christ are things of the past: whereas, by observing the sacraments of the law, they hold that those things are yet to come.

CHAPTER LVIII

THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW

Since, as stated above,[1] the remedies of spiritual welfare have been given to man under sensible signs, it follows that the remedies which give life to the soul differ from one

[1] Ch. lvi.

another in a manner that corresponds with the life of the body.

In the life of the body there is a twofold order. There are those who propagate and direct this life in others, and there are those who are propagated and directed, with this life in view. Three things are essentially necessary to the life of the body, and a fourth is required accidentally. In the first place, a thing needs to receive life by generation or nativity; secondly, it needs growth so as to attain to its proper size and strength; thirdly, it needs nourishment, for the preservation of the life thus generated and developed. These are essentially necessary to natural life, since without them the body cannot live: hence to the vegetative soul which is the principle of life, are assigned the three natural forces of generation, growth, and nutrition. Since, however, the life of the body meets with obstacles, which cause the body to ail, a fourth thing is necessary accidentally, and this is that the living being be healed of its ailments.

Accordingly, there are also in the spiritual life—first, spiritual regeneration by Baptism; secondly, spiritual growth bringing the soul to perfect strength by Confirmation; thirdly, spiritual nourishment by the sacrament of the Eucharist; and fourthly, spiritual healing, which is given either to the soul only, by the sacrament of Penance, or, when it is expedient, to the body through the soul, by the sacrament of Extreme Unction. These concern those who are propagated and safeguarded in the life of the soul. The propagators and directors of the life of the body are required from two points of view—namely, in respect of natural origin, which concerns the parents, and in respect of state control, whereby man is assured a peaceful life, and this regards kings and governors. Thus is it also in the life of the soul. There are those who propagate and safeguard the spiritual life, by a purely spiritual administration; to these corresponds the Sacrament of Orders; and these are those who propagate and safeguard the spiritual life by ministering to both body

and soul: this is the object of the sacrament of Matrimony in which husband and wife are joined together, in order to beget children, and bring them up in the fear of God.

CHAPTER LIX

BAPTISM

In accordance with what we have been saying, we shall be able to gather what are the peculiar effects and the appropriate matter of each sacrament. And first, with regard to spiritual regeneration, which is the result of Baptism.

The generation of a living thing is the change of a lifeless into a living being. Now man is deprived of spiritual life in his origin, by original sin, as we have already stated,[1] and whatsoever sins a man commits in addition to this, deprive him of life. Hence it was necessary that Baptism, which is spiritual birth, should have the power to remove original sin and all the actual sins a man has committed. Now the sensible sign in a sacrament should be adapted to signify the spiritual effect of that sacrament: and water is the easiest and handiest means of removing dirt from the body. Therefore Baptism is fittingly conferred with water, hallowed by the Word of God. Moreover, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and since that which is generated loses its previous form and the properties resulting therefrom, it follows that Baptism, which is spiritual generation, removes not only sins which are contrary to spiritual life, but also all guilt of sin: so that it not only washes sin away, but removes all debt of punishment. Hence no satisfaction for sin is demanded in the sacrament of Baptism.

Again. By generation a thing acquires its form; hence

[1] Ch. 1.

it acquires, at the same time, the operation that results from that form, and the place that is becoming to it: thus, as soon as it is kindled, fire tends upwards as towards its proper place. Wherefore, since Baptism is spiritual generation, as soon as a man is baptized he is fit for spiritual action, such as the reception of other sacraments and so forth; and a place befitting the spiritual life—namely, eternal happiness—is due to him. For this reason, if a man die immediately after being baptized, he is forthwith admitted into heaven; wherefore Baptism is said to open the gates of heaven.

Again we must observe that a thing can be born but once: so that, since Baptism is spiritual generation, a man is but once baptized. It is also evident that the disorder which, through Adam, came into the world, infects man but once: wherefore Baptism, which is chiefly a remedy for that disorder, may not be repeated. It is also a general rule that, when a thing is once consecrated, so long as it remains intact it must not be reconsecrated, lest the consecration seem to have been invalid. Consequently, since Baptism is a kind of consecration of the person baptized, it must not be repeated: and thus the error of the Donatists or Rebaptizers[1] is refuted.

CHAPTER LX

CONFIRMATION

THE perfection of spiritual strength is attained, properly speaking, when a man dares to confess his faith in Christ in the presence of anyone, whosoever it be; and is not held back by confusion or fear: since fortitude dispels inordinate fear. Accordingly, the sacrament whereby spiritual strength is conferred on one who is regenerate, makes him a soldier of Christ's faith. And, as soldiers carry the banner of the prince under whom they fight,

[1] Known later under the name of Anabaptists.

those who receive the sacrament of Confirmation receive the banner of Christ—namely, the sign of the cross—by which he fought and conquered. They receive this sign on their brow, to indicate that they are not ashamed to make public profession of their faith in Christ. Moreover, the cross is signed on them with a mixture of oil and balsam, called chrism: the reason of which is as follows. Oil signifies the power of the Holy Ghost, by whom Christ, as the word implies, was anointed: so that Christians take their name from Christ, as fighting under Him. Balsam, on account of its fragrance, signifies a good name, which those should have, who live among worldly people, that marching forth on to the field of battle from the hidden stronghold of the Church, they may make public profession of their faith in Christ. Moreover, this sacrament is fittingly conferred by bishops only. For they are the commanding officers of the Christian army: and in worldly warfare it belongs to the commander-in-chief to choose those whom he appoints to military service. Hence those who receive this sacrament are chosen for service in the spiritual combat: for which reason the bishop lays his hand upon them, to signify that they receive strength from Christ.

CHAPTER LXI

THE EUCHARIST

Just as the life of the body needs material nourishment, not only that the body may grow, but also for its natural upkeep, lest it wear away through continual dissolution, and lose all its strength: so too was spiritual nourishment needed for the spiritual life, so that those who have been born again may both be sustained and grow in virtue. And since spiritual effects are bestowed under visible symbols, as stated above,[1] it was fitting that this spiritual

[1] Ch. lvi.

element should be given to us under the forms of those things which man uses most commonly for the nourishment of the body. Such are bread and wine: wherefore this sacrament is conferred under the appearances of bread and wine.

We must take note however that in corporeal things there is a difference between the union of begetter with begotten, and that of nourishment with the subject nourished. The begetter and the begotten need not be united in substance, but only in likeness and power: whereas nourishment needs to be united to the body nourished in its very substance. Consequently, that the material symbols may correspond to their spiritual effects, in Baptism, which is spiritual regeneration, the mystery of the Incarnate Word is united to us in one way; and in another way in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is spiritual nourishment. The Word Incarnate is present in the sacrament of Baptism by His power only: whereas we believe Him to be present in the sacrament of the Eucharist, in His very substance. And because our salvation was consummated by Christ's passion and death, wherein His blood was separated from His body, the sacrament of His body is delivered to us separately under the form of bread, and His blood under the form of wine: so that this sacrament is a memorial and representation of our Lord's Passion. Thus were fulfilled our Lord's words (Jo. vi. 56), *My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed.*

CHAPTER LXII

THE ERROR OF UNBELIEVERS CONCERNING THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST

Even as, when Christ spoke the above words, some of the disciples were troubled and exclaimed (Jo. vi. 61): *This saying is hard; and who can hear it?* so again heretics have arisen and denied the truth of the Church's teaching. They

say that this sacrament contains the body and blood of Christ, not in reality, but only in signification. Thus, when Christ said, *This is my body,* His meaning would be, "This signifies or represents My body," in the same way as the Apostle says (1 Cor. x. 4), *And the rock was Christ—i.e.,* represented Christ. To support this interpretation they quote all the similar expressions of Scripture.

As a plea for holding this opinion, they allege the words of our Lord who, wishing to allay the scandal occasioned to His disciples by His speaking of His body and blood as meat and drink, explained Himself by saying (Jo. vi. 64): *The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life,* as though His previous statement were to be taken, not literally, but in a spiritual sense.

Moreover, they are led to hold this view by the many difficulties which would seem to follow from the teaching of the Church in this matter, and on account of which this saying of Christ and of the Church seems hard to them.

In the first place, it is hard to see how the true body of Christ begins to be present on the altar. A thing begins in two ways, to be where it was not before: either by local movement, or by something else being changed into it: thus fire begins to be in a place, either by being kindled there, or by being brought there. Now it is clear that the true body of Christ was not always present on this or that altar: since the Church declares that Christ ascended bodily into heaven. And it is seemingly impossible for anything here below to be changed anew into Christ's body. For surely nothing is changed into that which is already in existence, since that into which a thing is changed, acquires existence by that change. And it is evident that Christ's body was already in existence, through having been conceived in the Virgin's womb. Consequently it is seemingly impossible that He begin to be present on the altar through something else being changed into Him.—But neither could He begin to be there by local movement; since whatsoever is moved thus begins to be in another place in such a way as not to be

where it was before. And so, since Christ begins to be present on this altar where this sacrament is being enacted, we shall have to say that He is no longer in heaven whither He had ascended. Moreover no local movement terminates in two places at the same time. Now it is clear that this sacrament is celebrated on several altars simultaneously. Therefore it is impossible that Christ begin to be present there by local movement.

A second difficulty is one of place. As long as a thing remains entire, its parts are not scattered about in various places. Now, in this sacrament, it is plain that the bread and wine exist apart in separate places. If then Christ's flesh be under the appearance of bread, and His blood under the appearance of wine, it would seem to follow that Christ does not remain entire, but that whenever this sacrament is enacted His blood is separated from His body.—Moreover it seems impossible for a greater body to be enclosed in the space of a smaller body. And yet it is evident that Christ's body is greater in quantity than the bread that is offered on the altar. Therefore seemingly it is not possible for the whole body of Christ to be where there seems to be bread. And if His whole body is not there then, but only part of it, we come back to the first difficulty, namely, that whenever this sacrament is enacted, the parts of Christ's body are separated.—Further, one body cannot be in several places. Yet it is clear that this sacrament is celebrated in several places. Therefore, seemingly, it is impossible for Christ's body to be truly present in this sacrament: unless one were to say that one part of Him is here, and another part there. And thus again it follows that the celebration of this sacrament involves the division of Christ's body into parts: whereas it would seem that the size of Christ's body is insufficient to be divided into as many parts as there are places in which this sacrament is enacted.

A third difficulty arises from what our senses perceive in this sacrament. Even after the consecration, we clearly perceive all the accidents of bread and wine, namely,

colour, taste, smell, shape, quantity, and weight: and about these things we cannot be deceived, because the senses are not deceived about their proper sensible objects. Now these accidents cannot be subjected in Christ's body: nor can they be in the air immediately surrounding it: since several of them are natural accidents, and require a subject of a certain particular nature differing from that of the human body or the air. Nor can they exist by themselves, seeing that the very essence of an accident is to be in something: and accidents, since they are forms, cannot be individualized, save by a subject: so that, apart from a subject, they are universal forms. It follows then that these accidents are in their respective determinate subjects, namely, the substances of bread and wine. Therefore the substance of bread and wine is present, and not the substance of Christ's body: since two bodies, seemingly, cannot be in the same place.

A fourth difficulty arises from the fact that the bread and wine have the same action, and undergo the same changes, after the consecration, as before. Thus the wine, if it were taken in great quantity, would heat and inebriate: the bread would strengthen and nourish. Moreover, if they be kept for a long time and carelessly, they are liable to putrefy, and to be consumed by mice. Again, they can be burnt and turned into ashes and steam. All these things are incompatible with Christ's body, which according to faith is impassible. Therefore it would seem that the substance of Christ's body cannot be present in this sacrament.

A fifth difficulty regards especially the breaking of the bread: since this breaking is apparent to the senses; and is impossible without a subject. And it is absurd to say that the subject of that breaking is Christ's body. Therefore, seemingly, Christ's body is not there, but the substance of bread and wine.

For these and like reasons the teaching of Christ and the Church appears to be hard.

CHAPTER LXIII

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING DIFFICULTIES: AND FIRST WITH REGARD TO THE CHANGING OF THE BREAD INTO CHRIST'S BODY

ALTHOUGH the operation of the divine power in this sacrament is too sublime and hidden for human research, lest unbelievers should deem the teaching of the Church on this question to be impossible, we must endeavour to show that it involves no impossibility whatsoever.

The first point to consider, then, is how Christ's body begins to be present under this sacrament. It is, in fact, impossible for this to take place by local movement of Christ's body: both because it would follow that it ceases to be in heaven, whenever this sacrament is enacted; and because then this sacrament could only be celebrated in one place at a time, since the same local movement cannot terminate in more than one place; and because local movement cannot be instantaneous but needs time, whereas the consecration is effective in the last instant of the pronouncement of the words. It remains, therefore, to be said that the true body of Christ begins to be present in this sacrament, through the substance of the bread being changed into the substance of His body, and the substance of the wine into the substance of his blood.

Hence we see how false are the opinions of those who say that in this sacrament the substance of the bread exists together with the substance of Christ's body, as well as the opinion of those who say that the substance of the bread is annihilated, or that it is reduced to primal matter. In either case it follows that, in this sacrament, Christ's body begins to be present by local movement: and we have proved this to be impossible.

Moreover, if the substance of the bread is present in this sacrament together with Christ's body, He should have said, *Here is my body,* rather than, *This is my body:* because *Here* points to the substance seen, which

would be the substance of bread, if it remains in this sacrament together with Christ's body.

Likewise it is seemingly impossible that the substance of the bread be wholly annihilated. It would follow that a considerable portion of matter originally created has returned into nothingness, on account of the frequent celebration of this mystery. Nor is it becoming that the divine power should annihilate anything in the sacrament of salvation.

It is impossible for the substance of the bread to be reduced to primal matter, since primal matter cannot exist without a form. Unless indeed primal matter be taken to signify the elementary bodies: but then, if the substance of the bread is resolved into these, this would, of necessity, be perceptible to the senses; seeing that the corporeal elements are objects of sense. Moreover this would involve local change and the corporeal alteration of contraries, which cannot occur instantaneously.

It must however be observed that this changing of the bread into Christ's body is brought about in a manner different from all natural changes. In all natural changes, the subject remains, in which various forms succeed one another: and these forms may be either accidental—as when white is changed into black—or substantial—as when air is changed into fire: hence these are called formal changes. But in the aforesaid change, one subject passes into another, and the accidents remain: wherefore this is called a substantial change. How and why these accidents remain, we shall discuss later on. At present we have to inquire how one subject is changed into another: since nature cannot do this. For every work of nature presupposes matter, whereby subjects are individualized: so that nature cannot make this substance to be that substance; for instance, that this finger be that finger. But matter is subject to the divine power; since by it was it brought into being: wherefore it is possible, by the divine power, for this or that individual substance to be changed into this or that already existing substance. For just as,

by the power of a natural agent, whose operation does not go beyond the changing of a form in an already existing subject, the whole of one thing is changed into the whole of another by a change of species or form (for instance this air into this already kindled fire), so by the power of God, which presupposes no matter, but produces it, this matter is changed into that matter and, consequently, this individual into that; for matter is the principle of individuality, just as form is the principle of the species. Now it is clear that in the aforesaid change of the bread into Christ's body there is no common subject remaining after the change, seeing that a change is wrought of the primal subject which is the principle of individuality. And yet something must remain, in order that it should be true to say, *This is my body:* which words both signify and effect this change. And since, as we have proved, neither the substance of the bread, nor any prior matter remains, it follows that there remains that which is besides the substance of the bread: namely, that which is accidental to it. Therefore the accidents of the bread remain even after the aforesaid change.

Among these accidents a certain order is to be noted. Of all accidents, dimensive quantity adheres most closely to substance: afterwards, with quantity as a medium, the substance is affected with qualities: for instance with colour by means of the surface. Hence the division of the other accidents is incidental to the division of quantity. Further, qualities are the principles of actions and passions, as well as of certain relationships, for instance of father and son, master and servant, and so on; while some relationships are founded immediately on quantity, for instance greater and lesser, double and half, and the like. Accordingly, after the aforesaid change, the accidents of the bread must be said to remain in such wise, that dimensive quantity alone remains without a subject, while the qualities are founded thereon as their subject, and consequently actions, passions, and relations also. Wherefore, in this change, the contrary happens to that

which is the rule in natural transmutations, where the substance remains as the subject of change, while the accidents are changed: whereas here, on the contrary, accident remains and subject passes away. This change cannot, properly speaking, be described as a movement in the physical sense, that requires a subject: it is a kind of sequence of substances, just as in creation existence follows non-existence, as stated above.[1]

This then is one reason why the accident of the bread must needs remain, so that something may be found to remain in the aforesaid change. But there is yet another cogent reason. If the substance of the bread be changed into Christ's body, and the accidents of the bread pass away, the result of such a change would be that Christ's body, in its substance, is not where the bread was before; since Christ's body would bear no relation to that place. On the other hand, after the change, the dimensive quantity, whereby the bread occupied that place, remains; while the substance of the bread is changed into Christ's body, which thus comes to be under the dimensive quantity of the bread, and consequently occupies the place of the bread; by means however of the bread's dimensions.

Other reasons might be assigned, both from the point of view of faith which is of things invisible, and from the point of view of merit, which is so much greater as this sacrament is more invisibly enacted: for Christ's body is hidden under the accidents of bread, with a view to a more handy and more fitting use of this sacrament. It would indeed be revolting to the partakers, and repulsive to the beholders, if the faithful received Christ's body under its own form. Wherefore Christ's body is offered as meat, and His blood as drink, under the appearance of bread and wine, which are man's most common form of meat and drink.

[1] Bk. II., ch. xix.

CHAPTER LXIV

SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES AS REGARDS PLACE

Now that we have made these observations regarding the mode of the change, the way is, to a certain extent, prepared for the solution of the other difficulties. We have already stated that when this sacrament is enacted Christ's body occupies a place in reference to the dimensions of the bread, which remain after the substance of the bread has been changed into Christ's body. Hence whatever belongs to Christ must needs be in that place, according to the exigencies of the aforesaid change.

We must observe, then, that in this sacrament something is present by virtue of the change, and something by natural concomitance. By virtue of the change there is, in this sacrament, that which is the natural term of the change. Thus under the appearance of bread is Christ's body, into which the substance of the bread is changed, as indicated by the words of consecration, *This is my body*. Likewise, under the appearance of wine is Christ's blood, as signified by the words, *This is the chalice of my blood*, etc. By natural concomitance all other things are there, which are not the term of the change but are really united to that term. For it is plain that Christ's Godhead or His soul are not the term of the change; and yet both Christ's soul and His divinity are present under the appearance of bread, because both are united to His body.—If however this sacrament had been celebrated during the three days succeeding Christ's death, Christ's soul would not have been present under the appearance of bread, since it was not then really united to His body. Neither would His blood have been present under the appearance of bread, nor His body under the appearance of wine, since they were both separated in death. Now, however, since Christ's body, in His natural form, is not without His blood, both His body and His blood are present under either species: but, under the appearance of bread, His

body is present by virtue of the change, and His blood, by natural concomitance : and conversely under the species of wine.

