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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"



THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

PART II

(*SECOND PART*)

QQ. LXXX—C

(11)

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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART.

QQ. LXXX.—C.

QUESTION LXXX.

OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE.

WE must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the virtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of consideration: (1) What virtues are annexed to justice? (2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.

ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE VIRTUES ANNEXED TO JUSTICE ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are unsuitably enumerated. Tully* reckons six, viz. *religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth.* Now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above (Q. LXI., A. 4). Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice.

Obj. 2. Further, Macrobius (*Super Somn. Scip.* i. 8) reckons seven, viz. *innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity,* several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.

Obj. 3. Further, Others reckon five parts of justice, viz. *obedience* in respect of one's superiors, *discipline* with regard

* *De Invent.* ii. 53.

to inferiors, *equity* as regards equals, *fidelity* and *truthfulness* towards all; and of these *truthfulness* alone is mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.

Obj. 4. Further, The peripatetic Andronicus* reckons nine parts annexed to justice, viz. *liberality*, *kindliness*, *revenge*, *common-sense*,† *piety*, *gratitude*, *holiness*, *just exchange* and *just lawgiving*; and of all these it is evident that Tully mentions none but *revenge*. Therefore he would appear to have made an incomplete enumeration.

Obj. 5. Further, Aristotle (*Ethic.* v. 10) mentions ἐπιείκεια as being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly since justice is of one man to another, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 11). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. cxv. 12, *What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?* In this respect *religion* is annexed to justice since, according to Tully (*loc. cit.*), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or worship to *some superior nature that men call divine*. Secondly, it

* *De Affectibus.* † εὐγνωμοσύνη.

is not possible to make to one's parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* viii. 14); and thus *piety* is annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (*loc. cit.*), a man *renders service and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his country.* Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus *observance* is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (*loc. cit.*) in the *deference and honour rendered to those who excel in worth.*

A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (*Ethic.* viii. 13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed *truth*, whereby, as Tully says (*loc. cit.*), *present, past and future things are told without perversion.*—It may also be considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what he has done, —sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we have *gratitude* which *consists in recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back*, as Tully states (*loc. cit.*);—and sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed *revenge*, whereby, as Tully states (*loc. cit.*), *we resist force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defence.*

* St. Thomas read *obscurum*, and explains it as meaning *derogatory*, infra Q. CVIII., A. 2. Cicero, however, wrote *obfuturum*, i.e., *hurtful.*

There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This due is the concern of *liberality*, *affability* or *friendship*, or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in them.

Reply Obj. 1. The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice: whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.

Reply Obj. 2. Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral parts of justice, namely, *declining from evil*, to which *innocence* belongs, and *doing good*, to which the six others belong. Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, *friendship* in the external conduct and *concord* internally; two regard our relations toward superiors, namely, *piety* to parents, and *religion* to God; while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely, *condescension*, in so far as their good pleases us, and *humanity*, whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says (*Etym.* x.) that a man is said to be *humane, through having a feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one another.* In this sense *friendship* is understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in *Ethic.* iv. 6. *Friendship* may also be taken as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in *Ethic.* viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to friendship, namely, *benevolence* which is here called *affection; concord*, and *beneficence* which is here called *humanity*. These three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.

Reply Obj. 3. *Obedience* is included in observance, which Tully mentions, because both reverential honour and obedience are due to persons who excel. *Faithfulness*

whereby a man's acts agree with his words,* is contained in *truthfulness* as to the observance of one's promises: yet *truthfulness* covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on (Q. CIX., AA. 1, 3). *Discipline* is not due as a necessary duty, because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors, according to Matth. xxiv. 45, *A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family*: and for this reason it is omitted by Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity under ἐπιείκεια, or under *friendship*.

Reply Obj. 4. This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice. To particular justice belongs *justice of exchange*, which he describes as *the habit of observing equality in commutations*.—To legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes *legislative justice*, which he describes as *the science of political commutations relating to the community*. As regards things which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions *common sense* or *good judgement*,† which is our guide in suchlike matters, as stated above (Q. LI., A. 4) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that it is a *voluntary justification*, because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his judgement and not according to the written law. These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their executor.—Εὐσέβεια (piety) means *good worship* and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of *the service of God* (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that *all the virtues are sciences*):‡ and *holiness* comes to the same, as we shall state further on (Q. LXXXI., A. 8).—Εὐχαριστία (gratitude) means *good thanksgiving*, and is mentioned, as well as *revenge*, by Tully.—*Kindliness* seems to be the same as *affection* mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore

* Cicero, *De Repub.* iv., *De Offic.* i. 7.

† St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: εὐγνωμοσύνη quasi 'bona γνώμη.'

‡ Aristotle, *Ethic.* vi. 13.

Isidore says (*Etym.* x.) that *a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good, and is of gentle speech:* and Andronicus too says that *kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence. Liberality* would seem to pertain to *humanity.*

Reply Obj. 5. Ἐπιείκεια is annexed, not to particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of εὐγνωμοσύνη (common sense).

QUESTION LXXXI.

OF RELIGION.

(In Eight Articles.)

WE must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8) liberality, (9) ἐπιείκεια. Of the other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. Of legislative justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.

Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God? (2) Whether religion is a virtue? (3) Whether religion is one virtue? (4) Whether religion is a special virtue? (5) Whether religion is a theological virtue? (6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues? (7) Whether religion has any external actions? (8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGION DIRECTS MAN TO GOD ALONE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It is written (James i. 27): *Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself*

unspotted from this world. Now *to visit the fatherless and widows* indicates an order between oneself and one's neighbour, and *to keep oneself unspotted from this world* belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to God alone.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 1) that *since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons are wont to speak of religion as being exhibited to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of God.* Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.

Obj. 3. Further, Seemingly *latria* pertains to religion. Now *latria signifies servitude,* as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei* x. 1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbour, according to Gal. v. 13, *By charity of the spirit serve one another.* Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbour also.

Obj. 4. Further, Worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his neighbour, according to the saying of Cato,* *Worship thy parents.* Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbour, and not only to God.

Obj. 5. Further, All those who are in the state of grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.

On the contrary, Tully says (*Rhet.* ii. 53) that *religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine.*

I answer that, as Isidore says (*Etym.* x.), *according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from "religio," because he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again (relegit),*

* Dionysius Cato, *Breves Sententiae.*

the things which pertain to the worship of God, so that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Prov. iii. 6, *In all thy ways think on Him.*—According to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x. 3) it may also take its name from the fact that *we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect.** —Or again, religion may be derived from *religare* (*to bind together*), wherefore Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* 55): *May religion bind us to the one Almighty God.* However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.

Reply Obj. 1. Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it commands, directing them to the honour of God, because the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly *to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation* is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and *to keep oneself unspotted from this world* is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting.

Reply Obj. 2. Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, Augustine says:

* St. Augustine plays on the words *reeligere*, i.e., to choose over again, and *negligere*, to neglect or despise.

In a stricter sense religion seems to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God.

Reply Obj. 3. Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as *latria* in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion.

Reply Obj. 4. We are said to worship those whom we honour, and to cultivate* a man's memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer (*agricola*) is one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant (*incola*) is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honour is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is called Εὐσέβεια or Θεοσέβεια, as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei* x. 1).

Reply Objec. 5. Although the name *religious* may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term *contemplative* is applied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man's sake but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. iv. 14), *You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGION IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift, as stated

* In the Latin the same word *colere* stands for *worship* and *cultivate*.

above (Q. XIX., A. 9). Therefore religion is not a virtue but a gift.

Obj. 2. Further, Every virtue is a free exercise of the will, wherefore it is described as an *elective* or voluntary *habit.** Now, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3) *latria* belongs to religion, and *latria* denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, According to *Ethic.* ii. 1, aptitude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion *to offer ceremonial worship to the Godhead,*† and ceremonial matters, as stated above (I.–II., Q. XCIX., A. 3, *ad* 2; Q. CI.), do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears from what has been said above (Q. LXXX.).

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 3: I.–II. Q. LV., AA. 3, 4) *a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise,* wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine (*De Nat. Boni* iii.). Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honour to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 1, *ad* 3: I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 8).

Reply Obj. 2. Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master, and so *he makes a virtue of necessity,*‡ by

* *Ethic.* ii. 6. † Cf. A. 1. ‡ S. Jerome, Ep. liv., *ad Furiam.*

doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so voluntarily.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.

Third Article.

whether religion is one virtue?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion directs us to God, as stated above (A. 1). Now in God there are three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q. L., A. 2, *ad* 2). Therefore religion is not one virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such-like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself. Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that religion is not one virtue.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. iv. 5): *One God* (Vulg., —*Lord*), *one faith*. Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore religion is one virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LIV., A. 2, *ad* 1), habits are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect, namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of things. Wherefore He

Himself says (Malach. i. 6): *If . . . I be a father, where is My honour?* For it belongs to a father to beget and to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion is one virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. By the one same act man both serves and worships God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, either by offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.

Reply Obj. 3. The worship of religion is paid to images, not as considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither *latria* nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGION IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE, DISTINCT FROM THE OTHERS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 6): *Any action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice.* But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, The Apostle says (1 Cor. x. 31): *Do all to the glory of God.* Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence of God, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 2; A. 2). Therefore religion is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, The charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our neighbour. But according to *Ethic.* viii. 8 *to be honoured is almost to be loved.* Therefore the religion whereby we honour God is not a special virtue distinct from observance, or *dulia*, or piety whereby we honour our neighbour. Therefore religion is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the other parts.

I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the good to which religion is directed, is to give due honour to God. Again, honour is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honour due: even as in human affairs we see that different honour is due to different personal excellences, one kind of honour to a father, another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as stated above (A. 1. *ad* 1).

Reply Obj. 2. Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honour, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their specific character.

Reply Obj. 3. The object of love is the good, but the object of honour and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence the charity

whereby God is loved is not distinct from the charity whereby our neighbour is loved; whereas the religion whereby God is honoured, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honour our neighbour.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGION IS A THEOLOGICAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. Augustine says (*Enchir.* iii.) that *God is worshipped by faith, hope and charity*, which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, A theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore religion is a theological virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (I.-II., QQ. LVII., LVIII., LXII.). Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little; for one cannot worship God too much, according to Ecclus. xliii. 33, *Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise.* Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 4) religion pays due worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshipped do not reach out to God Himself, as when we

believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q. I., AA. 1, 2, 4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because we believe God.

Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshipped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.

Reply Obj. 1. The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshipped by faith, hope and charity.

Reply Obj. 2. Religion directs man to God not as its object but as its end.

Reply Obj. 3. Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say *equality*, I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability and God's acceptance.

And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other circumstance.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGION SHOULD BE PREFERRED TO THE OTHER MORAL VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 6. But religion fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, What is offered by one man to another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater need : wherefore it is written (Isa. lviii. 7) : *Deal thy bread to the hungry.* But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps. xv. 2, *I have said : Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods.* Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.

Obj. 3. Further, The greater the obligation to do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. ix. 16, *If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me : a necessity lieth upon me.* Now the more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human virtues.

On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion are given precedence (Exod. xx.) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral virtues.

I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end ; so that the nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (A. 5 : Q. IV., A. 7), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And religion approaches

nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honour of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.

Reply Obj. 2. In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.

Reply Obj. 3. Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the lustre of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.

Seventh Article.

whether religion has an external act?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is written (Jo. iv. 24): *God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth.* Now external acts pertain, not to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.

Obj. 2. Further, The end of religion is to pay God reverence and honour. Now it would savour of irreverence towards a superior, if one were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence to God.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* vi. 10) commends

Seneca for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to the true God, Who is *exalted above all gods.** Therefore it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore religion has no bodily actions.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lxxxiii. 3): *My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.* Now just as internal actions belong to the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshipped not only by internal but also by external actions.

I answer that, We pay God honour and reverence, not for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honour God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible world, since *invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,* as the Apostle says (Rom. i. 20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of God.

Reply Obj. 2. These external things are offered to God, not as though He stood in need of them, according to Ps. xlix. 13, *Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink*

* Ps. xciv. 3.

the blood of goats? but as signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 5): *The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice.*

Reply Obj. 3. Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER RELIGION IS THE SAME AS SANCTITY?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity. Religion is a special virtue, as stated above (A. 4): whereas sanctity is a general virtue, because it *makes us faithful, and fulfil our just obligations to God*, according to Andronicus.* Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.

Obj. 2. Further, Sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* xii.) that *sanctity is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity.* Now purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.

Obj. 3. Further, Things that are opposite members of a division are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above (Q. LXXX., *ad* 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke i. 74, 75): *That . . . we may serve Him . . . in holiness and justice.* Now, *to serve God* belongs to religion, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3; A. 3, *ad* 2). Therefore religion is the same as sanctity.

I answer that, The word *sanctity* seems to have two

* *De Affectibus.*

significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the Greek, for ἅγιος means *unsoiled*. In another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term *sancta* was applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred (*sancitum*) when it is ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word *sanctus* may be connected with purity, if it be resolved into *sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim's blood*, according to Isidore (*Etym.* x.). In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels and suchlike things are said to be sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Heb. xii. 14): *Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God.*—Again, firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. viii. 38, 39): *I am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me* from the love of God.*

Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but also the works of the other virtues, or according as

* Vulg.—*shall be able to separate us.*

man by means of certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God.

Reply Obj. 1. Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

Reply Obj. 2. Temperance practises purity, yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of virginity itself Augustine says (*De Virgin.* viii.) that *it is honoured not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God.*

Reply Obj. 3. Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not really but logically.

QUESTION LXXXII.

OF DEVOTION.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts; secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer. Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether devotion is a special act? (2) Whether it is an act of religion? (3) Of the cause of devotion? (4) Of its effect?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER DEVOTION IS A SPECIAL ACT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip. xxix. 31): *All the multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout mind.* Therefore devotion is not a special act.

Obj. 2. Further, No special kind of act is common to various genera of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely, corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special act.

Obj. 3. Further, Every special act belongs either to an appetitive or to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either faculty, as enumerated above

(P. I., QQ. LXXVIII. *seqq.*; I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 4). Therefore devotion is not a special act.

On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (I.-II., Q. XXI., AA. 3, 4). But devotion has a special reason for merit. Therefore devotion is a special act.

I answer that, Devotion is derived from *devote**; wherefore those persons are said to be *devout* who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject themselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (*Decad. I.* viii. 9; x. 28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it is written (Exod. xxxv. 20, 21) that *the multitude of the children of Israel . . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind.* Now it is evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of God is a special kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will.

Reply Obj. 1. The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above (I.-II., Q. IX., A. 3). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that are moved by the will.

Reply Obj. 2. Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found virtually in the movements of the things moved.

Reply Obj. 3. Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul, and is a movement of the will, as stated above.

* The Latin *devovere* means *to vow.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER DEVOTION IS AN ACT OF RELIGION?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion. Devotion, as stated above (A. 1), consists in giving oneself up to God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.) *the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved.* Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.

Obj. 2. Further, Charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of fire.* Therefore devotion is not an act of religion.

Obj. 3. Further, By religion man is directed to God alone, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1). But devotion is directed also to men; for we speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects are said to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says† that the Jews *out of devotion to the Roman laws*, said: *We have no king but Cæsar.* Therefore devotion is not an act of religion.

On the contrary, Devotion is derived from *devovere*, as stated (A. 1). But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is also an act of religion.

I answer that, It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do something, and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts have the same object. For this reason the Philosopher says (*Ethic* v. 1): *It is justice whereby men both will and do just actions.* Now it is evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God, belongs properly to religion, as stated above (Q. LXXXI.). Wherefore it belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of religion.

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs immediately to charity that

* Cant. viii. 6; Ps. lxii. 6. † *Serm.* viii., *De Pass. Dom.*

man should give himself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it belongs immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion, to charity which is the principle of religion, that man should give himself to God for certain works of Divine worship.

Reply Obj. 2. Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the process of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat thrives, as it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both causes devotion (inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's friend) and feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds.

Reply Obj. 3. Devotion to God's holy ones, dead or living, does not terminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honour God in His servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters is of another kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from the service of God.

Third Article.

Whether contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle considerations about abstract matters are often a hindrance to devotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion.

Obj. 2. Further, If contemplation were the proper and essential cause of devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged to greater devotion by considering Christ's Passion and other mysteries of His humanity than by considering the greatness of his Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.

Obj. 3. Further, If contemplation were the proper cause of devotion, it would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, are also most apt for devotion. Yet the

contrary is to be noticed, for devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the female sex, who are defective in contemplation. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xxxviii. 4): *In my meditation a fire shall flame out.* But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore meditation is the cause of devotion.

I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of Whom Ambrose, commenting on Luke ix. 55, says that *God calls whom He deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout.* But the intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or contemplation. For it was stated above (A. 1) that devotion is an act of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some consideration, since the object of the will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Trin.* ix. 12; xv. 23) that *the will arises from the intelligence.* Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives the thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration of God's goodness and loving kindness, according to Ps. lxxii. 28, *It is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God:* and this consideration wakens love* which is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that of man's own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on God, according to Ps. cxx. 1, 2, *I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth;* and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His strength.

Reply Obj. 1. The consideration of such things as are of a nature to awaken our love† of God, causes devotion; whereas

* *Dilectio,* the interior act of charity, cf. Q. XXVII.
† *Ibid.*

the consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such things is a hindrance to devotion.

Reply Obj. 2. Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the strongest incentive to love* and consequently to devotion, because God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to the ove of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words of the Preface,* *that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of things invisible.* Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead.

Reply Obj. 3. Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender himself to God. The result is that such-like things sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is increased.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER JOY IS AN EFFECT OF DEVOTION?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As stated above (A. 3, *ad* 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive to devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the soul, according to Lament. iii. 19, *Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood and the gall,* which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (*verse* 20) it is said: *I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall languish within me.* Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of devotion.

* Preface for Christmas-tide.

Obj. 2. Further, Devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. l. 19): *A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.* Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion rather than gladness or joy.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (*De Homine* xii.)* that *just as laughter proceeds from joy, so tears and groans are signs of sorrow.* But devotion makes some people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of devotion.

On the contrary, We say in the Collect†: *That we who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a holy devotion.*

I answer that, The direct and principal effect of devotion is the spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and indirect effect. For it has been stated (A. 3) that devotion is caused by a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of God's goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it were, of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and the direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps. lxxvi. 4, *I remembered God, and was delighted;* but accidentally this consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy God fully, according to Ps. xli. 3, *My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God,* and afterwards it is said (*verse* 4): *My tears have been my bread,* etc.—Secondarily devotion is caused, as stated (A. 3), by the consideration of one's own failings; for this consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in himself but subjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency to the first: for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly (when one thinks over one's own failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident that the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary and accidental effect is that *sorrow which is according to God.*‡

Reply Obj. 1. In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is something that causes sorrow, namely, the human

* *Orat. funebr. de Placilla Imp.*
† Thursday after fourth Sunday of Lent. ‡ 2 Cor. vii. 10.

defect, the removal of which made it necessary for Christ to suffer* ; and there is something that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to us in giving us such a deliverance.

Reply Obj. 2. The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is rejoiced by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of the Divine help.

Reply Obj. 3. Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one considers something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way tears arise from devotion.

* Luke xxiv. 25.

QUESTION LXXXIII.

OF PRAYER.

(In Seventeen Articles.)

WE must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen points of inquiry: (1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power? (2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God? (3) Whether prayer is an act of religion? (4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone? (5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray? (6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray? (7) Whether we ought to pray for others? (8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies? (9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer. (10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature? (11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us? (12) Whether prayer should be vocal? (13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer? (14) Whether prayer should last a long time? (15) Whether prayer is meritorious?* (16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying?† (17) Of the different kinds of prayer.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRAYER IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE POWER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is heard by God, according to Ps. ix. 38, *The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor.* Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iii.): *It is*

* Art. 16. † Art. 15.

useful to begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves to God and unite ourselves to Him. Now union with God is effected by love which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs to the appetitive power.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher states (*De Anima* iii. 6) that there are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is *the understanding of indivisibles*, by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: while the second is *synthesis and analysis*, whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be added, namely, *reasoning*, whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations. Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the appetitive power.

On the contrary, Isidore says (*Etym.* x.) that *to pray is to speak.* Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not of the appetitive, but of the intellective power.

I *answer that*, According to Cassiodorus* *prayer* (*oratio*) *is spoken reason* (*oris ratio*). Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to

* Comment. in Ps. xxxviii. 13.

command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 13) that the *reason exhorts us to do what is best.*

Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer* as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which sense Augustine† says (*De Verb. Dom.*) that *prayer is a petition*, and Damascene states (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 24) that *to pray is to ask becoming things of God.* Accordingly it is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Isaias (lxv. 24), *And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will hear.*

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (P. I., Q. LXXXII., A. 4; I.-II., Q. IX., A. 1, *ad* 3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God through being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God, according to Ps. xxvi. 4, *One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life.* Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence Dionysius says (*ibid.*) that *when we call upon*

* This last paragraph refers to the Latin word *oratio* (*prayer*) which originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from *os, oris* (*the mouth*).

† Rabanus, *De Univ.* vi. 14.

God in our prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence: and in the same sense Damascene says (*loc. cit.*) that *prayer is the raising up of the mind to God.*

Reply Obj. 3. These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by way of command or of petition, as stated above.

Second Article.

whether it is becoming to pray?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the person to whom we pray. But according to Matth. vi. 32, *Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things.* Therefore it is not becoming to pray to God.

Obj. 2. Further, By prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings xv. 29, *But the Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance.* Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.

Obj. 3. Further, It is more liberal to give to one that asks not, than to one who asks, because, according to Seneca (*De Benefic.* ii. 1), *nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers.* But God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to God.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke xviii. 1): *We ought always to pray, and not to faint.*

I answer that, Among the ancients there was a threefold error concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to worship God at all: of these it is written (Malach. iii. 14): *You have said: He laboureth in vain that serveth God.* Another opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of necessity, whether

by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these opinions were disproved in the First Part (Q. XIX., AA. 7, 8; Q. XXII., AA. 2, 4; Q. CXV., A. 6; Q. CXVI.). Wherefore it behoves us so to account for the utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part of the Divine disposition.

In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects. Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions, not that thereby they may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is it with regard to prayer. For we pray, not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers, in other words *that by asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give*, as Gregory says (*Dial.* i. 8).

Reply Obj. 1. We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to Him our needs or desires, but that we ourselves may be reminded of the necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above, our motive in praying is, not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may obtain what God has appointed.

Reply Obj. 3. God bestows many things on us out of His

liberality, even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good, namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence Chrysostom says:* *Think what happiness is granted thee, what honour bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer, when thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou desirest.*

Third Article.

whether prayer is an act of religion?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion. Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God.

Obj. 2. Further, The act of *latria* falls under a necessity of precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of religion.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems to belong to religion that one *offers worship and ceremonial rites to the Godhead.*† But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to ask to obtain something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. cxl. 2): *Let my prayer be directed as incense in Thy sight:* and a gloss on the passage says that *it was to signify this that under the old Law incense was said to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord.* Now this belongs to religion. Therefore prayer is an act of religion.

* Implicitly (*Hom.* ii. *de Orat.: Hom.* xxx. *in Genes*). Cf. *Caten. Aur.* on Luke xviii.

† Cicero, *Rhet.* ii. 53.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXI., AA. 2, 4), it belongs properly to religion to show honour to God, wherefore all those things through which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an act of religion.

