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TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

THIRD PART.

PROLOGUE

FORASMUCH as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to *save His people from their sins* (Matt. i. 21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race.

Concerning this we must consider—(1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection.

Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs—the first, about the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our salvation; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by our Saviour—*i.e.*, God incarnate.

QUESTION I.

OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION.

(In Six Articles.)

CONCERNING the first, three things occur to be considered—first, the fitness of the Incarnation of Christ; secondly, the mode of union of the Word Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate? (2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race? (3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate? (4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than actual? (5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the beginning of the world? (6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of the world?

First Article.

Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness, it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God to become incarnate.

Obj. 2. Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were *to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head of a man.** But God and flesh are infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most composite,—especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that God should be united to human flesh.

Obj. 3. Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God, Who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.

Obj. 4. Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom rests the care of great things should

* Horace, *Ars. Poet.*, line 1.

leave them for lesser things. But God—Who takes care of the whole world—the whole universe of things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that *He should be hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparison with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and that this Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government of the whole world to so frail a body,* as Volusianus writes to Augustine (*Ep.* cxxxv.).

On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by visible things the invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was the whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Rom. i. 20): *For the invisible things of* God . . . *are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.* But, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known at once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of God—*His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own handiwork; His justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant to be overcome by none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing greater than for God to become incarnate.*

I answer that, To each thing, that is befitting which belongs to it by reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* i.). Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by *His so joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three—the Word, a soul and flesh,* as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii.).

Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate.

Reply Obj. 1. The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself. But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable, should not always be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to be, although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him.

Reply Obj. 2. To be united to God in unity of person was not fitting to human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it was above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's salvation.

Reply Obj. 3. Every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by God's wisdom, and is ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own goodness. And so also the evil of punishment was established by God's justice for God's glory. But evil of fault is committed by withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the order of the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty, but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault.

Reply Obj. 4. As Augustine replies (*Ep. ad Volusian.* cxxxvii.): *The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were, contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe. This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal things. . . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing word of a man is heard at once by many,*

and wholly by each, is it incredible that the abiding Word of God should be everywhere at once? Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE HUMAN RACE THAT THE WORD OF GOD SHOULD BECOME INCARNATE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate. For since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said (I., Q. IV., AA. 1 and 2), no power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature, He could also have restored it without assuming flesh.

Obj. 2. Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to man's charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that the Word of God should become incarnate.

Obj. 3. Further, to revere God pertains especially to man's salvation; hence it is written (Mal. i. 6): *If, then, I be a father, where is my honour? and if I be a master, where is my fear?* But men revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far beyond man's senses, hence (Ps. cxii. 4) it is written: *The Lord is high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens;* and farther on: *Who is as the Lord our God?* which pertains to reverence. Therefore it would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should be made like unto us by assuming flesh.

On the contrary, What frees the human race from perdition is necessary for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the Incarnation is such; according to John iii. 16: *God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting.* Therefore it was necessary for man's salvation that God should become incarnate.

I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God of His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii. 10): *We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally subject; but that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery.*

Now this may be viewed with respect to our *furtherance in good.* First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xi. 2): *In order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith.* Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii. *loc. cit.*): *Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature?* Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (*De Catech. Rudib.* iv.): *What greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us?* And he after-

wards adds: *If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten to love in return.* Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii. *de Temp.*): *Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man.* Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii. *de Temp.*): *God was made man, that man might be made God.*

So also was this useful for our *withdrawal from evil.* First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honour him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii. 17): *Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have no bodies.* Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* xvi.): *God has proved to us how high a place human nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a true man.* And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi.): *Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness.* Thirdly, because, *in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before,* as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii. 17). Fourthly, because *man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so great,* as Augustine says in the same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii. 13), *ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ,* and this was done by Christ satis-

fying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behoved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: *Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in the other—for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not have set an example.*

And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's apprehension.

Reply Obj. 1. This reason has to do with the first kind of necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end.

Reply Obj. 2. Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two ways—first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not make up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offence. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly—*i.e.*, in the acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as everything imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that the satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ.

Reply Obj. 3. By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is increased by the increase of

knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly drew us to know Him.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER, IF MAN HAD NOT SINNED, GOD WOULD HAVE BECOME INCARNATE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also remains. But as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii. 17): *Many other things are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution from sin;* and these were discussed above (A. 2). Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect. But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last creature—viz., man—is joined to the first principle—viz., God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Obj. 3. Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Obj. 4. Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said of Christ (Rom. i. 4): *Who was predestinated the*

Son of God in power. Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.

Obj. 5. Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Gen. ii. 23. *This now is bone of my bones,* etc., which the Apostle says is *a great sacrament . . . in Christ and in the Church,* as is plain from Eph. v. 32. But man could not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels could not, as Augustine proves (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 18). Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Verb. Apost.* viii. 2), expounding what is set down in Luke xix. 10, *For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost:—Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would not have come.* And on 1 Tim. i. 15, *Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners,* a gloss says: *There was no cause of Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine.*

I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to be given to this opinion.

For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this;—even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate.

Reply Obj. 1. All the other causes which are assigned

in the preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on John i. 14, *And the Word was made flesh*, St. Augustine says (*Tract.* ii.): *Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh.*

Reply Obj. 2. The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.

Reply Obj. 3. A double capability may be remarked in human nature:—one, in respect to the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural capability;—the other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is false, as stated above (I., Q. CV., A. 6). But there is no reason why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. v. 20): *Where sin abounded, grace did more abound.* Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: *O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer!*

Reply Obj. 4. Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.

Reply Obj. 5. Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD BECAME INCARNATE IN ORDER TO TAKE AWAY ACTUAL SIN, RATHER THAN TO TAKE AWAY ORIGINAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (*Contra Julian.* v. 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed to taking away actual sins.

Obj 2. Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but merely pain of loss, as has been shown (I-II., Q. LXXXVII., A. 5). But Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction for sins—and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away actual sin rather than original sin.

Obj. 3. Further, as Chrysostom says (*De Compunctione Cordis* ii. 3): *This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself alone, Paul writes to the Galatians* (ii. 20): *Christ . . . loved me and delivered Himself for me.* But our individual sins are actual sins; for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. i. 29): *Behold the*

Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins (Vulg., *sin*) *of the world.*

I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it;—not that all are taken away (and this is from men's fault, inasmuch as they do not adhere to Christ, according to Jo. iii. 19: *The light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light*), but because He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is written (Rom. v. 15-16): *But not as the offence, so also the gift. . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many offences unto justification.*

Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ come to blot it out. But *greater* is said in two ways: in one way *intensively,* as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of the nature of voluntary, as has been shown (I.-II., Q. LXXXI., A. 1). In another way a thing is said to be greater *extensively,* as whiteness on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as *the good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an individual,* as is said *Ethic.* i. 2.

Reply Obj. 1. This reason looks to the intensive greatness of sin.

Reply Obj. 2. In the future award the pain of sense will not be meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst, death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and the like in Himself.

Reply Obj. 3. Chrysostom says (*ibid.* 6): *The Apostle*

used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than yourself? And hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by each one.

Fifth Article.

Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to Eph. ii. 4, 5: *But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ.* But charity does not tarry in bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to Prov. iii. 28: *Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and to-morrow I will give to thee, when thou canst give at present.* Therefore God ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (1 Tim. i. 15): *Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners.* But more would have been saved had God become incarnate at the begin-

ning of the human race; for in the various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race.

Obj. 3. Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as Boëthius says (*De Consol.* iii.). Therefore the work of Christ ought to have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to John i. 14: *The Word was made flesh;* and afterwards it is added: *Full of grace and truth.* Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the beginning of the human race.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. iv. 4): *But when the fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law:* upon which a gloss says that *the fulness of the time is when it was decreed by God the Father to send His Son.* But God decreed everything by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race.

I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is principally ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to the sick. Hence Our Lord Himself says (Matt. ix. 12, 13): *They that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill. . . . For I am not come to call the just, but sinners.*

Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin, which had come of pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the words in Gal. iii. 19, *Being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator,* a gloss says: *With great wisdom was it so ordered that the Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man's fall. For first of all God left man under*

the natural law, with the freedom of his will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when he failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and beseech the aid of grace.

Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 46, 47): *Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual. . . . The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly.*

Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the words (Gal. iv. 4), *But when the fulness of the time was come,* a gloss says: *The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the band of heralds who ought to have preceded him.*

Fourthly, lest the fervour of faith should cool by the length of time, for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence (Luke xviii. 8) it is written: *But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall He find think you faith on earth?*

Reply Obj. 1. Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt rather than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human race the remedy of the Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize their disease.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine replies to this (*De Sex Quest Pagan., Ep.* cii.), saying (Q. 2) that *Christ wished to appear to man and to have His doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were who would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel was not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so bear themselves towards His preaching as not to believe*

in His corporeal presence, even were He to raise the dead. But the same Augustine, taking exception to this reply in his book (*De Perseverantia*, ix.), says: *How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would not have believed had they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness that they would have done penance with great humility if these signs of Divine power had been wrought in their midst?* And he adds in answer (xi.): *Hence, as the Apostle says* (Rom. ix. 16), *'it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy'; Who (succours whom He will of) those who, as He foresaw, would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst them, (while others) He succours not, having judged them in His predestination secretly yet justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with those who are set free, and His truth with those who are condemned.**

Reply Obj. 3. Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time and nature, in things that are different (for what brings others to perfection must itself be perfect);—but in one and the same, imperfection is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus the eternal perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of human nature; but the latter's ultimate perfection in union with God follows.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INCARNATION OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN PUT OFF TILL THE END OF THE WORLD?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps. xci. 11): *My old age in plentiful mercy*—i.e., *in the last days*, as a gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of mercy, according to Ps. ci. 14: *For it is time to have mercy on it.*

* The words in brackets are not in the text of S. Augustine.

Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

Obj. 2. Further, as has been said (A. 5 *ad* 3), in the same subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore, what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because *in Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead should dwell,* as the Apostle says (Col. i. 19, and ii. 9). Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

Obj. 3. Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by two. But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

On the contrary, It is written (Habac. iii. 2): *In the midst of the years Thou shalt make it known.* Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation which was made known to the world ought not to have been put off till the end of the world.

I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it has been said (A. 5 *ad* 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being imperfect imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the efficient cause of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; and in this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation should take place at the beginning of the human race. And the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the per-

fection of human nature, according to John i. 16: *Of His fulness we have all received;* and hence the work of the Incarnation ought not to have been put off till the end of the world. But the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world.

Secondly, from the effect of man's salvation; for, as is said *Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu.* 83, *it is in the power of the Giver to have pity when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was fitting to succour, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the feebleness of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow dim and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them, justified, to God the Father.* But if this remedy had been put off till the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth.

Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power, which has saved men in several ways,—not only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in something present and past.

Reply Obj. 1. This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as Augustine says (*Retract.* i.), the time of the Incarnation may be compared to the youth of the human race, *on account of the strength and fervour of faith, which works by charity;* and to old age—*i.e.*, the sixth age—on account of the number of centuries for Christ came in the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a body, yet they can be

together in a soul, the former on account of quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says elsewhere (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 44) that *it was not becoming that the Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth.* But in another work (*De Gen. cont. Manich.* i. 23) he says: that Christ came in the sixth age—*i.e.*, in the old age—of the human race.

Reply Obj. 2. The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection, but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 3. As Chrysostom says on John iii. 17, '*For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world*' (*Hom.* xxviii.): *There are two comings of Christ:—the first, for the remission of sins; the second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God.* Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy till the end of the world.

QUESTION II.

OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE.

(In Twelve Articles.)

Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and, first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the nature assumed.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature? (2) Whether it took place in the Person? (3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis? (4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the Incarnation? (5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ? (6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally? (7) Whether the union itself is something created? (8) Whether it is the same as assumption? (9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union? (10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about by grace? (11) Whether any merits preceded it? (12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?

First Article.

WHETHER THE UNION OF THE INCARNATE WORD TOOK PLACE IN THE NATURE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii., act. 1): *We must understand not two natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God;* and this could not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.

Obj. 2. Further, Athanasius says in his *Creed* that, *as the rational soul and the flesh together are one man, so God and man together are one Christ.* Now the rational soul and flesh together form one human nature. Therefore the union took place in the nature.