Thus it is plain how to solve the difficulty about the inequality between Christ's body and the place occupied by the bread. The substance of the bread is directly changed into the substance of Christ's body. But the dimensions of Christ's body are in the Sacrament, by natural concomitance, and not by virtue of the change, since the dimensions of the bread remain. Hence Christ's body is related to that place, not through its own dimensions, so that it need to be equal to the place, but through the dimensions of the bread which remain, and to which the place is equal.

Hence also it is clear how to reply to the objection about plurality of places. Christ's body, as regards its own dimensions, is in but one place, but through the dimensions of the bread which has been changed into His body, it is present in as many places as this change is celebrated in : not indeed by being divided into parts, but remaining entire in each place : since each consecrated host is changed into the whole body of Christ.

CHAPTER LXV

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS ON THE PART OF THE ACCIDENTS

HAVING solved the difficulty about place, we have now to reply to the objection that arises out of the remaining accidents. For there is no denying that the accidents of bread and wine remain, seeing that one's senses are an infallible witness thereto. And yet Christ's body and blood are not affected by them, since this could not happen without their being altered : nor are they susceptible of such accidents ; as neither is the substance of air. It follows then that they are without a subject, but as explained above ; namely,

that only dimensive quantity subsists without a subject, and affords a support to the other accidents. Nor is it impossible that an accident be without a subject, by the divine power. We must judge of the upholding of things, as of their production into being. Now the divine power can produce the effects of any second causes whatsoever, without these second causes, even as it could fashion man without seed, and cure a fever without the operation of nature. This is because God's power is infinite, and because He bestows on every second cause its active energy; so that He can uphold the existence of the effects of second causes, without the second causes themselves. Thus then, in this sacrament, He upholds the accident in its being, although the subject that upheld it is no longer there. This is especially applicable to dimensive quantities (which the Platonists held to subsist even of themselves), since we can think of them as separate. Now it is evident that God can do more in His works, than the mind can in its thoughts. And it is peculiar to dimensive quantity, as compared with other accidents, that it is individualized by itself: the reason being that position, *i.e.*, the order of the parts in the whole, is included in the very notion thereof; since it is defined as *quantity having position*.[1] Now, wherever it is possible to understand various parts of the same species, we must needs understand individual distinction: since many things of the same species must needs be many individuals. For this reason we cannot apprehend several whitenesses, except in as much as they are in various subjects: but we can apprehend several lines, even as considered in themselves, because, since position is contained in the notion of a line, difference of position suffices for distinction of lines. And, since dimensive quantity alone is by its very nature sufficient to occasion a multiplicity of individuals in the same species, it would seem to be the foundation of this multiplicity: thus in the genus of substance multiplicity is according to material dimensions; in fact, it is inconceivable in matter apart from dimensions;

[1] Aristotle, *Categ.*, iv.

seeing that without quantity, all substance is indivisible, as the Philosopher states.[1] Now it is evident that as regards other accidents, the number of individuals in the same species depends on the number of subjects. Consequently, since in this sacrament we postulate *per se* subsistent dimensions, which are the foundation of the other accidents, it does not follow that these accidents are not individualized: because they retain the dimensions which are the foundation of individuality.

CHAPTER LXVI

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS ON THE PART OF ACTION AND PASSION

HAVING made these observations, we come to deal with the fourth objection. In some ways it presents no difficulty: in one respect however the solution is not quite so easy.

From what we have already said, it is surely fitting that, in this sacrament, we should observe the same action (of the elements) after (the consecration), as was to be noticed before in the substance of bread and wine, for instance it affects the senses in the same way, or the surrounding air or anything else, by its odour, or colour. We said, in fact,[2] that the accidents of bread and wine remain in this sacrament: and among those accidents are the sensible qualities, which are the principles of these actions. Again, as regards certain passions, *i.e.*, alterations in these accidents, there is no great difficulty, so long as we bear in mind what has already been said. We stated that the dimensions are the subject of the other accidents, and consequently these other accidents must be considered to be subject to alteration, in the same way as though the substance (of bread and wine) were actually present: thus, for instance, the wine would be subject to heating, or cooling, or a change of taste, and so on.

[1] 1 *Phys.* [2] Ch. lxiii.

A greater difficulty, however, is presented by the generation and corruption which are observed to happen in this sacrament. Thus, were a man to partake of the sacramental food in any quantity, he could be nourished, and he could even be made drunk with the wine, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. xi. 21), *One indeed is hungry, and another is drunk*. Now these things would be impossible, unless flesh and blood were produced by this sacrament: since nourishment is changed into the substance of the body nourished. It is true that some reply that this sacrament cannot nourish a man, but can only strengthen and refresh him, as the smell of wine stimulates him. But refreshment only lasts for a time, and does not suffice to nourish him, if he remain for a long time without food: and it is easy to prove by experiment that it is possible for a man to be nourished with this sacramental food for a considerable time. Moreover it is astonishing that they should deny that a man can be nourished with the sacramental elements through refusing to admit that they can be changed into flesh and blood: for it is apparent to the senses, that by putrefaction or burning they are changed into another substance, namely ashes and dust: and yet this would seem difficult, since apparently it is impossible for accidents to be transformed into substance, and it is unbelievable that Christ's body, which is impassible, be changed into another substance.

Perhaps someone will say that, as the bread is changed miraculously into Christ's body, so are the accidents miraculously changed into a substance. But, in the first place, it would seem inconsistent with the miraculous, that this sacrament should putrefy, or be destroyed by burning. Secondly, the putrefaction and burning that happen to this sacrament observe the ordinary course of nature, which is out of keeping with the course of miraculous effects. Accordingly, to solve this difficulty a well-known explanation has been devised, which finds favour with many. They say that when this sacrament is changed into flesh or blood by the process of nutrition, or into ashes by burning

or putrefaction, neither the accidents nor the substance of Christ's body are changed into another substance, but, by a divine miracle, the substance of the bread that was there before, returns, and therefrom are generated the things into which this sacrament is observed to be changed. But this is utterly impossible.

We have already proved[1] that the substance of the bread is changed into the substance of Christ's body. Now that which has been changed into something else cannot return unless this other thing be changed back again into it. Hence, if the substance of bread returns, it follows that the substance of Christ's body is changed into bread : and this is absurd.

Again. If the substance of bread returns, it follows that it returns either while the appearances of bread are still there, or after they have disappeared. But as long as the appearances of bread are there, the substance of bread cannot return, since as long as they remain, the substance of Christ's body remains present under them : so that it would follow that the substance of bread and the substance of Christ's body are both there at the same time. Yet neither can the substance of bread return after the appearances of bread have disappeared : both because the substance of bread must have its proper appearances ; and because, after the appearances of bread have disappeared, there is already another substance generated there, the generation of which was supposed to involve the return of the bread's substance.

It would seem, therefore, better to say that in the consecration, just as the substance of the bread is miraculously changed into Christ's body, so by a miracle the accidents are made to subsist, which is proper to a substance. Consequently they produce all the effects and undergo all the changes, which the substance would produce or undergo, if it were present : and therefore without any further miracle they can inebriate, nourish, be reduced to ashes or dust, in the same way and order, as though the substance of bread and wine were present.

[1] Ch. lxiii

CHAPTER LXVII

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS IN REGARD TO BREAKING OF THE HOST

THE fifth objection now remains to be considered. From what has been said it is clear that as subject of the breaking we can postulate the dimensions that subsist of themselves. Nor does the breaking of these dimensions involve the breaking of the substance of Christ's body, because Christ's body remains entire in each portion. This may seem difficult, yet it may be explained in accordance with what has been already said.[1] It has been stated that in this sacrament Christ's body is present in its substance, by virtue of the sacrament; and that the dimensions of Christ's body are present by natural concomitance with His substance, and in a manner contrary to that in which a body is in a place naturally. For a body is in a place naturally, through its dimensions whereby it is commensurate with the place. For the relation of a substantial thing to its container differs from that of a quantitative thing to that in which it is. A quantitative whole is contained by a whole, in such a way that it is not wholly in any single part, but each part is in itself, and the whole in the whole: hence a natural body is wholly in the whole place, and yet is not wholly in each part of the place, but each part of the body fits into its own part of the place; because a body is in a place through its dimensions. On the other hand, if a substantial totality is wholly in the whole of something, it is also wholly in each part of that thing. Thus the whole nature and species of water is in each part of the water, and the whole soul is in each part of the body. Since then Christ's body is in the Sacrament by reason of its substance, into which the substance of the bread has been changed, while the bread's dimensions remain; just as the whole species of bread was present in each part of the dimensions, so the whole body of Christ

[1] Ch. lxiv.

is present in each part of those same dimensions. Consequently the subject of this breaking or dividing is not Christ's body, but the dimensions of bread and wine: which dimensions remain and, as already stated, are the subject of the other accidents that remain after the consecration.

CHAPTER LXVIII

EXPLANATION OF THE PASSAGE QUOTED ABOVE[1]

HAVING solved these difficulties, we see clearly that the tradition of the Church concerning the Sacrament of the Altar contains nothing impossible to God who can do all things. Nor is this tradition incompatible with the words of our Lord spoken to those disciples who appeared to be shocked at this doctrine, *The words that I have spoken to you, are spirit and life* (Jo. vi. 64). By these words He did not intend to say that His real flesh is not given to be eaten by the faithful, but that it is not given to be eaten carnally; namely, that it is to be consumed, not piece-meal under its proper species, like other flesh-foods; but spiritually, and not as we are used to partake of other flesh-meats.

CHAPTER LXIX

WHAT KIND OF BREAD AND WINE SHOULD BE USED IN THIS SACRAMENT

WE have already said that this sacrament is celebrated with bread and wine: hence, the valid celebration of this sacrament requires that the bread and wine used for the purpose satisfy the essential conditions of bread and wine. Now wine is no other liquor but that which is pressed from grapes, and bread, properly speaking, must be made from grains of wheat. True, the name of bread is given to other

[1] Ch. lxii., *As a plea*, p. 226.

kinds that supply the lack of wheaten bread; and other liquors are given the name of wine. But this sacrament cannot be celebrated with any other kind of bread or wine; nor with any bread or wine that is so mixed with other materials that the species of bread or wine is destroyed. On the other hand, if the bread or wine be affected by accidents that do not affect the species of bread or wine, it is clear that, notwithstanding such accidents, the sacrament may be validly performed. Thus, since it is not essential to bread that it be leavened or unleavened, and whichever it happens to be, the essential conditions of bread remain, the Sacrament may be validly celebrated with either. For this reason different Churches have different uses in this respect. Indeed either use is in keeping with the signification of the Sacrament. As Gregory says in his *Register*:[1] *The Roman Church offers unleavened bread, because our Lord took flesh without union of sexes: but the Greek Churches offer leavened bread, because the Word of the Father was clothed with flesh, as leaven is mixed with the flour: and is true God and true man.*

However, the use of unleavened bread is more becoming to the purity of the mystic Body, *i.e.*, the Church; in as much as this purity is represented in this sacrament, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. v. 7, 8), *Christ, our pasch, is sacrificed: therefore let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.*

This excludes the error of certain heretics who say that this sacrament cannot be celebrated with unleavened bread: moreover, such a view is altogether opposed to the authority of the Gospels. For we are told (Matth. xxvi., Mark xiv., Luke xxii.) that our Lord, on the first day of the Azymes, partook of the pasch with His disciples, and afterwards instituted this sacrament. Now it was unlawful for the Jews to have leavened bread in their houses on the first day of the Azymes (Exod. xii. 15): and as long as He was in the world our Lord kept the law. It is, therefore,

[1] Innocent III. implicitly, *De Sacr. Miss.* iv. 4.

evident that He changed unleavened bread into His body, and gave it to His disciples to eat. Consequently it is foolish to condemn, in the use of the Latin Church, that which our Lord observed in the institution of this sacrament.

It must be noted however that some say that He anticipated the first day of the Azymes on account of His imminent Passion, and that he therefore used leavened bread. In their attempt to prove this they offer two reasons. In the first place, we are told that our Lord, *before the festival day of the pasch* (Jo. xiii. 1), kept with His disciples the supper at which He consecrated His body, as the Apostle relates (1 Cor. xi. 28). Hence it would seem that Christ kept the supper before the day of the Azymes, and consequently used leavened bread in consecrating His body. They think to confirm this by the fact that on the Friday, on which Christ was crucified, the Jews *went not into the hall* of Pilate, *that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the pasch*. Now *pasch* here means the Azymes. Therefore they conclude that the supper was celebrated before the Azymes.

To this we reply that according to the Lord's commandment (Exod. xii. 15), the feast of the Azymes was observed during seven days. The first of these, which was the fifteenth day of the month, was *more holy* and solemn than the others: but since the Jews commenced their festivals the evening before, they began to eat unleavened bread the evening of the fourteenth day, and continued to eat it during the seven following days. Hence we read (*ibid.* 18, 19): *The first month, the fourteenth day of the month in the evening, you shall eat unleavened bread, until the one and twentieth day of the same month in the evening. Seven days there shall not be found any leaven in your houses.* In the evening of that same fourteenth day the paschal lamb was slain. Accordingly, the fourteenth day of the month is called by the Evangelists, Matthew, Mark and Luke, *the first day of the Azymes,* because in the evening the Jews ate unleavened bread, and the pasch, namely the

paschal lamb, was slain. This is what John means by saying: *Before the festival day of the pasch,* that is to say, before the fifteenth day of the month, which day was the most solemn of all. On this day the Jews desired to eat the pasch, that is the paschal unleavened bread, but not the paschal lamb. Consequently there is no disagreement among the Evangelists, and it is clear that Christ at the supper consecrated His body from unleavened bread. Therefore the Latin Church has good reason to use unleavened bread in this sacrament.

CHAPTER LXX

THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE: AND FIRST, THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A MAN TO SIN AFTER RECEIVING SACRAMENTAL GRACE

ALTHOUGH the aforesaid sacraments confer grace on man, the grace bestowed on him does not make him impeccable.

Gratuitous gifts are received into the soul like habitual dispositions: for man does not always act in accordance with them. Now nothing prevents the man who has a habit, from acting either in accordance with it, or against it: thus a grammarian may speak either grammatically or ungrammatically. It is the same with the habits of moral virtue: thus a man who has the habit of justice may perform just actions, and may act unjustly. The reason is because the use of habits is subject to our will: and the will may be borne to either of two opposite alternatives. It is therefore clear that the man who has received gratuitous gifts, can sin by acting against grace.

Again. There can be no impeccability in man without unchangeableness of will. Now man's will cannot be unchangeable, except through his obtaining his last end: because the will is rendered unchangeable by being so wholly fulfilled, that there is nothing to turn it away from the object on which it is fixed. But such a fulfilment of

his will is not becoming to man, unless he has obtained his last end: since, as long as something remains to be desired, the will is not fulfilled. Accordingly, man cannot be impeccable until he has reached his last end: and this is not granted to man by sacramental grace, because the sacraments are intended to assist man on his way to that end. Therefore sacramental grace does not make man impeccable.

Further. Every sin is the result of ignorance: wherefore the Philosopher says (3 *Ethic.* i) that *every bad man is ignorant:* and it is said (Prov. xiv. 22): *They err that work evil.* Consequently then only is man safe from sin, as regards his will, when he is safe from ignorance and error in his intellect. Now it is evident that sacramental grace does not deliver man from all ignorance and error: since this is the privilege of those whose intellectual gaze is fixed on that truth which is the supreme criterion of all truth; of those, namely, who have obtained their last end, as shown above.[1] Therefore man is not made impeccable by the grace of the sacraments.

Moreover. Man's changeableness in vice and virtue depends not a little on his changeableness in the soul's passions: because, when those passions are curbed by his reason, man becomes and remains virtuous; whereas he becomes wicked when his reason obeys the impulse of his passions. Therefore, as long as man is subject to change in his passions, he is also changeable in vice and virtue. Now the changeableness which results from the soul's passions is not removed by sacramental grace, but remains in man as long as his soul is united to a passible body. It is therefore evident that man is not made impeccable by sacramental grace.

Further. It would seem unnecessary to warn against sin those who cannot sin. Nevertheless the faithful who, through the sacraments, have already received the grace of the Holy Ghost, are admonished by the teaching both of the Gospels and of the Apostle. Thus it is said (Heb. xii.

[1] Bk. III., ch. li.

15): *Looking diligently lest any man be wanting to the grace of God; lest any root of bitterness springing up do hinder:* and (Eph. iv. 30): *Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby you are sealed:* and (1 Cor. x. 12): *He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall.* Again the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. ix. 27): *I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection: lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway.* Therefore men are not rendered impeccable by the grace they receive in the sacrament.

This puts out of court the error of those heretics who say that a man cannot sin after receiving the grace of the Holy Ghost: and that if a man sins, he never had that grace.

They base their error on 1 Cor. xiii. 8, *Charity never falleth away:* and on 1 Jo. iii. 6, *Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not; and whosoever sinneth, hath not seen him, nor known him:* and on *ibid.* iii. 9, which is still more explicit, *Whosoever is born of God committeth no sin: for his seed abideth in him and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.* These texts however do not avail to support their contention. Charity is said never to fall away, not as though a man who has charity cannot lose it, since it is said (Apoc. ii. 4): *I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity;* but because the other gifts of the Holy Ghost imply some kind of imperfection,—as, for instance, the spirit of prophecy and the like,—and therefore are made void, when that which is perfect is come, whereas charity will remain in that state of perfection.—The sense of the texts quoted from the epistle of John is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost, by which man is adopted or is born again as a son of God, as far as they are concerned, have such great power that they can keep man from sin: and man cannot sin as long as he lives in accordance with them; but he can act against them, and sin by abandoning them. Thus it is said that *whosoever is born of God cannot sin* in the same sense as one might say that what is hot cannot make a thing cool

(yet it can become cool, and then it will cool something else); or that a just man does not perform unjust actions; that is, as long as he acts as a just man.

CHAPTER LXXI

THAT A MAN WHO HAS SINNED AFTER RECEIVING THE GRACE OF THE SACRAMENT CAN RETURN TO GRACE

It follows from what has been said in the preceding chapter that a man who falls into sin after receiving sacramental grace can be restored to grace.

As already stated, as long as we live here below, the will is changeable as to vice and virtue. Consequently, just as man can sin after receiving grace, so too, seemingly, he can return to virtue. Again. It is evident that good is more powerful than evil: since evil acts not, save by virtue of a good, as we proved above.[1] Hence, if a man's will is turned away from the state of grace by sin, much more can he be recalled from sin, by grace.