Reply Obj. 1. The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, as stated above (Q. LXXXII., A. 1, *ad* 1), and therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of God. Now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion directs man's intellect to God.

Reply Obj. 2. It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Matth. vii. 7, where it is said: *Ask and ye shall receive.**

Reply Obj. 3. By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A. 1, *Obj.* 2). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether bodily members, or those external things that are employed for God's service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE OUGHT TO PRAY TO GOD ALONE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer is an act of religion, as stated above (A. 3).

* Vulg.—*Ask and it shall be given you.*

But God alone is to be worshipped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone.

Obj. 2. Further, It is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God alone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. xiv. 15), *I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding:* and again because, as Augustine says (*De Cura pro mortuis*, xiii.) the *dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children, are doing.* Therefore we ought to pray to God alone.

Obj. 3. Further, If we pray to any of the saints, this is only because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace, and yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the saints who are in Paradise.

On the contrary, It is written (Job v. 1), *Call . . . if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints.*

I answer that, Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In the first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone gives, according to Ps. lxxxiii. 12, *The Lord will give grace and glory.* But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels or men, not that God may through them know our petitions, but that our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written (Apoc. viii. 4) that *the smoke of the incense*, namely *the prayers of the saints ascended up before God.* This is also clear from the very style employed by the Church in praying: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity *to have mercy on us*, while we ask any of the saints *to pray for us.*

Reply Obj. 1. To Him alone do we offer religious worship when praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so doing we confess that He is the

Author of our goods: but not to those whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence.

Reply Obj. 2. The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (*Moral.* xii. 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, is made known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their exalted position that they should know the petitions we make to them by word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to them are known to them through Divine manifestation.

Reply Obj. 3. Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them, but ask it of the living by speaking to them.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE OUGHT TO ASK FOR SOMETHING DEFINITE WHEN WE PRAY?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 24), *to pray is to ask becoming things of God;* wherefore it is useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James iv. 3, *You ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss.* Now according to Rom. viii. 26, *we know not what we should pray for as we ought.* Therefore we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray.

Obj. 2. Further, Those who ask another person for something definite strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we ought not to endeavour to make God will what we will; on the contrary, we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps. xxxii. 1,

Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just. Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite when we pray.

Obj. 3. Further, Evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers.

On the contrary, Our Lord (Matth. vi. and Luke xi.) taught His disciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of the Lord's Prayer.

I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus,* *Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods for nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because they at any rate know what is good for each one, whereas when we pray we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain.* This opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which may have an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as *riches, by which,* as stated by the same authority (*ibid.*), *many have come to an evil end; honours, which have ruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family.* Nevertheless there are certain goods which man cannot ill use, because they cannot have an evil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it: and these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as in Ps. lxxix. 4, *Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved,* and again in Ps. cxviii. 35, *Lead me into the path of Thy commandments.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to pray for, *the Spirit,* as stated in the same passage, *helpeth our infirmity,* since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask for what is right. Hence our Lord said (Jo. iv. 24) that true adorers *must adore . . . in spirit and in truth.*

Reply Obj. 2. When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our salvation, we conform our will to God's,

* *Fact. et Dict. Memor.* vii. 2.

of Whom it is written (1 Tim. ii. 4) that *He will have all men to be saved.*

Reply Obj. 3. God so invites us to take good things, that we may approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires and devout prayers.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN OUGHT TO ASK GOD FOR TEMPORAL THINGS WHEN HE PRAYS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we should not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Matth. vi. 33): *Seek ye . . . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things shall be added unto you,* that is to say, temporal things, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in prayer.

Obj. 2. Further, No one asks save for that which he is solicitous about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things, according to the saying of Matth. vi. 25, *Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat.* Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when we pray.

Obj. 3. Further, By prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. iv. 18), *While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.* Therefore man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays.

Obj. 4. Further, Man ought not to ask of God other than good and useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense. Therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. xxx. 8): *Give me only the necessaries of life.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep.* cxxx. 12): *It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire.* Now it is lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally, by placing our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher states (*Ethic* i. 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (*ibid.* 6, 7) when he states that *it is not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no more; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for the welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a way befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping with those among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that we may keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not, that we may gain possession of them.*

Reply Obj. 1. We should seek temporal things not in the first but in the second place. Hence Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* ii. 16): *When He says that this* (i.e. the kingdom of God) *is to be sought first, He implies that the other* (i.e. temporal goods) *is to be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being our good, the other as our need.*

Reply Obj. 2. Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden, but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above (Q. LV., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 3. When our mind is intent on temporal things in order that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level.

Reply Obj. 4. From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to something else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be granted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE OUGHT TO PRAY FOR OTHERS?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In praying we ought to conform to the pattern given by Our Lord. Now in the Lord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus we say: *Give us this day our daily bread*, etc. Therefore we should not pray for others.

Obj. 2. Further, Prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of the conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one pray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on Jo. xvi. 23, *If you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you*, says (*Tract.* cii.): *Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when he prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply, 'He will give it,' but, 'He will give it you.'* Therefore it would seem that we ought not to pray for others, but only for ourselves.

Obj. 3. Further, We are forbidden to pray for others, if they are wicked, according to Jerem. vii. 16, *Therefore do not then pray for this people, . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee.* On the other hand we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are heard when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we ought not to pray for others.

On the contrary, It is written (James v. 16): *Pray one for another, that you may be saved.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 6), when we pray we ought to ask for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not only for ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the love which we owe to our neighbour, as stated above (QQ. XXV., AA. 1, 12, XXVII., A. 2, XXXI., A. 1). Therefore charity requires us to pray for others. Hence Chrysostom says (*Hom.* xiv. *in Matth.*)*: *Necessity binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray for others: and the prayer that*

* *Opus Imperfectum*, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.

fraternal charity proffers is sweeter to God than that which is the outcome of necessity.

Reply Obj. 1. As Cyprian says (*De Orat. Dom.*), *We say 'Our Father' and not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the Master of unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves alone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself bore all in one.*

Reply Obj. 2. It is a condition of prayer that one pray for oneself: not as though it were necessary in order that prayer be meritorious, but as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail in its effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to his salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle on the part of the person we are praying for, according to Jerem. xv. 1, *If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people.* And yet the prayer will be meritorious for the person who prays thus out of charity, according to Ps. xxxiv. 13, *My prayer shall be turned into my bosom*, i.e. *though it profit them not, I am not deprived of my reward*, as the gloss expounds it.

Reply Obj. 3. We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may be converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in holiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate, according to Eccles. vii. 14, *No man can correct whom* God *hath despised.* Hence it is written (1 Jo. v. 16): *He that knoweth his brother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him, who sinneth not to death.* Now just as the benefit of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he lives here below, because we cannot distinguish the predestined from the reprobate, as Augustine says (*De Correp. et Grat.* xv.), so too no man should be denied the help of prayer.

We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons:

First, because the prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss on Rom. xv. 30, *Help me in your prayers*, says: *The Apostle rightly tells the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if they be united together in one mind, become great, and it is impossible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain* that which is possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank God for the graces conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the profit of many, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. i. 11). Thirdly, that the more perfect may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they need the prayers of the less perfect.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE OUGHT TO PRAY FOR OUR ENEMIES?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies. According to Rom. xv. 4, *what things soever were written, were written for our learning*. Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations against enemies; thus it is written (Ps. vi. 11): *Let all my enemies be ashamed and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled* very speedily*. Therefore we too should pray against rather than for our enemies.

Obj. 2. Further, To be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to them. But holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apoc. vi. 10, *How long, . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that dwell on earth?* Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their enemies, according to Ps. lvii. 11, *The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge*. Therefore we should not pray for our enemies, but against them.

Obj. 3. Further, Man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer. Now sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above (Q. XL., A. 1). Therefore we should not pray for our enemies.

* Vulg.,—*Let them be turned back and be ashamed.*

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. v. 44): *Pray for them that persecute and calumniate you.*

I answer that, To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated above (A. 7). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in the same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above in the treatise on charity (Q. XXV., AA. 8, 9), how we are bound to love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not their sin; and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of precept, while to love them in individual is not a matter of precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must be prepared to love his enemy even in the individual and to help him in a case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness. But to love one's enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist them, is an act of perfection.

In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not exclude our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for others: but it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to pray for them individually, except in certain special cases.

Reply Obj. 1. The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the prophets *to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation*, as Augustine states (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i. 21). Secondly, in the sense that certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on the wicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood to be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the kingdom of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the correction of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the Divine justice with regard to the damnation of those who are obstinate in sin.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine states in the same book (i. 22), *the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom of sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned*: or as he says again (*QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test.* lxviii.), *their prayer for vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, even as the blood*

of Abel cried from the earth. They rejoice in vengeance not for its own sake, but for the sake of Divine justice.

Reply Obj. 3. It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be restrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the good of others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that temporal evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may mend their ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one another.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEVEN PETITIONS OF THE LORD'S PRAYER ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to be hallowed which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy, according to Luke i. 49, *Holy is His name.* Again, His kingdom is everlasting, according to Ps. cxliv. 13, *Thy kingdom is a kingdom of all ages.* Again, God's will is always fulfilled, according to Isa. xlvi. 10, *All My will shall be done.* Therefore it is useless to ask for *the name of God to be hallowed*, for *His kingdom to come*, and for *His will to be done.*

Obj. 2. Further, One must withdraw from evil before attaining good. Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the attainment of good to be set forth before those relating to the removal of evil.

Obj. 3. Further, One asks for a thing that it may be given to one. Now the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we receive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly assigned, since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 4. Further, According to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned in the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter. Therefore it was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven.

Obj. 5. Further, It seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of one who forestalls us by his benevolence.

Now God forestalls us by His benevolence, since *He first hath loved us* (1 Jo. iv. 19). Therefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words, *Our Father Who art in heaven*, which seem to indicate a desire to win God's benevolence.

On the contrary, The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer, suffices.

I answer that, The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as Augustine says (*ad Probam Ep.* cxxx. 12), *if we pray rightly and fittingly, we can say nothing else but what is contained in this prayer of Our Lord.* For since prayer interprets our desires, as it were, before God, then alone is it right to ask for something in our prayers when it is right that we should desire it. Now in the Lord's Prayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that this prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to the end. Now our end is God towards Whom our affections tend in two ways: first, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy His glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus: *Hallowed be Thy name*, and the second thus: *Thy kingdom come*, by which we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom.

To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very nature the good which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing is useful in two ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way, directly and principally, according to the merit whereby we merit beatitude by obeying God, and in this respect we ask: *Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven;* in another way instrumentally, and as it were helping us to merit, and in this respect we say: *Give us this day our daily bread*, whether we understand this of the sacramental Bread, the daily use of which is profitable to man, and in which all the other

sacraments are contained, or of the bread of the body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augustine says (*ad Probam, Ep.* cxxx. 11), since the Eucharist is the chief sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew we read, *supersubstantial*, i.e. *principal*, as Jerome expounds it.

We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of beatitude. First, there is sin, which directly excludes a man from the kingdom, according to 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, *Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God;* and to this refer the words, *Forgive us our trespasses.* Secondly, there is temptation which hinders us from keeping God's will, and to this we refer when we say: *And lead us not into temptation*, whereby we do not ask not to be tempted, but not to be conquered by temptation, which is to be led into temptation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which is a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we refer in the words, *Deliver us from evil.*

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* ii. 5), when we say, *Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God's name is not holy, but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing*, and this pertains to the diffusion of God's glory among men. When we say, *Thy kingdom come, we do not imply that God is not reigning now*, but *we excite in ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to us, and that we may reign therein*, as Augustine says (*ad Probam, loc. cit.*). The words, *Thy will be done* rightly signify, *'May Thy commandments be obeyed' on earth as in heaven, i.e. by men as well as by angels.** Hence these three petitions will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the other four, according to Augustine (*Enchirid.* cxv.), belong to the needs of the present life.

Reply Obj. 2. Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of desire or intention, where the end

* *De Serm. Dom. in Monte* ii. 6.

precedes the things that are directed to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* ii. 11) adapts the seven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: *If it is fear of God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that we become meek and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby blessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for thus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed are they that hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest we have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which are the occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God, let us pray to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that very fact become the free children of God.*

Reply Obj. 4. According to Augustine (*Enchir.* cxvi.), *Luke included not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by omitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it;* because, to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this—that we come to the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with Him. *Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, Deliver us from evil, is omitted by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered from evil if he be not led into temptation.*

Reply Obj. 5. Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him, but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity in our regard, whereby He wills our good—wherefore we say: *Our Father;* and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil it—wherefore we say: *Who art in heaven.*

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRAYER IS PROPER TO THE RATIONAL CREATURE?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject. But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son said (Jo. xiv. 16): *I will ask My* (Vulg.—*the*) *Father*, and the Apostle says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. viii. 26): *The Spirit . . . asketh for us.*

Obj. 2. Angels are above rational creatures, since they are intellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels, wherefore we read in the psalm (xcvi. 7): *Adore Him, all you His angels.* Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature.

Obj. 3. Further, The same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted to call upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb animals are fitted to call upon God, according to Ps. cxlvi. 9, *Who giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon Him.* Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creatures.

On the contrary, Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above (A. 1). But the rational creature is so called from his reason. Therefore prayer is proper to the rational creature.

I answer that, As stated above (*ibid.*), prayer is an act of reason, and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of reason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly prayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have reason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore prayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it is proper to the rational creature.

Reply Obj. 1. Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of their nature, whereas prayer belongs to one

who receives through grace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e. His human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated in the First Part (Q. LXXIX., A. 8), intellect and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are the angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are included under them. In this sense prayer is said to be proper to the rational creature.

Reply Obj. 3. The young ravens are said to call upon God, on account of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire to attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey God, on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN PRAY FOR US?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for us. A man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others. But the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they pray for themselves, since they are already established in the term. Neither therefore do they pray for us.

Obj. 2. Further, The saints conform their will to God perfectly, so that they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for us.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as the saints in heaven are above so are those in Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory do not pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither do the saints in heaven pray for us.

Obj. 4. Further, If the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers of the higher saints would be more efficacious; and

so we ought not to implore the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of the higher saints.

Obj. 5. Further, The soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul, to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints therefore do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Machab. xv. 14): *This is . . . he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God.*

I answer that, As Jerome says (*Cont. Vigilant.* 6), the error of Vigilantius consisted in saying that *while we live, we can pray one for another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for others can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers are granted when they pray for their blood to be avenged.* But this is absolutely false, because, since prayers offered for others proceed from charity, as stated above (AA. 7, 8), the greater the charity of the saints in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the latter can be helped by prayers: and the more closely they are united to God, the more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order is such that lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher, even as the air receives the brightness of the sun. Wherefore it is said of Christ (Heb. vii. 25): *Going to God by His own power . . . to make intercession for us.** Hence Jerome says (*Cont. Vigilant., loc. cit.*): *If the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body and having to be solicitous for themselves, can pray for others, how much more now that they have the crown of victory and triumph.*

Reply Obj. 1. The saints in heaven, since they are blessed, have no lack of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they pray. But they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and their prayers are efficacious

* Vulg.—*He is able to save for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make intercession for us.*

in impetrating through their previous merits and through God's acceptance.

Reply Obj. 2. The saints impetrate whatever God wishes to take place through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem will be granted through their prayers according to God's will.

Reply Obj. 3. Those who are in Purgatory, though they are above us on account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a condition to pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them.

Reply Obj. 4. It is God's will that inferior beings should be helped by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not only to the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to implore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious, either because he is implored with greater devotion, or because God wishes to make known his sanctity.

Reply Obj. 5. It is because the saints while living merited to pray for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the saying of Exodus iii. 6, *I am the God of Abraham*, etc.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRAYER SHOULD BE VOCAL?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As stated above (A. 4), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God knows the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ vocal prayer.

Obj. 2. Further, Prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent man from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not use words in our prayers.

Obj. 3. Further, Prayer should be offered to God in secret, according to Matth. vi. 6, *But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret.* But prayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer should not be vocal.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. cxli. 2) : *I cried to the Lord with my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord.*

I answer that, Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common prayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such-like prayer should come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is offered : and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer. Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church should say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come to the knowledge of all.

On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any single person, whether he pray for himself or for others ; and it is not essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice is employed in such-like prayers for three reasons. First, in order to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether of words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections. Hence Augustine says (*ad Probam, Ep.* cxxx. 9) that *by means of words and other signs we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of holy desires.* Hence then alone should we use words and such-like signs when they help to excite the mind internally. But if they distract or in any way impede the mind we should abstain from them ; and this happens chiefly to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the Psalmist (Ps. xxvi. 8) said : *My heart hath said to Thee : 'My face hath sought Thee,'* and we read of Anna (1 Kings i. 13) that *she spoke in her heart.* Secondly, the voice is used in praying as though to pay

a debt, so that man may serve God with all that he has from God, that is to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and this applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is written (Osee xiv. 3): *Take away all iniquity, and receive the good: and we will render the calves of our lips.* Thirdly, we have recourse to vocal prayer, through a certain overflow from the soul into the body, through excess of feeling, according to Ps. xv. 9, *My heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced.*

Reply Obj. 1. Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell God something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the person praying or of other persons to God.

Reply Obj. 2. Words about other matters distract the mind and hinder the devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object of devotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout.

Reply Obj. 3. As Chrysostom says,* *our Lord forbids one to pray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others. Hence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's attention, either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking the heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. And yet,* according to Augustine (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* ii. 3), *it is not wrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen by men.*

Thirteenth Article.

Whether attention is a necessary condition of prayer?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of prayer. It is written (Jo. iv. 24): *God is a spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth.* But prayer is not in spirit unless it be atten-

* *Hom.* xiii. in the *Opus Imperfectum* falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.

tive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer.

Obj. 2. Further, Prayer is *the ascent of the mind to God.** But the mind does not ascend to God if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer.

Obj. 3. Further, It is a necessary condition of prayer that it should be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander while praying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God; even as if he were to speak to another man without attending to what he was saying. Hence Basil says† that the *Divine assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind wandering hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only will not obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to anger.* Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of prayer that it should be attentive.

On the contrary, Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of the mind when they pray, according to Ps. xxxix. 13, *My heart hath forsaken me.*

I answer that, This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer. Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways. First, a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better obtained: and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer. Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary when without it something cannot obtain its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The first is an effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity, and this is merit. In order to realize this effect, it is not necessary that prayer should be attentive throughout; because the force of the original intention with which one sets about praying renders the whole prayer meritorious, as is the case with other meritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper thereto, and consists in impetration: and again the original intention, to which God looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the original

* Damascene, *De Fide Orth.* iii. 24.
† *De Constit. Monach. i.*

intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and impetration: because, as Gregory* says, *God hears not the prayer of those who pay no attention to their prayer.* The third effect of prayer is that which it produces at once; this is the spiritual refreshment of the mind, and for this effect attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it is written (1 Cor. xiv. 14): *If I pray in a tongue, . . . my understanding is without fruit.*

It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words, lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the words, and a third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God, and to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong that the mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states.†

Reply Obj. 1. To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about praying through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards the mind wander through weakness.

Reply Obj. 2. The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long on account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs down the soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when, while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a sudden it wanders off through weakness.

Reply Obj. 3. Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this that Augustine says in his Rule (*Ep.* ccxi.): *When you pray God with psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips pronounce.* But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (*loc. cit.*): *If you are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray attentively, strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will pardon*

* Hugh of St. Victor, *Expos. in Reg. S. Aug.* iii.
† *De Modo Orandi* ii.

you, seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a becoming manner, not through negligence but through frailty.

FOURTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRAYER SHOULD LAST A LONG TIME?

We proceed thus to the Fourteenth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is written (Matth. vi. 7) : *When you are praying, speak not much.* Now one who prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal prayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time.

Obj. 2. Further, Prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all the holier according as it is centred on one thing, according to Ps. xxvi. 4, *One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after.* Therefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed by God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according to Exod. xix. 21 : *Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should perish.* But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by instituting the Lord's Prayer (Matth. vi.). Therefore it is not right to prolong our prayer beyond its limits.

Obj. 4. *On the contrary,* It would seem that we ought to pray continually. For Our Lord said (Luke xviii. 1) : *We ought always to pray, and not to faint :* and it is written (1 Thess. v. 17) : *Pray without ceasing.*

I answer that, We may speak about prayer in two ways : first, by considering it in itself ; secondly, by considering it in its cause. The cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought to arise : and this desire ought to be in us continually, either actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in whatever we do out of charity ; and we ought to *do all things to the glory of God* (1 Cor. x. 31). From this point of view prayer ought to be continual : wherefore Augustine says (*ad Probam, Ep.*

cxxx. 9) : *Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual longing.* But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual, because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says (*ibid.*), *we pray to God with our lips at certain intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of such-like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that desire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof.* Now the quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for instance the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health. And so it is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse the fervour of the interior desire : and when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness, it should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (*ad Probam, Ep.* cxxx.) : *It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and erect attention which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish, through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to continue, it should not be broken off too soon.* And just as we must judge of this in private prayers by considering the attention of the person praying, so too, in public prayers we must judge of it by considering the devotion of the people.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*ad Probam, loc. cit.*), *to pray with many words is not the same as to pray long ; to speak long is one thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord passed the whole night in prayer, and that He ' prayed the longer ' in order to set us an example.* Further on he says : *When praying say little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to say much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words : whereas to pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and devout clamour of the heart. Indeed this business is frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather than with speech.*

Reply Obj. 2. Length of prayer consists, not in praying for many things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing.

Reply Obj. 3. Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we might use no other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might have none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or think of them.

Reply Obj. 4. One may pray continually, either through having a continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain fixed times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the person who prays—because he remains more devout even after praying, or in some other person—as when by his kindness a man incites another to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased praying.

FIFTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRAYER IS MERITORIOUS?

We proceed thus to the Fifteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace; since even grace is obtained by means of prayer, according to Luke xi. 13, (*How much more*) *will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask Him!* Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

Obj. 2. Further, If prayer merits anything, this would seem to be chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always merit this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not heard; thus Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the flesh to be removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

Obj. 3. Further, Prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to James i. 6, *But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.* Now faith is not sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. xxxiv. 13, *My prayer shall be turned into my bosom,* explains them as

meaning, *if my prayer does not profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my reward.* Now reward is not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is meritorious.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 13), prayer, besides causing spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy in respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and efficacy in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is efficacious in meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its root, the proper object of which is the eternal good that we merit to enjoy. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of religion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above (A. 3), and with the concurrence of other virtues requisite for the goodness of prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the offering of prayer itself to God belongs to religion, while the desire for the thing that we pray to be accomplished belongs to charity. Faith is necessary in reference to God to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we can obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on the part of the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion too is necessary: but this belongs to religion, for it is its first act and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts, as stated above (Q. LXXXII., AA. 1, 2).

As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace of God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom., Serm.* CV. 1): *He would not urge us to ask, unless He were willing to give;* and Chrysostom* says: *He never refuses to grant our prayers, since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in praying.*

Reply Obj. 1. Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is *a gift of God,* as Augustine states (*De Persever.* xxiii.).

* Cf. *Catena Aurea* of S. Thomas on Luke xviii. The words as quoted are not to be found in the works of Chrysostom.