Obj. 3. Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other; for Cyril says (*loc. cit.*) that the Divine nature *is incarnate;* and Gregory Nazianzen says (*Ep.* i. *ad Cledon.*) that the human nature is *deified,* as appears from Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 6, 11). Therefore from two natures one seems to have resulted.

On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of Chalcedon: *We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation—the distinction of natures not having been taken away by the union.* Therefore the union did not take place in the nature.

I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is *nature.* Now it is to be observed that the word *nature* comes from nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the begetting of living beings, which is called *birth* or *sprouting forth,* the word *natura* meaning, as it were, *nascitura.* Afterwards this word *nature* was taken to signify the principle of this begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is an intrinsic principle, this word *nature* was further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says (*Phys.* ii.) that *nature is the principle of motion in that in which it is essentially and not accidentally.* Now this principle is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter. And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated, is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species is called the *nature.* And thus Boëthius defines nature (*De Duab.*

Nat.): *Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference—i.e.*, which perfects the specific definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the essence, or the *what-it-is*, or the quiddity of the species.

Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration (which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of the Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on (A. 6). Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually. Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the form of a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in Christ, as they wish.

Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is altogether immutable, as has been said (I., Q. IX., AA. 1 and 2), hence neither can it be changed into something else, since it is incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there

can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed—*e.g.*, if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain.

Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation. First, because each nature—*i.e.*, the Divine and the human—has its specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is said (*Metaph.* viii., text 10).

Reply Obj. 1. This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod (*i.e.*, Constantinople II., coll. viii., can. 8) thus: *If anyone proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not receive it as the Fathers taught—viz., that from the Divine and human natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results; —but endeavours from these words to introduce one nature or substance of the Divinity and flesh of Christ:—let such a one be anathema.* Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person.

Reply Obj. 2. From the soul and body a double unity—viz., of nature and person—results in each individual:—of nature inasmuch as the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one nature springs from the

two as from act and potentiality or from matter and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved (I., Q. III., A. 8). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.

Reply Obj. 3. As Damascene says (*loc. cit.*), the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (*ibid.* 15, 17), not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE UNION OF THE INCARNATE WORD TOOK PLACE IN THE PERSON?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from His Nature, as we said (I., Q. XXXIX., A. 1). If, therefore, the union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the person.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above (I., Q. XXIX., A. 3 *ad* 2). Hence, since our human nature has its proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ's should have its proper personality.

Obj. 3. Further, as Boëthius says (*De Duab. Nat.*), *a person is an individual substance of rational nature.* But the Word of God assumed an individual human nature, for *universal human nature does not exist of itself, but is the object of pure thought,* as Damascene says (*De Fide*

Orthod. iii. 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the person.

On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii., act. 5): *We confess that Our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same Only-Begotten Son and Word of God.* Therefore the union took place in the person.

I answer that, Person has a different meaning from *nature.* For nature, as has been said (A. 1), designates the specific essence which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which is the individual subsisting in this nature) because every individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the species—viz., accidents and individuating principles, which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called *nature* as it is an essence, and a *suppositum* as it is subsisting. And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than *an individual substance of rational nature,* according to Boëthius. Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is

united to it in person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word, and not in the nature.

Reply Obj. 1. Although in God Nature and Person are not really distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in the nature.

Reply Obj. 2. Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by the word *person*). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us, being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.

Reply Obj. 3. The Word of God *did not assume human nature in general, but 'in atomo'*—that is, in an individual—as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 11), otherwise every man would be the Word of God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person,

but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect—viz., in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a *person* being defined as *an individual substance*, for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect—viz., in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the person.

Third Article.

Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says (*Enchir.* xxxv., xxxviii.): *Both the Divine and human substance are one Son of God;—but they are one thing* (*aliud*) *by reason of the Word and another thing* (*aliud*) *by reason of the man.* And Pope Leo says in his letter to Flavian (*Ep.* xxviii.): *One of these is glorious with miracles, the other succumbs under injuries.* But *one* (*aliud*) and *the other* (*aliud*) differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.

Obj. 2. Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a *particular substance*, as Boëthius says (*De Duab. Nat.*). But it is plain that in Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word—viz., the body and the soul and the resultant of these. Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of the Word.

Obj. 3. Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any genus or species, as is plain from I., Q. III.,

A. 5. But Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of man; for Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* 1): *Within the limits of our nature He came, Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstantially.* Now nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word of God; and hence the same conclusion follows as above.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 3, 4, 5): *In Our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis.*

I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held, nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First, because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature—viz., rational—according to what Boëthius says (*De Duab. Nat.*), *a person is an individual substance of rational nature;* and hence it is the same to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: *If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence.* Now *subsistence* is the same as the subsisting thing, which is proper to hypostasis, as is plain from Boëthius (*De Duab. Nat.*). Secondly, because if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it is said by some that a person is a *hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity.* If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not in

the hypostasis, it follows that the union only took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii., can. 3), condemned in these terms: *If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be anathema.* Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be a suppositum, because he underlies (*supponitur*) whatever belongs to man and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word—*e.g.*, that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this, too, was condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (*ibid.* can. 4) in these words: *If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if they could be used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema.* Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: *If anyone does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with His flesh is both—to wit, God and man—let him be anathema.*

Reply Obj. 1. As accidental difference makes a thing *other* (*alterum*), so essential difference makes *another thing* (*aliud*). Now it is plain that the *otherness* which springs from accidental difference may pertain to the same hypo-

stasis or suppositum in created things, since the same thing numerically can underlie different accidents. But it does not happen in created things that the same numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence just as when we speak of *otherness* in regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to Chelidonius (*Ep.* ci.): *In the Saviour we may find one thing and another, yet He is not one person and another. And I say 'one thing and another'; whereas, on the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and another.*

Reply Obj. 2. Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing—viz., the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.

Reply Obj. 3. In created things a singular thing is placed in a genus or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation, but on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis.

Fourth Article.

Whether after the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ is composite?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Person of Christ is not composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or hypostasis of the Word, as appears from what has been said (A. 2). But in the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from I., Q. XXXIX., A. 1. Therefore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was shown above (I., Q. III., A. 7), it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composite.

Obj. 2. Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composed of two natures.

Obj. 3. Further, what is composed of others would seem to be homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed. Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures, it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to A. 2.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 3, 4, 5), *In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis composed from both.*

I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two.

And thereby the solution to the first is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. This composition of a person from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not verified in every composition, that the thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only in the parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed solely of continuous (parts). But an animal is composed of soul and body, and neither of these is an animal.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE IS ANY UNION OF SOUL AND BODY?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ, it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to AA. 2 and 3.

Obj. 2. Further, from the union of soul and body results the nature of the human species. But Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 3), that *we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ.* Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him.

Obj. 3. Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by the Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life. Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body.

On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as the Church chants: *Taking an*

*animate body, He deigned to be born of a Virgin.** Therefore in Christ there was a union of soul and body.

I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. ii. 7), *being made in the likeness of a man.* Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ's humanity.

Reply Obj. 1. This would seem to be the reason which was of weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ—viz., lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because of its union with a further and nobler perfection—viz., the rational soul, as has been said above (A. 2 *ad* 2).

Reply Obj. 2. This saying of Damascene may be taken in two ways: First, as referring to human nature, which,

* Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii., Lauds.

as it is in one individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son of God would not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Luke xxiv. 39), *A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have.* Neither can it be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (*ibid.* 11) that He assumed human nature *in atomo—i.e.*, in an individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son of God.

Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature (viz., human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two natures, Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds: *For there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated, another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man.*

Reply Obj. 3. There are two principles of corporeal life: one the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since *in living things to be is to live,* as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii. 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN NATURE WAS UNITED TO THE WORD OF GOD ACCIDENTALLY?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. ii. 7) of the Son of God, that He was *in habit found as a man*. But habit is accidentally associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came to Him accidentally.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (A. 1). Hence the human nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God.

Obj. 4. Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 15), that *the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead*. Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to the Son of God accidentally.

On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being. If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope Alexander (III.), who says (*Conc. Later.* iii.): *Since*

Christ is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a substance?

I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so that they confessed Christ to be *from* two natures (which were distinct before the union), but not *in* two natures (the distinction of nature coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person of the Son of man, and said these were mutually united—first, *by indwelling,* inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, *by unity of intention,* inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement with the will of the Word of God; thirdly, *by operation,* inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, *by greatness of honour,* inasmuch as all honour shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His union with the Son of God; fifthly, *by equivocation—i.e.,* communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union.

But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion set down by the Master (III. *Sent.,* D. 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (*ibid.*).

But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above (A. 3). And if stress is laid on the word *person*, we must have in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the unity of dignity and honour. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II., coll. viii., can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds *one person in dignity, honour and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly wrote.* But the other opinion falls into the error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it says something worse than Nestorius—to wit, that the soul and body are not united.

Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (*ibid.*) we read: *Since the unity may be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came together* (*i.e.*, destroying both natures), *confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which is in subsistence.* Therefore it is plain that the second of the three opinions, mentioned by the Master (*loc. cit.*), which holds one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils.

Reply Obj. 1. As Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 26): *Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in the Theology*—*i.e.*, in the Godhead of Persons—*and in the Dispensation*—*i.e.*, the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human nature in Christ is likened to a habit—*i.e.*, a garment, not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the human nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (*Qq.* 83, qu. 73).

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever accrues after the completion of the being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto the same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other from the being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united to the Son of God.

Reply Obj. 3. Accident is divided against substance. Now substance, as is plain from *Metaph.* v. 25, is taken in two ways—first, for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis—hence the union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that it is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in the nature.

Reply Obj. 4. Not everything that is assumed as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that the man was really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (*Epist. ad Monach. Ægyptii*): *The Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel—i.e.,* Christ—*was assumed for the office of an instrument, but as God truly humanized—i.e.,* made man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE UNION OF THE DIVINE NATURE AND THE HUMAN IS ANYTHING CREATED?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the Divine and human natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the union is not anything created.

Obj. 2. Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the end of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union is terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.

Obj. 3. Further, *That which is the cause of a thing being such is still more so* (*Poster.* i.). But man is said to be the Creator on account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing created, but the Creator.

On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is

created. Now this union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is something created.

I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above (I., Q. XIII., A. 7), every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created.

Reply Obj. 1. This union is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in Him.

Reply Obj. 2. The specific nature of a relation, as of motion, depends upon the end or term, but its being depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a created being.

Reply Obj. 3. A man is called Creator and is God because of the union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its relation.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER UNION IS THE SAME AS ASSUMPTION?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of assumption and union is

one and the same—viz., the Divine hypostasis. Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not different.

Obj. 2. Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 11): *Union is one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation, and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation determine the end of copulation.* But likewise assumption does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union is the same as assumption.

On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be united, not assumed.

I answer that, As was said above (A. 7), union implies a certain relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they come together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are brought about by some change; and change consists in action and passion. Hence the *first* and principal difference between assumption and union must be said to be that union implies the relation: whereas assumption implies the action, whereby someone is said to assume, or the passion, whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this difference another *second* difference arises, for assumption implies *becoming,* whereas union implies *having become,* and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of assumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of God, Who assumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human nature, considered in itself —*i.e.*, in the abstract—is viewed as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is human nature. From this same

follows a *third* difference, which is that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. And hence assumption determines the term whence and the term whither; for assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines none of these things; hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the human nature is joined to the Divine personality, so that the Divine Person subsists in human nature.

Reply Obj. 1. Union and assumption have not the same relation to the term, but a different relation, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2. What unites and what assumes are not the same. For whatsoever Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the united and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is said to be united, but not assumed.

Reply Obj. 3. Assumption determines with whom the union is made on the part of the one assuming, inasmuch as assumption means taking unto oneself (*ad se sumere*), whereas incarnation and humanation (determine with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus assumption differs logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE UNION OF THE TWO NATURES IN CHRIST IS THE GREATEST OF ALL UNIONS?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the two natures in Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls short of the unity of what is one, since

what is united is by participation, but one is by essence. Now in created things there are some that are simply one, as is shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of number. Therefore the union of which we are speaking does not imply the greatest of all unions.