Further. As long as he is a wayfarer, man's will is not unchangeable. Now, as long as he is here below, a man is on the way to his last end. Therefore his will is not so unchangeably turned to evil, as to be unable by divine grace to return to that which is good.

Moreover. It is evident that sacramental grace delivers a man from the sins committed by him before he received the grace of the sacraments. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. vi. 9-11): *Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers . . . shall possess the kingdom of God. . . . And such some of you were; but you are washed, but you are sanctified, but you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God.* It is also clear that the grace bestowed in the sacraments does not lessen, but increases the good of nature. Now it is part of the good of nature that a man can be restored from the state of sin to the state of righteousness; since the possibility for good is

[1] Bk. III., ch. xiv.

a good in itself. Therefore if a man happen to sin after receiving grace, he can still return to the state of righteousness.

Again. If those who sin after baptism cannot return to grace, they lose all hope of salvation. Now despair is the road to greater liberty in sinning: for it is said of some (Ephes. iv. 19) that *despairing* they *have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness, unto covetousness.* Therefore the above is a most dangerous opinion, since it leads man into a very sewer of sin.

Further. We have proved[1] that the grace which man receives in the sacraments does not render him impeccable. Consequently, if after receiving sacramental grace the sinner were unable to return to the state of righteousness, it would be dangerous to receive the sacraments: and this is clearly unreasonable. Therefore a return to justice is not denied those who sin after receiving the sacraments.

This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (1 Jo. ii. 1, 2): *My little children, these things I write to you, that you may not sin. But if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just. And he is the propitiation for our sins:* and it is evident that these words were addressed to the faithful who were already baptized. Paul also writes, in reference to the Corinthian who had been guilty of fornication (2 Cor. ii. 6, 7): *To him that is such a one, this rebuke is sufficient, that is given by many: so that contrariwise you should rather pardon and comfort him.* Again he says further on (vii. 9): *Now I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance.* It is also said (Jerem. iii. 1): *Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers: nevertheless, return to me, saith the Lord:* and (Lam. v. 21): *Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted: renew our days, as from the beginning.* From all these texts it is evident that, if the faithful fall after receiving grace, the way back to salvation is still open to them.

[1] Ch. lxx.

Hereby we exclude the error of the Novatians, who refused forgiveness to those who sinned after receiving Baptism. In support of their error they quoted Heb. vi. 4-6: *It is impossible for those who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, have moreover tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, and are fallen away, to be renewed again unto penance.* But it is clear from the context, in what sense the Apostle says this, for he continues: *Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God, and making him a mockery.* Hence the reason why those, who fall away after receiving grace, cannot be renewed again unto penance, is that the Son of God is not to be crucified again. Consequently that renewal unto penance is denied, whereby man is crucified with Christ, namely, by Baptism, according to Rom. vi. 3, *All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized in his death.* Therefore, just as Christ is not to be crucified again, so he that sins after Baptism is not to be baptized again; yet he can be restored to grace by penance. Hence the Apostle did not say that it is impossible for those who have once fallen to be recalled or restored to penance, but to be *renewed,* which expression is generally applied to Baptism: *According to his mercy, he saved us, by the laver of regeneration, and renovation of the Holy Ghost* (Tit. iii. 5).

CHAPTER LXXII

THE NECESSITY OF PENANCE AND OF ITS PARTS

ACCORDINGLY, if a man sin after being baptized, his sin cannot be mended by Baptism: and, since the abundance of divine mercy, and the efficacy of Christ's grace, do not allow man to remain without a remedy, another sacramental antidote has been provided for the cleansing of sins. This is the sacrament of Penance, which is a kind

of spiritual healing. When those who have acquired natural life through generation contract a disease that is contrary to the perfection of life, they can be cured, not by being born again, but by being healed, which is a process of alteration. So too when a man sins after Baptism, which is spiritual regeneration, his sin is remedied, not by a repetition of Baptism, but by Penance, which is a kind of spiritual alteration.

We must observe, however, that the body's healing proceeds sometimes entirely from within, as when a man is cured by his own natural forces; and sometimes both from within and without, as when nature's efforts are assisted by external help of medicine. But a body is never healed entirely from without; for it still retains the principles of life, which are the cause of its having health. On the other hand, spiritual healing cannot proceed entirely from within. For we have proved[1] that a man cannot be delivered from sin without the assistance of grace. Yet neither can spiritual healing proceed entirely from without: since the mind would not be restored to health, unless the will be moved in the right direction. Therefore, in the sacrament of Penance, spiritual health must come from within and from without. This happens as follows. In order that a man be perfectly cured of a bodily sickness, he needs to be delivered from all the mischief he incurs through the disease. So too the spiritual healing of Penance would not be perfect, unless man were relieved of all the mischief he has incurred through sin. The first mischief that afflicts man through sin, is disorder in his mind, in as much as it is turned away from the unchangeable good, namely, God, and is turned towards sin. The second mischief is that he incurs a debt of punishment; because, as proved above,[2] it is due to each sin that God, the most just ruler, should punish it. The third mischief is a certain weakness in man's natural good, in as much as by sinning he becomes more prone to sin, and less inclined to good works.

[1] Bk. III., ch. clvii.

[2] Bk. III., chs. cxl. *seq.*

Accordingly, the first thing required in Penance is to restore order in the mind; namely, that the mind be turned to God, and turned away from sin, that it grieve for the sin committed, and resolve not to commit it again: this is what is meant by *contrition*. Now this restoration of the mind to order cannot be brought about without grace: because our minds cannot be turned to God aright without charity, and there is no charity without grace, as we have already proved.[1] Accordingly contrition removes God's anger, and man is freed from the debt of eternal punishment: which is incompatible with grace or charity, since eternal punishment consists in separation from God, to whom man is united by grace and charity. For this restoration of the mind to order by contrition proceeds from within, that is, from the free will assisted by grace. Since however it has been proved[2] that the merit of Christ's sufferings for the human race is sufficient to expiate all sins, it is necessary for man's deliverance from sin, that he adhere with his mind not only to God, but also to the Mediator of God and man, Jesus Christ, in whom is given the remission of all sins. For spiritual health consists in the mind turning to God: and we cannot obtain this health except through the physician of our souls, Jesus Christ, who saved His people from their sins, and whose merit suffices to take away wholly all sins: for He it is *who taketh away the sin of the world* (Jo. i. 29). Nevertheless all do not receive the effect of perfect remission; each one receives a share in proportion to his union with Christ suffering. Since then our union with Christ in Baptism is effected, not by any internal operation on our part (since nothing brings itself into being), but by Christ, who regenerates us into a living hope: it follows that the forgiveness of sins in Baptism is the effect of Christ's power, who unites us to Himself perfectly and wholly, so that not only is the stain of sin washed away, but all debt of punishment is also remitted: except accidentally in those who are deprived of the effect of the

[1] Bk. III., ch. cli. [2] Ch. lv.

sacrament, through receiving the sacrament insincerely. By this spiritual healing we are united to Christ by means of our own action informed with divine grace; and consequently we do not always entirely, nor do we all equally, receive the remission which is the effect of this union. For the mind may turn to God, and turn away from sin with such strength that man receives complete forgiveness of sin, so that not only is he cleansed from the stain, but is released from the whole punishment. But this does not always happen. Sometimes contrition removes the stain and remits the debt of eternal punishment, as we have said, yet there still remains an obligation to some temporal punishment, that God's justice may be secured, in as much as sin is brought to order by punishment.

Now, infliction of punishment for a fault requires some kind of judgment, wherefore the penitent who comes to Christ to be healed must look to Christ for the assessment of the punishment: and Christ prescribes the remedy through His minister, as He does in the other sacraments. No one, however, can judge of sins of which he is not informed. Consequently, it was necessary to institute *confession* as the second part of this sacrament, that Christ's minister may be informed of the penitent's sin. Therefore the minister, to whom confession is made, needs to have judiciary power, as occupying the place of Christ, who is *appointed judge of the living and the dead*.[1] Now two things are requisite for judiciary power, namely the authority to take cognizance of a fault, and the power to absolve or condemn. These two are called the keys of the Church, discerning knowledge, and the power to bind and loose, which our Lord committed to Peter when He said (Matth. xvi. 19): *To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven*. But we must not suppose that He entrusted the keys to Peter, that Peter alone might have them, but that others might have them through him: otherwise sufficient provision would not have been made for the spiritual welfare of the faithful. Now these keys derive their efficacy

[1] Acts x. 42.

from Christ's Passion, whereby He opened to us the gate of the heavenly kingdom. Consequently, just as there is no salvation for man without Baptism, in which Christ's Passion is efficacious, received either in reality or in desire (namely, when necessity and not contempt excludes the sacrament), so is there no salvation for those who sin after Baptism, unless they submit themselves to the keys of the Church, either by actual confession and acceptance of the judgement of the Church's ministers, or at least by purposing to do so when the opportunity offers. For thus Peter declares (Acts iv. 12): *There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved,* except the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. Hereby we exclude the error of those who say that man can obtain forgiveness of his sins without confession, or the purpose to confess, or that the authorities of the Church can dispense a man from the obligation of going to confession. Ecclesiastical superiors cannot override the Church's power of the keys wherein all their powers consist, nor make it possible for a man to obtain forgiveness of his sins without the sacrament that derives its efficacy from Christ's Passion: this Christ alone can do: who is the institutor and author of the sacraments. Wherefore, just as the Ecclesiastical superiors cannot dispense a man so that he be saved without Baptism, so neither can they dispense a man so that he obtain forgiveness of sin without confession and absolution.

It must be observed, however, that Baptism has a certain efficacy for the remission of a man's sins, even before he actually receives it, and while he has the purpose to receive it; and afterwards, indeed, when actually received, it bestows an effect more plentiful in grace and forgiveness: whereas sometimes grace is bestowed and sin is remitted, in the actual reception of Baptism by one whose sin has not yet been remitted. In the same way, the keys of the Church produce their effect in a man even before he actually submits himself to them; provided he has the intention of so doing. But he receives grace and forgiveness more plentifully when he actually submits himself to them, by

confessing his sins, and receiving absolution. And sometimes, by the power of the keys a man after confessing his sins may obtain grace even at the moment of the absolution whereby his sins are remitted. Since then at the time of confession and absolution grace and forgiveness are more plentifully bestowed on a man who has already obtained both on account of his good intention, it is clear that, by the power of the keys, the minister of the Church, by absolving him, remits some of the temporal punishment which was still due to the penitent after his contrition. As to what remains of that punishment, he binds the penitent thereto by enjoining a penance, the fulfilment of which is called *satisfaction,* which is the third part of Penance. Hereby man is wholly freed from the debt of punishment, since he has paid the penalty which he deserved. More than this, the weakness of his natural good is repaired: for then he refrains from evil things, and habituates himself to good things by humbling his spirit to God in *prayer,* training his flesh by *fasting* that it should be subject to the spirit, and using his external possessions to give *alms* to his neighbour, to whom he thus unites himself, whereas he had been separated from him by sin. Hence it follows that the minister of the Church exercises a kind of judgement by using the keys. Now no man is appointed judge except over those who are subject to him. Consequently, it is not true, as some falsely assert, that a priest can absolve anyone from his sins; but only those over whom he exercises that power.

CHAPTER LXXIII

THE SACRAMENT OF EXTREME UNCTION

THE body is the instrument of the soul. Now an instrument is intended for the use of the principal agent; wherefore the instrument needs to be disposed so as to be suitable to the principal agent. Consequently the body is disposed

so as to be suitable to the soul. By dispensation of the divine judgement it happens sometimes that the disease of the soul, which is sin, spreads to the body; and this bodily ailment is sometimes profitable to the soul's health, in so far as a man bears his bodily infirmity with humility and patience; since this is credited to him as punishment as it were in satisfaction for his sins. Moreover bodily infirmity is sometimes a hindrance to the health of the soul, in so far as it is an obstacle to virtue. It was, therefore, fitting that a spiritual remedy should be applied against sin, in so far as sin is an occasion of bodily infirmity: and sometimes this remedy heals the bodily ailment; that is to say, when it is good for the soul's health. For this purpose the sacrament of Extreme Unction was instituted; of which it is said (James v. 14, 15): *Is any man sick among you? Let him bring in the priests of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord: and the prayer of faith shall heal*[1] *the sick man.* Nor is the efficacy of the sacrament prejudiced if sometimes the sick who have received this sacrament are not completely cured of their bodily ailment, because the healing of the body is not always good for the soul, even for those who have received this sacrament worthily. Nor do they receive it in vain, although they do not recover the health of the body. For while this sacrament is directed against bodily sickness as a result of sin, it is evidently directed also against other consequences of sin, namely proneness to evil, and difficulty in respect of good; and all the more so, as these latter infirmities of the soul are more akin to sin than sickness of the body. It is true that these infirmities should be repaired by penance, in as much as the penitent is withdrawn from evil and inclined to good, by deeds of virtue, which he does in satisfaction for sin. But, seeing that man does not completely repair these defects in himself, either through negligence or the manifold business of this life, or the shortness of time, and so forth; he is fortunately provided with a sacrament which completes his

[1] Douay, *save.*

cure and delivers him from the debt of temporal punishment. Thus when his soul departs from his body, there is no longer anything in him to prevent his entering into glory; wherefore James adds: *And the Lord shall raise him up*. It also happens that a man is not cognizant or mindful of all the sins he has committed, so as to be cleansed of them all in Penance: moreover, these are his daily sins, from which this life cannot be free. From all these man needs to be cleansed by this sacrament in the hour of death, so that nothing remain in him to prevent his entrance into glory: and therefore James adds: *If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him*. It is evident, therefore, that this sacrament is the conclusion and consummation of the whole spiritual healing, since it prepares man for a participation in glory: and for this reason it is called Extreme Unction.

Wherefore it is plain that this sacrament is not to be given to any sick person, but only to those who, through sickness, are likely to be near death. And if they get well again, they can receive this sacrament a second time, if they return to the same state of danger. The reason is that the anointing in this sacrament is not one of consecration, as the anointing of Confirmation, the washing of Baptism, and certain other anointings. These latter are never repeated, because consecration remains for always, so long as the consecrated thing remains, on account of the efficacy of the divine power which consecrates. Whereas the anointing of this sacrament is directed to healing: and a healing remedy should be repeated as often as the sickness recurs.

Now there are some who, without being sick, are near death (as for instance a man condemned to die) and who need the spiritual effects of this sacrament; yet to none may it be given, save to those who are in sickness, for it is given under the form of a bodily remedy: which is unsuitable except for one who is sick of body: and the signification of the sacraments must be observed. Consequently, just as a bodily washing is required in Baptism, so in this

sacrament is there required the application of a remedy for bodily infirmity. Hence oil is the special matter of this sacrament, because by easing pain it is useful for healing the body, even as water, that washes the body, is the matter of the sacrament in which the soul is cleansed.

Hence again we may see that as bodily remedies are applied to the source of the disease, so is this unction applied to those parts of the body that are the source of the disease which is sin. Such are the organs of sense, the hands, and feet, with which sins are committed: also, as is the custom in some places, the thighs which are the seat of lust.

Again seeing that sins are remitted in this sacrament, and that sin is not remitted without grace, it is evident that grace is bestowed in this sacrament.

Now those things which bestow illuminating grace may be given by none but a priest, whose order is light-giving, according to Dionysius (*Eccles. Hier.* vi.). A bishop is not necessary, since this sacrament does not confer excellence of state, as is the case in those things of which a bishop is the minister.[1] Since however this sacrament has the effect of producing a complete cure, and requires an abundance of grace, it becomes the sacrament that many priests be present, and that the prayers of the whole Church combine to secure the effect of this sacrament: hence James says (v. 14, 15): *Let him bring in the priests of the Church . . . and the prayers of faith shall save the sick man.* Yet, if there be only one priest present, he is understood to confer this sacrament as proxy of the whole Church, whose minister he is, and who speaks through him.—As in the other sacraments, the effect of this sacrament is hindered by insincerity on the part of the recipient.

[1] *Cf.* ch. lx.

CHAPTER LXXIV

THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER

FROM what has been said, it is clear that, in all the sacraments of which we have spoken hitherto, spiritual grace is bestowed under the sacred sign of visible things. Now every action should be proportionate to the agent. Hence these same sacraments should be dispensed by visible men having spiritual powers. For angels are not competent to dispense sacraments: but men clothed in visible flesh, according to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. v. 1), *Every high priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God.*

This may be proved in yet another way. Sacraments derive their institution and efficacy from Christ; of whom the Apostle says (Eph. v. 25, 26): *Christ loved the Church, and delivered himself for it, that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.* It is also clear that at the Supper He gave the Sacrament of His body and blood, and instituted it for our frequent use: and this is the greatest of all sacraments. Seeing then that He was about to withdraw His bodily presence from the Church, it was necessary that He should institute others as His ministers, who would dispense the sacraments to the faithful, according to the Apostle's words (1 Cor. iv. 1): *Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.* For this reason He entrusted His disciples with the consecration of His body and blood, saying (Luke xxii. 19): *Do this for a commemoration of me:* to them He gave the power to forgive sins (Jo. xx. 23): *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them:* and on them He conferred the office of teaching and baptizing, saying (Matth. xxviii. 19): *Going, teach ye all nations, baptizing them.* Now the minister is compared to his master as an instrument to the principal agent: for, just as the instrument is moved by the agent in order to produce an effect, so a minister is moved by

his master to execute his will. Again, the instrument should be proportionate to the agent. Therefore Christ's ministers should be conformed to Him. Now Christ wrought our salvation, as master, by His own authority and power, in as much as He is God and man: in that, as man, He suffered for our redemption, and, as God, His sufferings were made efficacious for our salvation. Consequently Christ's ministers needed to be men, and to share in His Godhead by a kind of spiritual power: since the instrument shares in the power of the principal agent. Of this power the Apostle says (2 Cor. xiii. 10) that *the Lord gave him power unto edification, and not unto destruction.*

Now it cannot be said that this power was given to Christ's disciples, yet so that it would not be derived from them by others: for it was given to them *unto the edification* of the Church, according to the Apostle's words. Therefore this power must last as long as the Church needs to be edified: that is to say from after the death of Christ's disciples until the end of the world. Consequently spiritual power was given to Christ's disciples in such wise that others were to receive it from them. Hence our Lord spoke to His disciples as representatives of the rest of the faithful, as we may see from His words (Mark xiii. 37), *What I say to you, I say to all.* Again He said to His disciples (Matth. xxviii. 20): *Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.*

Accordingly, this spiritual power flows from Christ to the ministers of the Church, and the spiritual effects accruing to us from Christ are conferred under certain sensible signs, as explained above;[1] and consequently it was proper that this spiritual power also should be conferred on men by means of sensible symbols. These are certain forms of words, certain actions, as for instance laying on of hands, anointing, delivery of book or chalice or something of the kind pertaining to the execution of a spiritual power. Now, whenever something spiritual is bestowed under a

[1] Ch. lvi.

bodily symbol, this is called a sacrament. It is clear, therefore, that in the bestowal of spiritual power, a sacrament is enacted: and this is known as the Sacrament of Order. Now it is a part of the divine liberality that whosoever receives power to perform a certain work, receives also whatsoever is required for the suitable execution of that work. Since then the sacraments that are the purpose of this spiritual power, cannot be becomingly administered without the assistance of divine grace: it follows that grace is conferred in this sacrament, even as in the others.