Reply Obj. 2. Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object of merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above (AA. 6, 7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes by asking for and desiring such things we lose merit, for instance if we ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious prayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks for. Hence Augustine says (*Liber Sentent. Prosperi* sent. ccxii.): *He who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows better than the sick man what is good for the disease.* For this reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we pray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by doing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: *since certain things are not denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a suitable time,* according to Augustine (*Tract.* cii. *in Joan.*): and again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it. Wherefore Basil says (*De Constit. Monast.* i.): *The reason why sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast asked for what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased asking.* Since, however, a man cannot condignly merit eternal life for another, as stated above (I.-II., Q. CXIV., A. 6), it follows that sometimes one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain to eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard when we pray for others, as stated above (A. 7, *ad* 2, 3). Hence it is that four conditions are

laid down; namely, to ask—*for ourselves—things necessary for salvation—piously—perseveringly;* when all these four concur, we always obtain what we ask for.

Reply Obj. 3. Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its efficacy in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but for its efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man comes to know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source whence prayer impetrates what it asks for.

Sixteenth Article.

Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by their prayers?

We proceed thus to the Sixteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by their prayers. It is written (Jo. ix. 31): *We know that God doth not hear sinners;* and this agrees with the saying of Prov. xxviii. 9, *He that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination.* Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from God. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God.

Obj. 2. Further, The just impetrate from God what they merit, as stated above (A. 15, *ad* 2). But sinners cannot merit anything, since they lack grace and charity which is the *power of godliness*, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. iii. 5, *Having an appearance indeed of godliness, but denying the power thereof;* and so their prayer is impious, and yet piety is required in order that prayer may be impetrative, as stated above (A. 15, *ad* 2). Therefore sinners impetrate nothing by their prayers.

Obj. 3. Further, Chrysostom* says: *The Father is unwilling to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired.* Now in the prayer inspired by Christ we say: *Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us:* and sinners do not fulfil this. Therefore either they lie in

* *Hom.* xiv. in the *Opus Imperfectum* falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

saying this, and so are unworthy to be heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because they do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Tract.* xliv. *super Joan.*): *If God were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord, be merciful to me a sinner;* and Chrysostom* says: *Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is to say whether he be righteous or sinful.*

I answer that, In the sinner, two things are to be considered, his nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when a sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a sinful desire, Gods hears him not through mercy but sometimes through vengeance when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For *God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger*, as Augustine declares (*Tract.* lxxiii. *in Joan.*). On the other hand God hears the sinner's prayer if it proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice, because the sinner does not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy,† provided however he fulfil the four conditions given above, namely, that he beseech for himself things necessary for salvation, piously and perseveringly.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine states (*Tract.* xliv. *super Joan.*), these words were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e. perfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there is truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which sense also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination.

Reply Obj. 2. There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer as though his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his prayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to godliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to will something just, as stated above (Q. LIX., A. 2). And though his prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit depends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (A. 7, *ad* 1) the Lord's

* *Hom.* xviii. of the same *Opus Imperfectum.* † Cf. A. 15, *ad* 1.

Prayer is pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone say the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbour's trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him personally: for they are true as referred to the person of the Church, from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently he is deprived of the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is prepared to forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore his prayers are heard, according to Ecclus. xxviii. 2, *Forgive thy neighbour if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to thee when thou prayest.*

Seventeenth Article.

Whether the parts of prayer are fittingly described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings?

We proceed thus to the Seventeenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings. Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according to Origen (*Super Matth. Tract.* xxxv.), *a man who wishes to live according to the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure.* Therefore supplication is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Damascene (*De Fide Orth.* iii. 24), *to pray is to ask becoming things of God.* Therefore it is unfitting to distinguish *prayers* from *intercessions.*

Obj. 3. Further, Thanksgivings regard the past, while the others regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore thanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others.

On the contrary suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Tim. ii. 1).

I answer that, Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, that the person who prays should approach God

Whom he prays: this is signified in the word *prayer*, because prayer is *the raising up of one's mind to God*. The second is that there should be a petition, and this is signified in the word *intercession*. In this case sometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say it is *intercession* properly so called, or we may ask for something indefinitely, for instance to be helped by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in Jo. xi. 3, *Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick*, and then they call it *insinuation*. The third condition is the reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the part of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account of which we ask to be heard, according to Dan. ix. 17, 18, *For Thy own sake, incline, O God, Thy ear;* and to this pertains *supplication* (*obsecratio*), which means a pleading through sacred things, as when we say, *Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord*. The reason for impetration on the part of the person who asks is *thanksgiving;* since *through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to receive yet greater benefits*, as we say in the collect.* Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. ii. 1 says that *in the Mass, the consecration is preceded by supplication*, in which certain sacred things are called to mind; that *prayers are in the consecration itself*, in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and that *intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings at the end*.

We may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects. Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, *Almighty eternal God* belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, *Who hast given to Thy servants*, etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, *grant, we beseech Thee*, belong to intercession; and the words at the end, *Through Our Lord*, etc. belong to supplication.

In the *Conferences of the Fathers* (ix., *cap.* 11, *seqq.*) we read: *Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing something to God; intercession is praying for others;*

* Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor Bishop.

thanksgiving is offered by the mind to God in ineffable ecstasy. The first explanation, however, is the better.

Reply Obj. 1. *Supplication* is an adjuration not for the purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy.

Reply Obj. 2. *Prayer* in the general sense includes all the things mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes properly the ascent to God.

Reply Obj. 3. Among things that are diverse the past precedes the future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by supplication, whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we dare approach Him.

QUESTION LXXXIV.

OF ADORATION.

(In Three Articles.)

In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in the first place, adoration whereby one uses one's body to reverence God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to God; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is assumed.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether adoration is an act of latria? (2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act? (3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?

First Article.

WHETHER ADORATION IS AN ACT OF LATRIA OR RELIGION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or religion. The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration is not due to God alone: since we read (Gen. xviii. 2) that Abraham adored the angels; and (3 Kings i. 23) that the prophet Nathan, when he was come in to king David, *worshipped him bowing down to the ground.* Therefore adoration is not an act of religion.

Obj. 2. Further, The worship of religion is due to God as the object of beatitude, according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x. 3): whereas adoration is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on Ps. xxviii. 2, *Adore ye the Lord in His holy court,* says: *We pass from these courts into the court where we adore His majesty.* Therefore adoration is not an act of latria.

Obj. 3. Further, The worship of one same religion is due

to the three Persons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one adoration, for we genuflect at each separate invocation of Them.* Therefore adoration is not an act of latria.

On the contrary are the words quoted, Matth. iv. 10: *The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve.*

I answer that, Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person adored. Now it is evident from what we have said (Q. LXXXI., AA. 2, 4) that it is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the adoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion.

Reply Obj. 1. Reverence is due to God on account of His excellence, which is communicated to certain creatures not in equal measure, but according to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence which we pay to God, and which belongs to latria, differs from the reverence which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs to dulia, and we shall speak of it further on (Q. CIII.). And since external actions are signs of internal reverence, certain external tokens significative of reverence are offered to creatures of excellence, and among these tokens the chief is adoration: yet there is one thing which is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 4): *Many tokens of Divine worship are employed in doing honour to men, either through excessive humility, or through pernicious flattery; yet so that those to whom these honours are given are recognized as being men to whom we owe esteem and reverence and even adoration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either knew or deemed or pretended to be a God?* Accordingly it was with the reverence due to an excellent creature that Nathan adored David; while it was the reverence due to God with which Mardochæus refused to adore Aman fearing *lest he should transfer the honour of his God to a man* (Esther xiii. 14).

Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature

* At the adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday.

Abraham adored the angels, as did also Josue (Jos. v. 15): though we may understand them to have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared and spoke to them in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence due to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc. xxii. 9), both to indicate the dignity which he had acquired through Christ, whereby man is made equal to an angel; wherefore the same text goes on: *I am thy fellow-servant and of thy brethren;* as also to exclude any occasion of idolatry, wherefore the text continues: *Adore God.*

Reply Obj. 2. Every Divine excellency is included in His majesty: to which it pertains that we should be made happy in Him as in the sovereign good.

Reply Obj. 3. Since there is one excellence of the three Divine Persons, one honour and reverence is due to them and consequently one adoration. It is to represent this that where it is related (Gen. xviii. 2) that three men appeared to Abraham, we are told that he addressed one, saying: *Lord, if I have found favour in thy sight,* etc. The triple genuflexion represents the Trinity of Persons, not a difference of adorations.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ADORATION DENOTES AN ACTION OF THE BODY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that adoration does not denote an act of the body. It is written (Jo. iv. 23): *The true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.* Now what is done in spirit has nothing to do with an act of the body. Therefore adoration does not denote an act of the body.

Obj. 2. Further, The word adoration is taken from *oratio* (*prayer*). But prayer consists chiefly in an interior act, according to 1 Cor. xiv. 15, *I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding.* Therefore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act.

Obj. 3. Further, Acts of the body pertain to sensible

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knowledge: whereas we approach God not by bodily but by spiritual sense. Therefore adoration does not denote an act of the body.

On the contrary, A gloss on Exod. xx. 5, *Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them*, says: *Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor adore them outwardly.*

I answer that, As Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* iv. 12), since we are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which consists in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts of latria that which is without is referred to that which is within as being of greater import, it follows that exterior adoration is offered on account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit signs of humility in our bodies in order to incite our affections to submit to God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the intelligible.

Reply Obj. 1. Even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so far as it proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and secondarily expressed in words, as stated above (Q. LXXXIII., A. 12), so too adoration consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but secondarily in certain bodily signs of humility; thus when we genuflect we signify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we prostrate ourselves we profess that we are nothing of ourselves.

Reply Obj. 3. Though we cannot reach God with the senses, our mind is urged by sensible signs to approach God.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ADORATION REQUIRES A DEFINITE PLACE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that adoration does not require a definite place. It is written (Jo. iv. 21): *The hour cometh,*

when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father; and the same reason seems to apply to other places. Therefore a definite place is not necessary for adoration.

Obj. 2. Further, Exterior adoration is directed to interior adoration. But interior adoration is shown to God as existing everywhere. Therefore exterior adoration does not require a definite place.

Obj. 3. Further, The same God is adored in the New as in the Old Testament. Now in the Old Testament they adored towards the west, because the door of the Tabernacle looked to the east (Exod. xxvi. 18 *seqq.*). Therefore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards the west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. lvi. 7): *My house shall be called the house of prayer,* which words are also quoted (Jo. ii. 16).

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), the chief part of adoration is the internal devotion of the mind, while the secondary part is something external pertaining to bodily signs. Now the mind internally apprehends God as not comprised in a place; while bodily signs must of necessity be in some definite place and position. Hence a definite place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it were essential thereto, but by reason of a certain fittingness, like other bodily signs.

Reply Obj. 1. By these words Our Lord foretold the cessation of adoration, both according to the rite of the Jews who adored in Jerusalem, and according to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on Mount Garizim. For both these rites ceased with the advent of the spiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which *a sacrifice is offered* to God *in every place,* as stated in Malach. i. 11.

Reply Obj. 2. A definite place is chosen for adoration, not on account of God Who is adored, as though He were enclosed in a place, but on account of the adorers; and this for three reasons. First, because the place is consecrated, so that those who pray there conceive a greater

devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may be seen in the prayer of Solomon (3 Kings viii.). Secondly, on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of holiness contained therein. Thirdly, on account of the concourse of many adorers, by reason of which their prayer is more likely to be heard, according to Matt. xviii. 20, *Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.*

Reply Obj. 3. There is a certain fittingness in adoring towards the east. First, because the Divine majesty is indicated in the movement of the heavens which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was situated in the east according to the Septuagint version of Gen. ii. 8, and so we signify our desire to return to Paradise. Thirdly, on account of Christ Who is *the light of the world*,* and is called *the Orient* (Zach. vi. 12); *Who mounteth above the heaven of heavens to the east* (Ps. lxvii. 34), and is expected to come from the east, according to Matth. xxiv. 27, *As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be.*

* Jo. viii. 12; ix. 5.

QUESTION LXXXV.

OF SACRIFICE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things are offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration: (1) Of things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby something is promised to Him.

Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations, first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature? (2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone? (3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue? (4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice?

First Article.

WHETHER OFFERING A SACRIFICE TO GOD IS OF THE LAW OF NATURE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of some, e.g. Melchisedech (Gen. xiv. 18), offering bread and wine in sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others by others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural law.

Obj. 2. Further, Things that are of the natural law were observed by all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. x. 2) that wisdom *brought him out*

of his sin. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not of the natural law.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 5, 19) that sacrifices are offered in significance of something. Now words which are chief among signs, as he again says (*De Doct. Christ.* ii. 3), *signify, not by nature but by convention,* according to the Philosopher (*Peri Herm.* i. 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the natural law.

On the contrary, At all times and among all nations there has always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by all is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of the natural law.

I answer that, Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in himself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all under the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural reason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should tender submission and honour, according to his mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in sign of the subjection and honour due to Him, like those who make certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now this is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural law.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (I.-II., Q. XCV., A. 2), certain things belong generically to the natural law, while their determination belongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural law, and consequently all are agreed on this point,

but the determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this is the reason for their difference.

Reply Obj. 2. Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to Gregory, who says (*Moral.* iv. 3) that in olden times original sin was remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have something special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should be represented as offering a sacrifice.

Reply Obj. 3. It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but the determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRIFICE SHOULD BE OFFERED TO GOD ALONE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to the most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God, it would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are partakers of the Godhead. Now holy men are made *partakers of the Divine nature*, according to 2 Pet. i. 4; wherefore of them is it written (Ps. lxxxi. 6): *I have said, You are gods*: and angels too are called *sons of God*, according to Job i. 6. Thus sacrifice should be offered to all these.

Obj. 2. Further, The greater a person is the greater the honour due to him from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any earthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much greater honour, by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts, than is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in sacrifice.

Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the angels and saints.

Obj. 3. Further, Temples and altars are raised for the offering of sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints. Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xxii. 20): *He that sacrificeth to gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a sacrifice is offered in order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is offered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby the soul offers itself to God according to Ps. l. 19, *A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit*, since, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 7; Q. LXXXIV., A. 2), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to the true faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in the First Part (QQ. XC., A. 3; CXVIII., A. 2), while in Him alone the beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above (I.-II., QQ. I., A. 8; II., A. 8; III., AA. 1, 7, 8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward sacrifices to Him alone: even so *in our prayers and praises we proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the things which we designate thereby*, as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei* x. 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to show the sovereign ruler some special sign of honour, and that if this be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in the Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer Divine honour to another than God.

Reply Obj. 1. The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is equal honour due to them.

Reply Obj. 2. The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done in honour of the sovereign Ruler of the whole

universe. Wherefore, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x., *loc. cit.*), *the demons rejoice, not in the stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honours.*

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* viii. 19), *we do not raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but their God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their triumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE OFFERING OF SACRIFICE IS A SPECIAL ACT OF VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of virtue. Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 6): *A true sacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy fellowship.* But not every good work is a special act of some definite virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, The mortification of the body by fasting belongs to abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the offering of sacrifice, according to Rom. xii. 1, *Present your bodies a living sacrifice.* Again the Apostle says (Heb. xiii. 16): *Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favour is obtained.* Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do good and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, A sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God. Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes, first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not appear to be a special act of a definite virtue.

On the contrary, The Law contains special precepts about sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XVIII., AA. 6, 7),

where an act of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it partakes somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to commit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of fornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it would be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of God, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God's sake, or when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence for God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving of praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts are properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion.

Reply Obj. 1. The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently the act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.

Reply Obj. 2. Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion, prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal sacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to speak, offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third is the good which consists of external things; and of these we offer a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possessions to God immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbour for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 3. A *sacrifice*, properly speaking, requires that something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance animals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The very word signifies this, since *sacrifice* is so called because a man does something sacred (*facit sacrum*). On the other hand an *oblation* is

properly the offering of something to God even if nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at the altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not conversely. *First-fruits* are oblations, because they were offered to God, according to Deut. xxvi., but they are not a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. *Tithes*, however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, properly speaking, because they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL ARE BOUND TO OFFER SACRIFICES?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all are not bound to offer sacrifices. The Apostle says (Rom. iii. 19): *What things soever the Law speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law.* Now the law of sacrifices was not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices.

Obj. 2. Further, Sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.

Obj. 3. Further, Priests* are so called because they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.

On the contrary, The offering of sacrifices is of the natural law, as stated above (A. 1). Now all are bound to do that which is of the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God.

I answer that, Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above (A. 2). The first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other is the outward sacrifice, and this again

* *Sacerdotes:* Those who give or administer sacred things (*sacra dantes*): cf. 1 Cor. iv. 1.

is twofold. There is a sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered to God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New or the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those who are under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices according to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God's honour, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to this or that action.—The other outward sacrifice is when the outward actions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God; some of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound, while others are works of supererogation, and to these all are not bound.

Reply Obj. 1. All were not bound to offer those particular sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to some sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Though all do not know explicitly the power of the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit faith, as stated above (Q. II., AA. 6, 7).

Reply Obj. 3. The priests offer those sacrifices which are specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but also for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can offer to God for himself, as explained above (AA. 2, 3).

QUESTION LXXXVI.

OF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept? (2) To whom are oblations due? (3) Of what things they should be made? (4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer them?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE UNDER A NECESSITY OF PRECEPT TO MAKE OBLATIONS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make oblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (I.-II., Q. CIII., AA. 3, 4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since it is written (Exod. xxiii. 14): *Three times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me*, and further on (*verse* 15): *Thou shalt not appear empty before Me.* Therefore men are not now under a necessity of precept to make oblations.

Obj. 2. Further, Before they are made, oblations depend on man's will, as appears from Our Lord's saying (Matth. v. 23), *If . . . thou offer thy gift at the altar*, as though this were left to the choice of the offerer: and when once oblations have been made, there is no way of offering them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a necessity of precept to make oblations.

Obj. 3. Further, If anyone is bound to give a certain

thing to the Church, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being deprived of the Church's sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to refuse the sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make oblations according to a decree of the sixth council,* quoted I., qu. i., can. *Nullus : Let none who dispense Holy Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything let them be deposed.* Therefore it is not necessary that men should make oblations.

On the contrary, Gregory† says‡: *Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God at the celebration of Mass.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXV., A. 3, *ad* 3), the term *oblation* is common to all things offered for the Divine worship, so that if a thing be offered to be destroyed in worship of God, as though it were being made into something holy, it is both an oblation and a sacrifice. Wherefore it is written (Exod. xxix. 18) : *Thou shalt offer the whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar ; it is an oblation to the Lord, a most sweet savour of the victim of the Lord ;* and (Levit. ii. 1) : *When anyone shall offer an oblation of sacrifice to the Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour.* If, on the other hand, it be offered with a view to its remaining entire and being deputed to the worship of God or to the use of His ministers, it will be an oblation and not a sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to oblations of this kind that they be offered voluntarily, according to Exod. xxv. 2, *Of every man that offereth of his own accord you shall take them.* Nevertheless it may happen in four ways that one is bound to make oblations. First, on account of a previous agreement ; as when a person is granted a portion of Church land, that he may make certain oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of rent. Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise ; as when a man offers a gift among the living, or by will bequeaths to the Church something whether movable or immovable to be delivered at some future time. Thirdly, on account of the need of the Church, for instance if her ministers were without means of support.

* Can. Trullan. xxiii. † Gregory VII.
‡ *Concil. Roman.* v., can. xii.

Fourthly, on account of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain solemn feasts to make certain customary oblations. In the last two cases, however, the oblation remains voluntary, as regards, to wit, the quantity or kind of the thing offered.

Reply Obj. 1. Under the New Law men are not bound to make oblations on account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on account of certain other reasons, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Some are bound to make oblations, both before making them, as in the first, third, and fourth cases, and after they have made them by assignment or promise: for they are bound to offer in reality that which has been already offered to the Church by way of assignment.

Reply Obj. 3. Those who do not make the oblations they are bound to make may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not by the priest himself to whom the oblations should be made, lest he seem to exact something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone superior to him.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER OBLATIONS ARE DUE TO PRIESTS ALONE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that oblations are not due to priests alone. For chief among oblations would seem to be those that are deputed to the sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the poor is called a *victim* in Scripture according to Heb. xiii. 16, *Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such victims* (Douay,—*sacrifices*) *God's favour is obtained.* Much more therefore are oblations due to the poor.

Obj. 2. Further, In many parishes monks have a share in the oblations. Now *the case of clerics is distinct from the case of monks,* as Jerome states.* Therefore oblations are not due to priests alone.

Obj. 3. Further, Lay people with the consent of the

* *Ep.* xiv. *ad Heliod.*

Church buy oblations such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other reason than that they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore oblations may have reference to the laity.

On the contrary, A canon of Pope Damasus* quoted X., qu. i.,† says: *None but the priests whom day by day we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the oblations which are offered within the precincts of the Holy Church: because in the Old Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the sacred loaves, with the exception of Aaron and his sons* (Levit. xxiv. 8, 9).

I answer that, The priest is appointed *mediator and stands*, so to speak, *between* the people and God, as we read of Moses (Deut. v. 5), wherefore it belongs to him to set forth the Divine teachings and sacraments before the people; and besides to offer to the Lord things appertaining to the people, their prayers, for instance, their sacrifices and oblations. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. v. 1): *Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins.* Hence the oblations which the people offer to God concern the priests, not only as regards their turning them to their own use, but also as regards the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them partly on things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly on things touching their own livelihood (since they that serve the altar partake with the altar, according to 1 Cor. ix. 13), and partly for the good of the poor, who, as far as possible, should be supported from the possessions of the Church: for Our Lord had a purse for the use of the poor, as Jerome observes on Matth. xvii. 26, *That we may not scandalize them.*

Reply Obj. 1. Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice properly speaking; yet it is called a sacrifice in so far as it is given to them for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same reason, it can be called an oblation; though not properly speaking, since it is not given immediately to

* Damasus I. † Can. *Hanc consuetudinem.*

God. Oblations properly so called fall to the use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the offerers, but by the dispensation of the priests.

Reply Obj. 2. Monks or other religious may receive oblations under three counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the priests, or by ordination of the Church; secondly, through being ministers of the altar, and then they can accept oblations that are freely offered; thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can accept oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3. Oblations when once they are consecrated, such as sacred vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the laity: and this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those which are unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MAN MAY MAKE OBLATIONS OF WHATEVER HE LAWFULLY POSSESSES?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a man may not make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses. According to human law* *the whore's is a shameful trade in what she does but not in what she takes*, and consequently what she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her to make an oblation with her gains, according to Deut. xxiii. 18, *Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of the Lord thy God.* Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever one possesses lawfully.

Obj. 2. Further, In the same passage it is forbidden to offer *the price of a dog* in the house of God. But it is evident that a man possesses lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Malach. i. 8): *If you offer*

* Dig. xii. v. *de Condict. ob turp. vel iniust. caus.*, 4.

the lame and the sick, is it not evil? Yet an animal though lame or sick is a lawful possession. Therefore it would seem that not of every lawful possession may one make an oblation.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. iii. 9): *Honour the Lord with thy substance.* Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his substance. Therefore he may make oblations of whatever he possesses lawfully.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom.* Serm. cxiii.), *shouldst thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the spoil to the judge, if he should pronounce in thy favour, such is the force of justice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and if this should not please thee, neither does it please thy God.* Hence it is written (Ecclus. xxxiv. 21): *The offering of him that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten is stained.* Therefore it is evident that an oblation must not be made of things unjustly acquired or possessed. In the Old Law, however, wherein the figure was predominant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of their signification, and it was forbidden to offer them. But in the New Law all God's creatures are looked upon as clean, as stated in Tit. i. 15: and consequently anything that is lawfully possessed, considered in itself, may be offered in oblation. But it may happen accidentally that one may not make an oblation of what one possesses lawfully; for instance if it be detrimental to another person, as in the case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting his father (which Our Lord condemns, Matth. xv. 5), or if it give rise to scandal or contempt, or the like.