Obj. 2. Further, the greater the distance between things united, the less the union. Now, the things united by this union are most distant—namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are infinitely apart. Therefore their union is the least of all.

Obj. 3. Further, from union there results one. But from the union of soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature; whereas from the union of the Divine and human nature there results what is one in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and hence the union of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 10) that *man is in the Son of God, more than the Son in the Father.* But the Son is in the Father by unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of the Incarnation. Therefore the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest union; and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the greatest unity.

I answer that, Union implies the joining of several in some one thing. Therefore the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two ways:—first, in regard to the things united; secondly, in regard to that in which they are united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it has no pre-eminence in regard to the things united.

Reply Obj. 1. The unity of the Divine Person is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a Divine Person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received into another by participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself whatever per-

tains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity, which is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things numbered. And hence in this respect the union of the Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine Person, but is united to it.

Reply Obj. 2. This reason regards the things united, and not the Person in Whom the union takes place.

Reply Obj. 3. The unity of the Divine Person is greater than the unity of person and nature in us; and hence the union of the Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us.

And because what is urged in the argument *on the contrary* rests upon what is untrue—namely, that the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence—we must say to the authority of Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But the man in some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the Father—namely, inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I say *man*, meaning Christ, and when I say *Son of God;* whereas it is not the same suppositum of Father and Son.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE UNION OF THE INCARNATION TOOK PLACE BY GRACE?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by grace. For grace is an accident, as was shown above (I.-II., Q. CX., A. 2). But the union of the human nature to the Divine did not take place accidentally, as was shown above (A. 6). Therefore it seems that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by grace.

Obj. 2. Further, the subject of grace is the soul. But it is written (Col. ii. 9): *In Christ* (Vulg., *Him*) *dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally.* Therefore it seems that this union did not take place by grace.

Obj. 3. Further, every saint is united to God by grace. If, therefore, the union of the Incarnation was by grace, it would seem that Christ is said to be God no more than other holy men.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Praed. Sanct.* xv.): *By the same grace every man is made a Christian, from the beginning of his faith, as this man from His beginning was made Christ.* But this man became Christ by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union was by grace.

I answer that, As was said above (I.-II., Q. CX., A. 1), grace is taken in two ways:—first, as the will of God gratuitously bestowing something; secondly, as the free gift of God. Now human nature stands in need of the gratuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to God, since this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human nature is lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as the saints know and love God; secondly, by personal being, and this mode belongs exclusively to Christ, in Whom human nature is assumed so as to be in the Person of the Son of God. But it is plain that for the perfection of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit, whereas that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take place by means of a habit.

And hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of God gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or acceptable to Him, the union of the Incarnation took place by grace, even as the union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the human nature is united to the Divine Person may be called a grace, inasmuch as it took place without being preceded by any merits—but not as though there were an habitual grace, by means of which the union took place.

Reply Obj. 1. The grace which is an accident is a certain likeness of the Divinity participated by man. But by the Incarnation human nature is not said to have participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but is said to be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated likeness of it.

Reply Obj. 2. Habitual grace is only in the soul; but the grace—*i.e.*, the free gift of God—of being united to the Divine Person belongs to the whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence it is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally in Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely to the soul, but to the body also. Although it may also be said that it dwelt in Christ corporeally—*i.e.*, not as in a shadow, as it dwelt in the sacraments of the old law, of which it is said in the same place (verse 17) that they are the *shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ* (Vulg., *Christ's*), inasmuch as the body is opposed to the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to have dwelt in Christ corporeally—*i.e.*, in three ways, just as a body has three dimensions:—first, by essence, presence, and power, as in other creatures; secondly, by sanctifying grace, as in the saints; thirdly, by personal union, which is proper to Christ.

Hence the reply to the third is manifest—viz., because the union of the Incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone, but in subsistence or person.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY MERITS PRECEDED THE UNION OF THE INCARNATION?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the Incarnation followed upon certain merits, because upon Ps. xxxii. 22, *Let Thy mercy, O Lord, be upon us, as*, etc., a gloss says: *Here the prophet's desire for the Incarnation and its merited fulfilment are hinted at.* Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever merits anything merits that without which it cannot be. But the ancient Fathers merited eternal life, to which they were able to attain only by the Incarnation; for Gregory says (*Moral.* xiii.): *Those who came into this world before Christ's coming, whatsoever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could not, on being divested of the body, at once be admitted into the bosom of the heavenly country, seeing that He had not as yet come Who, by His own descending, should place the souls of the righteous in their everlasting seat.* Therefore it would seem that they merited the Incarnation.

Obj. 3. Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung that *she merited to bear the Lord of all,** and this took place through the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Praed. Sanct.* xv.): *Whoever can find merits preceding the singular generation of our Head, may also find merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us His members.* But no merits preceded our regeneration, according to Titus iii. 5: *Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, by the laver of regeneration.* Therefore no merits preceded the generation of Christ.

I answer that, With regard to Christ Himself, it is clear from the above (A. 10) that no merits of His could have preceded the union. For we do not hold that He was first of all a mere man, and that afterwards by the merits of a good life it was granted Him to become the Son of God, as Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning of His conception this man was truly the Son of God, seeing that He had no other hypostasis but that of the Son of God, according to Luke i. 35: *The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God.* And hence every operation of this man followed the union. Therefore no operation of His could have been meritorious of the union.

Neither could the deeds of any other man whatsoever

* Little Office of B.V.M., Dominican Rite, Ant. at *Benedictus.*

have failed to merit this union condignly;—first, because the meritorious works of man are properly ordained to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and consists in the full enjoyment of God. Whereas the union of the Incarnation, inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the act of the soul in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Secondly, because grace cannot fall under merit, for the principle of merit does not fall under merit; and therefore neither does grace, for it is the principle of merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation fall under merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to John i. 17: *Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.* Thirdly, because the Incarnation is for the reformation of the entire human nature, and therefore it does not fall under the merit of any individual man, since the goodness of a mere man cannot be the cause of the good of the entire nature. Yet the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation congruously by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God should hearken to those who obeyed Him.

And thereby the reply to the first is manifest.

Reply Obj. 2. It is false that under merit falls everything without which there can be no reward. For there is something pre-required not merely for reward, but also for merit, as the Divine goodness and grace and the very nature of man. And again, the mystery of the Incarnation is the principle of merit, because *of His fulness we all have received* (Jo. i. 16).

Reply Obj. 3. The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the Lord of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and holiness, which fitted her to be the Mother of God.

Twelfth Article.

Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the grace of union was not natural to the man Christ. For the union of the Incarnation did not take place in the nature, but in the Person, as was said above (A. 2). Now a thing is denominated from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought rather to be called personal than natural.

Obj. 2. Further, grace is divided against nature, even as gratuitous things, which are from God, are distinguished from natural things, which are from an intrinsic principle. But if things are divided in opposition to one another, one is not denominated by the other. Therefore the grace of Christ was not natural to Him.

Obj. 3. Further, natural is that which is according to nature. But the grace of union is not natural to Christ in regard to the Divine Nature, otherwise it would belong to the other Persons; nor is it natural to Him according to the human nature, otherwise it would belong to all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore it would seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Enchir.* xl.): *In the assumption of human nature, grace itself became somewhat natural to that man, so as to leave no room for sin in Him.*

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* v. 5), nature designates, in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing. Hence natural may be taken in two ways:—first, for what is only from the essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to mount; secondly, we call natural to man what he has had from his birth, according to Eph. ii. 3: *We were by nature children of wrath;* and Wisd. xii. 10: *They were a wicked generation, and their malice natural.* Therefore the grace of Christ, whether of union or habitual, cannot be called natural as if caused by

the principles of the human nature of Christ, although it may be called natural, as if coming to the human nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Nature. But these two kinds of grace are said to be natural to Christ, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since from the beginning of His conception the human nature was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled with the gift of grace.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the union did not take place in the nature, yet it was caused by the power of the Divine Nature, which is truly the nature of Christ, and it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the beginning of His nativity.

Reply Obj. 2. The union is not said to be grace and natural in the same respect; for it is called grace inasmuch as it is not from merit; and it is said to be natural inasmuch as by the power of the Divine Nature it was in the humanity of Christ from His nativity.

Reply Obj. 3. The grace of union is not natural to Christ according to His human nature, as if it were caused by the principles of the human nature, and hence it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless, it is natural to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the *property* of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, so that He might be the natural Son of God and of man. But it is natural to Him in regard to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the active principle of this grace; and this belongs to the whole Trinity—to wit, to be the active principle of this grace.

QUESTION III.

OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON ASSUMING.

(In Eight Articles.)

WE must now consider the union on the part of the Person assuming, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether to assume is befitting to a Divine Person? (2) Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature? (3) Whether the nature abstracted from the personality can assume? (4) Whether one Person can assume without another? (5) Whether each Person can assume? (6) Whether several Persons can assume one individual nature? (7) Whether one Person can assume two individual natures? (8) Whether it was more fitting for the Person of the Son of God to assume human nature than for another Divine Person?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS FITTING FOR A DIVINE PERSON TO ASSUME?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature. For a Divine Person signifies something most perfect. Now no addition can be made to what is perfect. Therefore, since to assume is to take to oneself, and consequently what is assumed is added to the one who assumes, it does not seem to be befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature.

Obj. 2. Further, that to which anything is assumed is communicated in some degree to what is assumed to it, just as dignity is communicated to whosoever is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a person to be incommunicable, as was said above (I., Q. XXIX., A. 1).

Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume —*i.e.*, to take to Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, person is constituted by nature. But it is repugnant that the thing constituted should assume the constituent, since the effect does not act on its cause. Hence it is not befitting to a Person to assume a nature.

On the contrary, Augustine* says (*De Fide ad Petrum,* ii.): *This God—i.e., the Only-Begotten One—took the form—i.e., the nature—of a servant to His own Person.* But the Only-Begotten God is a Person. Therefore it is befitting to a Person to take—*i.e.*, to assume a nature.

I answer that, In the word *assumption* are implied two things—viz., the principle and the term of the act, for to assume is to take something to oneself. Now of this assumption a Person is both the principle and the term. The principle—because it properly belongs to a person to act, and this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine action. Likewise a Person is the term of this assumption, because, as was said above (Q. II., AA. 1 and 2), the union took place in the Person, and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to assume a nature is most properly befitting to a Person.

Reply Obj. 1. Since the Divine Person is infinite, no addition can be made to it. Hence Cyril says†: *We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to addition;* just as in the union of man with God, nothing is added to God by the grace of adoption, but what is Divine is united to man; hence, not God but man is perfected.

Reply Obj. 2. A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch as It cannot be predicated of several suppositа, but nothing prevents several things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist in several natures, for even in a created person several natures may concur accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quantity and quality. But this is proper to a Divine Person, on account of its infinity, that there should be

* Fulgentius. † Council of Ephesus, Part I., ch. 26.

a concourse of natures in it, not accidentally, but in subsistence.

Reply Obj. 3. As was said above (Q. II., A. 1), the human nature constitutes a Divine Person, not simply, but forasmuch as the Person is denominated from such a nature. For human nature does not make the Son of Man to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is constituted simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said to assume the Divine Nature, but to assume the human nature.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS BEFITTING TO THE DIVINE NATURE TO ASSUME?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to assume. Because, as was said above (A. 1), to assume is to take to oneself. But the Divine Nature did not take to Itself human nature, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (Q. II., AA. 1 and 3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to assume human nature.

Obj. 2. Further, the Divine Nature is common to the three Persons. If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume, it consequently is befitting to the three Persons; and thus the Father assumed human nature even as the Son, which is erroneous.

Obj. 3. Further, to assume is to act. But to act befits a person, not a nature, which is rather taken to be the principle by which the agent acts. Therefore to assume is not befitting to the nature.