Whereas the power of Order is directed to the dispensing of the sacraments, and since of all the sacraments the Eucharist is the most sublime and perfect, as was indicated above,[1] it follows that we must consider the power of Order chiefly in its relation to that sacrament: for a thing takes its name from its end. Now seemingly the same power bestows a perfection, and prepares the matter to receive that perfection: thus fire has the power to communicate its form to a thing, and to prepare the material for the reception of its form. Since then the power of Order extends to the production of Christ's body and the distribution thereof to the faithful, it follows that the same power should extend to the preparation of the faithful, that they be made apt and worthy to receive this sacrament. Now the faithful are made apt and worthy to receive this sacrament, by being freed from sin: otherwise spiritual union with Christ is impossible, in one who is united to Him sacramentally by receiving this sacrament. Consequently the power of Order must extend to the forgiveness of sins, by the dispensation of those sacraments that are directed to the remission of sin: such as Baptism and Penance, as is evident from what we have said above.[2] Wherefore, as we have already stated,[3] our Lord, having entrusted to His disciples the consecration of His body, gave them also the power to forgive sins, which power is indicated by the keys, of which He said to Peter (Matth. xvi. 19): *To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of*

[1] Ch. lxi. [2] Chs. lix., lxxii. [3] Ch. lxxii.

heaven. For heaven is closed and opened to a man according as he is shackled with, or freed from sin; and for this reason the use of these keys is expressed as binding and loosing, namely from sins. Of the keys themselves we have already spoken.

CHAPTER LXXV

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF ORDER

A POWER directed to a principal effect naturally has lesser powers administering to it. This may be clearly seen in the arts: the arts which dispose the material are subservient to the art which introduces the art-form: and the art that introduces the art-form is subservient to the art which is concerned with the end of the art-product: and again the art that is concerned with an anterior end is subservient to the art that is concerned with the ultimate end. Thus the art of wood-cutting serves the ship-building art; and the latter serves the art of sailing; and this latter serves the art of commerce or war or the like, in so far as sailing may be directed to various ends. Since then the power of Order is directed chiefly to the consecration of Christ's body, and to its distribution to the faithful, and likewise to the cleansing of the faithful from their sins, there is need for a principal order, whose power extends chiefly to these things, and this is the *Priesthood;* and for other orders that serve it by preparing the matter in one way or another; these are the Orders of the lower ministers.

Accordingly, since the priestly power, as we have stated,[1] extends to two things, namely the consecration of Christ's body and the preparation of the faithful, by absolving them from their sins, that they may be worthy to receive the Eucharist, it follows that the lower orders should minister to the priestly order, either in both, or in one of these things. And it is clear that among the lower orders, the

[1] Ch. lxxiv.

higher is the one that serves the priestly order in more ways, or in a higher way. The lowest orders then serve the priestly order, only in the preparation of the people: the *Door-keeper* by excluding unbelievers from the assembly of the faithful; the *Readers* by instructing catechumens in the rudiments of the faith; wherefore the Old Testament Scriptures are committed to them to read: the *Exorcists* by cleansing those who are already instructed, if in any way they be hindered by the devil from receiving the sacraments. The higher orders serve the priestly order, both in the preparation of the people and in the celebration of the Sacrament. *Acolytes* exercise their ministry over the non-sacred vessels, in which the matter of the Sacrament is prepared, wherefore the cruets are delivered to them at their ordination: *Subdeacons* exercise their ministry over the sacred vessels, and the preparation of the matter before consecration: *Deacons* exercise a ministry over the already consecrated matter, in as much as they distribute Christ's blood to the faithful. Wherefore these three, the priesthood, diaconate, and sub-diaconate, are called Sacred Orders, because they confer a ministry over sacred things. These higher orders serve also in the preparation of the people: hence deacons are entrusted with the proclamation of the Gospel teaching; subdeacons, with the teaching of the Apostles; while the acolytes serve by conducing to the solemnity of that teaching, by bearing lighted candles, and in other like ministrations.

CHAPTER LXXVI

OF THE EPISCOPAL DIGNITY: AND THAT ONE BISHOP IS OVER ALL

It has been stated[1] that all these orders are conferred by a certain sacrament, and that the sacraments of the Church have to be dispensed by certain ministers: consequently,

[1] Ch. lxxiv.

there must be in the Church a still higher power of some higher ministry, to confer the sacrament of Order. This is the episcopal power, which, while it does not surpass the priestly power in the consecration of Christ's body, nevertheless does surpass it in things concerning the faithful: for the priest himself derives his power from the bishop: while all difficult matters regarding the faithful are reserved to bishops, by whose authority even the priests are able to do what they are appointed to do. Thus in his priestly actions, the priest uses things consecrated by a bishop; for instance in the celebration of the Eucharist, he uses chalice, altar and pall. Hence it is evident that the supreme power in the direction of the faithful belongs to the episcopal dignity. Now although the people are distributed among various dioceses and cities, nevertheless there is but one Church, and therefore only one Christian people. Consequently, just as a bishop is appointed as the head of a certain people and a particular Church, so must the whole Christian people be subject to one who is the head of the whole Church.

Again. The unity of the Church requires that all the faithful be of one faith. Now questions are wont to arise about matters of faith: and the Church would be divided by differences of opinion, unless its unity were safeguarded by the pronouncement of one. Therefore, in order to safeguard the unity of the Church, it is necessary that there be one who presides over the whole Church. Now Christ loved the Church and shed His blood for her, wherefore He did not fail her in her needs, seeing that it is said even of the Synagogue (Isa. v. 4): *What is there that I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to it?* There can be no doubt, therefore, that Christ provided His Church with a head.

Further. We cannot doubt that the government of the Church was perfectly provided for, since it was devised by one through whom *kings reign and lawgivers decree just things* (Prov. viii. 15). Now the best form of government is when a people is governed by one: because the end of

government is peace; since peace and unity of the subjects is the end of the governing authority: and unity is more fittingly ensured by one than by many. Therefore the government of the Church is so arranged that one presides over the whole.

Moreover. The Church militant originates from the Church triumphant by its likeness to it: hence in the Apocalypse, John *saw Jerusalem coming down out of heaven;*[1] and Moses was bidden to make all things *according to the pattern that was shown* him *in the mountain.*[2] Now there is one who presides over the Church triumphant, namely God, Who also presides over the whole universe; for it is said (Apoc. xxi. 3): *They shall be his people: and God himself with them shall be their God.* Therefore, in the Church militant, there is one who presides over all. Hence it is said (Osee i. 2): *The children of Juda and the children of Israel shall be gathered together, and they shall appoint themselves one head:* and our Lord said (Jo. x. 16): *There shall be one fold, and one shepherd.*

Someone, however, may say that the one head and the one shepherd is Christ, who is the one bridegroom of the one Church: but this reply is not sufficient. It is evident that Christ Himself accomplishes all the Church's sacraments: He it is who baptizes; He it is who forgives sins; He is the true priest, who offered Himself on the altar of the cross, and by whose power His own body is consecrated daily on the altar. And yet, because He was not to remain bodily present to all the faithful, He chose ministers, that through them He might give that same body to the faithful, as we have shown above.[3] For this very reason then, that He was about to withdraw His bodily presence from the Church, He needed to appoint one to take His place in governing the whole Church. Wherefore, before His Ascension, He said to Peter (Jo. xxi 17): *Feed my sheep;* and before His Passion (Luke xxii 32): *Thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren;* and to him alone He made the promise (Matth. xvi. 19): *To thee will I give the keys*

[1] Apoc. xxi. 2. [2] Exod. xxv. 40. [3] Ch. lxxiv.

of the kingdom of heaven, in order to show that the power of the keys was to be received from him by others, so as to safeguard the unity of the Church. It cannot be said that, although He conferred this dignity on Peter, it does not pass from him to others. For it is evident that Christ so instituted His Church, that it would endure to the end of the world according to Isa. ix. 11, *He shall sit upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom; to establish it, and strengthen it with judgement and with justice, from henceforth and for ever.* Hence it is evident that those He appointed to the ministry then and there, were, for the good of the Church, to communicate their powers to their successors, until the end of time: especially, since He says (Matth. xxviii. 20): *Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.*

This suffices to refute the presumptuous error of those who dare to withdraw from obedience and submission to Peter, by refusing to acknowledge his successor, the Roman Pontiff, as the shepherd of the universal Church.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT THE SACRAMENTS CAN BE DISPENSED BY WICKED MINISTERS

We have said enough to show that the ministers of the Church, at their ordination, receive from above power to dispense the sacraments to the faithful. Now that which a thing acquires by being consecrated, remains in it for ever: wherefore that which is consecrated once, is not consecrated again. Therefore the ministers of the Church retain for ever the power of their Orders: and, consequently it is not taken away from them by sin. Therefore the sacraments of the Church can be administered by sinners and wicked men, provided they be in Orders.

Again. Nothing can produce an effect exceeding its faculty, unless it receive the power from elsewhere. This

is evident both in nature and in civil matters: water cannot give heat, unless it receive from fire the power to do so: nor can a magistrate imprison a citizen without having received power from the sovereign. Now the sacramental effects surpass the powers of man, as stated above.[1] Therefore no man, however good, can administer the sacraments unless he has received the power to do so. Now wickedness and sin are opposite to goodness. Therefore neither does sin prevent a man, who has received the power, from being able to administer the sacraments.

Again. A man is good or bad in reference to virtue and vice, which are habits. Now habit differs from power in that power makes it possible for us to do a certain thing, whereas habit does not make it possible for us to do a thing, but confers a certain ability or inability for doing well or ill that which it is possible for us to do. Consequently habit neither gives nor removes the possibility of doing, but gives the facility of doing a certain thing well or ill. Therefore the fact that a man is good or bad does not make it possible or impossible for him to administer the sacraments, but it makes him fit or unfit to administer them well.

Moreover. That which acts by the power of another agent does not assimilate the material to itself, but to the principal agent: thus a house is not made in likeness to the instruments used by the builder, but is likened to his art. Now the ministers of the Church in dispensing the sacraments, act not by their own, but by Christ's power, of whom it is said (Jo. i. 33): *He it is that baptizeth*. Wherefore the minister acts as a kind of instrument: for he is an animated instrument, as it were. Therefore the wickedness of a minister does not prevent the faithful from being saved by Christ through the sacraments.

Further. It is not for man to judge of another man's goodness or wickedness: this belongs to God alone, who searches the secrets of the heart. Consequently, if the wickedness of a minister could prevent a sacrament from

[1] Ch. xlvii.

taking effect, man would be unable to be confident of his soul's welfare, nor would his conscience be relieved of sin. Therefore it would be unseemly, were he to base his hope of salvation on the goodness of a mere man : for it is said (Jerem. xvii. 5) : *Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.* And if a man had no hope of obtaining salvation through the sacraments, unless they were dispensed by a good minister, he would seem somewhat to trust in man for his salvation. Wherefore, in order that we may place our hope of salvation in Christ, who is both God and man, we must acknowledge that the sacraments are salutary through Christ's power, whether they be dispensed by good or by wicked ministers.

This is also made evident by the fact that our Lord bade us obey even wicked superiors, although we must not imitate their works (Matth. xxiii. 2, 3) : *The Scribes and Pharisees have sitten on the chair of Moses. All things therefore whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do : but according to their works, do ye not.* And much more ought we to obey men by reason of their having been appointed ministers by Christ, than by reason of their sitting in the chair of Moses. Therefore even wicked ministers should be obeyed : and this would not be the case unless they retained the power of Orders, which is the reason why they should be obeyed. Therefore even the wicked have the power to dispense the sacraments. This disposes of the error of those who said that all good men, but no wicked men, can administer the sacraments.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY

ALTHOUGH the sacraments restore grace to man, they do not at once give him back immortality : the reasons for which we have already given.[1] Now whatsoever things are

[1] Chs. lii, lv.

corruptible cannot be perpetuated save by generation. Since then believers were to be perpetuated till the end of the world, this had to be done by means of generation, whereby also the human race is carried on.

We must observe that when a thing is directed to several ends, it needs several directors to those ends : because the end is proportionate to the agent. Now human generation is directed to several ends, namely, the continuation of the species, or the securing of some good of the state, such as the preservation of the people in some particular country : again it is directed to the perpetuity of the Church which is the assembly of the faithful. Wherefore the generation in question needs to receive its direction from various sources. In so far as it is directed to the good of nature, namely the perpetuation of the species, it is directed by nature which inclines to this end, and thus it is called an office of nature. In so far as it is directed to the good of the state, it is subject to the control of the civil authority. But in so far as it is directed to the good of the Church, it must be subject to ecclesiastical power. Now those things which are dispensed by the ministers of the Church are called sacraments. Therefore matrimony, as consisting in the union of a man and woman who intend to beget and educate children for the glory of God, is a sacrament of the Church : and hence it is that the bridal pair receive a blessing from the ministers of the Church. And just as in the other sacraments, something spiritual is symbolized by external actions, so in this sacrament the union of husband and wife signifies the union of Christ with the Church, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. v. 32) : *This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church.* And seeing that the sacraments cause what they signify, we must believe that the sacrament of matrimony confers on those who are joined in wedlock, the grace to take part in the union of Christ with His Church : since it is most necessary that they should so seek carnal and earthly things, as not to be separated from Christ and His Church.

Since then the union of husband and wife signifies the union of Christ and the Church, the figure must needs correspond to the thing signified. Now the union of Christ with the Church is the unending union of one with one, for the Church is one according to Cant. vi. 8, *One is my dove, my perfect one.* Nor will Christ ever be separated from His Church, for He said (Matth. xxviii. 20): *Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world:* and again it is said (1 Thess. iv. 16): *So shall we be always with the Lord.* Therefore Matrimony, as a sacrament of the Church, must needs be the indissoluble union of one man with one woman: and this pertains to the mutual troth which binds husband and wife together.

Accordingly there are three blessings attaching to Matrimony as a sacrament of the Church: namely, children, to be begotten and brought up to worship God; faithfulness, in as much as one husband is bound to one wife; and the sacrament, in as much as it is an indissoluble union, symbolising the union of Christ with the Church. Other matters connected with matrimony have been treated above.[1]

CHAPTER LXXIX

THAT OUR BODIES WILL RISE AGAIN THROUGH CHRIST

It has been proved[2] that Christ has delivered us from those things we have incurred through the sin of the first man; from whom we have contracted not only sin, but also death, the punishment of sin, according to the Apostle (Rom. v. 12), *By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.* Consequently Christ delivered us from both, namely, sin and death: wherefore the Apostle says (*Ibid.*, 17): *For if by one man's offence death reigned through one: much more they who receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through one*

[1] Bk. III., chs. xii. *seqq.* [2] Bk. IV., ch. liv.

Jesus Christ. And in order to afford us a proof of both in Himself, He chose both to die and to rise again. He chose to die, in order to free us from sin, wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. ix. 27, 28): *As it is appointed unto men once to die . . . so also Christ was offered once to exhaust the sins of many.* He chose to rise again, in order to free us from death; wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 20, 21): *Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep: for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of life.* Accordingly, we obtain the effect of Christ's Passion, as to the forgiveness of sin: for it has been already stated[1] that the sacraments produce their effect through the efficacy of Christ's Passion. But we shall obtain the effect of Christ's Resurrection, by being delivered from death, at the end of the world, when by the power of Christ, we shall all rise again. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 12-14): *If Christ be preached, that he arose again from the dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resurrection from the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen again. And if Christ be not risen again, then our preaching is vain, and your faith is also vain.* Therefore it is of faith to believe in the future resurrection of the dead. There are some, however, who disbelieve in the future resurrection of the body: such is the perversity of their mind that when, in the Scriptures, they read about the resurrection, they refer such statements to the spiritual resurrection of those who, through grace, arise from sin.

This error is condemned by the Apostle (2 Tim. ii. 16-18): *Shun profane and vain babblings: for they grow much towards ungodliness. And their speech spreadeth like a canker: of whom are Hymenæus and Philetus; who have erred from the truth, saying that the resurrection is past already:* which could only refer to a spiritual resurrection. Therefore it is against faith to substitute a spiritual for a bodily resurrection.

Moreover. It is evident from other passages in the

[1] Ch. lvi.

Epistle to the Corinthians that, in this particular one quoted above, the Apostle is speaking of the resurrection of the body. Thus, after a few words he goes on to say (verse 44): *It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body:* thus clearly indicating the body's resurrection, and then he adds (verse 53): *This corruptible must put on incorruption: and this mortal must put on immortality.* Now *this corruptible* and *this mortal* refer to the body. Therefore it is the body that will arise again.

Further. Our Lord foretold both resurrections. He said (Jo. v. 25): *Amen, amen I say unto you, that the hour cometh and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live.* These words, seemingly, refer to the spiritual resurrection of souls, which was already beginning when people believed in Christ. But afterwards He referred to the resurrection of the body, when He said (*Ibid.*, 28): *The hour cometh wherein all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God:* since it is clear that they who are in the graves are not souls but bodies. Therefore the resurrection of bodies is foretold here.

It is also expressly foretold by Job (Job xix. 25, 26): *I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth: and I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God.*

Reason also supplies an evident proof of the resurrection: provided we bear in mind what has already been proved. Thus we have shown[1] that the human soul is immortal: so that it survives the body after its separation from it. It is also manifest from what has been stated,[2] that the soul is united to the body naturally: since it is by its essence the form of the body: wherefore it is unnatural for the soul to be without the body. Now nothing unnatural can last for ever: and consequently the soul will not remain for ever without the body. Therefore, since the soul is immortal, it must needs be reunited to the body: and this is to rise again. Hence the immortality of the

[1] Bk. II., ch. lxxix. [2] Bk. II., chs. lxxxiii., lxxxiv.

soul would seem to demand the future resurrection of the body.

Again. It has been proved[1] that man's natural desire tends to happiness. Now ultimate happiness is the perfection of the happy one. Consequently whosoever lacks something for perfection, is not yet perfectly happy, since his desire is not yet wholly at rest: and all imperfect things naturally seek to attain to perfection. Now the soul when separated from the body is, in a way, imperfect: even as any part is when severed from its whole: and the soul is naturally part of human nature. Therefore man cannot obtain ultimate happiness, unless his soul be reunited to his body: and this is all the more true, seeing that as we have shown[2] man cannot reach ultimate happiness in this life.