Reply Obj. 1. In the Old Law it was forbidden to make an offering of the hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and in the New Law, on account of scandal, lest the Church seem to favour sin if she accept oblations from the profits of sin.

Reply Obj. 2. According to the Law, a dog was deemed an unclean animal. Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could be offered, according to Levit. xxvii. 27, *If it be an unclean animal, he that offereth*

it shall redeem it. But a dog was neither offered nor redeemed, both because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices to their idols, and because they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot be offered in oblation. However, this prohibition ceased under the New Law.

Reply Obj. 3. The oblation of a blind or lame animal was declared unlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose for which it was offered, wherefore it is written (Malach. i. 8): *If you offer the blind in sacrifice, is it not evil?* and it behoved sacrifices to be without blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt, wherefore the same text goes on (*verse* 12): *You have profaned* My name, *in that you say: The table of the Lord is defiled, and that which is laid thereupon is contemptible.* Thirdly, on account of a previous vow, whereby a man has bound himself to offer without blemish whatever he has vowed: hence the same text says further on (*verse* 14): *Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock a male, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which is feeble to the Lord.* The same reasons avail still in the New Law, but when they do not apply the unlawfulness ceases.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE BOUND TO PAY FIRST-FRUITS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound to pay first-fruits. After giving the law of the first-born the text continues (Exod. xiii. 9): *It shall be as a sign in thy hand,* so that, apparently, it is a ceremonial precept. But ceremonial precepts are not to be observed in the New Law. Neither therefore ought first-fruits to be paid.

Obj. 2. Further, First-fruits were offered to the Lord for a special favour conferred on that people, wherefore it is written (Deut. xxvi. 2, 3): *Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits, . . . and thou shalt go to the priest that shall be in those days, and say to him: I profess this day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the land, for which He*

swore to our fathers, that He would give it us. Therefore other nations are not bound to pay first-fruits.

Obj. 3. That which one is bound to do should be something definite. But neither in the New Law nor in the Old do we find mention of a definite amount of first-fruits. Therefore one is not bound of necessity to pay them.

On the contrary, It is laid down (XVI., qu. vii., can. *Decimas*) : *We confirm the right of priests to tithes and first-fruits, and everybody must pay them.*

I answer that, First-fruits are a kind of oblation, because they are offered to God with a certain profession (Deut. xxvi.) ; where the same passage continues : *The priest taking the basket* containing the first-fruits *from the hand of him that bringeth the first-fruits, shall set it before the altar of the Lord thy God,* and further on (*verse* 10) he is commanded to say : *Therefore now I offer the first-fruits of the land, which the Lord hath given me.* Now the first-fruits were offered for a special reason, namely, in recognition of the divine favour, as though man acknowledged that he had received the fruits of the earth from God, and that he ought to offer something to God in return, according to 1 Paral. xxix. 14, *We have given Thee what we received of Thy hand.* And since what we offer God ought to be something special, hence it is that man was commanded to offer God his first-fruits, as being a special part of the fruits of the earth : and since a priest *is ordained* for the people *in the things that appertain to God* (Heb. v. 1), the first-fruits offered by the people were granted to the priest's use. Wherefore it is written (Num. xviii. 8) : *The Lord said to Aaron : Behold I have given thee the charge of My first-fruits.* Now it is a point of natural law that man should make an offering in God's honour out of the things he has received from God, but that the offering should be made to any particular person, or out of his first-fruits, or in such or such a quantity, was indeed determined in the Old Law by divine command ; but in the New Law it is fixed by the declaration of the Church, in virtue of which men are bound to pay first-fruits

according to the custom of their country and the needs of the Church's ministers.

Reply Obj. 1. The ceremonial observances were properly speaking signs of the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed truth was actually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for a sign of a past favour, whence arises the duty of acknowledgment in accordance with the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a general sense this obligation remains.

Reply Obj. 2. First-fruits were offered in the Old Law, not only on account of the favour of the promised land given by God, but also on account of the favour of the fruits of the earth, which were given by God. Hence it is written (Deut. xxvi. 10) : *I offer the first-fruits of the land which the Lord hath given me*, which second motive is common among all people. We may also reply that just as God granted the land of promise to the Jews by a special favour, so by a general favour He bestowed the lordship of the earth on the whole of mankind, according to Ps. cxiii. 24, *The earth He has given to the children of men.*

Reply Obj. 3. As Jerome says*: *According to the tradition of the ancients the custom arose for those who had most to give the priests a fortieth part, and those who had least, one sixtieth, in lieu of first-fruits.* Hence it would seem that first-fruits should vary between these limits according to the custom of one's country. And it was reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not be fixed by law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are offered by way of oblation, a condition of which is that it should be voluntary.

* Comment. in Ezech. xlv. 13, 14. Cf. Cap. *Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.*

QUESTION LXXXVII.

OF TITHES.

(In Four Articles.)

NEXT we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes? (2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid? (3) To whom ought they to be paid? (4) Who ought to pay tithes?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE BOUND TO PAY TITHES UNDER A NECESSITY OF PRECEPT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay tithes. The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the Old Law (Levit. xxvii. 30), *All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the fruits of trees, are the Lord's*, and further on (*verse* 32): *Of all the tithes of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the shepherd's rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to the Lord.* This cannot be reckoned among the moral precepts, because natural reason does not dictate that one ought to give a tenth part, rather than a ninth or eleventh. Therefore it is either a judicial or a ceremonial precept. Now, as stated above (I.-II., QQ. CIII., A. 3; CIV., A. 3), during the time of grace men are bound neither to the ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Therefore men are not bound now to pay tithes.

Obj. 2. Further, During the time of grace men are bound only to those things which were commanded by Christ through the Apostles, according to Matth. xxviii. 20, *Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you;* and Paul says (Acts xx. 27): *I have not*

spared to declare unto you all the counsel of God. Now neither in the teaching of Christ nor in that of the apostles is there any mention of the paying of tithes: for the saying of Our Lord about tithes (Matth. xxiii. 23), *These things you ought to have done* seems to refer to the past time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (*Super Matth.* can. xxiv.): *The tithing of herbs, which was useful in foreshadowing the future, was not to be omitted.* Therefore during the time of grace men are not bound to pay tithes.

Obj. 3. Further, During the time of grace, men are not more bound to the legal observances than before the Law. But before the Law tithes were given, by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read (Gen. xxviii. 20, 22) that Jacob *made a vow* saying: *If God shall be with me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk . . . of all the things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee.* Neither, therefore, during the time of grace are men bound to pay tithes.

Obj. 4. Further, In the Old Law men were bound to pay three kinds of tithe. For it is written (Num. xviii. 23, 24): *The sons of Levi . . . shall . . . be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have separated for their uses and necessities.* Again, there were other tithes of which we read (Deut. xiv. 22, 23): *Every year thou shalt set aside the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth year by year; and thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God in the place which He shall choose.* And there were yet other tithes, of which it is written (*ibid.* 28): *The third year thou shalt separate another tithe of all things that grow to thee at that time, and shalt lay it up within thy gates. And the Levite that hath no other part nor possession with thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, that are within thy gates, shall . . . eat and be filled.* Now during the time of grace men are not bound to pay the second and third tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to pay the first.

Obj. 5. Further, A debt that is due without any time being fixed for its payment, must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly if during the time of grace men

are bound, under necessity of precept, to pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they would all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the ministers of the Church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable. Therefore during the time of grace men are not bound under necessity of precept to pay tithes.

On the contrary, Augustine,* whose words are quoted XVI., qu. i.,† says: *It is a duty to pay tithes, and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to another.*

I answer that, In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance of the ministers of God; hence it is written (Malach. iii. 10): *Bring all the tithes into My* (Vulg.—*the*) *store-house that there may be meat in My house.* Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was partly moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly judicial, deriving its force from its divine institution. Because natural reason dictates that the people should administer the necessaries of life to those who minister the divine worship for the welfare of the whole people even as it is the people's duty to provide a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers and so forth. Hence the Apostle proves this from human custom, saying (1 Cor. ix. 7): *Who serveth as a soldier at any time, at his own charge? Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof?* But the fixing of the proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does not belong to the natural law, but was determined by divine institution, in accordance with the condition of that people to whom the law was being given. For they were divided into twelve tribes, and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged exclusively in the divine ministry and had no possessions whence to derive a livelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that the remaining eleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their revenues to the Levites‡ that the latter might live respectably; and also because some, through negligence, would disregard this precept. Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept was

* *Append. Serm.* cclxxvii. † Can. *Decimæ.*

‡ Num. xviii. 21.

judicial, since all institutions established among this people for the special purpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance with this people's condition, are called *judicial precepts*. Nevertheless by way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed something in the future, even as everything else connected with them, according to 1 Cor. xii., *All these things happened to them in figure*. In this respect they had something in common with the *ceremonial precepts*, which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of the future. Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed something in the future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond ten but begin over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth, which is the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for himself, acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and that the perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped for from God. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial precept, as stated above.

There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Law, as we stated above (I.-II., Q. CIV., A. 3), that it is unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New Law, whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during the time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are bound to be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of those who have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of the Old Law that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Exod. xxii. 1), and if any king were to order this to be done his subjects would be bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the New Law the authority of the Church has established the payment of tithe; thus showing a certain kindliness, lest the people of the New Law should give less to the ministers of the New Testament than did the people of the Old Law to the ministers of the Old Testament; for the people of the New Law are under greater obligations, according to

Matth. v. 20, *Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven*, and, moreover, the ministers of the New Testament are of greater dignity than the ministers of the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor. iii. 7, 8).

Accordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithe arises partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church; who, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and persons might ordain the payment of some other proportion.

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *First Objection*.

Reply Obj. 2. The precept about paying tithe, in so far as it was a moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said (Matth. x. 10)*: *The workman is worthy of his hire*, and the Apostle says the same (1 Cor. ix., 4 *seqq.*). But the fixing of the particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3. Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of the divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although it is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received a double portion. For this very reason no particular portion was directed to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when they met with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed right. Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to Gen. xiv. 20, and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes,† although he appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to ministers, but for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance for the fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: *I will offer tithes to Thee.*

Reply Obj. 4. The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for the offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the legal victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to eat with the poor, is

* The words as quoted are from Luke x. 7: Matthew has *meat* instead of *hire*.

† Gen. xxviii. 20.

increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus, according to Luke xi. 41, *That which remaineth, give alms.* Moreover the tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be dispensed by them for the use of the poor.

Reply Obj. 5. The ministers of the Church ought to be more solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for the amassing of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his livelihood from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should occasion a hindrance to the Gospel of Christ.* Nor did they sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Apostle would not have omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the Church rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they could not demand them without scandal, on account of their having fallen into desuetude, or for some other reason. Nevertheless those who do not give tithes in places where the Church does not demand them are not in a state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and unwilling to pay even if tithe were demanded of them.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE BOUND TO PAY TITHES OF ALL THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of all things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the Old Law. Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes, viz. those that are payable on property acquired by one's own act, for instance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to pay tithe on such things.

Obj. 2. Further, It is not right to make oblations of that which is ill-gotten, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 3).

* 1 Cor. ix. 12.

Now oblations, being offered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected with the divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers. Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.

Obj. 3. Further, In the last chapter of Leviticus (30, 32) the precept of paying tithe refers only to *corn, fruits of trees* and animals *that pass under the shepherd's rod.* But man derives a revenue from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his garden and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to pay tithe.

Obj. 4. Further, Man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land and stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery; sometimes they are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes they are due to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and wages due to workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithe on such-like things.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. xxviii. 22): *Of all things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee.*

I answer that, In judging about a thing we should look to its principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithe is the debt whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. ix. 11), *If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?* [thus implying that on the contrary *it is no great matter if we reap your carnal things.*]* For this debt is the principle on which is based the commandment of the Church about the payment of tithes. Now whatever man possesses comes under the designation of carnal things. Therefore tithes must be paid on whatever one possesses.

Reply Obj. 1. In accordance with the condition of that people there was a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept about personal tithe; because, to wit, all the other tribes had certain possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient livelihood for the Levites

* The phrase in brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition.

who had no possessions, but were not forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the other Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are spread abroad throughout the world, and many of them have no possessions, but live by trade, and these would contribute nothing to the support of God's ministers if they did not pay tithes on their trade profits. Moreover the ministers of the New Law are more strictly forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades, according to 2 Tim. ii. 4, *No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business.* Wherefore in the New Law men are bound to pay personal tithe, according to the custom of their country and the needs of the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words are quoted XVI., *qu.* 1, *cap. Decimæ*, says*: *Tithes must be paid on the profits of soldiering, trade or craft.*

Reply Obj. 2. Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because the getting itself was unjust; such, for instance, are things gotten by robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the profits of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithe on the produce, because the latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the other hand certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are gotten of a shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or stage-playing, and the like. Such things a man is not bound to restore, and consequently he is bound to pay tithe on them in the same way as other personal tithes. Nevertheless the Church must not accept the tithe so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she appear to have a share in their sins: but when they have done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these things.

Reply Obj. 3. Things directed to an end must be judged according to their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is due not for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with careful exactitude, for

* *Append. Serm.* cclxxvii.

this is reckoned sinful according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 2). Hence the Old Law did not order the payment of tithes on such-like minute things, but left it to the judgement of those who are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as nothing. Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect justice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are they reproved by Our Lord on that account, but only because they despised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show them to be deserving of praise in this particular, when He said (Matth, xxiii. 23): *These things you ought to have done*, i.e. during the time of the Law, according to Chrysostom's* commentary. This also seems to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore now too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except perhaps by reason of the custom of one's country.

Reply Obj. 4. A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has lost by theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he has incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the Church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat that has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to her, both from the buyer who has a thing due to the Church, and from the seller, because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the Church: yet if one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on the fruits of the earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of God. Wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are they subject to workmen's wages. Hence it is not right to deduct one's taxes and the wages paid to workmen, before paying tithe: but tithe must be paid before anything else on one's entire produce.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TITHES SHOULD BE PAID TO THE CLERGY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that tithes should not be paid

* *Hom.* xliv. in the *Opus Imperfectum* falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.

to the clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because they had no portion in the people's possessions, according to Num. xviii. 23, 24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not only ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they receive first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead. Therefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them.

Obj. 2. Further, It sometimes happens that a man dwells in one parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may have his sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now in all these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which clergy the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed tithe ought to be paid to the clergy.

Obj. 3. Further, It is the general custom in certain countries for the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only to those of the clergy who have care of souls.

On the contrary, It is written (Num. xviii. 21): *I have given to the sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the ministry wherewith they serve Me in the tabernacle.* Now the clergy are the successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes are due to the clergy alone.

I answer that, Two things have to be considered with regard to tithes: namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in the name of tithe. The right to receive tithe is a spiritual thing, for it arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the altar have a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are due to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns none but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are competent to have this right.

On the other hand the things given in the name of tithe are material, wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it is that they fall into the hands of the laity.

Reply Obj. 1. In the Old Law, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 4), special tithes were ear-marked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor. Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this same purpose.

Reply Obj. 2. Personal tithe is due to the church in whose parish a man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to belong to the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law, however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained for a long time must be observed.* The shepherd who grazes his flock at different seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately to both churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from the pasture, the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose lands the flock grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the fold is situated.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the things she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him to receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being reserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the need of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers through being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the succouring of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted by way of alms to certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of souls. Some religious, however, are competent to receive tithes, because they have care of souls.

* Cap. *Cum sint*, and Cap. *Ad apostolicæ, de Decimis*, etc.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CLERGY ALSO ARE BOUND TO PAY TITHE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes. By common law* the parish church should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. Now it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their own on the territory of some parish church, or that one church has ecclesiastical property on the territory of another. Therefore it would seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes.

Obj. 2. Further, Some religious are clerics; and yet they are bound to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they cultivate even with their own hands.† Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from the payment of tithe.

Obj. 3. Further, In the eighteenth chapter of Numbers, 26, 28, it is prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the people, but also that they should themselves pay tithe to the high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to the clergy.

Obj. 4. Further, Tithes should serve not only for the support of the clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the latter is not true. Therefore the former is false.

On the contrary, A decretal of Pope Paschal‡ says: *It is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the clergy.*§

I answer that, The cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of passion; yet it happens that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes and from different points of view. Now tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar

* Cap. *Cum homines, de Decimis,* etc.
† *Ibid.,* Cap. *Ex parte,* and Cap. *Nuper.*
‡ Paschal II. § Cap. *Novum genus, de Decimis,* etc.

and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Wherefore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as having ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes; whereas from some other cause through holding property in their own right, either by inheriting it from their kindred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they are bound to the payment of tithes.

Hence the *Reply* to the *First Objection* is clear, because the clergy like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church, because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same as possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even though they be within the boundaries of another parish.

Reply Obj. 2. Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls, and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay tithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions granted by the Apostolic See.*

Reply Obj. 3. In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests, and tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the high-priest *the tenth part of the tenth*† instead of first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate of a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be able to carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.

Reply Obj. 4. Tithes should be employed for the assistance of the poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them.

* Capp. *Ex multiplici, Ex parte,* and *Ad audientiam, de Decimis,* etc,

† Num. xviii. 26.

QUESTION LXXXVIII.

OF VOWS.

(*In Twelve Articles.*)

WE must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) What is a vow? (2) What is the matter of a vow? (3) Of the obligation of vows. (4) Of the use of taking vows. (5) Of what virtue is it an act? (6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than without a vow? (7) Of the solemnizing of a vow. (8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows? (9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion? (10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation? (11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of continence? (12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation from a vow?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A VOW CONSISTS IN A MERE PURPOSE OF THE WILL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some,* *a vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain thing.* But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.

* William of Auxerre, *Sum. Aur.* III., xxviii., qu. 1: Albertus Magnus, *Sent.* iv., D. 38.

Obj. 2. Further, The very word vow seems to be derived from *voluntas* (*will*), for one is said to do a thing *proprio voto* (*by one's own vow*) when one does it voluntarily. Now to *purpose* is an act of the will, while to *promise* is an act of the reason. Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will.

Obj. 3. Further, Our Lord said (Luke ix. 62): *No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.* Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. v. 3): *If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him.* Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow is a promise.

I answer that, A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought, since according to 1 Kings xvi. 7, *Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart.* Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer (Q. LXXXIII., A. 12), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three

things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation; the second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth, according to Ps. lxv. 13, *I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have uttered;* and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (*Sent.* iv. D. 38) that a vow is *the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and about things relating to God:* although the *witnessing* may strictly refer to the inward protestation.

Reply Obj. 1. The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a promise.

Reply Obj. 2. Man's will moves the reason to promise something relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.

Reply Obj. 3. He that puts his hand to the plough does something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER A VOW SHOULD ALWAYS BE ABOUT A BETTER GOOD?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation. But vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps. lxxv. 12, *Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God;* and Jacob

vowed (Gen. xxviii. 21) that the Lord should be his God. Now this above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better good.

Obj. 2. Further, Jephthe is included among the saints (Heb. xi. 32). Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges xi.). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only about a better good, but also about something unlawful.

Obj. 3. Further, Things that tend to be harmful to the person, or that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good. Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always about a better good.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xxiii. 22): *If thou wilt not promise thou shalt be without sin.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say that one would do something against someone. In like manner it would be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly.

On the other hand, if a thing be necessary, not absolutely but on the supposition of an end—for instance if salvation be unattainable without it—it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it. But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an

end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation. Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.

Reply Obj. 1. Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same passage.

Reply Obj. 2. Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of Jephthe, who, as related in Judges xi. 30, 31, *made a vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and shall meet me when I return in peace, . . . the same will I offer a holocaust to the Lord.* For this could have an evil result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome says:* *In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in keeping his vow he was wicked.* Yet it is premised (*verse* 29) that *the Spirit of the Lord came upon* him, because his faith and devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy

* Implicitly 1 *Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam* vi. vii.: *Comment. in Jerem.* vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, *Hist. Scholast.*

Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something good.

Reply Obj. 3. The mortification of one's own body, for instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening nature. On this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. xii. 1), *Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God*, adds, *your reasonable service.* Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgement of a superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.

Third Article.

whether all vows are binding?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs things that are done by another, more than God does, since He has no need for our goods (Ps. xv. 2). Now according to the prescription of human laws* a simple promise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a simple promise made to God, which we call a vow.

Obj. 2. Further, No one is bound to do what is impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man vows to enter a

* Dig. L., xii., *de pollicitat.*, i.

monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always binding.

Obj. 3. Further, If a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is not always binding.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. v. 3, 4): *Whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised.*

I answer that, For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine* faith takes its name *from a man's deed agreeing with his word.*† Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, both on account of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favours he has received from God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfil the vows he has made to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be paid to God, because *an unfaithful . . . promise displeaseth Him.*‡

Reply Obj. 1. Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that a vow made to Him is most binding.

Reply Obj. 2. If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavour to the best of his power

* Ep. lxxxii. 2; *De Mendac.* xx.

† *Fides . . . fiunt dicta.* Cicero gives the same etymology (*De Offic.* i. 7).

‡ Eccles. v. 3.

to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. On the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by sinning.

Reply Obj. 3. The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will and intention, wherefore it is written (Deut. xxiii. 23): *That which is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and with thy own mouth.* Wherefore, if in taking a vow, it is one's intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for it is written (*ibid.* 21): *When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.*

Fourth Article.

whether it is expedient to take vows?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself

of the good that God has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.

Obj. 2. Further, No one should expose himself to danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine says (*Ep.* cxxvii. *ad Arment. et Paulin.*) : *Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good : whereas now, if thou breakest faith with God* (*which God forbid*) *thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow.* Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (1 Cor. iv. 16) : *Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.* But we do not read that either Christ or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lxxv. 12) : *Vow ye and pay to the Lord your God.*

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own profit ; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that service : whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own profit. Hence Augustine says (*loc. cit.*) : *He is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him.* And just as what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since *what is given Him is added to the giver,* as Augustine says (*ibid.*), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but it conduces to

our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to take vows.

Reply Obj. 1. Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augustine says (*loc. cit.*) that *happy is the necessity that compels us to do the better things.*

Reply Obj. 2. When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: else it would behove one to desist from all good things, that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. xi. 4): *He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap.* Now a man incurs danger, not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (*ibid.*): *Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment.*

Reply Obj. 3. It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a 'comprehensor.' By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. xxi. 26): *I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him*, when He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.

The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state of perfection when *they left all things and followed* Christ.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A VOW IS AN ACT OF LATRIA OR RELIGION?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Tully (*De Inv.* ii. 53) it belongs to religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

Obj. 3. Further, Religious worship should be offered to none but God. But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xix. 21) : (*The Egyptians*) *shall worship Him with sacrifices and offerings, and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them.* Now, the worship of God is properly the act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or religion.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1, *ad* 1), every act of virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it is directed to the reverence of God, which is the proper end of latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the proper act of latria.

Now, it is evident from what has been said above (AA. 1, 2) that a vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or service of

God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an act of latria or religion.

Reply Obj. 1. The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency; while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or praying. But promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise made to God, which is the essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the thing promised, which is the matter of the vow.

Reply Obj. 2. He who promises something gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises to give.

Reply Obj. 3. A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is made to a man, may be the matter of a vow, in so far as it is a virtuous act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something to the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the saints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to God to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or one's superiors.

Sixth Article.

Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow. Prosper says (*De Vita Contempl.* ii.): *We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly.* Now he who vows to fast puts himself

under the necessity of fasting. Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow.