On the contrary, Augustine* says (*De Fide ad Petrum,* ii.): *That nature which remains eternally begotten of the Father* (*i.e.,* which is received from the Father by eternal generation) *took our nature free of sin from His Mother.*

I answer that, As was said above (A. 1), in the word

* Fulgentius.

assumption two things are signified—to wit, the principle and the term of the action. Now to be the principle of the assumption belongs to the Divine Nature in itself, because the assumption took place by Its power; but to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the Divine Nature in itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is considered to be. Hence a Person is primarily and more properly said to assume, but it may be said secondarily that the Nature assumed a nature to Its Person. And after the same manner the Nature is also said to be incarnate, not that it is changed to flesh, but that it assumed the nature of flesh. Hence Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 6): *Following the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the Nature of God is incarnate.*

Reply Obj. 1. *Oneself* is reciprocal, and points to the same suppositum. But the Divine Nature is not a distinct suppositum from the Person of the Word. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took human nature to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to Itself. But although the Father takes human nature to the Person of the Word, He did not thereby take it to Himself, for the suppositum of the Father and the Son is not one; and hence it cannot properly be said that the Father assumes human nature.

Reply Obj. 2. What is befitting to the Divine Nature in Itself is befitting to the three Persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like. But to assume belongs to It by reason of the Person of the Word, as was said above, and hence it is befitting to that Person alone.

Reply Obj. 3. As in God *what is* and *whereby it is* are the same, so likewise in Him *what acts* and *whereby it acts* are the same, since everything acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the Divine Nature is both that whereby God acts, and the very God Who acts.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NATURE ABSTRACTED FROM THE PERSONALITY CAN ASSUME?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our mind, the Nature cannot assume. For it was said above (A. 1) that it belongs to the Nature to assume by reason of the Person. But what belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of colour, without colour cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be mentally abstracted, the Nature cannot assume.

Obj. 2. Further, assumption implies the term of union, as was said above (A. 1). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but only in the Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume.

Obj. 3. Further, it has been said above (I., Q. XL., A. 3) that in the Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains. But the one who assumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume.

On the contrary, In the Godhead Personality signifies a personal property; and this is threefold—viz., Paternity, Filiation and Procession, as was said above (P. I., Q. XXX., A. 2). Now if we mentally abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of God, by which the Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Luke i. 37): *No word shall be impossible with God.* Therefore it seems that if the Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still assume.

I answer that, The intellect stands in two ways towards God. First, to know God as He is, and in this manner it is impossible for the intellect to circumscribe something in God and leave the rest, for all that is in God is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as regards these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since they are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the same time. Secondly, the intellect stands towards God,

not indeed as knowing God as He is, but in its own way—*i.e.*, understanding manifoldly and separately what in God is one; and in this way our intellect can understand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the like, which are called essential attributes, without understanding Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect, we may still understand the Nature assuming.

Reply Obj. 1. Because in God *what is*, and *whereby it is*, are one, if any one of the things which are attributed to God in the abstract is considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will still be something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is an intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on account of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and as a Person. And in this way It may be understood to assume human nature by reason of Its subsistence or Personality.

Reply Obj. 2. Even if the personal properties of the three Persons are abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in our thoughts the one Personality of God, as the Jews consider. And the assumption can be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in the Person of the Word.

Reply Obj. 3. If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is said that nothing remains by way of resolution—*i.e.*, as if the subject of the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can think of in God is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However, some of the things predicated of God can be understood without others, not by way of resolution, but by the way mentioned above.

Fourth Article.

WHETHER ONE PERSON WITHOUT ANOTHER CAN ASSUME A CREATED NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one Person cannot assume a created nature without another assuming it. For *the works of the Trinity are inseparable,* as Augustine says (*Enchir.* xxxviii.). But as the three Persons have one essence, so likewise They have one operation. Now to assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to one without belonging to another.

Obj. 2. Further, as we say the Person of the Son became incarnate, so also did the Nature; for *the whole Divine Nature became incarnate in one of Its hypostases,* as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 6). But the Nature is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption is.

Obj. 3. Further, as the human nature in Christ is assumed by God, so likewise are men assumed by Him through grace, according to Rom. xiv. 3: *God hath taken him to Him.* But this assumption pertains to all the Persons; therefore the first also.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* ii.) that the mystery of the Incarnation pertains to *discrete theology—i.e.,* according to which something *distinct* is said of the Divine Persons.

I answer that, As was said above (A. 1), assumption implies two things—viz., the act of assuming and the term of assumption. Now the act of assumption proceeds from the Divine power, which is common to the three Persons, but the term of the assumption is a Person, as stated above (A. 2). Hence what has to do with action in the assumption is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as not to belong to another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son.

Reply Obj. 1. This reason regards the operation, and

the conclusion would follow if it implied this operation only, without the term, which is a Person.

Reply Obj. 2. The Nature is said to be incarnate, and to assume by reason of the Person in Whom the union is terminated, as stated above (AA. 1 and 2), and not as it is common to the three Persons. Now *the whole Divine Nature is* said to be *incarnate;* not that It is incarnate in all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to the perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as Damascene explains there.

Reply Obj. 3. The assumption which takes place by the grace of adoption is terminated in a certain participation of the Divine Nature, by an assimilation to Its goodness, according to 2 Pet. i. 4: *That you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature;* and hence this assumption is common to the three Persons, in regard to the principle and the term. But the assumption which is by the grace of union is common on the part of the principle, but not on the part of the term, as was said above.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER EACH OF THE DIVINE PERSONS COULD HAVE ASSUMED HUMAN NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no other Divine Person could have assumed human nature except the Person of the Son. For by this assumption it has been brought about that God is the Son of Man. But it was not becoming that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should be said to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the Divine Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Ghost could not have assumed flesh.

Obj. 2. Further, by the Divine Incarnation men have come into possession of the adoption of sons, according to Rom. viii. 15: *For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption of sons.* But sonship by adoption is a participated likeness of

natural sonship which does not belong to the Father nor the Holy Ghost; hence it is said (Rom. viii. 29): *For whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son.* Therefore it seems that no other Person except the Person of the Son could have become incarnate.

Obj. 3. Further, the Son is said to be sent and to be begotten by the temporal nativity, inasmuch as He became incarnate. But it does not belong to the Father to be sent, for He is innascible, as was said above (I., Q. XXXII., A. 3; Q. XLIII., A. 4). Therefore at least the Person of the Father cannot become incarnate.

On the contrary, Whatever the Son can do, so can the Father and the Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the three Persons would not be one. But the Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost were able to become incarnate.

I answer that, As was said above (AA. 1, 2, 4), assumption implies two things—viz., the act of the one assuming and the term of the assumption. Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the term is a Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to all the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the Son.

Reply Obj. 1. The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to be the Son of Man, does not constitute His Person, as does the eternal Sonship; but is something following upon the temporal nativity. Hence, if the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy Ghost in this manner, there would be no confusion of the Divine Persons.

Reply Obj. 2. Adoptive sonship is a certain participation of natural sonship; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the Father, Who is the principle of natural sonship, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal. iv. 6: *God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying, Abba, Father.* And therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we receive adoptive sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have received adoptive sonship from Him, as from the principle of the natural sonship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond of Father and Son.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to eternal birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the Son of God is said to be sent in regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as He is from another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for the nature of mission.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SEVERAL DIVINE PERSONS CAN ASSUME ONE AND THE SAME INDIVIDUAL NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there be only one man, for one man is *this man,* which signifies one person; and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be destroyed, which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can take one human nature.

Obj. 2. Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of Person, as has been said above (A. 2). But the Father,

Son, and Holy Ghost are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot assume one human nature.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 3, 4), and Augustine (*De Trin.* i. 11, 12, 13), that from the Incarnation of God the Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each of the three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely, what was said of the man could be said of each of the three Persons. Therefore what is proper to the Father—viz., to beget the Son—would be said of the man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons should assume one human nature.

On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But the three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they can also subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be assumed by the three Persons.

I answer that, As was said above (Q. II., A. 5 *ad* 1), by the union of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude another from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person. Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation *the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer,* as Augustine says (*Ep. ad Volusianum,* cxxxvii.), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the Divine Person assuming, and not according to the quality of the human nature assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or three Divine Persons should assume one human nature, but it would be impossible for them to assume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says, in the book *De Concep. Virg.* (*Cur Deus Homo* ii. 9),

that *several Persons cannot assume one and the same man to unity of Person.*

Reply Obj. 1. In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one human nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man, because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human nature. Nor would *one* imply unity of person, but unity in human nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons were one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men, who are many simply, are in some respect one—*e.g.*, one people—and as Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi. 3): *The Spirit of God and the spirit of man are by nature different, but by inherence one spirit results,* according to 1 Cor. vi. 17: *He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.*

Reply Obj. 2. In this supposition the human nature would be assumed to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of each Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each Person by assumption.

Reply Obj. 3. In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results a communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain. Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the man was unbegotten, inasmuch as *man* stood for the Person of the Father. But if one were to go

on to say, *The man is unbegotten; the Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten,* it would be the fallacy of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.

Seventh Article.

Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume two human natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of the Incarnation has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is plain from what has been stated above (Q. II., AA. 3 and 6). Therefore, if we suppose one Person to assume two human natures, there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species; which would seem to imply a contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multiplied by distinct supposita.

Obj. 2. Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have one human nature; neither could it be said that there were several, for several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there would be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole Divine Nature is united to the whole nature assumed —*i.e.*, to every part of it—for Christ *is perfect God and perfect man, complete God and complete man,* as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 7). But two human natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul of one would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two bodies would be together, which would give rise to confusion of natures. Therefore it is not possible for one Divine Person to assume two human natures.

On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son do. But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human nature distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son. Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can assume another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed.

I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no more, has a power limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite, nor can it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said that a Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume another. For it would seem to follow from this that the Personality of the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human nature as to be unable to assume another to its Personality; and this is impossible, for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is plain that, whether we consider the Divine Person in regard to His power, which is the principle of the union, or in regard to His Personality, which is the term of the union, it has to be said that the Divine Person, over and beyond the human nature which He has assumed, can assume another distinct human nature.

Reply Obj. 1. A created nature is completed in its essentials by its form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter. And hence, if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the union of form and matter—*i.e.*, of soul and body—does not constitute a new suppositum, as was said above (A. 6). Hence there can be a numerical multitude on the part of the nature, on account of the division of matter, without distinction of supposita.

Reply Obj. 2. It might seem possible to reply that in such a hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the two natures, just as, on the contrary, the

three Persons would be called one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said above (A. 6 *ad* 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we must use words according to the purpose of their signification, which is in relation to our surroundings. Consequently, in order to judge of a word's signification or co-signification, we must consider the things which are around us, in which a word derived from some form is never used in the plural unless there are several supposita. For a man who has on two garments is not said to be *two persons clothed,* but *one clothed with two garments;* and whoever has two qualities is designated in the singular as *such by reason of the two qualities.* Now the assumed nature is, as it were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit at all points, as has been said above (Q. II., A. 6 *ad* 1). And hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human natures, He would be called, on account of the unity of suppositum, one man having two human natures. Now many men are said to be one people, inasmuch as they have some one thing in common, and not on account of the unity of suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons were to assume one singular human nature, they would be said to be one man, as stated (A. 6 *ad* 1), not from the unity of suppositum, but because they have some one thing in common.

Reply Obj. 3. The Divine and human natures do not bear the same relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity; and afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed that the nature is the Person, but that the Person of God subsists in human nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but is not His manhood. And hence, in order that the human nature may be assumed by the Divine Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a personal union with the whole nature assumed—*i.e.*, in all its parts. Now in the two natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the Divine Person, nor would one assume the other.

Hence it would not be necessary for one of them to be altogether united to the other—*i.e.*, all the parts of one with all the parts of the other.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT WAS MORE FITTING THAT THE PERSON OF THE SON RATHER THAN ANY OTHER DIVINE PERSON SHOULD ASSUME HUMAN NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son of God should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Ghost. For by the mystery of the Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge of God, according to John xviii. 37: *For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, to give testimony to the truth.* But by the Person of the Son of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back from the true knowledge of God, since they referred to the very Person of the Son what was said of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an inequality of Persons, according to what is said (Jo. xiv. 28): *The Father is greater than I.* Now this error would not have arisen if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, for no one would have taken the Father to be less than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the Person of the Father, rather than the Person of the Son, should have become incarnate.

Obj. 2. Further, the effect of the Incarnation would seem to be, as it were, a second creation of human nature, according to Gal. vi. 15: *For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.* But the power of creation is appropriated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more becoming to the Father than to the Son to become incarnate.