Again. It was proved above[3] that divine providence punishes evil-doers and rewards those who do well. Now, in this life man, who is composed of soul and body, either sins or lives aright. Therefore reward or punishment is due to man in respect of his body and of his soul. But it is plain that in this life man cannot obtain the reward of ultimate felicity, as we have shown above.[4] Moreover, in many cases sins are not punished in this life: nay more, for it is said (Job xxi. 7): *Why then do the wicked live, are they advanced, and strengthened with riches?* Therefore we must postulate a reunion of soul and body, in order that both in soul and body man may be rewarded or punished.

CHAPTER LXXX

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE RESURRECTION

BELIEF in the resurrection encounters a certain number of objections.

In nature, that which is destroyed, does not return to

[1] Bk. III., ch. xxiv.
[2] Bk. III., ch. xlviii.
[3] Bk. III., ch. cxl.
[4] Bk. III., chs. xxvi. *seqq.*

existence, identically the same as before: just as the habit that one acquires after losing it, is not identically the same habit as before: and for this reason the purpose of nature is, by means of generation, to preserve the species of that which is destroyed. Accordingly, since death deprives man of life, and the human body is resolved into the primary elements, it would seem impossible for the same identical man to come back to life.

Again. A thing cannot be identically the same, if any of its essential principles be not identically the same: since the change of an essential principle always induces a change in a thing's essence, whereby a thing is, and is one. Now, when a thing is utterly annihilated it cannot resume existence as identically the same thing: a new thing, indeed, will be created; but the same thing will not be restored. And seemingly death annihilates several of man's essential principles.

In the first place, his corporeity and the form of the mixture of elements, since the body is evidently dissolved; secondly, the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul, which cannot exist without the organs of the body; in fact, there would seem to be nothing left of humanity, which is the form of all that remains after the soul has left the body. Therefore it would seem impossible for the same man to rise again.

Moreover. It would seem that continuity is an essential condition of identity, not only in quantities and movements, but also in qualities and forms: thus when a healthy person falls sick and is restored to health, the health which he recovers is not identically the same as his previous health. Now death clearly deprives man of being, since corruption is the change of being into non-being. Therefore it is impossible for man to recover the same identical being as he had before. Consequently he will not be the same man: because things that are identical have the same being.

Moreover. If the same human body returns to life, it follows that whatsoever was in the body must be restored

to it. But this leads to most unseemly consequences; as regards not only the hair on the head, and distributed about the body, and the nails, all of which clearly are frequently cut away: but also other parts of the body which are dissolved by the hidden action of natural heat: and if all these things were to be restored to man when he rises again, the result would be most unseemly. Therefore, apparently, man will not rise again after death.

Further. There are to be found men who eat human flesh and nothing else; and men thus nourished have children. Consequently the same flesh will be in several men. But it cannot possibly rise again in several men: and yet the resurrection would surely not be universal and entire, if each one did not regain what he had before. Therefore it would seem impossible that men will rise again.

Again. That which is common to all the individuals of one species would seem to be natural to that species. But the resurrection is not natural to man; because no natural agent is of sufficient power to cause the resurrection of all mankind. Therefore all mankind will not rise again.

Further. If we are delivered by Christ from sin, and from death the result of sin, seemingly those alone are to be delivered from death by rising again, who have partaken of the mysteries of Christ, whereby they are delivered from sin. But this does not apply to all men. Therefore it would seem that not all men will rise again.

CHAPTER LXXXI

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS

In order to solve these difficulties, we must observe that. in fashioning human nature, God, as we have already stated,[1] bestowed on the human body something in addition to that which was due to it by virtue of its natural

[1] Ch. lii.

principles. This was a kind of incorruptibility, the result of the body being so proportioned to its form, that as the soul's life is everlasting, so was it possible for the body, through the soul, to live for ever. This incorruptibility, although it was not natural in relation to a natural principle, was nevertheless natural, so to say, in relation to the end; in as much as the matter was proportioned to its natural form, which is the end of matter. Accordingly, when the soul, against the order of its nature, turned away from God, the body was deprived of that God-given disposition which made it proportionate to the soul, and death was the result. If then we consider the state in which human nature was created, death is incidental to man through sin. But this accident was removed by Christ, who through the merits of His Passion destroyed death by dying. We conclude then that the body is restored from death to life, by the same divine power that created the body incorruptible.

Accordingly, we reply to the first objection thus. The power of nature falls short of the divine power, even as the power of the instrument falls short of that of the principal agent. Hence, although nature is unable to restore a dead body to life, this can be done by the power of God. The reason why nature cannot do this is that nature always works through a form: and that which has a form already exists. Wherefore a thing cannot generate itself; but it generates something else that is its like in species. And when it has been destroyed, it has lost its form, by which it could be a principle of action. Consequently that which has been destroyed cannot be restored to its identity by the operation of nature. But the divine power, which brought things into being, so works through nature that, without it, it can produce an effect of nature, as we have proved above.[1] Therefore, since the divine power changes not though things themselves be destroyed, it can restore integrity to things which have been corrupted.

The second objection does not prove that the same man

[1] Bk. III., ch. xcix.

cannot rise again. None of man's essential principles is utterly annihilated by death: because the rational soul, which is man's form, remains after death, as we have shown.[1] The matter also which was subject to that form remains under the same dimensions that individualized it. Accordingly, the same man will be restored as a result of the union of the same identical matter with the same identical form.—As to corporeity, it can be taken in two ways. In one way it signifies the substantial form of the body, considered as a substance: and thus the corporeity of any body whatever is its substantial form, whereby that thing belongs to such and such a genus and species, and owing to which a body has the three dimensions. For there are not, in one and the same thing, several substantial forms, by one of which it belongs to a supreme genus, substance for example, and by another, to its proximate genus, such as bodies or animals, and by yet another, to its species, such as man or horse. For, if the first form makes it a substance, the subsequent forms would be additions to that which is already an actual individual, subsisting in nature, so that they would not be constituents of that individual, but like accidental forms would be in the subject which is that individual. Consequently corporeity taken as meaning the substantial form in man, is nothing else but the rational soul, which requires the three dimensions in its matter: since it is the actuating principle of a body.—In another sense, corporeity signifies an accidental form in regard to which a body is said to be in the genus of quantity: so that corporeity is identified with the three dimensions that enter into the definition of a body. Wherefore, although this corporeity returns to nothingness, when the body is corrupted, this cannot prevent a man from being identically the same when he rises again, since corporeity, taken in the first sense, does not return into nothing, but remains the same.

The form of a mixture can also be taken in two ways.—In one way, it signifies the substantial form of a mixed body:

[1] Bk. II., ch. lxxix.

and thus, since in man there is no other substantial form besides the rational soul, as we have proved,[1] neither can it be said that the form of the mixture, considered as his substantial form, is annihilated when a man dies.—In another way, when a number of simple qualities are mixed and attempered so as to form a composite quality, this latter may be called the form of the mixture, and stands in the same relation to the substantial form of the mixed body, as a simple quality does to the substantial form of a simple body. Wherefore, if the form of the mixture, thus understood, comes to nothing, this is no proof against the identity of the body that rises again.—This same applies to the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul. If by these we mean the sensitive and nutritive powers, which are natural properties of the soul or rather of the composite, they cease to be when the body ceases to be: and this does not interfere with the body's identity in the resurrection. If, however, by these parts we mean the very substance of the sensitive and nutritive soul, each of these is identical with the rational soul: for man has not three souls, but one only, as we have proved.[2]—As to the humanity, we must not imagine this to be a form resulting from the union of the form with the matter, and distinct from both: because, since the form makes the matter to be something actually (2 *De Anima*, text. viii.), this additional form would not be substantial, but accidental. There are some who say that the form of the part is also the form of the whole; but that it is said to be the form of the part, in as much as it actuates the matter; and the form of the whole, in as much as it completes the species. Thus humanity is really nothing else but the rational soul; so that clearly it is not annihilated when the body is destroyed. But, seeing that humanity is the essence of man, and that the essence of a thing is indicated by the definition, and that the definition of a natural thing indicates not the form only, but the form and the matter, it follows that humanity signifies something composed of matter and form, just as man does, but not in the same

[1] Bk. II., ch. lviii. [2] *Ibid.*

way. Humanity signifies the essential principles of the species, both formal and material, with abstraction of the individualizing principles: for humanity is that by which someone is a man; whereas it is not by the principles of individuality, but only by the essential principles of the species, that someone is a man. Wherefore *humanity* signifies nothing else besides the essential principles of the species; so that its signification is only partial. On the other hand *man* signifies the essential principles of the species, without excluding the principles of individuality from its signification: since man signifies one having humanity, and this does not exclude his having other things: wherefore its signification is complete, because it signifies the essential principles of the species actually, and the individualizing principles potentially. But *Socrates* signifies both actually, even as the genus includes the difference potentially, whereas the species includes it actually. From this it follows that both the very same man and the very same humanity rise again, by reason of the survival of the rational soul, and the unity of matter.

The third objection in stating that identity of being depends on continuity, is based on a false premiss. For it is evident that matter and form have one being, since matter has not actual being except through a form. In this respect, however, the rational soul differs from other forms: because the being of other forms is nothing else but their adherence to matter: for they do not transcend matter, either in being or in operation: whereas it is clear that the rational soul transcends matter in operation, since by its operation of understanding it is independent of any bodily organ: and consequently its being is not merely adherence to matter. Therefore the soul's being, which was that of the composite, remains after the dissolution of the body; and when the body is restored at the resurrection, it receives again the same being, which has remained in the soul.

The fourth objection proves nothing against the identity of those who rise again. That which is not an obstacle to man's identity in this life, is clearly no obstacle to his

identity when he rises again. Now, while a man lives, the parts of his body do not always remain the same as to matter, but only as to species: in fact, as regards matter, the parts come and go. Yet this does not prevent a man from retaining his identity from the beginning of his life to the end. Take fire for an example; as long as it continues to burn, we say that it is the same fire, because its species remains: and yet the logs have been consumed, and fresh ones have been put on. It is the same with the human body: since each single part retains its form and species during the whole of a lifetime: whereas their matter is both dissolved by the action of natural heat, and renewed by means of nourishment. Now a man remains the very same man, as to his various parts and stages of life, although the matter of his body changes from one stage to another. Accordingly, for a man to rise again identically the same as before, there is no need that he should have restored to him all the matter that was in him during his whole lifetime: but only as much as would suffice for the quantity due to him: and especially such matter as is closely connected with form and species. If there be anything lacking to a man's proper quantity, whether because he died before reaching maturity, or because he has lost a limb, the divine power will supply the deficiency. Nor will this prevent the identity of the rising body; seeing that nature too, makes additions to a child's body from extraneous sources, so that the body attains to maturity; and such an addition does not change its identity: since the child and the adult are the same man.

Hence we gather that even if some people partake of human flesh, this is no proof against identity in the resurrection; as the fifth objection argued. In fact, as we have already proved, there is no need that whatever was in man materially should rise again in him; and that if anything be lacking, it can be supplied by God's power. Accordingly, the flesh consumed will rise again in the man in whom it was first perfected by a rational soul; the second man—if he partook of other food besides human flesh—

will rise again with only such matter as he acquired from this other food, and in such quantity as is required for the proper size of his body. But if he partake of no other food, he will rise again with what he received from his parents, and the deficiency will be supplied by the omnipotence of his Creator. And if his parents also partook of none but human meat, so that this seed would also be engendered therefrom, their children will rise again with that seed, and he whose flesh was consumed will be supplied from another source. In the resurrection it will be the rule that if any matter belong to several in common, it will rise again in him to whose perfection it most intimately belonged: so that if it were in one as the radical seed from which he was generated, and in another as the result of nourishment, it will rise again in the man who was generated from it as from seed. But if it were in one as belonging to the perfection of the individual, and in another as directed to the perfection of the species, it will rise again in him to whom it belonged as a perfection of the individual. Hence the seed will rise again in the begotten and not in the begetter: and Adam's rib will rise again in Eve, and not in Adam, in whom it was as in the principle of nature. And if it be in both on the same count, it will rise again in the one to whom it first belonged.

The reply to the sixth objection is clear from what we have already said. Resurrection is natural, if we look at its final cause, in as much as it is natural for the soul to be united to the body: but its efficient cause is not natural, since it is caused by the power of God alone.

Nor should we deny that all will rise again, although all men do not believe in Christ, nor are partakers in His mysteries. The Son of God took human nature that He might restore it. Accordingly, the natural defect that is shared by all will be repaired, and the dead will rise again. But this defect will not be repaired perfectly, save in those who adhere to Christ, either by their own action in believing in Him, or at least by the sacrament of faith.

CHAPTER LXXXII

THAT MAN WILL RISE AGAIN IMMORTAL

It follows that man will so rise as not to die again.

The necessity of dying is a defect that nature has contracted from sin. Now Christ by the merits of His Passion, repaired the defects which nature contracted from sin: for as the Apostle says (Rom. v. 15), *not as the offence, so also the gift: for if by the offence of one many died: much more the grace of God, and the gift, by the grace of one man Jesus Christ, have abounded unto many.* From this we gather that Christ's merit is more efficacious in destroying death, than Adam's sin in causing it. Therefore those who rise again, being delivered from death by the merits of Christ, will not die again.

Further. That which is to endure for ever has not been destroyed. Wherefore, if after rising from the dead men are to die again, so that death will go on for ever, death was in no sense destroyed by the death of Christ. Yet it has been destroyed now indeed in its cause, as the Lord foretold by the prophet Osee (xiii. 14), *O death, I will be thy death:* and at last it will be actually destroyed, according to 1 Cor. xv. 26, *And the enemy death shall be destroyed last.* It is therefore part of the Church's faith that those who arise will not die again.

Moreover. The effect is likened to its cause. Now Christ's resurrection is the cause of the resurrection to come, as stated above.[1] But Christ so rose from the dead that He will not die again, according to Rom. vi. 9, *Christ rising from the dead, dieth now no more.* Therefore men will so rise, that they will die no more.

Again. If after rising from the dead men are to die again: either they will rise again from this latter death, or they will not. If not, their souls will remain for ever separated from their bodies; and we have proved this to be unfitting, and for this reason it is granted that they will

[1] Ch. lxxix.

rise again: otherwise if they were not to rise again after dying a second time, there would be no reason for their rising after dying the first time. On the other hand, if they rise again after this second death, either this second resurrection will be followed by yet another death, or not. If not, the same argument applies, as to their first resurrection. And if they are to die again, there will be an indefinite alternation of death and life in the subject. But this is unseemly, because God must have some definite end in raising the dead to life: while alternate death and life is a kind of succession and change which cannot be an end: for movement of its very nature cannot be an end, since all movement tends towards something else.

Further. The purpose of nature's action in this lower world tends to perpetuity; because that action is directed to generation, which aims at the perpetuation of the species: hence nature does not intend this or that individual as its last end, but the preservation of the species in the individual. It is thus with nature, because nature acts by the power of God, the fount of perpetuity: wherefore the Philosopher (2 *De Gen. et Corr.*) says that the purpose of generation is that the participation of the divine being may be perpetuated in the things generated. Much more therefore does the action of God himself tend to something perpetual. Now resurrection is not directed to the perpetuity of the species: since this might have been secured by generation. Therefore it is directed to the perpetuation of the individual. But not in respect of the soul only: for the soul has this without the resurrection. Therefore in respect of the composite; and consequently man will live for ever after the resurrection.

Again. If we compare the soul and body from the point of view of a man's first generation on the one hand and of his resurrection on the other, we shall find a different order between them. In man's first generation, the creation of the soul follows the generation of the body: for at first the matter is prepared, by the power of the disconnected seed, and then God creates and infuses the soul: whereas in the

resurrection the body will be united to the pre-existing soul. Now the first life, which man obtains by generation, follows the condition of the mortal body, in that death puts an end to it. Therefore the life which he obtains by the resurrection will be everlasting, in accordance with the condition of the immortal soul.

Again. If there be an indefinite succession of life and death in the same man, this alternating life and death will form a kind of circle. Now, in things subject to generation and corruption, every circle originates from the first circle of incorruptible bodies: for the first circle is composed of local movement, and this is communicated thence by way of imitation to other kinds of movement. Consequently the alternation of death and life would be caused by a heavenly body: but this is impossible, since the restoration of life to a dead body is beyond the scope of nature's action. Hence we cannot admit this alternation of death and life, nor consequently that bodies will die after rising from the dead.

Further. Whatsoever things succeed one another in the same subject, last for a certain time: and all such things are subject to the heavens' movement, of which time is a result. But the separated soul is not subject to the movement of the heavens, because it is above all corporeal nature. Consequently its alternate separation from and union with the body is not subject to the heavens' movement. Therefore there is no such rotation of alternate death and life, as would result if those who rise from death were to die again. Therefore they will rise to die no more. Hence it is said (Isa. xxv. 8): The Lord *shall cast death down headlong for ever;* and (Apoc. xxi. 4): *Death shall be no more.*

Hereby we reject the error of certain heathens of old, who held that the history of times and temporal things repeats itself. For instance, just as once upon a time the philosopher Plato taught at Athens in the school known as the Academy, so during a space of countless previous centuries, at long but certain intervals, we shall find again

and again the same Plato, and the same city, and the same disciples, and we shall go on finding them during ages without number: so Augustine relates (12 *De Civ. Dei*). To this, says he (*ibid.*) some would refer the words of Ecclesiastes i. 9, 10, *What is it that hath been? The same thing that shall be. What is it that hath been done? The same that shall be done. Nothing under the sun is new: neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new: for it had already gone before it in the ages that were before us.* This however does not mean that the same identical things occur over again, but the same kind of thing, as Augustine explains (*ibid.*). Aristotle also (*De Generat.*) taught this in opposition to the foregoing view.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

THAT AFTER THE RESURRECTION THERE WILL BE NO USE OF FOOD OR VENERY

From what has been said it follows that men after rising again will have no use of venery or food. When corruptible life is no more there will be an end of those things that minister to it. Now it is evident that the use of food ministers to the corruptible life: since the reason why we partake of food is to avoid the corruption that might result from the consumption of the natural humidity. Moreover in the present life food is necessary for growth; whereas after the resurrection men will not grow, since they will rise again of the size that is due to them, as we have already stated.[1] Likewise the alliance of male with female administers to the corruptible life; for its purpose is generation, whereby that which cannot last for ever in the individual may be preserved in the species. Now we have shown[2] that the life of those who rise again will be everlasting. Therefore after the resurrection there will be no use for food or venery.

[1] Ch. lxxxi. [2] Ch. lxxxii.