Obj. 2. Further, The Apostle says (2 Cor. ix. 7) : *Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity : for God loveth a cheerful giver.* Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed : and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to *Met.* v.* Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow, than in fulfilment of a vow.

Obj. 3. Further, A vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the will on that which is vowed, as stated above (A. 4). But the will cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow.

On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. lxxv. 12, *Vow ye and pay,* says : *Vows are counselled to the will.* But a counsel is about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow : since he that does it without a vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow and the counsel to do it.

I answer that, For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because to vow, as stated above (A. 5), is an act of religion which is the chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is the better and the more meritorious for being commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being commanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for instance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence ; and being continent, which is an act of chastity) are better and more meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine worship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore Augustine says (*De*

* Ed. Did. iv., 5.

Virg. viii.) that *not even is virginity honourable as such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cherished by godly continence.*

Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects himself to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm* observes (*De Simil.* viii.). For this reason, we thank even those who promise, as stated above (A. 5, *ad* 2).

Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 4), just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. XIV., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted should be understood as referring to necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: *Lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly.* On the other hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.

Reply Obj. 2. According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine says (*Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin.* cxxvii.): *Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment.* If, however, the very deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion which

* Eadmer.

is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act.

Reply Obj. 3. He who does something without having vowed it has an immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow: for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did that particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A VOW IS SOLEMNIZED BY THE RECEPTION OF HOLY ORDERS, AND BY THE PROFESSION OF A CERTAIN RULE?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the reception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now external actions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but to men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper circumstance of a vow.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many things may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either with holy orders, nor to any particular rule: as when a man vows a pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization that takes place in the reception of holy orders or in the profession of a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow.

Obj. 3. Further, A solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow. Now many other vows may be made in public besides that which is pronounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule; which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only these vows are solemn.

On the contrary, These vows alone are an impediment to the contract of marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted,

which is the effect of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third Part of this work.*

I answer that, The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its nature (*conditio*) : thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes the fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God ; wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual pertaining to God ; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration which, in accordance with the institution of the apostles, is given when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the second degree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states (*Eccl. Hier.* vi.). The reason of this is that solemnization is not wont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only when the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine ministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession of a certain rule.

Reply Obj. 1. This kind of solemnization regards not only men but also God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration or blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister, according to Num. vi. 27, *They shall invoke My name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them.* Hence a solemn vow is more binding with God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either commits a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man vows particular deeds, such as a

* Suppl., Q. LIII., A. 2.

pilgrimage, or some special fast, such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or service: and yet many particular works are included under this vow as under a universal.

Reply Obj. 3. Through being pronounced in public vows may have a certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE SUBJECT TO ANOTHER'S POWER ARE HINDERED FROM TAKING VOWS?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking vows.

Obj. 2. Further, Children are under their parents' power. Yet children may make religious profession even without the consent of their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through being subject to another's power.

Obj. 3. Further, To do is more than to promise. But religious who are under the power of their superiors can do certain things without the permission of their superiors, such as to say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.

Obj. 4. Further, Whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.

On the contrary, It is commanded (Num. xxx. 4–6) that

if a woman vow any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age, she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is said there (*verses* 7–9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's power cannot bind themselves by vow.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power. Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a promise made to God, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power vows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.

Reply Obj. 2. As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his father.

A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his master's service.

Reply Obj. 3. A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to do something now and

then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent ; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the vow of one who is subject to another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not sin by vowing ; because his vow is understood to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior approve or do not gainsay it.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHILDREN CAN BIND THEMSELVES BY VOW TO ENTER RELIGION ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, it is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves by vow to enter religion.

Obj. 2. Further, That which can be validly done by one cannot be annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian (XX., qu. ii., cap *Puella*). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.

Obj. 3. Further, According to the rule of Blessed Benedict* and a statute of Innocent IV., a year's probation is granted to those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation, for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.

* Ch. 58.

On the contrary, That which is not done aright is invalid without being annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even before attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her parents within a year (XX., qu. ii., cap. *Puella*). Therefore even before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a vow to enter religion.

I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said above (A. 7), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to another's power, as stated above (A. 8). Now these two circumstances concur in children before the age of puberty, because in most instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents: wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens, however, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into account that which is of most frequent occurrence.

Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can, for their own part, bind

themselves by vow ; but their vows can be annulled by their parents, under whose care they are still subject.

Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account of the Church's decree* which considers the majority of cases. But after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument avails in the case of children who have not yet reached the use of reason : for their vows then are invalid, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. The vows of persons subject to another's power contain an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which are taken in profession.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER VOWS ADMIT OF DISPENSATION ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation. It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. xxvii. 9, 10, *A beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a better.* Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.

Obj. 2. Further, No man can grant a dispensation in matters concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as shown above (A. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First Table

* Sext. Decret. cap. *Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad Relig.*

since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of dispensation.

Obj. 3. Further, The obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity which a man owes to God, as stated above (A. 3). But no man can dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can anyone grant a dispensation from a vow.

On the contrary, That which proceeds from the common will of many has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.

I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, as stated above (I.-II., QQ. XCVI., A. 6; XCVII., A. 4), a law is made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances. But since in certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be observed. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or application of some common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food to a household.

In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good: and this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow, as is clear from what has been said above (A. 2). Therefore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular vow is not to be observed, this is called a *dispensation* from that vow; but if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was to have been observed, the vow is said to be *commuted.* Hence it is less to commute a vow

than to dispense from a vow: both, however, are in the power of the Church.

Reply Obj. 1. An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being, as it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason it could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an animal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law requires (*ibid.*). Even so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has intervened.

Reply Obj. 2. Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the Divine command; but it amounts to this—that what was law is not law in this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that which was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the Divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to which a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every circumstance.

Reply Obj. 3. The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not contrary to the fidelity due to God.

Eleventh Article.

whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle to a greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the good of an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to the good of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if certain persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of their country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency.

Obj. 2. Further, Religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity. Now if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice to God, he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he be dispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of chastity.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body. Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of continency.

Obj. 4. Further, Just as the vow of continency is part of the religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed from the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who are appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xxvi. 20): *No price is worthy of a continent soul.*

Further, (Extra, *De Statu Monach.*) at the end of the Decretal, *Cum ad Monasterium*, it is stated that the *renouncing*

of property, like the keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense from its observance.

I answer that, Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency; secondly, the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds himself by vow to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the solemnity of the vow. Accordingly, some* say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter of dispensation, on account of the continency itself for which no worthy price can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by continency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect of purity of both body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, far surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and yet one may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation. Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a matter of dispensation; especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor. vii. 34) exhorts us to be continent on account of contemplation, when he says that the unmarried woman . . . *thinketh on the things of God* (Vulg.—*the Lord*), and since the end is of more account than the means.

Consequently others† find the reason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For they assert that the vow of continency cannot be cancelled, save by something altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any vow. But this is evidently false, because just as the practice of carnal intercourse is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these latter vows may be a matter for dispensation.

For this reason others‡ maintain that one may be dispensed

* William of Auxerre, *Sum. Aur.* III. vii. 1, qu. 5.
† Albertus Magnus, *Sent.* iv. D. 38.
‡ Innocent IV, on the above decretal.

even from a solemn vow of continency, for the sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the example given above (*Obj.* 1), of a country being restored to peace through a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal quoted says explicitly that *not even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a monk from keeping chastity*, it follows, seemingly, that we must maintain that, as stated above (A. 10, *ad* 1, cf. Lev. xxvii. 9, 10, 28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to any other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose its consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, for instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated, so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate make a man that is consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so long as he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of consecration or blessing of the person who takes the vow, as stated above (A. 7). Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he was consecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest no more, although a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from exercising his order. In like manner the Pope cannot make a man who has made his religious profession cease to be a religious, although certain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary.

We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized; because if not, the solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that for which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing continency is connected with Holy Orders, not essentially but by the institution of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can grant a dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the reception of Holy Orders. On the other hand the obligation of observing continency is an essential condition of the religious state, whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to God's

service, for this is incompatible with matrimony, in which state a man is under the obligation of taking to himself a wife, of begetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring whatever is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 33) that *he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided.* Hence the *monk* takes his name from *unity** in contrast with this division. For this reason the Church cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession; and the reason assigned by the Decretal is because *chastity is bound up with the monastic rule.*

Reply Obj. 1. Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any human contingency.

Reply Obj. 2. A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a vow of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being an act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it is already an act of religion.

Reply Obj. 3. Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person, therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly ordered to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the person this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance by abstinence, or other corporal remedies.

Reply Obj. 4. A religious who is made a bishop is no more absolved from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since he must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither is he dispensed from

* The Greek μόνος.

his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he is not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of obedience.

The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency, which is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares (*De Sanct. Virgin.*, viii.). Wherefore it is said pointedly *of a continent soul*, not *of a continent body*.

Twelfth Article.

Whether the authority of a prelate is required for the commutation or the dispensation of a vow?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world, even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.* Therefore the commutation or dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior prelate.

Obj. 2. Further, To dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows, as stated above (A. 10, *ad* 2, A. 11). Likewise, when anyone rightly determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it have an evil result (Art. 2, *ad* 2). Therefore the authority of a prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.

Obj. 3. Further, If it belongs to a prelate's power to grant

* Cap. *Scripturæ, de Voto et Voti redempt.*

dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all prelates. But it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow. Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense from vows.

On the contrary, A vow binds one to do something, even as a law does. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation from a precept of the law, as stated above (I.-II., QQ. XCVI., A. 6; XCVII., A. 4). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise something to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what you promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place. Therefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God, according to 2 Cor. ii. 10: *For . . . have pardoned . . . for your sakes . . . in the person of Christ.* And he says significantly *for your sakes*, since whenever we ask a prelate for a dispensation we should do so to honour Christ in Whose person he dispenses, or to promote the interests of the Church which is His Body.

Reply Obj. 1. All other vows are about some particular works, whereas by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a Decretal* says that *a man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the perpetual service of religion.* And yet a man who enters religion is not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring the addition of other burdens.

Reply Obj. 2. Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at their will, for the reason that every vow

* Cap. *Scripturæ, de Voto et Voti redempt.*

supposes as a condition that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above (A. 8) that the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this condition, *if the father or master consent*, or *does not dissent*. And thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.

But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given *unto edification, not for destruction* (2 Cor. x. 8), and consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to God, namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide what is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God. Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's dispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious life, without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his vow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation or of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgement in the matter, because he does not stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate.

Reply Obj. 3. Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those vows that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows of pilgrimage,* fasting and the like. But the greater vows, such as of continency and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff.†

* Cap. *de Peregrin., de Voto et Voti redempt.* † *Ibid.*, Cap. *Ex multa.*

QUESTION LXXXIX.

OF OATHS.

(In Ten Articles.)

WE must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or the Name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name we shall treat now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of oath in order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly, by way of adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of invocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of oaths: and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) What is an oath? (2) Whether it is lawful? (3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath? (4) Of what virtue is it an act? (5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as something useful and good? (6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature? (7) Whether an oath is binding? (8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow? (9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation? (10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO SWEAR IS TO CALL GOD TO WITNESS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to witness, since it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would swear. But this is false. Therefore the antecedent is false also.

Obj. 2. Further, One does not pay anything to a person by calling him to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him: for it is written (Matth. v. 33): *Thou shalt pay* (Douay,—*perform*) *thy oaths to the Lord*; and Augustine says* that to swear (*jurare*) is *to pay the right* (*jus reddere*) *of truth to God*. Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.

Obj. 3. Further, The duties of a judge differ from the duties of a witness, as shown above (QQ. LXVII., LXX.). Now sometimes a man, by swearing, implores the Divine judgement, according to Ps. vii. 5, *If I have rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my enemies*. Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (*loc. cit.*): *When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that God is his witness?*

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. vi. 16), oaths are taken for the purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such matters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, for many give way to lying, according to Ps. xvi. 10, *Their mouth hath spoken lies* (Vulg.,—*proudly*). Secondly, on account of his lack of knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things, and our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is named *jurare* (to swear) because it is established as though it were a principle of law (*jure*) that what a man asserts under the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is called to witness

* *Serm.* clxxx.

when we assert present or past events, and this is termed a *declaratory oath;* while sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something future, and this is termed a *promissory oath.* But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come under the investigation of reason; for it would seem absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath.

Reply Obj. 1. It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.

Reply Obj. 2. A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal knowledge and unerring truth.

Reply Obj. 3. A person is called to give witness, in order that he may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness, and then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar He makes known his lie.

Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple contestation of God, as when a man says *God is my witness,* or, *I speak before God,* or, *By God,* which has the same meaning, as Augustine states;* the other is by cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to punishment if what is alleged be not true.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO SWEAR?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to swear.

* See argument *On the contrary.*

Nothing forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden (Matth. v. 34), *But I say to you not to swear at all;* and (James v. 12), *Above all things, my brethren, swear not.* Therefore swearing is unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful, because according to Matth. vii. 18, *neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.* Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Matth. v. 37): *But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which is over and above these is of evil.* Therefore swearing is apparently unlawful.

Obj. 3. Further, To seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God, and this is altogether unlawful, according to Deut. vi. 16, *Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.* Now he that swears seems to seek a sign of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is altogether unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. vi. 13): *Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name.*

I answer that, Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly: thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it *unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgement to himself* (1 Cor. xi. 29). Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to put an end to controversy (Heb. vi. 16).

Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if a man calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would seemingly prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he would not treat even a good

man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, according to James iii. 2, *If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man.* Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. xxiii. 9): *Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls.*

Reply Obj. 1. Jerome, commenting on Matth. v. 34, says: *Observe that our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth. For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing by the elements.* Yet this answer does not suffice, because James adds, *nor by any other oath.* Wherefore we must reply that, as Augustine states (*De Mendacio* xv.), *when the Apostle employs an oath in his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say to you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear easily and, from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swore only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids hasty words.*

Reply Obj. 2. According to Augustine (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i. 17): *If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is evil,' but 'is of evil.' For you do no evil; since you make good use of swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes of the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to swear.*

Reply Obj. 3. He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance. Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness at some future time, when He *will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts* (1 Cor. iv. 5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither for nor against him.

Third Article.

WHETHER THREE ACCOMPANYING CONDITIONS OF AN OATH ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED, NAMELY, JUSTICE, JUDGEMENT AND TRUTH?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that justice, judgement and truth are unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a part of justice, according to Tully (*De Invent. Rhet.* ii. 53): and judgement is an act of justice, as stated above (Q. LX., A. 1). Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably assigned.

Obj. 2. Further, Many other things are required for an oath, namely, devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things and cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are insufficiently enumerated.

Obj. 3. Further, These three are requisite in man's every deed: since he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without judgement, according to 1 Tim. v. 21, *Do nothing without prejudice*, i.e. without previous judgement.* Therefore these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with other human actions.

On the contrary, It is written (Jerem. iv. 2): *Thou shalt swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgement, and in justice:* which words Jerome expounds, saying: *Observe that an oath must be accompanied by these conditions, truth, judgement and justice.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), an oath is not good except for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous, but for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires judgement or discretion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor

* Vulg.,—*Observe these things without prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.*

unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgement, a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.

Reply Obj. 1. Judgement does not signify here the execution of justice, but the judgement of discretion, as stated above. Nor is truth here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of speech.

Reply Obj. 2. Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the right manner of swearing are implied by judgement: for the other two regard the thing sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that justice regards the reason for swearing.

Reply Obj. 3. There is great danger in swearing, both on account of the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an oath than for other human actions.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN OATH IS AN ACT OF RELIGION OR LATRIA?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion or latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle declares (Heb. vi. 16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to religion to give worship to God, as Tully says (*De Invent. Rhet.* ii. 53). But he who swears offers nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.

Obj. 3. Further, The end of religion or latria is to show reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. vi. 13): *Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt*

swear by His name. Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is an act of religion.

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (A. 1), he that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful. Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For this reason the Apostle says (Heb. vi. 16) that *men swear by one greater than themselves,* and Jerome commenting on Matth. v. 34, says that *he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears.* The Philosopher, too, states (*Met.* i. 3) that *to swear is to give very great honour.* Now to show reverence to God belongs to religion or latria; wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of religion or latria.

Reply Obj. 1. Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human. Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and not of the latter.

Reply Obj. 2. In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to the reverence and honour of God, so that he offers something to God, namely, reverence and honour.

Reply Obj. 3. Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honour of God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in God's honour that they may conduce to our neighbour's good, since God also works for His own glory and for our good.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER OATHS ARE DESIRABLE AND TO BE USED FREQUENTLY AS SOMETHING USEFUL AND GOOD?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that oaths are desirable and to

be used frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are desirable as being good essentially.

Obj. 2. Further, Jerome, commenting on Matth. v. 34, says that *he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears.* Now reverence and love of God are desirable as something good essentially. Therefore swearing is also.

Obj. 3. Further, Swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion. Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xxiii. 12): *A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity!* and Augustine says (*De Mendacio* xv.) that *the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your own part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of swearing, as though it were a good thing.*

I answer that, Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary: this is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary for this life; and such things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i., 17): *He who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good thing,* i.e. desirable for its own sake, *restrains himself as far as he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need.*

Reply Obj. 1. There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because by a vow we direct something to the honour of

God, so that for this very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason, become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from the end.

Reply Obj. 2. He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or love for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something else that is necessary for the present life.

Reply Obj. 3. Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it be employed aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. xxiii. 13), *if he make it void*, i.e. if he deceive his brother, *his sin shall be upon him: and if he dissemble it*, by swearing falsely, and with dissimulation, *he offendeth double*, (because, to wit, *pretended equity is a twofold iniquity*, as Augustine* declares): *and if he swear in vain*, i.e. without due cause and necessity, *he shall not be justified.*

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO SWEAR BY CREATURES?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by creatures. It is written (Matth. v. 34–36): *I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by Jerusalem . . . nor by thy head:* and Jerome, expounding these words, says: *Observe that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven and earth*, etc.

Obj. 2. Further, Punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is written (XXII., qu. i., can. *Clericum*): *If a cleric swears by creatures he must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this vicious habit we wish that he*

* *Enarr. in Ps.* lxiii. 7.

be excommunicated. Therefore it is unlawful to swear by creatures.

Obj. 3. Further, An oath is an act of religion, as stated above (A. 4). But religious worship is not due to any creature according to Rom. i. 23, 25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature.

On the contrary, Joseph swore *by the health of Pharao* (Gen. xlii. 16). Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics, and by the saints.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3), there are two kinds of oath. One is uttered as a simple contestation or calling God as witness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth. Now faith is essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very truth, and secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as stated above (Q. I., A. 1). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred to God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an appeal by oath is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God Whose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints, who believed this truth and kept it.

The other way of swearing is by cursing: and in this kind of oath a creature is adduced that the judgement of God may be wrought therein. Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some other thing that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. i. 23), saying: *I call God to witness upon my soul.*

As to Joseph's oath *by the health of Pharao,* this may be understood in both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's health to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to the truth of God's justice which the princes of the earth are appointed to execute.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds (*ibid.*) that *the Jews, through swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures with a Divine honour.*

In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (*loc. cit.*, *Obj.* 2), for swearing by a creature, for this savours of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter it is said: *If any one swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter blasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be degraded.*

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *Second Objection.*

Reply Obj. 3. Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is invoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Exod. xxiii. 13): *By the name of strange gods you shall not swear.* But religious worship is not given to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN OATH HAS A BINDING FORCE?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a person makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true, though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. i. 15, *seqq.*), though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Cor. xvi. 5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue is not contrary to virtue (*Categ.* viii. 22). Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above (A. 4). But it would sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance if one were to swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action. Therefore an oath is not always binding.

Obj. 3. Further, Sometimes a man is compelled against his will to promise something under oath. Now, *such a person is loosed by the Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath* (Extra, *De Jurejur.*, cap. *Verum in ea quæst.* etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.

Obj. 4. Further, No person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet sometimes the person who swears and the

person to whom he swears have opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. v. 33): *Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord.*

I answer that, An obligation implies something to be done or omitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath (which is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are about something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example, if one were to swear that it would rain to-morrow), but only such as are about things to be done by the person who swears.

Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a difference: since, in the oath that is about the past or present, this obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what is or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is made about something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has sworn, else his oath lacks truth.

Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is lacking in judgement of discretion: unless perchance what was possible when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap; as when a man swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in fact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 3, *ad* 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he can do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or because it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or a hindrance to good. For in either case *its result is evil.**

Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do

* Cf. Bede, *Homil.* xix., *in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.*

something is bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, judgement and justice.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the truth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do, since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the doer. But an oath should not be employed save in a matter about which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn, through reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil result, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First, because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric, or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be expedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this kind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing (through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer of good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he does much better if he does not keep it.

Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset, supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel asked what it was right to grant; but the fulfilment of the oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (*De Officiis* i. 50): *Sometimes it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath;*

as Herod, who granted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised.

Reply Obj. 3. There is a twofold obligation in the oath which a man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the person to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the promise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue of which he is bound to fulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not removed in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather to suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the contrary, because such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of this kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed the obligation for some just cause.

Reply Obj. 4. When the intention of the swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due to the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* ii. 31): *However artful a man may be in wording his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as understood by the person to whom it is made.* And that this refers to the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: *He is doubly guilty who both takes God's name in vain, and tricks his neighbour by guile.* If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (*Moral.* xxvi. 7): *The human ear takes suchlike words in their natural outward sense, but the Divine judgement interprets them according to our inward intention.*

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN OATH IS MORE BINDING THAN A VOW?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A vow is a simple promise : whereas an oath includes, besides a promise, an appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a vow.

Obj. 2. Further, The weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger. Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is stronger than a vow.

Obj. 3. Further, The obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation of the mind, as stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1) ; while the obligation of an oath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since therefore God's truth is something greater than human deliberation, it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow.

On the contrary, A vow binds one to God, while an oath sometimes binds one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore a vow is more binding than an oath.

I answer that, The obligation both of a vow and of an oath arises from something Divine ; but in different ways. For the obligation of a vow arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject to his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by its very nature is more binding than an oath.

Reply Obj. 1. A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to God ; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous.

Reply Obj. 2. An oath is added to a vow, not because it is more stable, but because greater stability results from *two immutable things.**

* Heb. vi. 18.

Reply Obj. 3. Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause of stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYONE CAN DISPENSE FROM AN OATH?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath. Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither can anyone dispense a man from making true that which he has promised by oath to do in the future.

Obj. 2. Further, A promissory oath is used for the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the reverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted by anyone.

Obj. 3. Further, Any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow, except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 12, *ad* 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly this is to be against the law.* Therefore it would seem that an oath does not admit of dispensation.

On the contrary, A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated above (A. 8). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath does also.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 10), the necessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that something which is useful

* Caus. XV., qu. 6, can. *Auctoritatem, sqq.:* Cap. *Si vero, de Jurejurando.*

and morally good in itself and considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgement. Therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensation.

Reply Obj. 1. A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just as we have said with regard to vows (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 10, *ad* 2). Now the matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the matter of the oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept about the keeping of oaths.

Reply Obj. 2. One man may promise something under oath to another in two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for instance, if he promise to serve him or to give him money: and from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it: for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises another something pertaining to God's honour or to the benefit of others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case the person to whom the promise

is made cannot release him that made the promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God: unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, *provided he give his consent* or some suchlike condition.