Obj. 3. Further, the Incarnation is ordained to the remission of sins, according to Matt. i. 21: *Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He shall save His people from their sins.* Now the remission of sins is attributed to the Holy

Ghost, according to John xx. 22, 23: *Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.* Therefore it became the Person of the Holy Ghost rather than the Person of the Son to become incarnate.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 1): *In the mystery of the Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made known: the wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; the power, for He made the conquered conquer.* But power and wisdom are appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Cor. i. 24: *Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God.* Therefore it was fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate.

I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as are similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is the Word of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures, because the word of the craftsman—*i.e.*, his concept—is an exemplar likeness of whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is His eternal concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And therefore as creatures are established in their proper species, though movably, by the participation of this likeness, so by the non-participated and personal union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the creature should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable perfection; for the craftsman by the intelligible form of his art, whereby he fashioned his handiwork, restores it when it has fallen into ruin. Moreover, He has a particular agreement with human nature, since the Word is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man's wisdom is derived. And hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper perfection, as he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is said (Ecclus. i. 5): *The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom.* And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting that the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature.

Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the union, which is the fulfilling of predestination—*i.e.*, of such as are preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on sons, according to Rom. viii. 17: *If sons, heirs also.* Hence it was fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same chapter (viii. 29): *For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son.*

Thirdly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the sin of our first parent, for which the Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of the serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led back to God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst for knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1. There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse, since it even abuses God's goodness, according to Rom. ii. 4: *Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness?* Hence, even if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, men would have been capable of finding an occasion of error, as though the Son were not able to restore human nature.

Reply Obj. 2. The first creation of things was made by the power of God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation ought to have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God the Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation according to 2 Cor. v. 19: *For God indeed was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.*

Reply Obj. 3. To be the gift of the Father and the Son is proper to the Holy Ghost. But the remission of sins is caused by the Holy Ghost, as by the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to man's justification that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift the Holy Ghost is.

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QUESTION IV.

OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE.

(In Six Articles.)

WE must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.

Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature; secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order of the assumption.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any other nature? (2) Whether He assumed a person? (3) Whether He assumed a man? (4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature abstracted from all individuals? (5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all its individuals? (6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any man begotten of the stock of Adam?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER HUMAN NATURE WAS MORE ASSUMABLE BY THE SON OF GOD THAN ANY OTHER NATURE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that human nature is not more capable of being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine says (*Ep. ad Volusianum*, cxxxvii.): *In deeds wrought miraculously the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer.* Now the

power of God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite. Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any other creature.

Obj. 2. Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated (Q. III., A. 8). But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in irrational creatures we find the likeness of trace. Therefore the irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature.

Obj. 3. Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (*Hom. de Cent. Ovib.*; xxxiv. *in Ev.*), where he introduces Ezech. xxviii. 12: *Thou wast the seal of resemblance.* And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according to Job iv. 18: *And in His angels He found wickedness.* Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man.

Obj. 4. Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed than human nature

On the contrary, It is said (Prov. viii. 31) by the mouth of Begotten Wisdom: *My delights were to be with the children of men;* and hence there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human nature.

I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness in human nature may be taken from two things—viz., according to its dignity, and according to its

need. According to its dignity—because human nature, as being rational and intellectual, was made for attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation—viz., by knowing and loving Him. According to its need—because it stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational creature the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was assumable.

Reply Obj. 1. Creatures are said to be *such* with reference to their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God, but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no capability for this.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of image is found in human nature, forasmuch as it is capable of God—viz., by attaining to Him through its own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is the union with God in personal being than the union by operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with God by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being.

Reply Obj. 3. Some say that angels are not assumable, since they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption; hence they cannot be assumed

to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the One assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed. For God by producing a new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is irremediable, as stated above (I., Q. LXIV., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 4. The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of one person or suppositum, but of something which is one by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of assumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of being assumed.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED A PERSON?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 11) that the Son of God *assumed human nature 'in atomo'*—*i.e.*, in an individual. But an individual in rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boëthius (*De Duab. Nat.*). Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.

Obj. 2. Further, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 6) that the Son of God *assumed what He had sown in our nature*. But He sowed our personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent III.* says in a Decretal that *the Person of God absorbed the person of man*. Therefore it would seem that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed.

* Paschas. Diac., *De Spiritu Sancto*, ii.

On the contrary, Augustine* says (*De Fide ad Petrum,* ii.) that *God assumed the nature, not the person, of man.*

I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is taken into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it is the term of the assumption, as was said (Q. III., AA. 1 and 2). For if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted—in which case it was useless; or it remains after the union—and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is false, as was shown above (Q. II., A. 6). Hence it follows that the Son of God nowise assumed a human person.

Reply Obj. 1. The Son of God assumed human nature *in atomo—i.e.,* in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was assumed.

Reply Obj. 2. Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something which is above human nature—viz., the union with a Divine Person.

Reply Obj. 3. Absorption does not here imply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person, the human nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person *absorbed the person,* inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature from having its personality.

* Fulgentius.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DIVINE PERSON ASSUMED A MAN?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For it is written (Ps. lxiv. 5): *Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee,* which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (*De Agone Christ.* xi.): *The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore things human.*

Obj. 2. Further, the word *man* signifies a human nature. But the Son of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man.

Obj. 3. Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed.

On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: *We believe in Our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be another besides Him.*

I answer that, As has been said above (A. 2), what is assumed is not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption. Now it was said (Q. III., AA. 1 and 2) that the individual to Whom the human nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term of the assumption. Now this word *man* signifies human nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 4, 11), this word God signifies Him who has human nature. And hence it cannot properly be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, in fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. But according to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two suppositа in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that

the Son of God assumed a man. Hence the first opinion quoted in III. *Sent.*, D. 6, grants that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was said above (Q. II., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 1. These phrases are not to be taken too literally, but are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy doctors; so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this,—that the Son of God is man.

Reply Obj. 2. The word *man* signifies human nature in the concrete, inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot say a suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.

Reply Obj. 3. The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed, but the man whose nature He assumed.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED HUMAN NATURE ABSTRACTED FROM ALL INDIVIDUALS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said of Christ (1 Tim. iv. 10) that He is *the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful.* But nature as it is in individuals withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.

Obj. 2. Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing (*per se*) man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.

Obj. 3. Further, human nature was not assumed by the

Son of God in the concrete as is signified by the word *man*, as was said above (A. 3). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is plain from what has been said (*ibid.*). Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from individuals.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 11): *God the Word incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought; for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious Incarnation.* But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from individuals *is taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist in itself*, as Damascene says (*ibid.*). Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is separated from individuals.

I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing, beyond the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two ways:—first, as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the Platonists held; secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (*Metaph.* vii. 26, 27, 29, 51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God. First, because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits, whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in order that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show Himself in men's sight, according to Baruch iii. 38: *Afterwards He was seen upon earth, and conversed with men.*

Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this would mean nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a false understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (*loc. cit.*).

Reply Obj. 1. The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to the nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause, whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human salvation.

Reply Obj. 2. Self-existing (*per se*) man is not to be found in nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.

Reply Obj. 3. Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an individual.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED HUMAN NATURE IN ALL INDIVIDUALS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita.

Obj. 2. Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine Love; hence it is written (Jo. iii. 16): *God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son.* But love makes us give ourselves to our friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to assume several human natures, as was said above (Q. III., A. 7), and with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature in all its supposita.

Obj. 3. Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the shortest manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all men had been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to lead many to the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. iv. 5 (*cf.* Heb. ii. 10). Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all its supposita.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 11) that the Son of God *did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He assume all its hypostases.*

I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature, except the Person assuming, as was said above (A. 3), if there was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming. Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren, according to the human nature, even as He is the First-born of all creatures according to the Divine, for then all men would be of equal dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature, so that on both sides unity might be found.

Reply Obj. 1. To be assumed belongs to the human nature of itself, because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it belongs to the Divine Nature to assume

by reason of the Person; not, however, that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential principles, or as its natural property, in which manner it would belong to all its supposita.

Reply Obj. 2. The love of God to men is shown not merely in the assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in human nature for other men, according to Rom. v. 8: *But God commendeth His charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died for us,* which would not have taken place had He assumed human nature in all its supposita.

Reply Obj. 3. In order to shorten the way, which every skilful workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR THE SON OF GOD TO ASSUME HUMAN NATURE OF THE STOCK OF ADAM?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says (Heb. vii. 26): *For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest, . . . separated from sinners.* But He would have been still further separated from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have assumed human nature of the stock of Adam.

Obj. 2. Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what is from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He ought to have assumed it in Adam himself.

Obj. 3. Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews, as a gloss says on Gal. ii. 15: *For we by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners.* Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from sinners, He ought

rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from the stock of Abraham, who was just.

On the contrary (Luke iii.), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back to Adam.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii. 18): *God was able to assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by his sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better to assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the enemy of the human race.* And this for three reasons: First, because it would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends; and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature. Secondly, it pertains to man's greater dignity that the conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly, because God's power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was raised to such might and glory.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ ought to be separated from sinners as regards sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature which He came to save, and in which *it behoved Him in all things to be made like to His brethren,* as the Apostle says (Heb. ii. 17). And in this is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed from a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity.

Reply Obj. 2. As was said above (*ad* 1) it behoved Him Who came to take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which Adam was subject, whom Christ *brought out of his sin,* as is written Wisd. x. 2. For it behoved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover is immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human nature in Adam himself.

Reply Obj. 3. Since Christ ought especially to be separ-

ated from sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it was fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men should stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ was to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in Abraham, who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and circumcision, as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is written Gen. xvii. 11.

QUESTION V.

OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH WERE ASSUMED.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body? (2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body—*i.e.*, one of flesh and blood? (3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul? (4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED A TRUE BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true body. For it is written (Phil. ii. 7), that He was *made in the likeness of men.* But what is something in truth is not said to be in the likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body.

Obj. 2. Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (*Serm. de Nativ.*) that *the glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption lessen the higher.* But it pertains to the dignity of God to be altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the assumption God was not united to a body.

Obj. 3. Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But the apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the imagination, as is plain from

Isa. lx. 1: *I saw the Lord sitting,* etc. Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world was not in a real body, but only in imagination.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 13): *If the body of Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a phantom.* Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.

I answer that, As is said (*De Eccles. Dogm.* ii.): *The Son of God was not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body was real.* The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of human nature, to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore granted, as already proved (Q. IV., A. 1), that it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His work, since He is the Truth. Hence Our Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Luke xxiv. 37, 39), when the disciples, *troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit,* and not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying: *Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.*

Reply Obj. 1. This likeness indicates the truth of the human nature in Christ,—just as all that truly exist in human nature are said to be like in species,—and not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of this the Apostle subjoins (verse 8) that He became *obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross;* which would have been impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness.

Reply Obj. 2. By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of God is nowise lessened. Hence Augustine* says (*De Fid. ad Pet.* ii.): *He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that He might become a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the form of God.* For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to become the form of a body, which is repugnant to the Divine simplicity and purity—for this would be to assume a body to the unity of the nature, which is impossible, as is plain from what has been stated above (Q. II., A. 1): but, the natures remaining distinct, He assumed a body to the unity of Person.

Reply Obj. 3. The figure ought to correspond to the reality as regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For if they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness but the reality itself, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 26). Hence it was more fitting that the apparitions of the Old Testament should be in appearance only, being figures; and that the apparition of the Son of God in the world should be in a real body, being the thing prefigured by these figures. Hence the Apostle says (Col. ii. 17): *Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED A CARNAL OR EARTHLY BODY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly, but a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 47): *The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly.* But the first man—*i.e.*, Adam—was of the earth as regards his body, as is plain from Gen. i. Therefore the second man—*i.e.*, Christ—was of heaven as regards the body.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said (1 Cor. xv. 50): *Flesh and blood shall not* (Vulg., *cannot*) *possess the kingdom of*

* Fulgentius.

God. But the kingdom of God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in Him, but rather a heavenly body.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But of all bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behoved Christ to assume such a body.

On the contrary, Our Lord says (Luke xxiv. 39): *A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.* Now flesh and bones are not of the matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior elements. Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and earthly body.