Again. The life of those who will have risen again will not be less orderly than the present life: in fact, it will be more so, since they will obtain that life through the agency of God alone, whereas the present life is acquired through the co-operation of nature. Now in this life food is consumed for a certain purpose, namely that it may be transformed into the body by the process of digestion. Wherefore, if then there will be a use for food, it will be that it may be transformed into the body. Since then the body will suffer no dissolution, because it will be incorruptible, we shall have to admit that whatever a man will derive from nourishment will add to his size: and seeing that, as we have shown above,[1] he will rise again in the size due to him, it follows that he will become of immoderate size: for that which is more than due is immoderate.

Further. Man after rising again will live for ever. Either then he will continue always to take food, or only for a certain time. If he continue always to take food, his growth will be according to a certain measure, since his food will have been transformed into his body, in which nothing will be dissolved: and consequently his body will grow indefinitely. But this is impossible, because growth is a natural movement: and a natural motive force never aims at the indefinite, but always at something definite. The reason is that as Aristotle says (2 *De Anima*, text. xli.). *there is a limit to the size and increase of all things in nature*. On the other hand if man who is to live for ever is not always to partake of food after the resurrection, there will be a time during which he will not partake of it: and so should he have done from the beginning. Therefore there will be no use for food after the resurrection.

And if he will have no use for food, neither will he have any use for venery, which requires emission of seed. Now after the resurrection there can be no emission of seed: neither from the substance of a man's body, since this is incompatible with the nature of seed: for it would involve corruption and a subtraction from man's nature, so that it

[1] Ch. lxxxi.

could not be a principle of nature, as the Philosopher says (1 *De Gener. Anim.*, xviii.). Another reason is because no resolution will be possible in the incorruptible bodies of those who rise again. Nor will it be possible for the seed to be the product of the surplus nourishment, since after the resurrection man will not partake of food, as we have shown. Therefore man will have no use for venery after the resurrection.

Again. The use of venery aims at generation. Consequently, if it be used after the resurrection, and to some purpose, it follows that men will be begotten then, even as now. Hence, there will be many, after the resurrection, who were not in existence before. And thus there will be no use in deferring the resurrection of the dead, that all who have the same nature may receive life together.

Moreover. If, after the resurrection, men will be begotten, either they too will die, or they will be incorruptible and immortal.—If they are to be incorruptible and immortal, many difficulties will result. In the first place, we shall have to say that those men will be born without original sin, seeing that the necessity of dying is the punishment resulting from original sin. And this is against the statement of the Apostle (Rom. v. 12) that *by one man, sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men.* Secondly, it follows that not all men need to be redeemed by Christ, if some are to be born without original sin and the necessity of dying. Thus Christ would not be the head of all; and this is contrary to the statement of the Apostle (1 Cor. xv. 22) that *as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive.* There is also yet another incongruity, in that men having like generation should have different terms of generation: since men begotten of seed now acquire a corruptible life, whereas then they will acquire an immortal life.—On the other hand if the men to be born then, are to be corruptible and die:—either they will not rise again, and, in consequence, their souls will remain for ever separated from their bodies: and this is unreasonable, seeing that they are of the same species

as the souls of those who rise again :—or they will rise again, and then the others should wait for them, so that all who share in the same nature may, at the same time, receive the benefit of resurrection, which belongs to the reparation of nature, as stated above.[1] Moreover there would, seemingly, be no reason for some to wait until they rise together, if all do not wait alike.

Moreover. If after the resurrection men are to have sexual intercourse and beget, this will either be for always, or only for a time. If it is to go on for ever, men will increase in numbers indefinitely. Now after the resurrection the intention of nature in the begetter can be for no other end but the increase in numbers : for it cannot be for the preservation of the species by means of generation, seeing that man's life will be incorruptible. Consequently the intention of nature in the begetter will be for something indefinite : and this is impossible. On the other hand if they are not to go on for ever begetting, but only for a certain time ; then after that time they will no longer beget : and so we ought to say that neither will they from the beginning have sexual intercourse and beget.

Someone, however, might say that there will be use for food and sexual intercourse, not for the preservation and increase of the body, nor for the preservation of the species and the increase of mankind, but merely for the pleasure accompanying those acts, lest in the final reward something should be lacking to man's enjoyment.

But there are many ways of showing that such a statement is devoid of reason :—First, because, as we have already observed, life after the resurrection will be better ordered than the present life, as stated above. Now, in this life it is inordinate and sinful to make use of food or venery for mere pleasure, and not for the purpose of supporting the body, and begetting children. And there is reason in this : since the pleasure attaching to these actions is not their end ; but contrariwise, nature has made them pleasant, lest man should not take the trouble to perform acts that

[1] Ch. lxxxi.

are necessary to nature; and that might happen unless the pleasure urged him. Consequently to do these things with the sole object of pleasure is altogether out of order and unbecoming. Therefore this cannot be said of those who will rise again, whose life will be most orderly.

Again. The life of those who rise again will have perfect beatitude for its object: and man's perfect happiness does not consist in pleasures of the body, such as those that are derived from food and sexual intercourse, as we proved.[1] Therefore we must not ascribe such pleasures to life after the resurrection.

Moreover. Acts of virtue are directed to happiness as their end. Therefore, if the state of future bliss includes the pleasures of the table and sexual intercourse, as pertaining to happiness, it would follow that those who act virtuously, must in some way include those pleasures in their intention. But this would exclude temperance, since it is inconsistent with that virtue to abstain from pleasures now, in order the more to enjoy them hereafter: every chaste man would be a rake, and every abstainer a glutton. If however the said pleasures are to be present in the state of bliss, but not as belonging thereto, so that those who act virtuously would not have to intend them; this is impossible, because whatsoever is at all, is either for the sake of something else, or for its own sake. Now the said pleasures will not be for the sake of something else, since they will not be for the sake of actions directed to nature's end, as we have already shown. Consequently they will be for their own sake. But all such things are either happiness itself, or part of it. Hence, if those pleasures are to be present in the life of those who rise again, they will form part of their happiness: and we have proved this to be impossible. Therefore in no sense will those pleasures have any place in the life to come.

Further. It seems ridiculous to seek pleasures of the body, that are common to us and dumb animals, in a place where the highest pleasures are to be found consisting in

[1] Bk. III., ch. xxvii.

the vision of God, which we shall have in common with the angels, as stated above;[1] unless someone were to say that the angels' happiness is imperfect, because they lack the pleasures of the beasts: which is equally absurd.

Hence, our Lord said (Matth. xxii. 30) that *in the resurrection they shall neither marry, nor be married, but shall be as the angels of God in heaven.*

Hereby we refute the error of the Jews and Mohammedans who say that after the resurrection men will use food and sexual intercourse, even as now. They were followed by some Christian heretics, who said that Christ would reign over an earthly kingdom, that would last for a thousand years: and that for that space of time those who have risen again will give themselves to the most immoderate pleasures in eating and drinking, to such an extent as to exceed not only all moderation, but even the bounds of credibility: but such things can enter the minds of those only who are carnally inclined. Those who are spiritual call those who believe these things χιλιασται, a Greek word which, as Augustine observes, may be rendered *Millenarians*. There are, however, a few things that would seem to support this opinion. In the first place, Adam, before he sinned, was immortal; and yet he could use food and sexual intercourse in that state, since it was before he sinned that it was said to him (Gen. i. 28): *Increase and multiply:* and again (*ibid.* ii. 16): *Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat.*

Again, after His resurrection, Christ is said to have eaten and drunk: for it is said (Luke xxiv. 43) that, *when he had eaten before them, taking the remains he gave to them.* Also, Peter said (Acts x. 40, 41): *Him,* that is Jesus, *God raised up the third day, and gave him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses pre-ordained by God, even to us, who did eat and drink with him after he arose again from the dead.*

There are, moreover, some texts which would seem to promise the use of food to men in that state. It is said

[1] Bk. III., ch. li.

(Isa. xxv. 6): *The Lord of hosts shall make unto all people in this mountain, a feast of fat things, a feast of wine, of fat things full of marrow, of wine purified from the lees.* And that this refers to the state of life after the resurrection, is clear from what follows (verse 8): *He shall cast death down headlong for ever: and the Lord God shall wipe away tears from every face.* Again, it is said (*ibid.* lxv. 13): *Behold my servants shall eat, and you shall be hungry: behold my servants shall drink, and you shall be thirsty:* and this is shown to refer to the state of the future life, by the words that follow (verse 17): *Behold I create new heavens and a new earth.*—Again, our Lord said (Matth. xxvi. 29): *I will not drink from henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I shall drink it with you new in the kingdom of my Father:* and (Luke xxii. 29, 30): *I dispose to you, as my Father hath disposed to me, a kingdom: that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom.*—Again it is said (Apoc. xxii. 2) that *on both sides of the river,* which shall be in the city of the blessed, there shall be *the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits:* and again (*ibid.* xx. 4, 5): *I saw . . . the souls of them that were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus . . . and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years.* All these texts might seem to confirm the opinion of the above-mentioned heretics: but the answer is not very difficult to find.

The objection which refers to Adam avails nothing. Adam had a certain personal perfection: but human nature was not as yet wholly perfect in point of numbers. Accordingly, Adam was created with the perfection becoming to the principle of the whole human race: wherefore it behoved him to beget, in order that mankind might increase in numbers; and consequently it was necessary also that he should partake of food. On the other hand the perfection of man, after the resurrection, will consist in human nature attaining to its full perfection, so that the number of the elect may be complete: wherefore there will be no room for begetting or partaking of nourishment. Hence the immortality and incorruption of those who rise again

will differ from the immortality and incorruption of Adam. They will be immortal and incorruptible in such a way as to be unable to die, and as to preclude any dissolution whatsoever in their bodies: whereas Adam was immortal in such a way that it was possible for him not to die, if he sinned not, and possible for him to die, if he sinned. And his immortality could be preserved in such a way, not that there would be no dissolution in his body, but that the dissolution of the natural humidity would be remedied by the use of food, lest his body should be actually corrupted.

With regard to Christ it must be said that, after His resurrection, He ate, not because He needed to, but to show the reality of His resurrection. Consequently that food was not changed into His flesh, but dissolved into prejacent matter. But there will be no such reason for eating after the general resurrection.

The texts that seem to promise the use of food after the resurrection should be understood in a spiritual sense. Holy Scripture sets before us intelligible truths under the guise of sensible objects; in order that our mind, from the things that come under its ken, may learn to love the things which are beyond its ken. Thus then the delight afforded by the contemplation of wisdom, and the acquisition of intelligible truth by our understanding, is wont to be indicated in Holy Scripture by the use of food: according to what is said of Wisdom (Prov. ix. 2, 5), *She hath mingled her wine, and set forth her table . . . and to the unwise she said: Come, eat my bread, and drink the wine which I have mingled for you:* and again (Ecclus. xv. 3), The Lord *shall feed him with the bread of life and understanding, and give him the water of wholesome wisdom to drink.* Again it is said of Wisdom (Prov. iii. 18): *She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her: and he that shall retain her is blessed.* Therefore these texts do not prove that those who rise again will partake of food.

The words of our Lord, quoted from Matth. xxvi., can be understood in another sense to the one suggested, so as to refer to His eating and drinking with His disciples, after

the resurrection, a new wine indeed, that is in a new way, namely not because He needed it, but in order to prove His resurrection : and the words, *in the kingdom of my Father* signify that in the resurrection of Christ the kingdom of immortality began to be demonstrated. The reference in the Apocalypse to the thousand years and the first resurrection of the martyrs, signifies that the first resurrection is that of souls, in rising from sins, according to the Apostle (Eph. v. 14), *Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee.* The thousand years signify the whole time of the Church, when the martyrs and other saints reign with Christ, both in the Church of the present, which is called the kingdom of God, and in the heavenly kingdom, as to their souls. For a thousand is the number that signifies perfection, because it is a cube, *i.e.*, a solid figure, and its root is ten, which also is wont to signify perfection. Accordingly, it is evident that those who rise again will have no use for meat, drink and venery.

Lastly, we may conclude that all the occupations of the active life will cease, since they appear to be directed to the use of food and sexual intercourse, and other necessities of a corruptible life. Consequently only the occupation of the contemplative life will remain in those who rise again : for which reason it was said of Mary when contemplating (Luke x. 42) that she *hath chosen the better part, which shall not be taken away from her.* Hence also it is said (Job vii. 9, 10) : *He that shall go down to hell shall not come up : nor shall he return any more into his house, neither shall his place know him any more.* In these words Job denies the resurrection such as some held, saying that after the resurrection man will return to occupations like those he has now, as for instance, the building of houses and similar avocations.

CHAPTER LXXXIV

THAT THE BODIES OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN WILL HAVE THE SAME NATURE AS BEFORE

THE preceding matter gave some an occasion for erring about the condition of those who rise again. Seeing that a body composed of contrary elements is seemingly of necessity subject to corruption, some have maintained that the bodies of those who rise again will not be composed of contrary elements. Of these, some held that our bodies will not rise again with a corporeal nature, but will be transformed into spirits: and they were induced to hold this view by the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. xv. 44), *It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body.* Others, moved by the same text, asserted that our bodies, in the resurrection, will be rarefied, like air and wind: for the air is called *spiritus,* so that the *spiritual body* would mean an air-like body. Others again said that in the resurrection our souls will resume, not earthly, but heavenly bodies: and they were brought to hold this view, by the words of the Apostle speaking of the resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 40), *And there are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial.* And all these would seem to find a support in the words of the Apostle (*ibid.* 50), *Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God:* so that, seemingly, the bodies of those who rise again will not contain flesh and blood, nor consequently any other humours. These views, however, are manifestly erroneous.

For our resurrection will be in conformity with Christ's, according to the Apostle (Philip. iii. 21), *Who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of his glory.* Now, after His resurrection, Christ had a palpable body, consisting of flesh and bone: since as it is related, He said to His disciples after the Resurrection (Luke xxiv. 39): *Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have.* Therefore other men, also, when they

rise again, will have palpable bodies, consisting of flesh and bone.

Again. The soul is united to the body as form to matter. Now every form has its definite matter, since act must be proportionate to potentiality. Since then the soul will be of the same species, seemingly it will have the same specific matter. Therefore the body will be the same specifically after the resurrection as before: so that it will consist of flesh and bone and other like parts.

Further. Since the definition of natural things, which signifies the specific essence, includes matter, it would seem to follow that a specific change of matter must involve a specific change of the natural thing. Now man is a natural thing. Accordingly if, after the resurrection, he will not have, as now, a body consisting of flesh and bone and like parts, those that rise again will not be of the same species as now, and they will be called men but equivocally.

Again. The soul of one man is more distant from a body of another species, than from the body of another man. Now the soul cannot be united to the body of another man, as we have proved.[1] Much less then can it be united, in the resurrection, to a body of another species.

Further. For a man to be the selfsame when he rises again, his essential parts must be the selfsame. If then, his body will not consist of flesh and bone when he rises from the dead, he will not be the very same man.

Job most clearly rejects all these false opinions when he says (xix. 26, 27): *I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God, whom I myself shall see . . . and not another.*

Moreover, each of the above opinions is objectionable in its own way.

It is quite impossible for a body to be transformed into a spirit. For things which are transformable into each other must have common matter: and there can be no matter common to spiritual and corporeal things, since the former

[1] Bk. II., ch. lxxxiii.

are utterly immaterial, as we have proved.[1] Therefore the human body cannot be changed into a spiritual substance.

Again. If the human body be changed into a spiritual substance, it will either be transformed into the spiritual substance of the soul, or into some other. If it be changed into the former, then after the resurrection there will be nothing in man besides his soul, even as before the resurrection: and consequently his condition will not be altered in the resurrection. And if it be transformed into another spiritual substance, it would follow that two spiritual substances would combine to form one thing in nature: and this is altogether impossible, since every spiritual substance is self-subsistent.

It is likewise impossible for the body of the man who rises again to be akin to air or wind. For the body of a man, or of any animal, must have definite configuration, both in the whole and in its parts. And a body with a definite figure must be terminable: since a figure is that which is comprised within its term or terms: whereas air is not of itself terminable, but is confined by the terms of something else. Therefore the body of a man, in the resurrection, cannot be akin to air or wind.

Further. The body of the man who rises again must have the sense of touch: since no animal is without it; and when he rises again he must needs be an animal, if he is to be a man. Now, an air-like body cannot have the sense of touch, nor indeed can any simple body, since a body that is perceptive of contact needs to be in the mean of tangible qualities, so as to be in potentiality to them, as the Philosopher states (2 *De Anima*, text. ci.). Therefore the body of a man who rises again cannot be akin to air or wind.

Hence neither can it be a celestial body. For the body of a man or of any animal, must be susceptible to tangible qualities, as we have just stated. Now this is incompatible with a celestial body, which is neither hot, nor cold, nor damp, nor dry, nor anything else of the kind, either

[1] Bk. II., chs. xlix., l.

actually or potentially, as is proved in 1 *De Cœlo*. Therefore man's body, in the resurrection, will not be a celestial body.

Again. The celestial bodies are incorruptible, and consequently cannot be changed from their natural disposition : and they are naturally spherical in figure (1 *De Cœlo et Mundo*). Therefore they cannot be given the figure which is naturally due to the human body. Consequently the bodies of those who rise again cannot possibly have the nature of celestial bodies.

CHAPTER LXXXV

THAT THE BODIES OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN WILL HAVE A DIFFERENT DISPOSITION FROM THAT WHICH THEY HAD BEFORE

ALTHOUGH the bodies of those who rise again will be of the same species as our bodies are now, they will be of a different disposition. In the first place in the resurrection the bodies of all men, both good and wicked, will be incorruptible. There are three reasons for this.

The first is taken from the end of the resurrection. Both good and bad will rise again, in order that they may, in their own bodies, receive the reward or punishment due to the works they performed while yet they lived in the body. Now the reward of the good, namely beatitude, will be everlasting : likewise eternal punishment is due to mortal sin. Both these points have been proved.[1] Therefore, in both cases, must they receive an incorruptible body.

Another reason may be found in the formal cause of those who rise again, namely the soul. We have already said[2] that the soul will resume its body at the resurrection, lest it should remain for ever separated from it. Since then the body is restored to the soul for the sake of the soul's perfection, it is becoming that the body should be disposed in a manner suitable to the soul. Hence, seeing that the

[1] Bk. III., ch. cxliv. [2] Ch. lxxix.

soul is incorruptible, an incorruptible body will be restored to it.

The third reason may be taken from the active cause of the resurrection. God will restore to life bodies already corrupt, wherefore a fortiori will he be able to preserve for ever the life which he will restore to those bodies. Thus, when he so willed, he guarded from corruption even corruptible bodies, for example the bodies of the three children in the fiery furnace.