Reply Obj. 3. Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter religion: and such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A. 7, *ad* 2). Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. In this case any Bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, when there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a father may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Num. xxx. 6 *sqq.*), as stated above with regard to vows (Q. LXXXVIII., AA. 8, 9).

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN OATH IS VOIDED BY A CONDITION OF PERSON OR TIME?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. vi. 16), is employed for the purpose of con-

firmation. Now it is competent to anyone to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.

Obj. 2. Further, To swear by God is more than to swear by the Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom* says: *If there is a reason for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great thing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be said: Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for the sake of the Scriptures.* Now men of all conditions and at all times are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to swear by the Gospels.

Obj. 3. Further, The same effect does not proceed from contrary causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children, for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person ought not to be debarred from swearing neither on account of his dignity, as clerics, nor on account of the solemnity of the time.

Obj. 4. Further, In this world no living man is equal in dignity to an angel: for it is written (Matth. xi. 11) that *he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he*, namely than John the Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it is written (Apoc. x. 6) that the angel *swore by Him that liveth for ever and ever*. Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, on account of his dignity.

On the contrary, It is stated (II., qu. v., can. *Si quis presbyter*): *Let a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of being put on his oath: and* (XXII., qu. v., can. *Nullus*): *Let no one in ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman.*

I answer that, Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is on the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and

* *Hom.* xliv. in the *Opus Imperfectum*, falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

in this respect we should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason children before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths,* and are not called upon to swear, because they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to take an oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due to it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated with due reverence, the law says (XXII., qu. v., can. *Honestum*) : It is *becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and fear of God.*

The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what he says, wherefore *it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear.* For this reason the law says (II., qu. v., can. *Si quis presbyter*) that *priests should not swear for trifling reasons.* Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, or if a great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take oaths on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves to spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths on temporal matters, except perhaps in cases of grave necessity.

Reply Obj. 1. Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on account of their own defect : and some there are whose words should be so certain that they need no confirmation.

Reply Obj. 2. The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (*Ad Public., Ep.* xlvii.) : and accordingly it is a graver matter to swear by God than by the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account of the manner of swearing ; for instance, an oath by the Gospels might be

* Caus. XXII., qu. 5, can. *Parvuli.*

taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God frivolously and without deliberation.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are of such little authority that their oaths have no standing.

Reply Obj. 4. The angel's oath is adduced, not on account of any defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word, but in order to show that the statement made issues from God's infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of this word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. vi. 17).

QUESTION XC.

OF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION.

(In Three Articles.)

WE must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration: under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man? (2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons? (3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ADJURE A MAN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man. Origen says (*Tract. xxxv. super Matth.*): *I deem that a man who wishes to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For if, according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear, it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and consequently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured Jesus by the living God.*

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion. But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man.

Obj. 3. Further, To adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it belongs to a man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors.

On the contrary, Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain holy things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful *by the mercy of God* (Rom. xii. 1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is lawful to adjure.

I answer that, A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of his promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so orders himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man can order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others, by beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as stated above (Q. LXXXIII., A. 1). Accordingly when either of these orderings is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this difference between them, that man is master of his own actions, but not of those of others; wherefore he can put himself under an obligation by invoking the Divine name, whereas he cannot put others under such an obligation unless they be his subjects, whom he can compel on the strength of the oath they have taken.

Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing, intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps over another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.

If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name or of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully employed in respect of anyone.

Reply Obj. 1. Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man intends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he would bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure Our Lord Jesus Christ.*

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an obligation.

Reply Obj. 3. To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a certain thing.

Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another;

* Matth. xxvi. 63.

because when we adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ADJURE THE DEMONS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says (*Tract. xxxv. super Matth.*): *To adjure the demons is not in accordance with the power given by Our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice.* Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

Obj. 2. Further, Many make use of necromantic incantations when invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration. Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore the antecedent is false also.

Obj. 3. Further, Whoever adjures a person, by that very fact associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship with the demons, according to 1 Cor. x. 20, *I would not that you should be made partakers with devils.* Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

On the contrary, It is written (Mark xvi. 17): *In My name they shall cast out devils.* Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons.

I answer that, As stated in the preceding article, there are two ways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence of some holy thing; the other by way of compulsion. In the first way it is not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way seems to savour of benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear towards the demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which is by compulsion,

we may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not for others. For during the course of this life the demons are our adversaries: and their actions are not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy angels, because, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 4), *the rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit.* Accordingly we may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjuring them through the power of God's name, lest they do us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ, as recorded by Luke (x. 19): *Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall hurt you.*

It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when certain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use of the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we read of the Blessed James* that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the instrumentality of the demons.

Reply Obj. 1. Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly appeal.

Reply Obj. 2. Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on Our Lord's words to the unclean spirit (Mark i. 25), *Speak no more, and go out of the man,* says: *A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the demons, however much they speak the truth.*

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the adjuration whereby the demon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this savours of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.

* The Greater. Cf. Apocrypha, N.T., *Hist. Certam. Apost.* iv. 3.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ADJURE AN IRRATIONAL CREATURE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature. An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore it is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible, swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ adjuration towards one.

Obj. 3. Further, There are two ways of adjuring, as explained above (AA. 1, 2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their own actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and, seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because we have not the power to command irrational creatures, but only He of Whom it was said (Matth. viii. 27): *For the winds and the sea obey Him.* Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational creatures.

On the contrary, Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons and to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert.*

I answer that, Irrational creatures are directed to their own actions by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and moved is also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement of the arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation of the irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also ascribed to the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of irrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man.

Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may

* From the apocryphal *Historiæ Certam. Apost.* vi. 19.

be of two kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of this kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God: secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

QUESTION XCI.

OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF PRAISE.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken (Q. LXXXIII.). Wherefore we must speak now of praise.

Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether God should be praised with the lips? (2) Whether God should be praised with song?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD SHOULD BE PRAISED WITH THE LIPS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God should not be praised with the lips. The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* 1. 12.): *The best of men are accorded, not praise, but something greater.* But God transcends the very best of all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, but something greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus. xliii. 33) to be *above all praise.*

Obj. 2. Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it is an act of religion. Now God is worshipped with the mind rather than with the lips: wherefore Our Lord quoted against certain ones the words of Isa. xxix. 13, *This people . . . honours* (Vulg.,—*glorifies*) *Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me.* Therefore the praise of God lies in the heart rather than on the lips.

Obj. 3. Further, Men are praised with the lips that they may be encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked proud, so does it incite the good to better

things. Wherefore it is written (Prov. xxvii. 21): *As silver is tried in the fining-pot, . . . so a man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth.* But God is not incited to better things by man's words, both because He is unchangeable, and because He is supremely good, and it is not possible for Him to grow better. Therefore God should not be praised with the lips.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lxii. 6): *My mouth shall praise Thee with joyful lips.*

I answer that, We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason, and in speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man we use words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to him. Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or others may learn that have a good opinion of him: so that in consequence we may incite him to yet better things; and that we may induce others, who hear him praised, to think well of him, to reverence him, and to imitate him. On the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who is the searcher of hearts, but that we may bring ourselves and our hearers to reverence Him.

Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is aroused towards Him, according to Ps. xlix. 23: *The sacrifice of praise shall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the salvation of God.* And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed to God, according to Isa. xlviii. 9, *For My praise I will bridle thee lest thou shouldst perish.* The praise of the lips is also profitable to others by inciting their affections towards God, wherefore it is written (Ps. xxxiii. 2): *His praise shall always be in my mouth,* and farther on: *Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with me.*

Reply Obj. 1. We may speak of God in two ways. First, with regard to His essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, He is above all praise. In this respect

we owe Him reverence and the honour of latria; wherefore Ps. lxiv. 2 is rendered by Jerome in his Psalter :* *Praise to Thee is speechless, O God,* as regards the first, and as to the second, *A vow shall be paid to Thee.* Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects which are ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise; wherefore it is written (Isa. lxiii. 7): *I will remember the tender mercies of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that the Lord hath bestowed upon us.* Again, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* 1.): *Thou wilt find that all the sacred hymns,* i.e. divine praises *of the sacred writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed Processions of the Thearchy,* i.e. of the Godhead, *showing forth and praising the names of God.*

Reply Obj. 2. It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when it fervently recalls *the glorious things of His works.*† Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the inward fervour of those who praise, and to incite others to praise God, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours as stated.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD SHOULD BE PRAISED WITH SONG?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that God should not be praised with song. For the Apostle says (Coloss. iii. 16): *Teaching and admonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles.* Now we should employ nothing in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on the authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising God, we should employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.

Obj. 2. Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. v. 19, *Singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord,* says: *Listen young men whose duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung not with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like play-actors, ease your throat and jaws with*

* Translated from the Hebrew. † Cf. Ecclus. xvii. 7, 8.

medicaments, and make the church resound with theatrical measures and airs. Therefore God should not be praised with song.

Obj. 3. Further, The praise of God is competent to little and great, according to Apoc. xiv., *Give praise to our God, all ye His servants; and you that fear Him, little and great.* But the great, who are in the church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (*Regist.* iv. *ep.* 44): *I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar must not sing.* (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. *In sancta Romana Ecclesia.*) Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.

Obj. 4. Further, In the Old Law God was praised with musical instruments and human song, according to Ps. xxxii. 2, 3: *Give praise to the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument of ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle.* But the Church does not make use of musical instruments, such as harps and psalteries, in the divine praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in like manner neither should song be used in the divine praises.

Obj. 5. Further, The praise of the heart is more important than the praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from the consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to understand the things that are sung than if they were recited without chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.

On the contrary, Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church of Milan, as Augustine relates (*Conf.* ix.).

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the praise of the voice is necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted in the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the Philosopher states (*Polit.* viii. 5), and also Boethius (*De Musica,* prologue). Hence

the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion. Wherefore Augustine says (*Conf.* x. 33) : *I am inclined to approve of the usage of singing in the church, that so by the delight of the ears the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of devotion* : and he says of himself (*ibid.* ix. 6) : *I wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched to the quick by the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church.*

Reply Obj. 1. The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as suchlike canticles arouse spiritual devotion.

Reply Obj. 2. Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse devotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence Augustine says (*Conf.* x. 33) : *When it befalls me to be more moved by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally, and then had rather not hear the singer.*

Reply Obj. 3. To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates, whom it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by means of preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, lest thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says (*ibid.*) : *It is a most discreditable custom for those who have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it behoves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and to taking charge of the alms.*

Reply Obj. 4. As the Philosopher says (*Polit.* viii. 6), *Teaching should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument such as the harp or anything else of this kind : but only with such things as make good hearers.* For suchlike musical instruments move the soul to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it. In the Old Testament instruments of this description were employed, both because the people were more coarse and carnal—so that they needed to be aroused by such instruments as also by earthly

promises—and because these material instruments were figures of something else.

Reply Obj. 5. The soul is distracted from that which is sung, by a chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as Augustine remarks (*Conf.* x. 33), *each affection of our spirit, according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the voice and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is stirred.* The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them understand not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung, namely, for God's glory : and this is enough to arouse their devotion.

QUESTION XCII.

OF SUPERSTITION.

(*In Two Articles.*)

IN due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and afterwards irreligion and its parts.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion? (2) Whether it has several parts or species?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SUPERSTITION IS A VICE CONTRARY TO RELIGION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other. But religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the latter is defined as being *immoderate observance of religion*, according to a gloss on Coloss. ii. 23, *Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in superstition.* Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.

Obj. 2. Further, Isidore says (*Etym.* x.): *Cicero* states that the superstitious were so called because they spent the day*

* *De Natura Deorum* ii., 28.

in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive (*superstites*) *them.* But this may be done even in accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to religion.

Obj. 3. Further, Superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 5, *ad* 3), there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Decem Chord.* Serm. ix.) : *Thou strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of superstition hath fallen.* Now the worship of one God belongs to religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 5), religion is a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above (I-II., Q. LXIV., A. 1). Therefore a two-fold vice is opposed to a moral virtue ; one by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circumstance called *how much*, but also with regard to other circumstances : so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and magnificence ; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (*Ethic.* iv. 1, 2, 3).

Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil things—thus we speak of a good thief—so too sometimes the names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke xvi. 8, *The children of this world are more prudent* (Douay,—*wiser*) *in their*

generation than the children of light. It is in this way that superstition is described as religion.

Reply Obj. 2. The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ sometimes: for *lapis* (a stone) takes its name from hurting the foot (*lædere pedem*), but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that *superstition* means that from which the word is derived.

Reply Obj. 3. Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine worship that ought not to be done.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE VARIOUS SPECIES OF SUPERSTITION?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are not various species of superstition. According to the Philosopher (*Topic.* i. 13), *if one contrary includes many kinds, so does the other.* Now religion, to which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has superstition various species.

Obj. 2. Further, Opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are directed to God, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1). Therefore superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain human actions.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Coloss. ii. 23, *Which things have . . . a show of wisdom in superstition,* adds: *that is to say in a hypocritical religion.* Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of superstition.

On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various species of superstition (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 20).

I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances (A. 1). For as we have stated (I.-II., Q. LXXII., A. 9), not every diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above (I.-II., Q. I., A. 3: Q. XVIII., AA. 2, 6).

Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true God, but *in an undue mode,* and this is the first species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstition, divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first place to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species of this genus is *idolatry,* which unduly gives divine honour to a creature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by God Whom he worships; and to this must be referred *divinatory* superstition, which consults the demons through compacts made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the superstition of certain *observances.*

Augustine alludes to these three (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 20), where he says that *anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols is superstitious,* and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on to say, *or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens,* which refers to the second species; and a little further on he adds: *To this kind belong all sorts of amulets and suchlike,* and this refers to the third species.

Reply Obj. 1. As Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.), *good results*

from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single defect. Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated above (A. 1 : Q. X., A. 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.

Reply Obj. 2. Divinations and certain observances come under the head of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the demons : and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.

Reply Obj. 3. Hypocritical religion is taken here for *religion as applied to human observances*, as the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given to God in an undue mode : as, for instance, if a man were, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.

QUESTION XCIII.

OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true God: (2) Of the superstition of idolatry: (3) Of divinatory superstition: (4) Of the superstition of observances.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? (2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANYTHING PERNICIOUS IN THE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel ii. 32): *Everyone that shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.* Now whoever worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.

Obj. 2. Further, It is the same God that is worshipped by the just in any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just worshipped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special kind of worship, as related in Genesis xxviii. Therefore now also no worship of God is pernicious.

Obj. 3. Further, Nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet the Church tolerates various rites of divine

worship: wherefore Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (*Regist.* xi. *ep.* 64), who stated that there existed in the churches various customs in the celebration of Mass, wrote: *I wish you to choose carefully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the Church.* Therefore no way of worshipping God is pernicious.

On the contrary, Augustine* in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in a gloss on Gal. ii. 14) says that *after the Gospel truth had been preached the legal observances became deadly,* and yet these observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be something deadly in the divine worship.

I answer that, As Augustine states (*Cont. Mendac.* xiv.), *a most pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to Christian religion.* Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above (Q. LXXXI., A. 7). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship, this worship will be pernicious.

Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of the worshipper, and especially in common worship which is offered by ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the guilt of falsehood who, on the part of the Church,

* Jerome (*Ep.* lxxv., *ad Aug.*). See Opp. August. *Ep.* lxxxii.

gives worship to God contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine authority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose * says: *He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered it.* For this reason, too, a gloss on Coloss. ii. 23 says that superstition is *the use of human observances under the name of religion.*

Reply Obj. 1. Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in spirit and truth, according to Jo. iv. 23. Hence a worship that contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.

Reply Obj. 2. Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by an inward instinct as to the way of worshipping God, and others followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.

Reply Obj. 3. The various customs of the Church in the divine worship are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them, and to disregard them is unlawful.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANY EXCESS IN THE WORSHIP OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship of God. It is written (Ecclus. xliii. 32): *Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, for He will yet far exceed.* Now the divine worship is directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess in it.

Obj. 2. Further, Outward worship is a profession of inward worship, *whereby God is worshipped with faith, hope, and charity,* as Augustine says (*Enchirid.* iii.). Now there can be no excess in faith, hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of God.

* *Comment. in* 1 *ad Cor.* xi. 27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard.

Obj. 3. Further, To worship God consists in offering to Him what we have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God. Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God's honour, there will be no excess in the divine worship.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 18) *that the good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies from Holy Writ.* But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.

I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God. Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion, through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God's glory, and subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine worship, provided it be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives.

On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the general custom—which, according to Augustine,* *has the force of law*—all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine (*De Vera Relig.* iii.) quotes the words of Luke xvii. 21, *The kingdom of God is within you,* against the *superstitious,* those, to wit, who pay more attention to externals.

Reply Obj. 1. The glorification of God implies that what

* *Ad Casulan., Ep.* xxxvi.

is done is done for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by superstition.

Reply Obj. 2. Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with external acts, which sometimes have no connexion with these virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers excess by way of absolute quantity.

QUESTION XCIV.

OF IDOLATRY.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition? (2) Whether it is a sin? (3) Whether it is the gravest sin? (4) Of the cause of this sin.

The question whether one should hold communication with idolaters has been treated above under the head of unbelief (Q. X., AA. 7, 10).

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IDOLATRY IS RIGHTLY RECKONED A SPECIES OF SUPERSTITION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above (Q. XI., A. 1). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition.

Obj. 2. Further, Latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is nothing cannot be the species of any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. viii. 4): *We know that an idol is*

nothing in the world, and further on (x. 19): *What then? Do I say that what is offered in sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?* implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of superstition.

Obj. 4. Further, It belongs to superstition to give divine honour to whom that honour is not due. Now divine honour is undue to idols, just as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached (Rom. i. 25) for that they *worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator*. Therefore this species of superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be named *worship of creatures*.

On the contrary, It is related (Acts xvii. 16) that when Paul awaited Silas and Timothy at Athens, *his spirit was stirred within him seeing the whole city given to idolatry*, and further on (*verse* 22) he says: *Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too superstitious*. Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XCII., A. 2), it belongs to superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given. Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1) when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is superstition to give divine worship to any creature whatsoever.

Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or shape, which is called an *idol*. Yet divine worship was given to idols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed images which produced certain effects by the power of the demons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained something God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This was the opinion of Hermes

Trismegistus,* as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei* viii. 23): while others gave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. i. 23, 25). For, as regards the former, he says: *They changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things*, and of the latter he says: *Who . . . worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator.*

These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men; for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God to be nothing else than a soul governing the world by movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but of his soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (*De Civ. Dei* vii. 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme god. These they called *gods*, on account of their having a share of the godhead; but we call them *angels*. After these they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these again they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (*De Civ. Dei* xviii. 14).

The last two opinions were held to belong to *natural theology* which the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in the schools: while the other,

* *De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep.*

relating to the worship of men, was said to belong to *mythical theology* which was wont to be represented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion relating to images was held to belong to *civil theology*, which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples.*

Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Doct. Christ.* ii. 20): *Anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, is superstitious.*

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false opinion. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of superstition.

Reply Obj. 2. The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax is univocally the same, whether it be paid to the true or to a false king. In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and to that which is carnal.

Reply Obj. 3. The saying of the Apostle that *an idol is nothing in the world* means that those images which were called idols, were not animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we must understand the saying that *what is offered in sacrifice to idols is not*

* *Ibid.* vi. 5.

anything, because by being thus sacrificed the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.

Reply Obj. 4. It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the term *idolatry* was used to signify any worship of a creature, even without the use of images.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IDOLATRY IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a sin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in Exod. xxv., and in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Reverence should be paid to every superior. But the angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like.

Obj. 3. Further, The most high God should be honoured with an inward worship, according to John iv. 24, *God . . . they must adore . . . in spirit and in truth:* and Augustine says (*Enchirid.* iii.), that *God is worshipped by faith, hope and charity.* Now a man may happen to worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly without prejudice to the divine worship.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xx. 5): *Thou shalt not adore them*, i.e. outwardly, *nor serve them*, i.e. inwardly, as a gloss explains it: and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.

I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this

matter. For some* have thought that to offer sacrifices and other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that divine honour should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due to the most high God, Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is the worship of latria.

Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that *these visible sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered.*† The reason is that, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 19), *external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts.*

Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* vi. 10) quotes Seneca as saying: *We shall adore*, says he, *in such a way as to remember that our worship is in accordance with custom rather than with the reality*: and (*De Vera Relig.* v.) Augustine says that *we must not seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the nature of their gods, and the sovereign good.* This error was embraced also by certain heretics,‡ who affirmed that it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart.

But this is evidently false. For since outward worship

* The School of Plato. † Augustine, as quoted below.
‡ The Helcesaitæ.

is a sign of the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary of what one holds inwardly of the true faith, so too is it a wicked falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments of one's heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (*De Civ. Dei* vi. 10) in that *his worship of idols was so much the more infamous, forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by him that the people believed him to act honestly.*

Reply Obj. 1. Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we shall state in the Third Part (Q. XXV., A. 3).

The *Replies* to the *Second* and *Third Objections* are evident from what has been said above.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IDOLATRY IS THE GRAVEST OF SINS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins. The worst is opposed to the best (*Ethic.* viii. 10). But interior worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which is opposed to external worship.

Obj. 2. Further, The more a sin is against God the more grievous it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems that lesser evils are punished

with greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against nature, as stated in Rom. i. 26. Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin than idolatry.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xx. 5): *Neither do we say that you*, viz. the Manichees, *are pagans, or a sect of pagans, but that you bear a certain likeness to them, since you worship many gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship things that exist, but should not be worshipped as gods, whereas you worship things that exist not at all.* Therefore the vice of heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry.

Obj. 5. Further, A gloss of Jerome on Gal. iv. 9, *How turn you again to the weak and needy elements?* says: *The observance of the Law, to which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship of idols, to which they had been given before their conversion.* Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Levit. xv. 25, about the uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: *Every sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry.*

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honour to another than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God's honour to a creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of one that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin through ignorance.

Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on the part of the sinner.

Reply Obj. 1. Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without internal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated above (A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith by deeds.

Reply Obj. 3. Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin; and in this way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of the sin of idolatry, in other that, as by idolatry man abuses the order of the divine honour, so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature.

Reply Obj. 4. Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more derogatory to the divine honour, since they set up two gods in opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their belief in one God and worship Him alone.

Reply Obj. 5. The observance of the Law during the time of grace is not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but *almost* equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CAUSE OF IDOLATRY WAS ON THE PART OF MAN?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the part of man. In man there is nothing but either

nature, virtue, or guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's nature, since rather does man's natural reason dictate that there is one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in man on the part of virtue, since *a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit*, according to Matth. vii. 18: nor again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to Wis. xiv. 27, *the worship of abominable idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil.* Therefore idolatry has no cause on the part of man.

Obj. 2. Further, Those things which have a cause in man are found among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated* to have been originated either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshipped. Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (*Etym.* viii. 11), Prometheus was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xxi. 6): *It was not possible to learn, for the first time, except from their* (i.e. the demons') *teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and their professors:* and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. xiv. 14): *By the vanity of men they,* i.e. idols, *came into the world.*

I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divine honour, through either loving or revering them too much. This cause is assigned (Wis. xiv. 15): *A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly*

* Peter Comestor, *Hist. Genes.*, xxxvii., xl.

taken away : and him who then had died as a man he began now to worship as a god. The same passage goes on to say (*verse* 21) that *men serving either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name* (Vulg.,—*names*), i.e. of the Godhead, *to stones and wood.* Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher observes (*Poet.* iv.), wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human images skilfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship ; hence it is written (Wis. xiii. 11–17) : *If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his children, or his marriage.* Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. xiii. 1, 2) : *All men . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world.*

The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvellous. Hence it is written (Ps. xcv. 5) : *All the gods of the Gentiles are devils.*

Reply Obj. 1. The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, or disorder in his affections, as stated above ; and this pertains to guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in the worship of idols ; such as homicides,

mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.