I answer that, By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ was not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a heavenly body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature of Christ would not have been maintained had His body been an imaginary one, such as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have been maintained if we supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a heavenly body. For since the form of man is a natural thing, it requires determinate matter, to wit, flesh and bones, which must be placed in the definition of man, as is plain from the Philosopher (*Metaph.* vii. 39). Secondly, because this would lessen the truth of such things as Christ did in the body. For since a heavenly body is impassible and incorruptible, as is proved *De Cœl.* i. 20, if the Son of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would not have truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His passion and death. Thirdly, this would have detracted from God's truthfulness. For since the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He had a carnal and earthly body, the manifestation would have been false, had He had a heavenly body. Hence (*De Eccles. Dogm.* ii.) it is said: *The Son of God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin's body, and not bringing it with Him from heaven.*

Reply Obj. 1. Christ is said in two ways to have come down from heaven. First, as regards His Divine Nature;

not indeed that the Divine Nature ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be here below in a new way, viz., by His assumed nature, according to John iii. 13: *No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, Who is in heaven.* Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was formed by a heavenly power, *i.e.*, by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine, explaining the passage quoted, says (*Ad Orosium**): *I call Christ a heavenly man because He was not conceived of human seed.* And Hilary expounds it in the same way (*De Trin.* x.).

Reply Obj. 2. Flesh and blood are not taken here for the substance of flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh; which was not in Christ as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a punishment; thus, for a time, it was in Christ, that He might carry through the work of our redemption.

Reply Obj. 3. It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have raised a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General Council of Ephesus (P. II., Act. 1) we read the saying of St. Theophilus: *Just as the best workmen are esteemed not merely for displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because by making use of the poorest clay and commonest earth, they show the power of their craft; so the best of all workmen, the Word of God, did not come down to us by taking a heavenly body of some most precious matter, but shewed the greatness of His skill in clay.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED A SOUL?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul. For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (Jo. i. 14): *The Word was made flesh—*

* *Dial. Qq.* lxv., qu. 4, work of an unknown author.

no mention being made of a soul. Now it is not said that *the Word was made flesh* as if changed to flesh, but because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have assumed a soul.

Obj. 2. Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to quicken it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it would seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Ps. xxxv. 10): Lord, *with Thee is the fountain of life*. Therefore it would seem altogether superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But *God and nature do nothing uselessly,* as the Philosopher says (*De Cœl.* i. 32; ii. 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed a soul.

Obj. 3. Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the common nature, which is the human species. But *in the Lord Jesus Christ we are not to look for a common species,* as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Agone Christ.* xxi): *Let us not hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word of God; and take 'the Word was made flesh' to mean that the man had no soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Heres.* 69, 55), it was first of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of God assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took the place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that there were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold, for three reasons. First, because it is counter to the authority of Scripture, in which Our Lord makes mention of His soul, Matt. xxvi. 38: *My soul is sorrowful even unto death;* and John x. 18: *I have power to lay down My soul (animam meam:* Douay, *My life*). But to this Apollinaris replied that in these words soul is taken metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the Old Testament of the soul of God (Isa. i. 14): *My soul hateth your new moons*

and your solemnities. But, as Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 80), the Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry. Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, slept and was weary shows that He had a true human body: otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined. For it is one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and another that historical events were related in very truth by the Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the Incarnation, which is man's liberation. For Augustine* argues thus (*Contra Felician.* xiii.): *If the Son of God in taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness, and trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable to Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? or God of all, if He has not made our soul. And as regards the other two reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the cause of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin of wilful transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can His generosity be known to anyone who says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than the body:—but if at the sin of transgression, on account of its intelligence it is worse than the body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt that He is most loving; and because of the first of these He did not despise what was better and more capable of prudence; and because of the second He protected what was most wounded.* Thirdly, this position is

* Vigilius Tapsensis.

against the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (*De Anima* ii. 9; *Metaph.* vii. 34).

Reply Obj. 1. When we say, *The Word was made flesh,* 'flesh' is taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, *The Word was made man,* as Isa. xl. 5: *All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken.* And the whole man is signified by flesh, because, as is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became visible by flesh; hence it is subjoined: *And we saw His glory.* Or because, as Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 80), *in all that union the Word is the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend the love of God's humility to us, the Evangelist mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it is less than the Word and nobler than flesh.* Again, it was reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the Word, was less assumable, as it would seem.

Reply Obj. 2. The Word is the fountain of life, as the first effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded that the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary, to say that in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul coming to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a common species—*i.e.*, a third something resulting from the Godhead and the humanity.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED A HUMAN MIND OR INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind or intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not required. But man is made to God's image, as regards his mind, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv. 3, 6). Hence, since in Christ there was the presence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human mind.

Obj. 2. Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word of God, Who is *the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world,* as is written John i. 9, is compared to the mind as the greater light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it were a lamp enkindled by the First Light (Prov. xx. 27): *The spirit of a man is the lamp of the Lord.* Therefore in Christ Who is the Word of God, there is no need of a human mind.

Obj. 3. Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God is called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing carnal, either in its substance or in its act; for it is not the act of a body, as is proved *De Anima* iii. 6. Hence it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind.

On the contrary, Augustine* says (*De Fid. ad Pet.* xiv.): *Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has true flesh and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His flesh He says* (Luke xxiv. 39): '*Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.*' *And He proves that He has a soul, saying* (Jo. x. 17): '*I lay down my soul* (Douay, *life*) *that I may take it again.*' *And He proves that He has an intellect, saying* (Matt. xi. 29): '*Learn of Me, because I am meek and*

* Fulgentius.

humble of heart.' And God says of Him by the prophet (Isa. lii. 13): *'Behold my servant shall understand.'*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Heres.* 49, 50), *the Apollinarists thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning the soul of Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh alone, without a soul; and on being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ's soul, but that the Word supplied its place.* But this position is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding. First, because it runs counter to the Gospel story, which relates how He *marvelled* (as is plain from Matt. viii. 10). Now marvelling cannot be without reason, since it implies the collation of effect and cause, *i.e.*, inasmuch as when we see an effect and are ignorant of its cause, we seek to know it, as is said *Metaph.* i. 2. Secondly, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation, which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of sin nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 6) that *the Word of God assumed a body and an intellectual and rational soul,* and adds afterwards: *The whole was united to the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for what was not assumed is not curable.* Thirdly, it is against the truth of the Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the soul as matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it is not perfected by a human, *i.e.*, a rational, soul. And hence if Christ had had a soul without a mind, He would not have had true human flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 80) that from this error it would have followed that the Son of God *took an animal with the form of a human body,* which, again, is against the Divine truth, which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth.

Reply Obj. 1. Where a thing is by its presence, its image is not required to supply the place of the thing, as

where the emperor is the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing is required together with its presence, that it may be perfected by the presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected by the impression of the seal, and as the image of a man is reflected in the mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human mind it was necessary that the Word should unite it to Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. The greater light dims the lesser light of another luminous body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the light of the body illuminated;—at the presence of the sun the light of the stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of man is perfected rather than overshadowed.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the intellective power is not the act of a body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a better disposed body should correspond to it.

QUESTION VI.

OF THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTION.

(In Six Articles.)

WE must now consider the order of the foregoing assumption, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul? (2) Whether He assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit or mind? (3) Whether the soul was assumed previous to the flesh? (4) Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word previous to being united to the soul? (5) Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts? (6) Whether it was assumed through the medium of grace?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED FLESH THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God is united to human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the mode whereby He is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures immediately by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is the Son of God united to flesh without the medium of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God in unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to the human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the hypostasis than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of indi-

viduation, which is implied in the word *hypostasis,* would seem to be matter. Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, take away the medium and you separate what were joined by the medium; for example, if the superficies be removed colour would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the medium of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the body by death, yet there still remained the union of the Word to the flesh, as will be shown (Q. L., AA. 2 and 3). Hence the Word was not joined to flesh through the medium of the soul.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Ep. ad Volusianum,* cxxxvi.): *The greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something higher.*

I answer that, A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end. Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now there is a twofold order:—one, of time; the other, of nature. But in the mystery of the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to Himself at the same time, as will appear (Q. XXX., A. 3). An order of nature between things may be taken in two ways:—first, as regards rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God; secondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is midway between the first cause and the last effect. And this second order follows the first to some extent; for as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* xiii.), God acts upon the more remote substances through the less remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is found to be midway between God and flesh; and in this way it may be said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the medium of the soul. But even as regards the second order of causality the soul is to some extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of God. For the flesh would not have been assumable, except by its relation to the rational soul, through

which it becomes human flesh. For it was said above (Q. IV., A. 1) that human nature was assumable before all others.

Reply Obj. 1. We may consider a twofold order between creatures and God:—the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and depending on Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on account of the infinitude of His power God touches each thing immediately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is in all things by essence, presence and power. But the second order is by reason of things being directed to God as to their end; and it is here that there is a medium between the creature and God, since lower creatures are directed to God by higher, as Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.* v.); and to this order pertains the assumption of human nature by the Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and hence it is united to flesh through the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. If the hypostasis of the Word of God were constituted simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was nearest to it, since it is matter which is the principle of individuation; even as the soul, being the specific form, would be nearer the human nature. But because the hypostasis of the Word is prior to and more exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any part of the human nature is, the nearer it is to the hypostasis of the Word. And hence the soul is nearer the Word of God than the body is.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the other remains; because although a thing's becoming may depend on another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as a friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter has gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her beauty, which makes a woman's fittingness for the marriage tie, yet when her beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So likewise, when the soul was separated, the union of the Word with flesh still endured.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED A SOUL THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE SPIRIT OR MIND?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium between itself and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence but the soul itself, as was said above (I., Q. LXXVII., A. 1 *ad* 1). Therefore the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind.

Obj. 2. Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself more assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the soul; which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not assumable, as was said above (Q. IV., A. 1). Hence it seems that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit.

Obj. 3. Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first through the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the very essence, which naturally comes before its power,—the mind. Therefore it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Agone Christ.* xviii.): *The invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit, and a body by means of the soul.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the Son of God is said to have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the order of dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these may be applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed congruously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit, according to Eph. iv. 23: *Be renewed in the spirit of your mind.* So, too, the intellect is the highest

and noblest of the parts of the soul, and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 6) that *the Word of God is united to flesh through the medium of the intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the soul, God Himself being an intellect.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although the intellect is not distinct from the soul in essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a power; and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium.

Reply Obj. 2. Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human spirit, as is clear from what has been said above (I., Q. LXII., A. 8; and Q. LXIV., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. The soul, between which and the Word of God the intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower powers, which are common to every soul.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL WAS ASSUMED BEFORE THE FLESH BY THE SON OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before the flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, as was said above (A. 1). Now the medium is reached before the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul before the body.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels, according to Ps. xcvi. 8: *Adore Him, all you His angels.* But the angels were created in the beginning, as was said above (I., Q. XLVI., A. 3). Therefore the soul of Christ also (was created in the beginning). But it was not created before it was assumed, for Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 2, 3, 9), that *neither the soul nor the body of Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of the*

Word. Therefore it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Jo. i. 14): *We saw Him* (Vulg., *His glory*) *full of grace and truth,* and it is added afterwards that *of His fulness we have all received* (verse 16) —*i.e.*, all the faithful of all time, as Chrysostom expounds it (*Hom.* xiii. *in Joan.*). Now this could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fulness of grace and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of the world, for the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since the fulness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union with the Word, according to what is written in the same place: *We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth,* it would seem in consequence that from the beginning of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the Word of God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iv. 6): *The intellect was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God, and henceforth called Christ, before the Incarnation which was of the Virgin.*

I answer that, Origen (*Peri Archon* i. 7, 8; ii. 8) maintained that all souls, amongst which he placed Christ's soul, were created in the beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first of all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would follow that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the Word; and thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul was corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting to suppose that this soul was united to the Word from the beginning, and that it afterwards became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin; for thus His soul would not seem to be of the same nature as ours, which are created at the same time that they are infused into bodies. Hence Pope Leo says (*Ep. ad Julian.* xxxv.) that *Christ's flesh was not of a different nature to ours, nor was a different soul infused into it in the beginning than into other men.*

Reply Obj. 1. As was said above (A. 1), the soul of Christ is said to be the medium in the union of the flesh with the Word, in the order of nature; but it does not follow from this that it was the medium in the order of time.