Accordingly, the incorruptibility of the life to come is to be understood in the sense that the body which is now corruptible will, by divine power, be made incorruptible, in that the soul in giving life to the body will exercise perfect dominion over it, nor will anything be able to hinder the soul in this life-giving effect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 53): *This corruptible must put on incorruption: and this mortal must put on immortality.* Consequently man will rise immortal, not through resuming another and an incorruptible body, as the aforesaid opinions maintained, but because that which is corruptible now will be rendered incorruptible. Wherefore we are to understand the saying of the Apostle (*ibid.* 50), *Flesh and blood cannot possess the Kingdom of God,* in the sense that in the life after the resurrection there will be no corruption of flesh and blood, but that these things will remain in substance: wherefore he adds, *Neither shall corruption possess incorruption.*

CHAPTER LXXXVI

THE QUALITY OF GLORIFIED BODIES

Although, by the merits of Christ, the defect of nature will be taken away from all, both good and bad, in the resurrection, there will still be a difference between good and bad, as regards things that belong to them personally. Now it pertains to nature that the human soul is the body's

form, quickening and preserving it in being: but it is by personal deeds that the soul merits to be raised to the glory of the beatific vision, or to be excluded from this glory on account of sin. Accordingly, the bodies of all without exception will be disposed in a manner becoming the soul, so that the incorruptible form will impart its incorruptible being to the body, notwithstanding the latter's formation from contrary elements; because by the divine power the matter of the human body will be altogether subject to the soul in that respect: besides which, on account of the glory and power of the soul, when raised to the vision of God, the body united to it will acquire something more. For the divine power will have the effect of making the body wholly subject to the soul, not only in its being, but also in its actions, and passions, and movements, and bodily qualities.

Accordingly, just as the soul that enjoys the sight of God will be filled with spiritual brightness, so by a kind of overflow from the soul to the body, the latter will be, in its own way, clothed with the brightness of glory. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 18): *It is sown*, namely the body, *in dishonour, it shall rise in glory:* because now this body of ours is impervious to light, whereas then it will be full of light, according to Matth. xiii. 43, *Then shall the just shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father.*

Again, the soul which, united to its last end, will enjoy the sight of God, will find its every desire fulfilled: and since the body moves in obedience to the soul's desire, the result will be that the body's movements will be in perfect obedience to the spirit. Hence the bodies of the blessed, after the resurrection, will be agile: and this is indicated by the Apostle (1 Cor. xv. 43): *It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power.* For we feel the body's weakness, when we find it unable to satisfy the soul's desire, in the movements and actions commanded by the soul. This weakness will then be wholly removed, because the body will receive an overflow of power from the soul united to God: wherefore again is it said of the just (Wis. iii. 7) that they *shall*

run to and fro, like sparks among the reeds. Their movements, however, will not be occasioned by need, since those who possess God need nothing, but they will be exhibitions of power.

Moreover, just as the soul that enjoys God will have its desire fulfilled, through having obtained possession of all good, so also will its desire be fulfilled as to the removal of all evil, since there can be no evil where the sovereign good is. Accordingly, the body that is perfected by that soul will, in conformity with it, be free from all evil, both in act and in potentiality. In act, since in it there will be neither corruption, nor deformity, nor defect of any kind: in potentiality, because nothing will be able to do it any harm; so that it will be impassible. This impassibility, however, does not imply insensibility: for they will use their senses for such pleasures as are not incompatible with a state of incorruption. The Apostle indicates this state of impassibility, when he says (1 Cor. xv. 42): *It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption.*

Again. The soul that enjoys God will adhere to Him most completely, and will participate in His goodness in the highest degree possible that is consistent with its mode of being. Wherefore both the body will be perfectly subject to the soul, and it will share in the soul's properties, as far as possible, in acuteness of sense, in the orderliness of the bodily appetite, and in the superlative perfection of its nature. For a thing is so much the more perfect in nature, as its matter is more completely subject to its form. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 44): *It is sown a natural (animal) body; it shall rise a spiritual body.* In the resurrection, the body will be spiritual, not that it will be a spirit, as some wrongly understood (whether *spirit* mean a spiritual substance, or air or wind), but because it will be completely subject to the spirit. Even so, we speak of the *animal body,* not that it is an animal, but because it is subject to animal passions, and needs food.

From the foregoing it follows that just as man's soul will be raised to the glory of the heavenly spirits, by seeing

God in His essence, as above stated,[1] so will his body be uplifted to the properties of the heavenly bodies, in brightness, impassibility, easy and unwearying movement, and in being perfected by its most perfect form. This is what the Apostle meant when he said that man will rise again with a celestial body, celestial indeed not in nature, but in glory. Hence, after saying that *there are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial,* he adds that *one is the glory of the celestial, and another the glory of the terrestrial* (1 Cor. xv. 40). And just as the glory to which the human soul is uplifted surpasses the natural power of the heavenly spirits, as we have proved,[2] so does the glory of risen bodies surpass the natural perfection of heavenly bodies in greater brightness, more changeless impassibility, and more perfect agility and dignity of nature.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THE PLACE OF THE GLORIFIED BODIES

SINCE a place should be proportionate to that which is in it, it follows that, as the bodies of those who rise again acquire the properties of heavenly bodies, they have a place in heaven also, or rather above all the heavens, in order that they may be together with Christ, by whose power they will be brought to that glory; and of whom the Apostle says (Eph. iv. 10) that *he ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things.*

It seems stupid to argue against this divine promise, from the natural position of the elements, as though it were impossible for the human body to be raised above the lighter elements, in that it is made of earth, and by nature should occupy the lowest place. For it is evident that, owing to the soul's power, the body, perfected by the soul, does not follow the inclinations of the elements. Even in this life the soul, by its power, holds the body to-

[1] Bk. III., ch. li. [2] Bk. III., ch. liii.

gether, lest it be dissolved through being composed of contrary elements: and again by the motive power of the soul, the body is moved upwards, and so much the more as the motive power is stronger. Now it is evident that the soul's power will be perfect, when it is united by vision to God. Therefore it should not seem difficult for the body, by the power of the soul, to be preserved from all corruption, and to be raised above all other bodies. Nor is this divine promise proved to be impossible by the fact that the heavenly bodies are unbreakable,[1] and prevent the glorified bodies from being raised above them; because the divine power will enable the glorified body to be in the same place as a heavenly body. We have already an indication of this in Christ's body which came in to the disciples, the doors being closed.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

THE SEX AND AGE OF THOSE WHO WILL RISE AGAIN

We must not deem, however, as some have done, that the female sex will be lacking in the bodies of those who rise again. Since defects of nature are to be repaired in the resurrection, the bodies of those who will rise from the dead will lack none of the things that belong to the perfection of nature. Now, just as other members of the body belong to the integrity of the human body, so do those that serve the purpose of generation, both in man and in woman. Therefore bodies will rise again with these members.

Nor is this obviated by the fact that there will be no use for these members, as we have proved:[2] for if that were a sufficient reason for dispensing with those members, the members that are used for taking nourishment would equally be absent in those who will rise again, since neither will there be any use for food after the resurrection: and

[1] According to the physical system in vogue at the time of St Thomas the heavenly bodies or spheres were solid.

[2] Ch. lxxxiii.

thus a considerable number of members would be lacking in the bodies of those who will rise from the dead.

Wherefore none of those members will be lacking, although they will not have their use; yet not without purpose, since they will serve to restore the integrity of the human body. Nor does the weakness of the female sex prejudice the perfection of those who will rise again, because that is not a weakness in default of nature, but intended by nature. Moreover this very distinction in nature by extending to all things, will serve as a proof of nature's perfection, and as an indication of divine wisdom disposing all things in order.

Nor need we be moved to think otherwise, by the words of the Apostle (Eph. iv. 13), *Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of age of the fulness of Christ.* This does not mean that at this meeting, when those who will rise from the dead shall go into the air, to meet Christ, each one will belong to the male sex; but is intended to indicate the perfection and power of the Church. The whole Church will be like *a perfect man* going forth to meet Christ, as is clear from what we have been saying, and from what we have yet to say.

All will rise again at the age of Christ, which is the age of youth, because it is only at that age that nature is perfect: for the child has not yet grown so as to have reached the perfection of nature, and old age has overpassed it through decay.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THE QUALITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION AS REGARDS THE DAMNED

We have now sufficient to go on, to realize what will be in the resurrection the condition of the bodies of the damned. For those bodies will needs be proportionate to the souls of those about to be condemned. Now the souls

of the wicked have a good nature, since it was created by God; but their will is disordered, and turned away from its proper end. Wherefore their bodies, in whatever belongs to their nature, will be restored to integrity, since they will rise again of a perfect age, without any diminution of members, and without any defect or corruption, occasioned by the erring or weakness of nature. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 52): *The dead shall rise again incorruptible,* which evidently refers to all, both good and wicked, as the context shows. Since however their souls will be, as to the will, turned away from God and deprived of their proper end, their bodies will not be spiritual, and altogether subject to the spirit, but will be carnal in their affections. Nor will their bodies be agile, as obeying the soul without difficulty, but will be heavy and unwieldy: and, in a way, they will be insupportable to their souls, even as their souls will be averted from God by disobedience. They will also remain passible as now, or even more so; and yet while being afflicted by sensible things, they will not be corrupted, even as their souls will be tormented by the utterly frustrated desire for happiness. Moreover their bodies will be impervious to light, and darksome; even as their souls will be strangers to the light of divine knowledge. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 51): *We shall all indeed rise again; but we shall not all be changed:* because the good alone will be changed unto glory; whereas the bodies of the wicked will rise again without glory.

Someone might deem it impossible for the bodies of the wicked to be passible without being also corruptible: since *excess of passion causes loss of substance:*[1] thus if a body remain long in the fire, it is at length consumed; and if pain be too intense, the soul quits the body.

But all this postulates the changeableness of matter from one form to another: whereas, after the resurrection, the human body both of good and wicked will not be changeable from one form to another, since in both cases it will

[1] Aristotle, *Topic.* vi.

be completely perfected in its natural being by the soul. Wherefore it will no longer be possible for this form to be removed from this body, and for another form to take its place, because the divine power will completely subject the body to the soul. Hence the potentiality of primal matter to all forms will remain in the human body, restrained, as it were, by the power of the soul from the possibility of being actuated by another form. Since however the bodies of the damned in respect of certain conditions, will not be wholly subject to their souls, they will suffer pain from the antagonism of sensible objects: for they will suffer from the material fire, in as much as the quality of fire, by reason of its predominance, counteracts the equilibrium of the humours and the mutual adjustment that are connatural to the senses, although it cannot destroy them altogether. And yet this pain will be unable to separate the soul from the body, because the body is under the necessity of remaining for ever under the same form.

Moreover, just as the bodies of the blessed, through being renewed unto glory, will be raised above the heavenly bodies, so in due proportion, the bodies of the damned will be consigned to the nether regions, a place of darkness and torment. Hence it is said (Ps. liv. 16): *Let death come upon them, and let them go down alive into hell:* and (Apoc. xx. 9, 10): *The devil who seduced them, was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beast and the false prophet shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever.*

CHAPTER XC

HOW INCORPOREAL SUBSTANCES CAN SUFFER FROM A MATERIAL FIRE

A doubt may arise as to how the devil, who is incorporeal, and, before the resurrection, the souls of the damned, can suffer from the material fire, which, according to our Lord's words (Matth. xxv. 41), will torment the souls of the damned

in hell. For He said: *Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels.*

We must not think that incorporeal substances can be affected by a material fire, so that their nature be corrupted or altered, or in any way changed by the fire, in the same way as our corruptible bodies are affected by fire. For incorporeal substances have not a material nature, so as to be able to be changed by material substances. Nor are they receptive of the forms of sensible objects, except by understanding them: and such a reception is not penal, but perfecting and pleasure-giving. Nor can it be said that they suffer from the material fire, by reason of a certain antagonism, as bodies will after the resurrection: since incorporeal substances have no organs of sense, and have no use for sensitive powers. Accordingly, incorporeal substances suffer from the material fire by being coupled with it in some way. For a spirit can be coupled with a body either as its form;—thus the soul is coupled with the body to give it life:—or without being its form; thus necromancers, by the power of the demons, couple spirits with apparitions and the like. A fortiori, therefore, can the divine power bind the souls of the damned to a material fire: and thus it is painful to them to know themselves to be united to the lowest things as a punishment.

Moreover it is reasonable that the souls of the damned be punished with material pain.

Every sin of the rational creature results from disobedience to God. Now the punishment should correspond with the fault, so that the will may receive a punishment in contrast with that for love of which it sinned. Therefore it is reasonable that the rational nature should be punished for its sin, by being in a way bound to things beneath it, and thus made subject to them.

Again. Sin that is committed against God, deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the pain of sense, as we have proved.[1] For the pain of sense corresponds to sin with

[1] Bk. III., ch. cxlv.

respect to the inordinate conversion to a mutable good, even as the pain of loss corresponds to sin, as regards the aversion from the immutable good. Now the rational creature, and especially the human soul, sins by turning inordinately to material things. Therefore it is fitting for it to be punished by means of material things.

Further. If sin deserves the painful punishment which is called the pain of sense, as proved above,[1] this punishment must come from something that can cause pain. Now nothing causes pain except in so far as it is contrary to the will. And it is not contrary to the natural will of the rational creature, to be united to a spiritual substance; on the contrary it gives it pleasure and conduces to its perfection. For it is the union of like to like, and of the intelligible object to the intelligence: since every spiritual substance is, in itself, intelligible. On the other hand it is contrary to the natural will of a spiritual substance, that it be subject to a body, from which, according to the order of its nature, it should be free. Therefore it is fitting that a spiritual substance should be punished by means of material things.

Hence it follows that, although the material things spoken of by Scripture to describe the rewards of the blessed, are to be understood in a spiritual sense, as we have stated in regard to the promise of meat and drink, nevertheless some of the corporal punishments with which Scripture threatens the sinner are to be understood in the material and strict sense. For it is not fitting for the higher nature to be rewarded by using a lower nature, but by being united to a yet higher nature: whereas it is fitting for it to be punished by being consigned to the society of things beneath it. However this does not forbid our giving a spiritual and metaphorical interpretation to certain material expressions of Scripture in reference to the punishments of the damned. For instance, it is said (Isa. lxvi. 24): *Their worm shall not die:* since by the worm we may understand the remorse of conscience, with which also the wicked will

[1] Bk. III., ch. cxlv.

be tortured: for a material worm can eat neither into a spiritual substance, nor into the bodies of the damned, which will be incorruptible. Again, *weeping and gnashing of teeth* cannot be ascribed, save metaphorically, to spiritual substances; although they can be applied in the material sense to the bodies of the damned after the resurrection. By *weeping* however we must not understand the shedding of tears, since nothing will be resolved from those bodies; but this signifies the constriction of the heart, the convulsion of the eyes and brow, which are associated with weeping.

CHAPTER XCI

THAT THE SOUL WILL RECEIVE ITS PUNISHMENT OR REWARD, AS SOON AS IT DEPARTS FROM THE BODY

FROM what we have said, it may be gathered that immediately after death, the souls of men are punished or rewarded according to their merits.

The separated soul is susceptible to pain both spiritual and bodily, as we have proved.[1] It is also clear from what was said in the Third Book[2] that it is capable of being glorified: because as soon as the soul departs from the body, it is capable of seeing God, which it could not do, so long as it was united to a corruptible body: and man's ultimate happiness, which is the reward of virtue, consists in seeing God. Now there is no reason for deferring a punishment or reward, after the moment in which the soul is capable of receiving them. Therefore, as soon as the soul departs from the body, it receives its punishment or reward, for those things which it did while yet in the body.

Again. This life is the time for merit or demerit: wherefore it is compared to military or domestic service: thus it is said (Job vii. 1): *The life of man upon earth is a warfare, and his days are like the days of a hireling.* Now reward

[1] Ch. xc. [2] Chs. li., lvii.

or punishment is due to those who have served well or ill, as soon as their service is ended: wherefore it is said (Levit. xix. 13): *The wages of him that hath been hired by thee, shall not abide with thee until the morning:* and the Lord said (Joel iii. 4): *I will very soon return you a recompense upon your own head.* Therefore the soul will receive its reward or punishment immediately after death.

Again. The order in punishment and reward should correspond to the order in fault and merit. Now merit and fault are not ascribed to the body except through the soul: since nothing is deserving of praise or blame, except in so far as it is voluntary. Consequently both reward and punishment are awarded to the body through the soul: and not to the soul on account of the body. Hence there is no reason why the punishment or reward of the soul should await its reunion with the body: indeed it would seem more fitting that the soul which was the first to be the subject of sin or merit, should be the first to be punished or rewarded.

Moreover. By the same divine providence rewards and punishments are due to the rational creature, as natural things are provided with the perfections due to them. Now natural things receive at once each one the perfection of which it is capable, unless there be an obstacle, either on the part of the recipient, or on the part of the agent. Since then the soul as soon as it departs from the body, is capable of receiving either glory or punishment: it follows that the reward of the good, and the punishment of the wicked, are not delayed until the reunion of soul and body.

We must observe, however, with regard to the good, that there may be something to prevent their souls from receiving, as soon as they are separated from the body, their ultimate reward, consisting in the vision of God. The rational creature cannot be raised to that vision, unless it be wholly purified, since that vision surpasses the entire natural faculty of the creature. Hence it is said (Wis. vii. 25) of wisdom, that *no defiled thing cometh into her,* and (Isa. xxxv. 8): *The unclean shall not pass over it.* Now the soul is defiled by sin, whereby it adheres in-

ordinately to things beneath it: and in this life it is cleansed from this defilement by Penance and the other sacraments, as stated above.[1] Sometimes, however, it happens that this cleansing is not entirely completed in this life, but the soul still owes a debt of punishment, through either neglect, or occupations, or because it has been surprised by death. Nevertheless, it does not for this reason deserve to be wholly deprived of its reward, since these things may happen without mortal sin, which alone takes away charity, to which the reward of eternal life is due, as we have stated in the Third Book.[2] Consequently, after this life, that soul will need to be cleansed before it can receive its final reward. Now this cleansing is effected by means of punishment, even as in this life the soul might have been cleansed by satisfactory punishment: otherwise the negligent would be better off than the prudent, if in the next life they were not to suffer for their sins the punishment they failed to undergo in this life. Therefore the souls of the just, who have something that could have been cleansed in this world, are debarred from receiving their reward, until they have suffered a purgatorial punishment: and this is why we hold that there is a Purgatory.

We are justified in this statement by the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. iii. 15), *If any man's work burn he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire.* This is confirmed by the universal custom of the Church in praying for the dead: since such prayers would be useless if there were no Purgatory after death. For the Church prays not for those who are already in the final term of a good or evil life, but for those who have not yet reached it.