Reply Obj. 2. There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed over the devil.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the consummative cause of idolatry.

QUESTION XCV.

OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether divination is a sin? (2) Whether it is a species of superstition? (3) Of the species of divination: (4) Of divination by means of demons: (5) Of divination by the stars: (6) Of divination by dreams: (7) Of divination by auguries and like observances: (8) Of divination by lots.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER DIVINATION IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is derived from something *divine*: and things that are divine pertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* i. 1): *Who dares to say that learning is an evil?* and again: *I could nowise admit that intelligence can be an evil.* But some arts are divinatory, as the Philosopher states (*De Memor.* i.): and divination itself would seem to pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore divination is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xviii. 10, 11): *Neither let there be found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers:* and it is stated in the

Decretals (XXVI., qu. v., can. *Qui divinationes*) : *Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a penance of five years' duration, according to the fixed grades of penance.*

I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The future may be foreknown in two ways : first in its causes, secondly in itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold : for some produce their effects, of necessity and always : and suchlike future effects can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most part, yet they rarely fail : and from suchlike causes their future effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians, concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in themselves, are indifferent ; and this is chiefly the case in the rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to the Philosopher.* Suchlike effects, as also those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to produce these effects. Consequently suchlike effects cannot be foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking : the consideration of such things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in the First Part (Q. XIV., A. 13 ; Q. LVII., A. 3 : Q. LXXXVI., A. 4). Hence it is written (Isa. xli. 23) : *Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.* Therefore if anyone presume to foreknow or foretell suchlike future things by any means whatever, except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what

* *Metaph.* viii. 2, 5, 8.

belongs to God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore Isidore says (*Etym.* viii. 9): *They are called divines, as though they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men.*

Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then he does not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives something divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mich. iii. 9 *sqq.* that *divination is always taken in an evil sense.*

Reply Obj. 1. Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil's deceit, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xxi. 8).

Reply Obj. 3. Man has a natural inclination to know the future by human means, but not by the undue means of divination.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER DIVINATION IS A SPECIES OF SUPERSTITION?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that divination is not a species of superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine (*De Vera Relig.* xxxviii.).* Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition.

* Cf. *De Doct. Christ.* ii. 23, 24: *De Divin. Dæm.* 3.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as religion is due worship, so is superstition undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.

Obj. 3. Further, Superstition is opposed to religion. But in true religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.

On the contrary, Origen says in his *Peri Archon**: *There is an operation of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly, under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of the demons.* Now, according to Augustine (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 20, 23), *whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is superstitious.* Therefore divination is a species of superstition.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1 : QQ. XCII., XCIV.), superstition denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of God in two ways : in one way, it is something offered to God ; as a sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind : in another way, it is something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an oath (Q. LXXXIX., A. 4, *ad* 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all divination results from the demons' operation, either because the demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the future, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this kind of vanity it is written (Ps. xxxix. 5) : *Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies.* Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be foreknown.

* The quotation is from his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers.

Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of superstition.

Reply Obj. 1. Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind of superstition as regards the mode of operation.

Reply Obj. 2. This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express, with the demons.

Reply Obj. 3. In the New Law man's mind is restrained from solicitude about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there were consultations about the future in connection with religious matters. Hence where it is written (Isa. viii. 19): *And when they shall say to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their enchantments*, it is added by way of answer: *Should not the people seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead?* *

In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE OUGHT TO DISTINGUISH SEVERAL SPECIES OF DIVINATION?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that we should not distinguish several species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not several species of divination.

Obj. 2. Further, A human act takes its species from its

* Vulg.,—*seek of their God, for the living of the dead?*

end, as stated above (I.-II., Q. I., A. 3: Q. XVIII., A. 6). But all divination is directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore all divinations are of one species.

Obj. 3. Further, Signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether one detracts by word, writing or gestures, it is the same species of sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore there are not several species of divination.

On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species of divination (*Etym.* viii. 9).

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), all divinations seek to acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have been explained in the First Part (Q. LVII., A. 3). When demons are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order to foretell the future: and this species is called *prestigiation* because man's eyes are blindfolded (*praestringuntur*). Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is called *divination by dreams*: sometimes they employ apparitions or utterances of the dead, and this species is called *necromancy*, for as Isidore observes (*Etym.* viii.) in Greek, *νεκρόν means dead, and μαντεία divination, because after certain incantations and the sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to answer questions.* Sometimes they foretell the future through living men, as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by *pythons*, of whom Isidore says that *pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination.* Sometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called *geomancy*, if in water *hydromancy*, if in the air *aeromancy*, if in fire *pyromancy*,

if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the altars of demons, *aruspicy*.

The divination which is practised without express invocation of the demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of certain things. If one endeavour to know the future by observing the position and movements of the stars, this belongs to *astrologers*, who are also called *genethliacs*, because they take note of the days on which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs, this belongs in general to *augury*, which is so called from the chattering of birds (*avium garritu*), just as *auspice* is derived from watching birds (*avium inspectione*). These are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If, however, these observations have for their object men's words uttered unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that he wishes to foreknow, then it is called an *omen*: and as Valerius Maximus* remarks, *the observing of omens has a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating whether they would change their position, a centurion happened to exclaim at the time: "Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best stand here": and on hearing these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned their intention of advancing further.* If, however, the observation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of divination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines of the hand is called *chiromancy*, i.e. divination of the hand (because χείρ is the Greek for hand): while the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is called *spatulamancy*.

To this second species of divination, which is without express invocation of the demons, belongs that which is

* *De Dict. Fact. Memor.* i. 5.

practised by observing certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult, whether by drawing lots, which is called *geomancy;* or by observing the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out several unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the lesser; or by throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest score; or by observing what catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are named *sortilege.*

Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the head of *necromancy;* the second is merely an observation of the disposition or movement of some other being, and this belongs to *augury;* while the third consists in doing something in order to discover the occult; and this belongs to *sortilege.* Under each of these many others are contained, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 1. In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not the same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous to invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the demons' interference.

Reply Obj. 2. Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the various species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters, according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.

Reply Obj. 3. The things observed by diviners are considered by them, not as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in detraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that diversity of principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative sciences.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER DIVINATION PRACTISED BY INVOKING THE DEMONS IS UNLAWFUL?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that divination practised by

invoking the demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1 Pet. ii. 22, *Who did no sin.* Yet Our Lord asked the demon: *What is thy name?* and the latter replied: *My name is Legion, for we are many* (Mark v. 9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons about the occult.

Obj. 2. Further, The souls of the saints do not encourage those who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war (1 Kings xxviii. 8 *sqq.*). Therefore the divination that consists in questioning demons is not unlawful.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems lawful to seek the truth from one who knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in the discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xviii. 10, 11): *Neither let there be found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . . nor . . . that consulteth pythonic spirits.*

I answer that, All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against certain persons (Isa. xxviii. 15): *You have said: We have entered into a league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell.* And still more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result. For the demon who intends man's perdition endeavours, by his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words of Luke iv. 35, *He rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace,* says: *Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness and accustom us to*

care little for such things, however much he may seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine Scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Bede's commentary on Luke viii. 30, *Our Lord inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which he tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine forth more graciously.* Now it is one thing to question a demon who comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 2. According to Augustine (*Ad Simplic.* ii. 3), *there is nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, but some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things.*

Reply Obj. 3. No temporal utility can compare with the harm to spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by invoking the demon.

Fifth Article.

whether divination by the stars is unlawful?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that divination by the stars is not unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes: thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the world, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Therefore divination by the stars is not unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, Human science originates from experiments, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* i. 1). Now it has been discovered through many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

Obj. 3. Further, Divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God's creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is not unlawful.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Conf.* iv. 3): *Those astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their divinations; which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and condemns.*

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the operation of the demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false and vain opinions, in order that man's mind may become entangled in vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what things can be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident that those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this means: even so astrologers forecast a future eclipse.

However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some have stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable statement: since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause, in consequence it signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather, in so

far as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements of the heavenly bodies are the effect of future events: nor again can they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature, although they are referable to a common higher cause, which is divine providence. On the contrary the appointment of the movements and positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the latter are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible to acquire foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the stars, except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their causes.

Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In the first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in *Metaph.* vi.,* an accidental being has no cause, least of all a natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs accidentally, neither is a *being* properly speaking, nor is *one*—for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave—for these and like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things. Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its term, just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form of a natural thing.

In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the Philosopher shows (*De Anima* iii. 4, 9). Now no body can make an impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and will:

* Ed. Did. v. 3.

for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle reproaches (*De Anima* iii. 3) those who held that *such is the will of man, as is the day which the father of men and of gods*, i.e. the sun or the heavens, *brings on.**

Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free-will's operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause of an inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an impression on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since, however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philosopher shows (*De Anima* iii. 11 : *Ethic.* i. 13), this does not impose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies.

Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with certitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion ; and so the operation of the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand if one were to apply the observation of the stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination.

Wherefore the *Reply* to the *First Objection* is evident.

Reply Obj. 2. That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the inclination of the heavenly bodies : while there are few, namely, the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude. Secondly, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* ii. 17) : *When astrologers tell the*

* Odyssey xviii. 135.

truth, it must be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man, for they are permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs. Wherefore he concludes: *Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers, and of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth, lest his soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of partnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship.*

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *Third Objection.*

Sixth Article.

whether divination by dreams is unlawful?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job xxxiii. 15, 16): *By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds, then He,* God to wit, *openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn.* Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by dreams.

Obj. 2. Further, Those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharao's butler and of his chief baker (Gen. xl.), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon (Dan. ii., iv.). Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful.

Obj. 3. Further, It is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xviii. 10): *Neither let there be found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams.*

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 6), divination is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences ; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something : while sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future occurrences, or be cognisant of them.

Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams is twofold : one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination while asleep. A suchlike cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body : because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition ; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humours dreams that he is in the water or snow : and for this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions.

In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleepers' imagination is affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according to Num. xii. 6,

If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. Sometimes, however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images appear to persons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.

Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible limits.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

Seventh Article.

Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is unlawful?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related (Gen. xliv. 5) that Joseph's steward said: *The cup which you have stolen is that in which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine* (*augurari*): and he himself afterwards said to his brethren (*verse* 15): *Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of divining?* Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

Obj. 2. Further, Birds naturally know certain things regarding future occurrences of the seasons, according to Jerem. viii. 7, *The kite in the air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed the time of their*

coming. Now natural knowledge is infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make use of the bird's knowledge in order to know the future, and this is divination by augury.

Obj. 3. Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. xi. 32). Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and interpreting of a dream (Judges vii. 15); and Eliezer, Abraham's servant, acted in like manner (Gen. xxiv.). Therefore it seems that this kind of divination is not unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xviii. 10): *Neither let there be found among you anyone . . . that observeth omens.*

I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and whatever dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known therefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything future can be known from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are cognisant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals' actions is a certain instinct whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause. For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, every power of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from being signs of the future, in so far as they are conformed to the dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to which certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must observe two things: first, that such observations must not be applied to the foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be foreknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above (AA. 5, 6): secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those which in some way may have reference to these animals (since they acquire

through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things necessary for their life—such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so forth).

In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause, namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems to be true of all suchlike things; except omens, because human words which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and sometimes according to the action of the demons.

Accordingly we must say that all suchlike divinations are superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set according to the order of nature or of divine providence.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine,* when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.

Reply Obj. 2. The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds have about things concerning them; and in order to know these things it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.

Reply Obj. 3. Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words, having previously prayed to God.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER DIVINATION BY DRAWING LOTS IS UNLAWFUL?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that divination by drawing lots

* *QQ. in Genes.*, qu. cxlv.

is not unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. xxx. 16, *My lots are in Thy hands*, says: *It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt.*

Obj. 2. There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances which the Scriptures relate as being practised by holy men. Now both in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practising the casting of lots. For it is related (Jos. vii. 14 *sqq.*) that Josue, at the Lord's command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kings xiv. 58 *sqq.*): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea (Jon. i. 7 *sqq.*): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense (Luke i. 9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the apostleship (Acts i. 26). Therefore it would seem that divination by lots is not unlawful.

Obj. 3. Further, Fighting with the fists, or *monomachy*, i.e. single combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called *popular* trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single combat with the Philistines (1 Kings xvii. 32 *sqq.*). Therefore it would seem that divination by lot is not unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI., qu. v., can. *Sortes*): *We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under pain of anathema.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), sortilege consists, properly speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession, an honour,

a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is called *sortilege of allotment*; if one seeks to know what ought to be done, it is called *sortilege of consultation*; if one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called *sortilege of divination*. Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege and their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if anyone practising sortilege is so minded as though the human acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful.

Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in *sortilege of allotment*, it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of something or other, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.

If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech. xxi. 21) that *the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols, and consulted entrails*: sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and forbidden by the canons.

Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov. xvi. 33, *Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord*: sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine declares.*

Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Luke i. 8, says: *He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgement of men*. Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to

* *Enarr. ii. in Ps. xxx., serm.* 2. Cf. *Obj.* 1.

lots without reverence. Hence, Acts of the Apostles, Bede says: (*Super Act. Apost.*, i.) *But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks that he ought, after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting lots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so, except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and pouring forth prayer to God.* Thirdly, if the Divine Oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says (*ad inquisit. Januar.*, ii.; *Ep.* lv.): *Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that anyone should wish to apply the Divine Oracles to worldly matters and to the vain things of this life.* Fourthly, if anyone resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says (*Super Act. Apost., loc. cit.*): *Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias was decided by lot,* because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was not yet poured forth into the Church: *whereas the same deacons were ordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples.* It is different with earthly honours, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions.

If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the divine judgement by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed. Hence Augustine says (*Ep. ad Honor.* ccxxviii.), *If, at a time of persecution, the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there be no other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen by lot.* Again he says (*De Doctr. Christ.* xxviii.): *If thou aboundest in that which it behoves thee to give to him who hath not, and which cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of whom surpasses the other either in need or in some claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not give to both.*

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *First* and *Second Objections.*

Reply Obj. 3. The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to the investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of something done by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgement of the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgement, and because such-like trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen* (II., qu. v., can. *Consuluisti*) : *The sacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must presume, by a superstitious innovation, to practise what is not sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable that public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the culprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been approved, with due regard to the fear of God ; but hidden and unknown crimes must be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of men.* The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in strength or skill.

* Stephen V.

QUESTION XCVI.

OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider superstition in observances, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the magic art: (2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies: (3) Of observances practised in fortune-telling: (4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS UNLAWFUL TO PRACTISE THE OBSERVANCES OF THE MAGIC ART?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not unlawful to practise the observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft: secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person gives an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a good end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not unlawful to practise these observances.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Dan. i. 17) that *to* the *children* who abstained, *God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and wisdom.* Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practise it.

Obj. 3. Further, Seemingly, as stated above (A. 1), the reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning

the future is because they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about things necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of keener intellect, as Augustine says.* Therefore it seems to be no sin to practise the magic art, even though it achieve its result through the demons.

On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xviii. 10, 11): *Neither let there be found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth from the dead:* which search relies on the demons' help. Now through the observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought *by means of certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons.*† Therefore it is unlawful to practise the notary art.

I answer that, The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have not in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing on certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as causes, but as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are the sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty signs, and consequently a kind of *agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens.*‡ Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and avoided by a Christian, even as other arts of vain and noxious superstition, as Augustine declares (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 23). This art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is not intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner connatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the consequence is that this effect is expected either from God or from the demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and science infused into

* *Gen. ad Lit.* ii. 17: *De Divin. Dæmon.* 3, 4.
† Augustine, *De Doct. Christ.* ii. 20. See above Q. XCII., A. 2.
‡ *Ibid.*

them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Kings iii. and 2 Para. i.). Moreover, Our Lord said to His disciples (Luke xxi. 15): *I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay.* However, this gift is not granted to all, or in connexion with any particular observance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in 1 Cor. xii. 8, *To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit,* and afterwards it is said (*verse* 11): *All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He will.* On the other hand it does not belong to the demons to enlighten the intellect, as stated in the First Part (Q. CIX., A. 3). Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is effected by the enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did anyone acquire knowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 9): *Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way cleansed by theurgic inventions,* i.e. the operations *of the demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true,* such as are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.

Reply Obj. 1. It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that the magic art tends.

Reply Obj. 2. The abstinence of these children was not in accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to the authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received knowledge from God, according to Ps. cxviii. 100, *I have had understanding above the ancients, because I have sought Thy commandments.*

Reply Obj. 3. To seek knowledge of the future from the demons is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on account of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies to the case in point.

Second Article.

Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful.

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical order things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (*De Civ. Dei* xxi. 5, 7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ suchlike forces for the alteration of bodies.

Obj. 2. Further, Artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain occult forces resulting from their species through the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. images, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of them and of suchlike things.

Obj. 3. Further, The demons too are able to alter bodies in many ways, as Augustine states (*De Trin.* iii. 8, 9). But their power is from God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose of producing these alterations.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 20) that *to superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and nostrums condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing worn or fastened on.*

I answer that, In things done for the purpose of producing some bodily effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their proper effects. But, if they

seem unable to produce those effects naturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose of producing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that they come under the head of *compact by tokens entered into with the demons.** Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xxi. 6) : *The demons are allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, but by God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking, by means of various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites.*

Reply Obj. 1. There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such as they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in addition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be superstitious and unlawful.

Reply Obj. 2. The natural forces of natural bodies result from their substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of heavenly bodies ; wherefore through this same influence they acquire certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bodies result from the conception of the craftsman ; and since they are nothing else but composition, order and shape, as stated in *Phys.* i. 5, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently, no force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are artificial, but only in respect of their natural matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* x. 11), that *by herbs, stones, animals, certain particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again by certain movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens, it is possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into effect the various dispositions of the stars,* as though the results of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly bodies. In fact, as Augustine

* Augustine, *De Doct. Christ.* See above Q. XCII., A. 2.

adds (*ibid.*), *all these things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that are subject to them.*

Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is requisite to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce to any effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the latter include certain explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements made with the demons: whereas in the other images there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the contrary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons. Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help by compacts either tacit or express.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER OBSERVANCES DIRECTED TO THE PURPOSE OF FORTUNE-TELLING ARE UNLAWFUL?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms, which the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe suchlike signs.

Obj. 2. Further, It is unreasonable to deny that which nearly everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain times, or places, hearing of certain words, meetings of men or animals, uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things.

Obj. 3. Further, Human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine providence in a certain order : and this order seems to require that precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences : wherefore, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. x. 6), the things that happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to observe these presages.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 20) that *a thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts entered into with the demons : for instance, the twitching of a limb ; a stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together ; kicking the door-post when anyone passes in front of one's house ; to go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes ; to return home if you trip when going forth ; when the rats have gnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret the actual damage.*

I answer that, Men attend to all these observances, not as causes but as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them as signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the co-operation of the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with suchlike trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these observances are superstitious and unlawful : they are apparently remains of idolatry, which authorized the observance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars, in respect of which one day is differentiated from another : except that these observances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are yet more vain and superstitious.

Reply Obj. 1. The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully observe. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future events as proceeding from its cause ; as when a slave fears a flogging when he sees his

master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if one were to fear for a child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of which we have spoken in the First Part (Q. CXVII., A. 3, *ad* 2). But this does not apply to this kind of observances.

Reply Obj. 2. That men have at first experienced a certain degree of truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many things occur in connexion with them through the trickery of the demons, *so that men, through being entangled in these observances, become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold snares of a pernicious error,* as Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 23).

Reply Obj. 3. Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born, not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states (*Contra Faust.* iv. 2, xxii. 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all things, however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove.

Fourth Article.

Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine words at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written than when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of producing certain effects; (for instance in order to heal the sick), such as the *Our Father* or the *Hail Mary,* or in any way whatever to call on the Lord's name, according to Mark xvi. 17, 18, *In My name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents.* Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred words at one's neck, as a remedy for sickness or for any kind of distress.

Obj. 2. Further, Sacred words are no less efficacious on the human body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals.

Now certain incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing certain other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps. lvii. 5): *Their madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the charmers, nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely.* Therefore it is lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men.

Obj. 3. Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the saints; wherefore Augustine says (*Lib. L. Hom.* xxvi.) that *God's word is of no less account than the Body of Christ.* Now it is lawful for one to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, or to carry them about one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether uttered or written, for one's protection.

Obj. 4. *On the other hand,* Chrysostom says (*Hom.* xliii. *in Matth.**): *Some wear round their necks a passage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in church and heard by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good to have the Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing them round his neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In the shapes of the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in the shapes, you do well to wear them round your neck; if in the understanding, you will then do better to bear them in your heart than to wear them round your neck.*

I answer that, In every incantation or wearing of written words, two points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or written, because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it is clearly superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems that one should beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they conceal something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says (*loc. cit.*†) that *many now after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels, and fasten*

* Cf. the *Opus imperfectum in Matthæum*, among St. Chrysostom's works, and falsely ascribed to him.

† Cf. footnote on *Obj.* 4.

them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those who do not understand them. Again, one should take care lest it contain anything false, because in that case also the effect could not be ascribed to God, Who does not bear witness to a falsehood.

In the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words it contain something vain, for instance certain written characters, except the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of writing or fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connexion with reverence for God, because this would be pronounced superstitious: otherwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written in the Decretals (XXVI., qu. v., cap. *Non liceat Christianis*): *In blending together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make use of observances or incantations, other than the divine symbol, or the Lord's Prayer, so as to give honour to none but God the Creator of all.*

Reply Obj. 1. It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or to invoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honour God alone, from Whom the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in connexion with any vain observance.

Reply Obj. 2. Even in the case of incantations of serpents or any animals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred words and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Suchlike incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely on the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents, because the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: *Note that Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard the widow's request.*

Reply Obj. 3. The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they be worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics they are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this matter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be three-cornered, or the like,

having no bearing on the reverence due to God and the saints), it would be superstitious and unlawful.

Reply Obj. 4. Chrysostom is speaking of the case in which more attention is paid to the written characters than to the understanding of the words.

QUESTION XCVII.

OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God; (2) vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God's name is taken with irreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) In what the temptation of God consists: (2) Whether it is a sin? (3) To what virtue it is opposed: (4) Of its comparison with other vices.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE TEMPTATION OF GOD CONSISTS IN CERTAIN DEEDS, WHEREIN THE EXPECTED RESULT IS ASCRIBED TO THE POWER OF GOD ALONE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of God does not consist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the power of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man, so is man tempted by God, man, and demons. But when man is tempted the result is not always expected from his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when the result is expected from His power alone.

Obj. 2. Further, All those who work miracles by invoking the divine name look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if the temptation of God consisted in suchlike deeds, all who work miracles would tempt God.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems to belong to man's perfection that he should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence Ambrose, commenting on Luke ix. 3, *Take nothing for your journey*, etc., says : *The Gospel precept points out what is required of him that announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he should hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the less he seeks these things.* And the Blessed Agatha said : *I have never treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who restores all things by His mere word.** But the temptation of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfection. Therefore the temptation of God does not consist in suchlike deeds, wherein the help of God alone is expected.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxii. 36) : *Christ who gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet not allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him, nevertheless by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest it should dare to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which it needs to avoid.* From this it would seem that the temptation of God consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape from danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone.