Reply Obj. 2. As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ's soul excels our soul *not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of power;* for it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the angels in *fulness of grace and truth.* But the mode of creation is in harmony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is the form of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it is infused into and united with the body; which does not happen to angels, since they are substances entirely free from matter.

Reply Obj. 3. Of the fulness of Christ all men receive according to the faith they have in Him; for it is written (Rom. iii. 22) that *the justice of God* is *by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe in Him.* Now just as we believe in Him as already born; so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, since *having the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe,* as it is written (2 Cor. iv. 13). But the faith which is in Christ has the power of justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God, according to Rom. iv. 5: *But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God.* Hence because this purpose is eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was full of grace and truth.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FLESH OF CHRIST WAS ASSUMED BY THE WORD BEFORE BEING UNITED TO THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine* says (*De Fid. ad Pet.* xviii.): *Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the Godhead, before it was assumed by the Word.* But the flesh of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being united to the rational soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the completive form in order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before being united to the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above (A. 3). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ; and thus the flesh was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, as is said (*De Causis*), *the first cause excels the second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union with the effect.* But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a second cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before it was to the soul.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 2): *At the same time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational and intellectual soul.* Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh did not precede the union with the soul.

I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account of the order which it has to the rational

* Fulgentius.

soul as to its proper form. Now it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it receives that form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human flesh; and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, inasmuch as it is against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body, so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul, since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul.

Reply Obj. 1. Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being; and hence, before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception of Christ, the Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might, disposed the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time.

Reply Obj. 2. The form actually gives the species; but the matter in itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would be against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature. And therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin, inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and Christ's flesh is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature, viz., that we are conceived from the seed of man, and Christ is not. But a difference which would be with reference to the origin of the soul, would bespeak a diversity of nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The Word of God is understood to be united to the flesh before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say *before,* not in time, but in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as united to the soul before it is united to the

Word, for it is from its union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the Word in Person; especially since a person is found only in the rational nature.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WHOLE HUMAN NATURE WAS ASSUMED THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE PARTS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole human nature through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says (*De Agone Christ.* xviii.) that *the invisible and unchangeable Truth assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the medium of the soul, and in this way the whole man.* But the spirit, soul, and body are parts of the whole man. Therefore He assumed all, through the medium of the parts.

Obj. 2. Further, the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the parts of human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would seem to be more like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole. Therefore He assumed the whole through the medium of the parts.

Obj. 3. Further, the whole results from the union of parts. But the union is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are presupposed to the assumption. Therefore He assumed the whole by the parts.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 16): *In Our Lord Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are immediately joined, i.e., the Godhead and the manhood.* Now the humanity is a whole, which is composed of soul and body, as parts. Therefore the Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of the whole.

I answer that, When anything is said to be a medium in the assumption of the Incarnation, we do not signify order of time, because the assumption of the whole and the parts

was simultaneous. For it has been shown (AA. 3 and 4) that the soul and body were mutually united at the same time in order to constitute the human nature of the Word. But it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what is prior in nature, that is assumed which is posterior in nature. Now a thing is prior in nature in two ways: First on the part of the agent, secondly on the part of the matter; for these two causes precede the thing. On the part of the agent,—that is simply first, which is first included in his intention; but that is relatively first, with which his operation begins:—and this because the intention is prior to the operation. On the part of the matter,—that is first which exists first in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the Incarnation the order depending on the agent must be particularly considered, because, as Augustine says (*Ep. ad Volusianum*, cxxxvii.), *in such things the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer.* But it is manifest that, according to the intention of the doer, what is complete is prior to what is incomplete, and, consequently, the whole to the parts. Hence it must be said that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature, through the medium of the whole; for even as He assumed the body on account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He assumed a body and soul on account of their relation to human nature.

Reply Obj. 1. From these words nothing may be gathered, except that the Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole human nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of the intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of time; whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider the intention: and this is to be simply first, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2. God is so simple that He is also most perfect; and hence the whole is more like to God than the parts, inasmuch as it is more perfect.

Reply Obj. 3. It is a personal union wherein the assumption is terminated, not a union of nature, which springs from a conjunction of parts.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN NATURE WAS ASSUMED THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF GRACE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature through the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But the human nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the union took place by grace.

Obj. 2. Further, as the body lives by the soul, which is its perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was fitted for the assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul through the medium of grace.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv. 11) that the incarnate Word is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our speech by means of *breathing* (*spiritus*). Therefore the Word of God is united to flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor. xii. 4: *Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.*

On the contrary, Grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown above (I.-II., Q. CX., A. 2). Now the union of the Word with human nature took place in the subsistence, and not accidentally, as was shown above (Q. II., A. 6). Therefore the human nature was not assumed by means of grace.

I answer that, In Christ there was the grace of union and habitual grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the medium of the assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that is given gratis from above to the human nature in the Person of the Word, and is the term of the assumption. Whereas the habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is an effect following the union, according to John

i. 14: *We saw His glory, . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth*:—by which we are given to understand that because this Man (as a result of the union) is the Only-begotten of the Father, He is full of grace and truth. But if by grace we understand the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, the union took place by grace, not as a means, but as the efficient cause.

Reply Obj. 1. Our union with God is by operation, inasmuch as we know and love Him; and hence this union is by habitual grace, inasmuch as a perfect operation proceeds from a habit. Now the union of the human nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which depends not on any habit, but on the nature itself.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul is the substantial perfection of the body; grace is but an accidental perfection of the soul. Hence grace cannot ordain the soul to personal union, which is not accidental, as the soul ordains the body.

Reply Obj. 3. Our word is united to our speech, by means of breathing (*spiritus*), not as a formal medium, but as a moving medium. For from the word conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which the speech is formed. And similarly from the eternal Word proceeds the Holy Spirit, Who formed the body of Christ, as will be shown (Q. XXXII., A. 1). But it does not follow from this that the grace of the Holy Spirit is the formal medium in the aforesaid union.

QUESTION VII.

OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS AN INDIVIDUAL MAN.

(In Thirteen Articles.)

We must now consider such things as were co-assumed by the Son of God in human nature; and first what belongs to perfection; secondly, what belongs to defect.

Concerning the first, there are three points of consideration: (1) The grace of Christ; (2) His knowledge; (3) His power.

With regard to His grace we must consider two things: (1) His grace as He is an individual man; (2) His grace as He is the Head of the Church. Of the grace of union we have already spoken (Q. II.).

Under the first head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the soul of Christ there was any habitual grace? (2) Whether in Christ there were virtues? (3) Whether He had faith? (4) Whether He had hope? (5) Whether in Christ there were the gifts? (6) Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear? (7) Whether in Christ there were any gratuitous graces? (8) Whether in Christ there was prophecy? (9) Whether there was the fulness of grace in Him? (10) Whether such fulness was proper to Christ? (11) Whether the grace of Christ was infinite? (12) Whether it could have been increased? (13) How this grace stood towards the union?

First Article.

WHETHER IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST THERE WAS ANY HABITUAL GRACE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem there was no habitual grace in the soul assumed by the Word. For grace is a certain partaking of the Godhead by the rational creature, accord-

ing to 2 Pet. i. 4: *By Whom He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.* Now Christ is God not by participation, but in truth. Therefore there was no habitual grace in Him.

Obj. 2. Further, grace is necessary to man, that he may operate well, according to 1 Cor. xv. 10: *I have laboured more abundantly than all they; yet not I, but the grace of God with me;* and in order that he may reach eternal life, according to Rom. vi. 23: *The grace of God (is) life everlasting.* Now the inheritance of everlasting life was due to Christ by the mere fact of His being the natural Son of God; and by the fact of His being the Word, by Whom all things were made, He had the power of doing all things well. Therefore His human nature needed no further grace beyond union with the Word.

Obj. 3. Further, what operates as an instrument does not need a habit for its own operations, since habits are rooted in the principal agent. Now the human nature in Christ was *as the instrument of the Godhead,* as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 15). Therefore there was no need of habitual grace in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xi. 2): *The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him;*—which (Spirit), indeed, is said to be in man by habitual grace, as was said above (I., Q. VIII., A. 3; Q. XLIII., AA. 3 and 6). Therefore there was habitual grace in Christ.

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose habitual grace in Christ for three reasons. First, on account of the union of His soul with the Word of God. For the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence. Now the influx of grace is from God, according to Ps. lxxxiii. 12: *The Lord will give grace and glory.* And hence it was most fitting that His soul should receive the influx of Divine grace. Secondly, on account of the dignity of this soul, whose operations were to attain so closely to God by knowledge and love, to which it is necessary for human nature to be raised by grace. Thirdly,

on account of the relation of Christ to the human race. For Christ, as man, is the *Mediator of God and men,* as is written, 1 Tim. ii. 5; and hence it behoved Him to have grace which would overflow upon others, according to John i. 10: *And of His fulness we have all received, and grace for grace.*

Reply Obj. 1. Christ is the true God in Divine Person and Nature. Yet because together with unity of person there remains distinction of natures, as stated above (Q. II., AA. 1 and 2), the soul of Christ is not essentially Divine. Hence it behoves it to be Divine by participation, which is by grace.

Reply Obj. 2. To Christ, inasmuch as He is the natural Son of God, is due an eternal inheritance, which is the uncreated beatitude through the uncreated act of knowledge and love of God—*i.e.,* the same whereby the Father knows and loves Himself. Now the soul was not capable of this act, on account of the difference of natures. Hence it behoved it to attain to God by a created act of fruition which could not be without grace. Likewise, inasmuch as He was the Word of God, He had the power of doing all things well by the Divine operation. And because it is necessary to admit a human operation, distinct from the Divine operation, as will be shown (Q. XIX., A. 1), it was necessary for Him to have habitual grace, whereby this operation might be perfect in Him.

Reply Obj. 3. The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead—not, indeed, an inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but is merely acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so acted upon as to act. And hence the nature of the action demanded that he should have habitual grace.

Second Article.

whether in christ there were virtues?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there were no virtues. For Christ had the plenitude of grace. Now grace is sufficient for every good act, according to 2 Cor. xii. 9: *My grace is sufficient for thee.* Therefore there were no virtues in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 1), virtue is contrasted with a *certain heroic or godlike habit* which is attributed to godlike men. But this belongs chiefly to Christ. Therefore Christ had not virtues, but something higher than virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, as was said above (I.-II., Q. LXV., AA. 1 and 2), all the virtues are bound together. But it was not becoming for Christ to have all the virtues, as is clear in the case of liberality and magnificence, for these have to do with riches, which Christ spurned, according to Matt. viii. 20: *The Son of man hath not where to lay His head.* Temperance and continence also regard wicked desires, from which Christ was free. Therefore Christ had not the virtues.

On the contrary, On Ps. i. 2, *But His will is in the law of the Lord,* a gloss says: *This refers to Christ, Who is full of all good.* But a good quality of the mind is a virtue. Therefore Christ was full of all virtue.

I answer that, As was said above (I.-II., Q. CX., AA. 3 and 4), as grace regards the essence of the soul, so does virtue regard its power. Hence it is necessary that as the powers of the soul flow from its essence, so do the virtues flow from grace. Now the more perfect a principle is, the more it impresses its effects. Hence, since the grace of Christ was most perfect, there flowed from it, in consequence, the virtues which perfect the several powers of the soul for all the soul's acts; and thus Christ had all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Grace suffices a man for all whereby he is ordained to beatitude; nevertheless, it effects some of these by itself—as to make him pleasing to God, and the like; and some others through the medium of the virtues which proceed from grace.

Reply Obj. 2. A heroic or godlike habit only differs from virtue commonly so called by a more perfect code, inasmuch as one is disposed to good in a higher way than is common to all. Hence it is not hereby proved that Christ had not the virtues, but that He had them most perfectly beyond the common mode. In this sense Plotinus gave to a certain sublime degree of virtue the name of *virtue of the purified soul* (*cf.* I.-II., Q. LXI., A. 5).