That the soul receives its pain or punishment immediately after death, provided there be no obstacle, is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. Of the wicked it is said (Job xxi. 13): *They spend their days in wealth, and in a moment they go down to hell:* and (Luke xvi. 22): *The rich man also died; and he was buried in hell:* for

[1] Chs. lvii. *seqq.* [2] Ch. cxlvii.

hell is the place where souls are punished. The same is clear with regard to the just: thus according to Luke xxiii. 43, our Lord, while hanging on the cross, said to the thief: *This day shalt thou be with me in paradise:* and by paradise is meant the reward that is promised to the just, according to Apoc. ii. 7, *To him that overcometh, I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the paradise of my God.*

Some say however that paradise does not mean the final reward that will be in heaven, according to Matth. v. 12, *Be glad and rejoice for your reward is very great in heaven,* but an earthly reward, because paradise would seem to indicate a place on earth, on account of its being said (Gen. ii. 8) that *the Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning: wherein he placed man whom he had formed.*

Nevertheless, if we consider the words of Holy Scripture, we shall find that the final reward which is promised in heaven to the saints, is bestowed immediately after this life. For the Apostle after speaking of the final glory says (2 Cor. iv. 17, 18): *That which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly, an eternal weight of glory. While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal: but the things which are not seen are eternal:* where he evidently is speaking of the final glory which is in heaven. Then, in order to show when and how this glory is to be bestowed, he adds (*ibid.* v. 1): *For we know, if our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in heaven.* This evidently means that, the body being delivered to corruption, the soul is taken into the eternal and heavenly mansion, which is no less than the enjoyment of the Godhead, together with the angels in heaven.

And if someone choose to contradict this by maintaining that the Apostle did not say that, as soon as the body is given over to dissolution, we are to have an eternal dwelling

in heaven in reality, but only in hope, and that at length we are to have it in reality, it is clear that this is contrary to the meaning of the Apostle. For even while we live here below, we are to have a heavenly habitation, according to divine predestination, so that we have it already in hope, according to Rom. viii. 24, *For we are saved by hope.* Consequenty, there would be no purpose in his adding, *If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved,* since it would have sufficed him to say, *We know that we have a building of God,* etc. This is made clearer still by what he says further on (v. 6-8), *Knowing that while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord.* (*For we walk by faith and not by sight.*) *But we are confident, and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord.* Now there would be no use in our desiring *to be absent,* that is separated, *from the body,* unless we were to be at once *present with the Lord.* But we are not present, unless He is present to our sight: since as long as we *walk by faith* and not *by sight, we are absent from the Lord* (*ibid.*). Therefore as soon as the soul of the just man is separated from the body, it sees God; and this is final beatitude, as we have proved in the Third Book.[1] The same conclusion is proved by the words of the same Apostle (Philip. i. 23), *Having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ.* Now Christ is in heaven; and therefore the Apostle desired to go to heaven as soon as his body was dissolved.

This disposes of the error of certain Greeks who deny Purgatory and say that souls, before the resurrection of the bodies, neither ascend into heaven nor are cast into hell.

[1] Ch. xxxvii.

CHAPTER XCII

THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEATH THE SOULS OF THE JUST HAVE THEIR WILL FIXED UNCHANGEABLY ON THE GOOD

It follows from what we have said that the soul, as soon as it is separated from the body, becomes unchangeable in its will, so that it can no more be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good.

As long as the soul can be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good, it is in a state of conflict and warfare: since it needs either to be watchful in resisting evil lest it be overcome by it, or to strive to be delivered from it. As soon, however, as it is separated from the body, it will no longer be in a state of warfare or conflict, but of receiving the reward or punishment according as it has striven rightly or wrongly: for it has been proved[1] that it will receive its reward or punishment at once. Therefore the soul will no longer have a changeable will as regards good and evil.

Again. It has been proved[2] that happiness, consisting in the vision of God, is everlasting. It has also been proved[3] that eternal punishment is due to mortal sin. Now the soul cannot be happy, if its will be not right; for it ceases to be right through being turned away from its end, and it is right by enjoying its end: and it cannot be turned away from it and enjoy it at the same time. Therefore the rectitude of the will in the beatified soul must needs be everlasting, and cannot turn away from good to evil.

Further. The rational creature naturally desires to be happy. Hence it cannot desire not to be happy: and yet it can, by its will, turn from that in which true happiness consists, and then its will is perverse. The reason for this is because instead of apprehending that in which true happiness consists, as being happiness, it takes for happiness something else, to which the disordered will turns as though that thing were its end. Thus, for instance, the man who places his end in bodily pleasures, takes them to

[1] Ch. xci. [2] Bk. III., chs. lxi., lxii. [3] Bk. III., ch. cxliv.

be the best thing: and this is what is meant by happiness. On the other hand the blessed apprehend that in which true beatitude consists, as being their happiness and last end: otherwise their appetite would not rest therein, and they would not be truly happy. Therefore whosoever is in the state of heavenly bliss cannot turn his will away from that in which is true happiness. Consequently his will cannot be perverse.

Again. Whosoever has sufficient for himself seeks for nothing else. Now that in which true happiness consists is enough for each of the blessed: otherwise his desire would not be fulfilled. Therefore every one of the blessed seeks nothing that does not pertain to that in which true happiness consists. But no one has a perverse will, unless he desire something incompatible with that in which true happiness consists. Therefore the will of the blessed cannot be changed to evil.

Further. There is no sin in the will without ignorance in the intellect: for we will nothing but what is either really good or seemingly good: wherefore it is said (Prov. xiv. 22): *They err, that work evil;* and the Philosopher declares (3 *Ethic.* iii.) that *every wicked man is ignorant.* But the truly beatified soul cannot be ignorant: since, in God, it sees whatever pertains to its own perfection: and consequently by no means can it have an evil will, especially seeing that the beatific vision is always actual, as we proved in the Third Book.[1]

Moreover. Our intellect can err about conclusions, before tracing them back to first principles: but when this has been done its knowledge of the conclusion is scientific, and in such knowledge error is impossible. Now, as the principle of demonstration is in speculative matters, so is the end in matters relating to the appetite. Wherefore, as long as our will has not obtained its last end, it can be perverse, but not after it has attained to the enjoyment of the last end, which is desirable for itself, even as the first principles of demonstration are evident in themselves.

[1] Chs. lix, lx.

Again. The good, as such, is lovable: wherefore that which is apprehended as supremely good is most lovable. Now the beatified rational substance, in seeing God, apprehends him as supremely good: therefore it loves God above all things. Moreover, it is a part of love that those who love each other should be of one will. Therefore the will of the blessed is perfectly conformed to God, since the divine will is the supreme rule of all wills: and consequently the will of those who see God cannot be perverse.

Further. As long as a thing can acquire something else it has not reached its final end. Wherefore, if a beatified soul can be changed from good to evil, it has not reached its ultimate end: and this is inconsistent with beatitude. Consequently the soul that is beatified immediately after death, becomes unchangeable in its will.

CHAPTER XCIII

THAT THE SOULS OF THE WICKED AFTER DEATH HAVE THEIR WILL FIXED UNCHANGEABLY ON EVIL

In like manner the souls which, immediately after death, are punished by being deprived of happiness, become unchangeable in their will.

It has been proved[1] that, for mortal sin, the soul is condemned to eternal punishment. But this punishment of the soul would not be everlasting if its will could be changed for the better: since it would be unjust if its punishment continued after its will is good. Therefore the will of a lost soul cannot turn towards the good.

Further. The very disorder of the will is a punishment, and is most painful: since when a man has a disordered will, good deeds are displeasing to him: and the damned will be distressed to see in all things the fulfilment of God's will, which by sinning they had resisted. Therefore they will never lose their disordered will.

[1] Bk. III., ch. cxliv.

Again. The will does not turn from sin to goodness except by God's grace, as we have proved.[1] Now, whereas the souls of the just are admitted to perfect participation in the divine goodness, the souls of the damned are utterly excluded from grace. Therefore the lost souls are unable to change their will for the better.

Again. Whereas the just, whilst in the flesh, look to God as the end of all their deeds and desires, the wicked look to an unlawful end which turns them away from God. Now the separated souls of the just will adhere unchangeably to God as the end to which they looked in this life. Therefore the souls of the wicked will adhere unchangeably to the end which they have chosen for themselves. Hence, as the will of the just will be unchangeable to evil, so the will of the wicked will be unchangeable to the good.

CHAPTER XCIV

THE UNCHANGEABLENESS OF WILL OF THE SOULS IN PURGATORY

However, some souls do not attain beatitude as soon as they depart, and yet are not damned. Such are those who depart with something that needs to be cleansed, as stated above.[2] We must prove then that neither do these souls admit of a change in their will, after they have been separated from the body.

We have shown[3] that both blessed and damned have an unchangeable will, as regards the end to which they adhered. Now the souls that finally depart with something that needs to be cleansed, differ not from the souls of the blessed, in that they depart in charity, whereby we adhere to God as our end. Therefore they also have an unchangeable will.

[1] Bk. III., chs. clv., clvii. [2] Ch. xci. [3] Ch. xciii.

CHAPTER XCV

THE COMMON CAUSE OF THIS UNCHANGEABLENESS IN ALL SOULS AFTER THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THE BODY

THIS unchangeableness of the will in all souls after their departure from the body is to be traced to the end as its cause.

This may be proved as follows. As already stated[1] the end is, in matters of appetite, what the first principles of demonstration are in speculative matters. These principles are known naturally, and any error that may occur about such principles must be traced to some corruption in nature. Hence a man who understands these principles aright cannot come to understand them wrongly, or *vice versa*, unless his nature be changed. For one who errs about those principles cannot be set right by more certain principles as would be possible if he erred about some conclusion. Nor is it possible for one who grasps these principles aright, to be led astray by anything more certain. The same applies to the end: since everyone naturally desires the ultimate end; and in consequence the rational nature desires happiness in general. But that it desire this or that thing as happiness and its last end, depends on some special condition of nature; hence the Philosopher says (1 *Ethic.* viii.) that *such as a man is, such does he deem his end to be*. Accordingly if this disposition which makes a man desire a certain thing as his last end, cannot be removed from him, his will cannot be changed from its desire for that end. Now these dispositions can be removed from us so long as the soul is united to the body. The desire for something as our last end, is occasioned sometimes through our being disposed thereto by a passion, which is of short duration: wherefore our desire for that end is easily removed: and this is especially evident in contingent matters. And sometimes we are disposed to desire something as an end, good or evil, by a habit. But

[1] Ch. xcii.

this disposition is not easily removed: and consequently such a desire for an end has a firmer hold on us: and of this we have an example in the temperate. Nevertheless an habitual disposition can be removed in this life.

It is evident then that as long as the disposition remains that causes the desire for a certain thing as the ultimate end, the desire for that end cannot be removed; because the ultimate end is desired above all; so that one cannot be turned back from the desire for the ultimate end, by something more desirable. Now, so long as the soul is united to the body, it is in a changeable state; but not after its separation from the body. For a disposition of the soul is accidentally subject to change in accordance with some change in the body: because, since the body serves the soul in the soul's proper operations, it is natural that while the soul is in the body, it should be perfected by being moved to perfection. Hence, when it departs from the body, it will no longer be in a state of mobility towards the end, but of quiescence in the end. Consequently the will, as regards the desire for the ultimate end, will be immovable. Now the goodness or badness of the will depends entirely on the ultimate end, since whatsoever goods a man desires in relation to a good end, he desires well, and whatsoever he desires in relation to a bad end, he desires ill. Therefore the will of the separated soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from the desire for one thing to the desire for another, provided the order to the ultimate end be observed.

Hence it is evident that this immobility of the will is not inconsistent with free-will, the act of which is to choose: since we choose things that are directed to the end, but not the ultimate end itself. Therefore, just as it is not inconsistent with free-will that we desire happiness and shun unhappiness, in general, with an unchangeable will, so will it not be incompatible with free-will that the will be fixed immovably on a particular object as its last end. For, just as now our common nature adheres to us unchangeably, whereby we desire happiness in general, so too that

special disposition whereby we desire this or that as our last end, will remain in us unchangeably. Now the separate substances, that is the angels, as regards the nature wherein they were created, are nearer to ultimate perfection than souls: because they do not need to gain knowledge through senses, nor to reach conclusions by arguing from principles as souls do; but reach the contemplation of truth at once through the ideas implanted in them. Consequently, as soon as they adhere to an end, due or undue, they abide therein immovably.

It must not be imagined that the soul ceases to have an immovable will, after being reunited to the body. On the contrary, it will remain thus, because as we have already said,[1] at the resurrection, the body will be disposed according to the exigencies of the soul, and the soul will not be influenced by the body, but will remain unchangeable.

CHAPTER XCVI

THE LAST JUDGEMENT

We gather from what has been said that a twofold award is assigned to men's deeds in this life: one with respect to the soul is received as soon as the soul departs from the body: the other will be when the soul returns to the body, and some will return to an impassible and glorious body, some to a passible and base body.

The first award is made to each one separately, in as much as each one dies separately; but the second award will be made to all at the same time, in as much as all will rise together. Now there must needs be a judgement whenever different awards are made according to difference of merits. Consequently there must be a twofold judgement: one in which each soul receives separately its reward or punishment; while the other is a general judgement, when all at the same time will receive as to soul and body, the

[1] Ch. lxxxvi.

award due to their merits. And since Christ in His human nature, by His Passion and Resurrection, merited for us resurrection and eternal life, it is fitting that He should preside at this general judgement, in which those who have risen from the dead will be rewarded or punished: hence it is said of Him (Jo. v. 27): *He hath given him power to do the judgement, because he is the Son of man.* Now the judgement should be in keeping with the things that are judged. And, seeing that the last judgement will refer to the rewards and punishments due to visible bodies, it is fitting for that judgement to be carried out visibly. Wherefore Christ will judge in His human form, which all will be able to see, both good and wicked: whereas the sight of His divinity is beatific, as we have proved:[1] so that thus He can be seen by the good alone. On the other hand, the judgement of souls, since it is about things invisible, will be enacted invisibly.

Moreover although Christ, at the last judgement, will exercise the authority of judge, others nevertheless will judge with Him as assessors: and these will be those who were most closely united to Him, namely the Apostles, to whom it was said (Matth. xix. 28): *You, who have followed me . . . shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel:* which promise extends to those who follow in the footsteps of the Apostles.

CHAPTER XCVII

THE STATE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGEMENT

After the last judgement has taken place, human nature will have reached its term. But, since all corporeal things were made for man, as we have shown,[2] it will be fitting that the state of all corporeal creatures should be changed, so as to be in conformity with the state of men, as they will be then. And, seeing that men will then be incor-

[1] Bk. III., ch. li.

[2] Bk. III., ch. lxxxi.

ruptible, all corporeal creatures will cease to be in the state of generation and corruption. This is indicated by the Apostle (Rom. viii. 21): *The creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.* Now since generation and corruption in the lower bodies is caused by the movement of the heavens, it follows that the heavens' movement must also cease, if generation and corruption in the lower bodies is to come to an end: whence it is said (Apoc. x. 6): *Time shall be no longer.* Nor ought it to be deemed impossible for the heavens' movement to cease. This movement, in fact, is natural, not as proceeding from an interior active principle, like the movement of heavy and light bodies; but because the heavens have, by nature, an aptitude for such a movement: while the principle of that movement is our intellect, as we have proved.[1] Hence the heavens are moved like things moved by the will: and the will moves for the sake of an end. Now the end of the heavens' movement is not that they be moved: for, since movement always tends to something else, it cannot be a last end. Nor can it be said that the end of the heavens' movement is that it be moved from potentiality to actuality in point of its whereabouts: because such a potentiality can never wholly be reduced to actuality, since while a heavenly body is in one place, it is potentially in another: and the same applies to the potentiality of primal matter in respect of forms. Consequently, just as the end of nature in generation is not to reduce matter from potentiality to actuality, but something that results from this, namely the perpetuation of things, whereby they approach to the divine likeness, so the end of the heavens' movement is not that the heavens may be reduced from potentiality to actuality, but something resulting therefrom, namely, to be like God in causality. Now all the things subject to generation and corruption, that are caused by the heavens' movement, are, in a sense, directed to man as their end, as we have proved.[2] Therefore the movement of the heavens is chiefly for the

[1] Bk. III., ch. xxii. [2] Bk. III., ch. lxxxi.

sake of the generation of mankind: for it is especially in this that it approaches to a divine likeness in point of causality, since the form of man, namely the rational soul, is immediately created by God, as proved above.[1] Now the indefinite increase in the number of souls cannot be an end, since the indefinite is incompatible with the nature of an end. Therefore there is nothing unreasonable in saying that the movement of the heavens will cease when the number of men is complete.

Nevertheless, when the heavens cease to move, and the elements cease to generate and corrupt, their substance will remain, because God's goodness is unchangeable. For He created things that they might be: wherefore things that have an aptitude for perpetuity will remain for ever. The heavenly bodies have this aptitude both in whole and in part: whereas the elements have it in whole but not in part, since, in part, they are corruptible: and men have it in part, but not in whole; since the rational soul is incorruptible, whereas the composite is corruptible. Accordingly, those things will remain, in their substance, in that last state of the world, which in any way whatever have an aptitude for perpetuity: for God, by His power, will supply what is lacking to them through their own infirmity. Other things, animals, plants and mixed bodies, which are entirely corruptible, both in whole and in part, will nowise remain in the state of incorruption. Thus then are we to understand the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. vii. 31), *The fashion of this world passeth away*, because the present outward appearance of the world will pass away, while its substance will remain. In the same sense we are to understand the saying of Job (xv. 12), *Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not awake till the heavens be broken*, that is, until the present disposition of the heavens ceases, whereby the heavens move and cause movement in other things.

Moreover, since of all the elements fire is the most active, and the most destructive of corruptible things, the destruc-

[1] Bk. II., ch. lxxxvii.

tion of those things which will not remain in the future state, will be fittingly brought about by fire. Wherefore it is of faith that the world will be finally cleansed by fire, not only from corruptible bodies, but even from the contamination which this world has contracted through being the abode of sinners. Thus it is said (2 Pet. iii. 7): *The heavens and the earth, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgement:* where by the heavens, we are to understand, not the firmament wherein are the stars, whether fixed or planets, but the atmosphere contiguous to the earth.

Since then the corporeal creature is disposed of finally in a manner that is in keeping with man's state, and man himself will not only be delivered from corruption, but also clothed in glory, as we have stated;[1] it follows that even the corporeal creature will acquire a certain glory of brightness befitting its capacity. Wherefore it is said (Apoc. xxi. 1): *I saw a new heaven and a new earth:* and (Isa. lxv. 17, 18): *I create new heavens, and a new earth, and the former things shall not be in remembrance, and they shall not come upon the heart. But you shall be glad and rejoice for ever.* AMEN.

[1] Ch. lxxxvi.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.
Summa Contra Gentiles
(English Translation)

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