I answer that, Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By words, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether he can and will grant it : by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe another's prudence, will or power.—Either of these may happen in two ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter : thus Samson (Judges xiv. 12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order to tempt them.—In the second place it may be done with cunning and by stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Matth. xxii. 15 *sqq.*—Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends, by word or deed, to put some person to the test ; and sometimes implicitly,

* Office of S. Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican Breviary).

when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person, yet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose than putting him to a test.

Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the intention of probing God's knowledge, power or will.—He tempts God explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to experiment on God's power, good will or wisdom.—But He will tempt God implicitly, if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks for or does something which has no other use than to prove God's power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his horse to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving the horse a trial: but if he make the horse gallop without any useful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a trial of the horse's speed; and the same applies to all other things. Accordingly when a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine assistance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt God: for it is written (2 Paralip. xx. 12): *As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee.* But if this be done without any useful or urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a gloss on Deut. vi. 16, *Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God*, says: *A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by God.*

Reply Obj. 1. Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same deeds.

Reply Obj. 2. When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is an effect of the divine power.

Reply Obj. 3. The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with temporal aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God: wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they tempt God. But if they were

to neglect human assistance without any useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine (*Contra Faust.* xxii. 36) says that *Paul fled, not through ceasing to believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee when he had the means of flight.* The blessed Agatha had experience of God's kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself suddenly cured by God.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS A SIN TO TEMPT GOD?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the same as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. iii. 10): *Bring all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the flood-gates of heaven.* Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God.

Obj. 2. Further, A man is tempted not only in order to test his knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written (Ps. xxxiii. 9): *O taste and see that the Lord is sweet,* and (Rom. xii. 2): *That you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God.* Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.

Obj. 3. Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the Lord said: *Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God,* he replied: *I will not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord,* and then it was said to him: *Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are grievous to my God also?* (Isa. vii. 11–13). And we read of Abraham (Gen. xv. 8) that he said to the Lord: *Whereby may I know that I shall possess it?* namely, the land which God had promised him. Again Gedeon asked God for a sign of the victory promised

to him (Judges vi. 36 *sqq.*). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.

On the contrary, It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written (Deut. vi. 10) : *Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), to tempt a person is to put him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain. Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God's perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself may know God's power.

On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it to others : this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts iv. 30, in order, to wit, that Christ's power might be made manifest to unbelievers.

Reply Obj. 1. The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 1). Hence there was a motive of urgency to pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of usefulness, as stated in the text quoted—*that there may be meat in God's house :* wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The words that follow, *and try Me,* are not to be understood causally, as though they had to pay tithes in order to try if *God would open the flood-gates of heaven,* but consecutively, because, to wit, if they paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favours which God would shower upon them.

Reply Obj. 2. There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will. One is speculative, and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to prove whether God's will be good, or

whether God is sweet.—The other knowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental, and thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness, and complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (*Div. Nom.* ii.) that *he learnt divine things through experience of them.* It is in this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste His sweetness.

Reply Obj. 3. God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone, but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because he would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it was a matter relating to the common good.—Abraham asked for a sign through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin.—Gedeon seems to have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel (Luke i. 18): *Whereby shall I know this?* so that he was punished for his unbelief.

It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God for a sign: first, in order to test God's power or the truth of His word, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God.—Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of temptation of God.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TEMPTATION OF GOD IS OPPOSED TO THE VIRTUE OF RELIGION?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a man doubts God, as stated above (A. 2). Now doubt about God comes under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Ecclus. xviii. 23): *Before prayer prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God.* *Such a man*, that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, *prays for what God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to do.* Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Ps. lxxvii. 18, *And they tempted God in their hearts*, says that *to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts.* Now deceit is opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is opposed, not to religion, but to truth.

On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above *to tempt God is to pray to Him inordinately.* Now to pray to God becomingly is an act of religion as stated above (Q. LXXXIII., A. 15). Therefore to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.

I answer that, As clearly shown above (Q. LXXXI., A. 5), the end of religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 7), it belongs to religion to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of reverence towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that, through doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of irreligion.

Reply Obj. 2. He that prepares not his soul before prayer by forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and

without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence towards Him. For it is written (1 Pet. v. 6): *Be you humbled . . . under the mighty hand of God*, and (2 Tim. ii. 15): *Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God.* Therefore also this kind of temptation is a species of irreligion.

Reply Obj. 3. A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man. Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed to the truth.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE TEMPTATION OF GOD IS A GRAVER SIN THAN SUPERSTITION?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. Now the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their number were slain, as related in Exod. xxxii. 28,* whereas for the sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. xciv. 9, *Your fathers tempted Me*, and further on, *so I swore in My wrath that they should not enter into My rest.* Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition.

Obj. 2. Further, The more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems to be a greater sin to behave disrespectfully to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we owe to our parents. Now God should be

* Septuagint Version. The Vulgate has *twenty-three thousand.*

honoured by us as the Father of all (Malach. i. 6). Therefore, temptation of God whereby we behave irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby we give to a creature the honour we owe to God.

On the contrary, A gloss on Deut. xvii. 2, *When there shall be found among you*, etc., says: *The Law detests error and idolatry above all: for it is a very great sin to give to a creature the honour that belongs to the Creator.*

I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to the divine excellence, than if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error, as shown above (Q. XCIV., A. 1, *ad* 1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of the divine excellence, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God.

Reply Obj. 1. The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is written (Exod. xxxii. 34): *And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin also of theirs.*

Reply Obj. 2. Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God, since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine excellence. There is no comparison with the honour due to our parents, which can without sin be given to others.

QUESTION XCVIII.

OF PERJURY.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury? (2) Whether perjury is always a sin? (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR PERJURY THAT THE STATEMENT CONFIRMED ON OATH BE FALSE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Q. LXXXIX., A. 3), an oath should be accompanied by judgement and justice no less than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgement, as when one swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears to something unjust.

Obj. 2. Further, That which confirms is more weighty than the thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human statement which is confirmed on oath.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Verb. Apost. Jacobi: Serm.* clxxx.): *Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are deceived themselves;* and he gives three

examples. The first is: *Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, whereas it is false;* the second is: *Take the instance of another who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it were true;* and the third is: *Take another, who thinks his statement false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true,* of whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for perjury.

On the contrary, Perjury is defined *a falsehood confirmed by oath.**

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XCII., A. 2), moral acts take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.

Reply Obj. 1. As Jerome says on Jerem. iv. 2, *whichever of these three be lacking, there is perjury,* but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgement is lacking, since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing into falsehood.

Reply Obj. 2. In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in *Phys.* ii. 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that kind of perversity

* H[illegible] St. Victor, *Sum. Sent.* iv. 5.

in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by swearing what is false.

Reply Obj. 3. Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (*ibid.*): *It depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty except the mind be guilty.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL PERJURY IS SINFUL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is perplexed.

Obj. 2. Further, No man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by committing perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not all perjury is sinful.

Obj. 3. Further, He that swears to do another's will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter order him to do some-

thing too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly not all perjury is sinful.

Obj. 4. Further, A promissory oath extends to future, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Verb. Apost. Jacobi: Serm.* cxxx.), in speaking of perjury: *See how you should detest this horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXIX., A. 1), to swear is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs to show reverence to God.

Reply Obj. 1. He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.

Reply Obj. 2. A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is doing could not be matter of an oath.

Reply Obj. 3. When one man swears or promises to do another's will, there is to be understood this requisite condition—that the thing commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate.

Reply Obj. 4. An oath is a personal act, and so when a

man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods.

The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XCVI., A. 4).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL PERJURY IS A MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is laid down (Extra, *De Jurejur.*, cap. *Verum*): *Referring to the question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin.* Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, As Chrysostom* says, *it is a greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels.* Now it is not always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels.

* *Hom.* xliv. in the *Opus imperfectum* on S. Matthew, falsely ascribed to S. John Chrysostom.

Obj. 3. Further, According to the Law a man incurs infamy through committing perjury (VI., qu. i., cap. *Infames*). Now it would seem that infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury.* Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is written (Lev. xix. 12): *Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name. Therefore it is a mortal sin.*

I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (*Poster.* i. 2), *that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so.* Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that, of its nature, implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature, implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (A. 2), the reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very nature, is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. LXXXIX., A. 7, *ad* 3), coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled man.

When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.

Reply Obj. 2. He that swears falsely in fun is none the less irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he adverts to the fact that he is

* Cap. *Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.*

swearing, and that he is swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and consequently is excused from the sin of perjury.

It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels, than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels.

Reply Obj. 3. Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HE SINS WHO DEMANDS AN OATH OF A PERJURER?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand an oath : and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one enjoin an oath on another person.

Obj. 2. Further, To receive an oath from a person is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to impose an oath on one who swears falsely.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Lev. v. 1): *If anyone sin, and hear the voice of one swearing falsely,* and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity.* Hence it would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath of such a man.

Obj. 4. On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (*ad Public. Ep.* xlvii.). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who swears falsely.

I answer that, As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as does Augustine (*de Perjuriis*, serm. clxxx.): *For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: "Swear to me" in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation* (because, to wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak the truth). *This is the evil whereof Our Lord says* (Matth. v. 37): *That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he knows the man to have done so,* i.e. the contrary of what he swears to, *and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer.*

If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose instance he demands it.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument avails in the case of one

* *Falsely* is not in the Vulgate.

who demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*ad Public., loc. cit.*), *though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others.* Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*QQ. Super Lev.*, qu. i.), Moses in the passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another's perjury : wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced *to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm.* Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made : wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another person's injury : because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above (Q. XXXIII., A. 7 ; Q. LXVIII., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 4. It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods.—Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (*loc. cit.*). Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully.

QUESTION XCIX.

OF SACRILEGE.

(In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1) Sacrilege: (2) Simony.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is sacrilege? (2) Whether it is a special sin? (3) Of the species of sacrilege: (4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.

First Article

WHETHER SACRILEGE IS THE VIOLATION OF A SACRED THING?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII., qu. iv.)*: *They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honour.* Now this seems to have no connexion with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sacred.

Obj. 2. Further, It is stated further on† that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, *he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege.* Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.

Obj. 3. Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things receive their sacred character from God.

* Append. Gratian. on can. *Si quis suadente.*
† *Ibid.*, can. *Constituit.*

Therefore they cannot be violated by man : and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing.

On the contrary, Isidore says (*Etym.* x.) that *a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects*, i.e. steals, *sacred things.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 5 : I.-II., Q. CI., A. 4), a thing is called *sacred* through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 2) the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine providence, according to Wis. vi. 5, *Being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly.* Hence by an extension of the term, whatever savours of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called a sacrilege by a kind of likeness.

Reply Obj. 2. Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Cor. vi. 11, *But you are washed, but you are sanctified.* Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. ii. 9) : *You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people.* Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.

Reply Obj. 3. Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonour. Now as *honour is in the person who honours and not in the one who is honoured* (*Ethic.* i. 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence. Hence, so far as he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRILEGE IS A SPECIAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege is not a special sin. It is stated (XVII., qu. iv.)*: *They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, or violate and defile it by their negligence.* But this is done in every sin, because sin is *a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God,* according to Augustine (*Contra Faust.* xxii. 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin.

Obj. 2. Further, No special sin is comprised under different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege is comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance under murder, if one kill a priest; under lust, as the violation of a consecrated virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place; under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Every special sin is to be found apart from other sins, as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (*Ethic.* v. 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.

On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely, religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege is a special sin.

I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a special sin.

Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* iv. 3), *When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it honour and homage, and if anyone dishonour it he is condemned to death,* as acting

* Append. Gratian. on can. *Si quis suadente.*

against the king: and in the same way if a man violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behaviour is contrary to the reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.

Reply Obj. 1. Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the divine law, who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do. These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to the reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin materially.

Reply Obj. 3. Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place, for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SPECIES OF SACRILEGE ARE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO THE SACRED THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.

Obj. 2. Further, It does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they cannot belong

to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred things.

Obj. 3. Further, Among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things.

On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the sin of sacrilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.

Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written (2 Machab. v. 19): *God did not choose the people for the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake.* Hence sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places.

In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament of the

Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honoured. After these come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.

Reply Obj. 1. There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a material, but also a formal difference.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in one respect, and to different species in another respect. Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, *animal*, but differ in the species *coloured thing*, if one be white and the other black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation.

Reply Obj. 3. Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome* says that *a trifle on a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy*. But formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to be said of other instances.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT OF SACRILEGE SHOULD BE PECUNIARY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege

* The quotation is from S. Bernard, *De Consideration* ii. 13.

should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by capital sentence according to civil law.* Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Obj. 2. Further, The same sin should not receive a double punishment, according to Nahum i. 9, *There shall not rise a double affliction.* But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (1 Thess. ii. 5): *Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness.* But it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege.

On the contrary, It is written (XVII., qu. iv., can. *Si quis contumax*): *If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi:* and again further on† (*ibid.*, Can. 21): *Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver.*

I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and that *by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he* may be *tormented* (Wis. xi. 17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication‡ whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things,

* Dig. xlviii. 13: Cod. i. 3, *de Episc. et Cleric.*
† *Ibid.* can. *Quisquis inventus.*
‡ Append. Gratian. on can. *Si quis contumax,* quoted above.

is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, who does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.

Reply Obj. 1. The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but excommunication in its stead.

Reply Obj. 2. When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things.

Reply Obj. 3. If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.

QUESTION C.

ON SIMONY.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) What is simony? (2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments? (3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions? (4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals? (5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or remuneration by service? (6) Of the punishment of simony.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIMONY IS AN INTENTIONAL WILL TO BUY OR SELL SOMETHING SPIRITUAL OR CONNECTED WITH A SPIRITUAL THING?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that simony is not *an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing.* Simony is heresy, since it is written (I., qu. i.)*: *The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his possessions.* But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above (Q. X., A. 2). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will.

* Can. *Eos qui per pecunias.*

Obj. 2. Further, To sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, Nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says in a homily (*v. in Ev.*): *The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you possess.* Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something spiritual.

Obj. 4. Further, Simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of whom we read (Acts viii. 18, 19) that *he offered the apostles money* that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, *that on whomsoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost.* But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will to sell a spiritual thing.

Obj. 5. Further, There are many other voluntary commutations besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction.* Therefore it would seem that simony is defined insufficiently.

Obj. 6. Further, Anything connected with spiritual things is itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add *or connected with spiritual things.*

Obj. 7. Further, According to some, the Pope cannot commit simony: yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing.

On the contrary, Gregory VII says (*Regist.*)†: *None of the faithful is ignorant that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of simony.*

I answer that, As stated above (I.-II., Q. XVIII., A. 2) an act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter, Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said concerning wisdom (Prov. iii. 15), *she is more precious than all riches,*

* A kind of legal compromise.—*Oxford Dictionary.*

† Caus. I., qu. i., can. *Presbyter,* qu. iii., can. *Altare.*

and all things that are desired, are not to be compared with her : and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said (Acts viii. 20) : *Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money.*

Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (*Obj.* 1). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, according to 1 Cor. iv. 1, *Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of God.*

Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord said (Matth. x. 8) : *Freely have you received, freely give.*

Therefore, by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of irreligion.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart, so too the vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is said to be a *heresy*, as regards the outward protestation, since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is the owner of a spiritual gift ; and this is heretical. It must, however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states (*Etym.* viii. 5) : and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine's book on heretics.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 4), justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the will.—This act is furthermore described as *express*, in order to signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in virtue and vice.

Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated above (Q. XIV., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man gives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term *buying* in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither *the sufferings of this time*, nor any gift or deed of ours, *are worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us* (Rom. viii. 18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection.

Reply Obj. 4. Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I., qu. iii.),* that *Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the signs to be wrought by him.* Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate, in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kings v. 20–24) that he received money from the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only *simoniacs* but also *giezites*.

Reply Obj. 5. The terms *buying* and *selling* cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing simony, as laid down by law.† Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or necessary reasons.

Reply Obj. 6. Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual, through

* Can. *Salvator.*

† Cap. *Quæsitum, de rerum Permutat.*: Cap. *Super, de Transact.*

adhering to those others. Hence (I., qu. iii., cap., *Siquis objecerit*) it is stated that *spiritual things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no bodily life without the body.*

Reply Obj. 7. The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is his sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS ALWAYS UNLAWFUL TO GIVE MONEY FOR THE SACRAMENTS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as we shall state in the Third Part (Q. LXVIII., A. 6: Q. LXXIII., A. 3). But seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments.

Obj. 2. Further, The greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other sacraments.

Obj. 3. Further, The sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.

Obj. 4. Further, Custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be not sinful; thus Augustine says (*Contra Faust.*

xxii. 47) that *it was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom.* Now it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it is not unlawful.

Obj. 5. Further, It happens sometimes that someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a like ecclesiastical dignity.

Obj. 6. Further, Marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.

On the contrary, It is written (I., qu. i.) :* *Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from the priesthood.*

I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. ix. 13), *Know you not, that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the holy place ; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar ?*

Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused by any custom whatever, since *custom does not prevail over natural or divine law.*† Now by money we are to understand *anything that has a pecuniary value,* as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* iv. 1).—On the other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes

* Can. *Qui per pecunias.*

† Cap. *Cum tanto, de Consuetud.* Cf. I.-II., Q. XCVII., A. 3.

of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. v. 17, *Let the priests that rule well*, says: *They should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry.*

Reply Obj. 1. In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be baptized by anyone else.—He could, however, lawfully buy the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element.

But if it were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2. The priest receives money, not as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. The money exacted of the person absolved is not the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.

Reply Obj. 4. As stated above, *custom does not prevail over natural or divine law* whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and especially

if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess. v. 22), *From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves.*

Reply Obj. 5. It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one has already acquired that right.

Reply Obj. 6. Some* say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state in the Third Part of this work.† Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law,‡ it is forbidden to demand anything for the Nuptial Blessing.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO GIVE AND RECEIVE MONEY FOR SPIRITUAL ACTIONS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears from 1 Kings ix. 7, 8, and 3 Kings xiv. 3. Therefore it would seem that it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.

Obj. 2. Further, Prayer, preaching, divine praise, are

* Innocent IV. on Cap. *Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia.*
† Suppl., Q. XLII., A. 3.
‡ Cap. *Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia.*

most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Luke xvi. 9, *Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.* To preachers also, who sow spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1 Cor. ix. 14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to receive something for spiritual actions.

Obj. 3. Further, Science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth.

Obj. 4. Further, Religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for spiritual things.

On the contrary, It is stated (I., qu. i.):* *It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever.* Now all these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them.

I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men, according to 1 Cor. ix. 7, *Who serveth a soldier at any time at his own charges? . . . Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?* Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual in suchlike actions; but to receive or give something for

* Can. *Quidquid invisibilis.*

the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done.

Reply Obj. 1. As Jerome says in his commentary on Micheas iii. 9, certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it.

Reply Obj. 2. Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. v. 17, *Let the priests that rule well,* says: *Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price.* In like manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would preclude the free granting of pious

offices to any person. The ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed that this honour would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.

Reply Obj. 3. A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labour (which he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand it is lawful for him to receive *procurations*, when he visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood.

He that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labour. If, on the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts.

Reply Obj. 4. It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the monastery is free, to accept

something for the support of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or receive something for entrance into a monastery (I., qu. ii., cap. *Quam pio*).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO RECEIVE MONEY FOR THINGS ANNEXED TO SPIRITUAL THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, and this is clearly false.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (*De Offic.* ii. 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.

Obj. 3. Further, Things annexed to spiritual things include right of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gen. xxiii. 8 *sqq.*), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gen. xxv. 31 *sqq.*). Again the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and is granted *in fee.* Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates

also at times retain for themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the presentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.

On the contrary, Pope Paschal * says (cf. I., qu. iii., cap. *Si quis objecerit*) : *Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical.*

I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have ecclesiastical benefices is said to be annexed to spiritual things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices ; and sacred vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual things.

Reply Obj. 1. All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale.

Reply Obj. 2. Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor, provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels but mere metal : so that if like vessels were to be made out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again.

* Paschal II.

Reply Obj. 3. We have no authority for supposing that the double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have also said with regard to sacred vessels (*Reply Obj.* 2).—Or again, Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself.

The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's choice, according to Malach. i. 2, 3, *I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.* Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his grievance.

The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it be granted *in fee*, but is transferred with the property sold or granted.

The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to lay-folk, but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 3).

With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt of simony.

Fifth Article.

Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or for an oral remuneration?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration. Gregory says (*Regist.* iii. *ep.* 18): *It is right that those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded.* Now an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received.

Obj. 2. Further, To confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simoniacal.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is done only at another's request would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's request. Therefore this is not simoniacal.

Obj. 4. Further, Hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony.

On the contrary, Pope Urban* says: *Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things not for the purpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or money received, is guilty of simony.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), the term *money* denotes *anything that can have a pecuniary value.* Now it is evident that a man's service is directed to some kind

* Urban II., *Ep.* xvii. *ad Lucium.*

of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or promised, at which that service could be valued. Likewise, to grant a person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favour is directed to some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any external thing which comes under the head of *real remuneration*, so too does he contract it by receiving *oral remuneration* or an *equivalent in service rendered.*

Reply Obj. 1. If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service, directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony.

Reply Obj. 2. The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred from the revenue is manifest simony.

Reply Obj. 3. *Oral remuneration* denotes either praise that pertains to human favour, which has its price, or a request whereby man's favour is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly, one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request

be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the person, but to human favour. If, however, a person asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls.

Reply Obj. 4. A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false pretences stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that seemingly the hyprocrite is not guilty of simony.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE GUILTY OF SIMONY ARE FITTINGLY PUNISHED BY BEING DEPRIVED OF WHAT THEY HAVE ACQUIRED BY SIMONY?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally.

Obj. 2. Further, It sometimes happens that one who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if he has acquired it by simony.

Obj. 3. Further, No one should be punished for what was done without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is voluntary, as was shown above (I.-II., Q. LXXIV., AA. 1, 2; Q. LXXVII., A. 7). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed on him.

Obj. 4. Further, No one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.

Obj. 5. Further, Sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic state which he has acquired by simony.

Obj. 6. Further, In this world external punishment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he has acquired by simony.

Obj. 7. Further, To be promoted to greater dignity is much less than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have received.

On the contrary, It is written (I., qu. i., cap. *Si quis Episcopus*): *He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money.*

I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Matth. x. 8, *Freely have you received, freely give.* Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i., cap. *Si quis Episcopus.**

Reply Obj. 1. He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it.

Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not as regards others.

Reply Obj. 2. One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows to have been promoted simoniacally,

* *Ibid.*, qu. iii., can. *Si quis præbendas.*

neither on account of his command nor for fear of his excommunication : and such as receive Orders from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony ; and they need to receive a dispensation.—Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a dispensation.—But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully : wherefore no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another's sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated above (*ad* 1).

Reply Obj. 3. To be deprived of what one has received is not only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his Order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the nett fruits, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the Church.

On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured

simoniacally by others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised.

Reply Obj. 4. Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that Church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the guilty parties be not the gainers.—But if the prelate and the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of superior authority, either to the poor or to some other Church.

Reply Obj. 5. If there are any persons who have been simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General Council,* they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank, and must be assigned a lower place.

On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.

* Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III.

Reply Obj. 6. In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of simony ; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of his evil intention.

Reply Obj. 7. The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to retain his Order in some other Church ; or again a greater dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor Orders ; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major Orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.

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