Reply Obj. 3. Liberality and magnificence are praiseworthy in regard to riches, inasmuch as anyone does not esteem wealth to the extent of wishing to retain it, so as to forego what ought to be done. But he esteems them least who wholly despises them, and casts them aside for love of perfection. And hence by altogether contemning all riches, Christ showed the highest kind of liberality and magnificence; although He also performed the act of liberality, as far as it became Him, by causing to be distributed to the poor what was given to Himself. Hence, when Our Lord said to Judas (Jo. xiii. 27), *That which thou dost, do quickly,* the disciples understood Our Lord to have ordered him to give something to the poor. But Christ had no evil desires whatever, as will be shown (Q. XV., AA. 1 and 2); yet He was not thereby prevented from having temperance, which is the more perfect in man, as he is without evil desires. Hence, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 9), the temperate man differs from the continent in this—that the temperate has not the evil desires which the continent suffers. Hence, taking continence in this sense, as the Philosopher takes it, Christ, from the very fact that He had all virtue, had not continence, since it is not a virtue, but something less than virtue.

Third Article.

whether in Christ there was faith?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was faith in Christ. For faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues—*e.g.*, temperance and liberality. Now these were in Christ, as stated above (A. 2). Much more, therefore, was there faith in Him.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ did not teach virtues which He had not Himself, according to Acts i. 1: *Jesus began to do and to teach.* But of Christ it is said (Heb. xii. 2) that He is *the author and finisher of our faith.* Therefore there was faith in Him before all others.

Obj. 3. Further, everything imperfect is excluded from the blessed. But in the blessed there is faith; for on Rom. i. 17, *the justice of God is revealed therein from faith to faith,* a gloss says: *From the faith of words and hope to the faith of things and sight.* Therefore it would seem that in Christ also there was faith, since it implies nothing imperfect.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. xi. 1): *Faith is the evidence of things that appear not.* But there was nothing that did not appear to Christ, according to what Peter said to Him (Jo. xxi. 17): *Thou knowest all things.* Therefore there was no faith in Christ.

I answer that, As was said above (II.-II., Q. I., A. 4), the object of faith is a Divine thing not seen. Now the habit of virtue, as every other habit, takes its species from the object. Hence, if we deny that the Divine thing was not seen, we exclude the very essence of faith. Now from the first moment of His conception Christ saw God's Essence fully, as will be made clear (Q. XXXIV., A. 1). Hence there could be no faith in Him.

Reply Obj. 1. Faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, seeing that it has to do with nobler matter; nevertheless, it implies a certain defect with regard to that

matter; and this defect was not in Christ. And hence there could be no faith in Him, although the moral virtues were in Him, since in their nature they imply no defect with regard to their matter.

Reply Obj. 2. The merit of faith consists in this—that man through obedience assents to what things he does not see, according to Rom. i. 5: *For obedience to the faith in all nations for His name.* Now Christ had most perfect obedience to God, according to Phil. ii. 8: *Becoming obedient unto death.* And hence He taught nothing pertaining to merit which He did not fulfil more perfectly Himself.

Reply Obj. 3. As a gloss says in the same place, faith is that *whereby such things as are not seen are believed.* But faith in things seen is improperly so called, and only after a certain similitude with regard to the certainty and firmness of the assent.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS HOPE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was hope in Christ. For it is said in the Person of Christ (Ps. xxx. 1): *In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped.* But the virtue of hope is that whereby a man hopes in God. Therefore the virtue of hope was in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, hope is the expectation of the bliss to come, as was shown above (II.-II., Q. XVII., A. 5 *ad* 3). But Christ awaited something pertaining to bliss—viz., the glorifying of His body. Therefore it seems there was hope in Him.

Obj. 3. Further, everyone may hope for what pertains to his perfection, if it has yet to come. But there was something still to come pertaining to Christ's perfection, according to Eph. iv. 12: *For the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up* (Douay, *edifying*)

of the body of Christ. Hence it seems that it befitted Christ to have hope.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. viii. 24): *What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?* Thus it is clear that as faith is of the unseen, so also is hope. But there was no faith in Christ, as was said above (A. 1): neither, consequently, was there hope.

I answer that, As it is of the nature of faith that one assents to what one sees not, so is it of the nature of hope that one expects what as yet one has not; and as faith, forasmuch as it is a theological virtue, does not regard everything unseen, but only God; so likewise hope, as a theological virtue, has God Himself for its object, the fruition of Whom man chiefly expects by the virtue of hope; yet, in consequence, whoever has the virtue of hope may expect the Divine aid in other things, even as he who has the virtue of faith believes God not only in Divine things, but even in whatsoever is divinely revealed. Now from the beginning of His conception Christ had the Divine fruition fully, as will be shown (Q. XXXIV., A. 4), and hence he had not the virtue of hope. Nevertheless He had hope as regards such things as He did not yet possess, although He had no faith with regard to anything; because, although He knew all things fully, wherefore faith was altogether wanting to Him, nevertheless He did not as yet fully possess all that pertained to His perfection, viz., immortality and glory of the body, which He could hope for.

Reply Obj. 1. This is said of Christ with reference to hope, not as a theological virtue, but inasmuch as He hoped for some other things not yet possessed, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2. The glory of the body does not pertain to beatitude as being that in which beatitude principally consists, but by a certain outpouring from the soul's glory, as was said above (I.-II., Q. IV., A. 6). Hence hope, as a theological virtue, does not regard the bliss of the body but the soul's bliss, which consists in the Divine fruition.

Reply Obj. 3. The building up of the Church by the

conversion of the faithful does not pertain to the perfection of Christ, whereby He is perfect in Himself, but inasmuch as it leads others to a share of His perfection. And because hope properly regards what is expected by him who hopes, the virtue of hope cannot properly be said to be in Christ, because of the aforesaid reason.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WERE THE GIFTS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts were not in Christ. For, as is commonly said, the gifts are given to help the virtues. But what is perfect in itself does not need an exterior help. Therefore, since the virtues of Christ were perfect, it seems there were no gifts in Him.

Obj. 2. Further, to give and to receive gifts would not seem to belong to the same; since to give pertains to one who has, and to receive pertains to one who has not. But it belongs to Christ to give gifts according to Ps. lxvii. 19. *Thou hast given gifts to men* (Vulg., *Thou hast received gifts in men*). Therefore it was not becoming that Christ should receive the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3. Further, four gifts would seem to pertain to the contemplation of earth—viz., wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel which pertains to prudence; hence the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 3) enumerates these with the intellectual virtues. But Christ had the contemplation of heaven. Therefore He had not these gifts.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. iv. 1): *Seven women shall take hold of one man:* on which a gloss says: *That is, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost shall take hold of Christ.*

I answer that, As was said above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 1), the gifts, properly, are certain perfections of the soul's powers, inasmuch as these have a natural aptitude to be moved by the Holy Ghost, according to Luke iv. 1: *And Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the*

Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert. Hence it is manifest that in Christ the gifts were in a pre-eminent degree.

Reply Obj. 1. What is perfect in the order of its nature needs to be helped by something of a higher nature; as man, however perfect, needs to be helped by God. And in this way the virtues, which perfect the powers of the soul, as they are controlled by reason, no matter how perfect they are, need to be helped by the gifts, which perfect the soul's powers, inasmuch as these are moved by the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 2. Christ is not a recipient and a giver of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the same respect; for He gives them as God and receives them as man. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.) that *the Holy Ghost never quitted the human nature of Christ, from Whose Divine nature He proceedeth.*

Reply Obj. 3. In Christ there was not only heavenly knowledge, but also earthly knowledge, as will be said (Q. XV., A. 10). And yet even in heaven the gifts of the Holy Ghost will still exist, in a certain manner, as was said above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 6).

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS THE GIFT OF FEAR?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of fear. For hope would seem to be stronger than fear; since the object of hope is goodness, and of fear, evil; as was said above (I.-II., Q. XL., A. 1; Q. XLII., A. 1). But in Christ there was not the virtue of hope, as was said above (A. 4). Hence, likewise, there was not the gift of fear in Him.

Obj. 2. Further, by the gift of fear we fear either to be separated from God, which pertains to *chaste* fear;—or to be punished by Him, which pertains to *servile* fear, as

Augustine says (*in Joan. Tract.* ix.). But Christ did not fear being separated from God by sin, nor being punished by Him on account of a fault, since it was impossible for Him to sin, as will be said (Q. XV., AA. 1 and 2). Now fear is not of the impossible. Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (1 Jo. iv. 18) that *perfect charity casteth out fear.* But in Christ there was most perfect charity, according to Eph. iii. 19: *The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge.* Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xi. 3): *And He shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.*

I answer that, As was said above (I.-II., Q. XLII., A. 1), fear regards two objects, one of which is an evil causing terror; the other is that by whose power an evil can be inflicted, as we fear the king inasmuch as he has the power of putting to death. Now whoever can hurt would not be feared unless he had a certain greatness of might, to which resistance could not easily be offered; for what we easily repel we do not fear. And hence it is plain that no one is feared except for some pre-eminence. And in this way it is said that in Christ there was the fear of God, not indeed as it regards the evil of separation from God by fault, nor as it regards the evil of punishment for fault; but inasmuch as it regards the Divine pre-eminence, on account of which the soul of Christ, led by the Holy Spirit, was borne towards God in an act of reverence. For Christ as man had this act of reverence towards God in a fuller sense and beyond all others. And hence Scripture attributes to Him the fulness of the fear of the Lord.

Reply Obj. 1. The habits of virtues and gifts regard goodness properly and of themselves; but evil, consequently; since it pertains to the nature of virtue to render acts good, as is said *Ethic.* ii. 6. And hence the nature of the gift of fear regards not that evil which fear is concerned with, but the pre-eminence of that goodness—viz., of God, by Whose power evil may be inflicted. On the other hand,

hope, as a virtue, regards not only the author of good, but even the good itself, as far as it is not yet possessed. And hence to Christ, Who already possessed the perfect good of beatitude, we do not attribute the virtue of hope, but we do attribute the gift of fear.

Reply Obj. 2. This reason is based on fear in so far as it regards the evil object.

Reply Obj. 3. Perfect charity casts out servile fear, which principally regards punishment. But this kind of fear was not in Christ.

Seventh Article.

whether the gratuitous graces were in christ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gratuitous graces were not in Christ. For whoever has anything in its fulness, to him it does not pertain to have it by participation. Now Christ has grace in its fulness, according to John i. 14: *Full of grace and truth.* But the gratuitous graces would seem to be certain participations, bestowed distributively and particularly upon divers subjects, according to 1 Cor. xii. 4: *Now there are diversities of graces.* Therefore it would seem that there were no gratuitous graces in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, what is due to anyone would not seem to be gratuitously bestowed on him. But it was due to the man Christ that He should abound in the word of wisdom and knowledge, and to be mighty in doing wonderful works and the like, all of which pertain to gratuitous graces: since He is *the power of God and the wisdom of God,* as is written 1 Cor. i. 24. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to have the gratuitous graces.

Obj. 3. Further, gratuitous graces are ordained to the benefit of the faithful. But it does not seem that a habit which a man does not use is for the benefit of others, according to Ecclus. xx. 32: *Wisdom that is hid and*

treasure that is not seen: what profit is there in them both? Now we do not read that Christ made use of these gratuitously given graces, especially as regards the gift of tongues. Therefore not all the gratuitous graces were in Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Ep. ad Dardan.* cclxxxvii.) that *as in the head are all the senses, so in Christ were all the graces.*

I answer that, As was said above (I.-II., Q. III., AA. 1 and 4), the gratuitous graces are ordained for the manifestation of faith and spiritual doctrine. For it behoves him who teaches to have the means of making his doctrine clear; otherwise his doctrine would be useless. Now Christ is the first and chief teacher of spiritual doctrine and faith, according to Heb. ii. 3, 4: *Which having begun to be declared by the Lord was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders.* Hence it is clear that all the gratuitous graces were most excellently in Christ, as in the first and chief teacher of the faith.

Reply Obj. 1. As sanctifying grace is ordained to meritorious acts both interior and exterior, so likewise gratuitous grace is ordained to certain exterior acts manifestive of the faith, as the working of miracles, and the like. Now of both these graces Christ had the fulness; since inasmuch as His soul was united to the Godhead, He had the perfect power of effecting all these acts. But other saints who are moved by God as separated and not united instruments, receive power in a particular manner in order to bring about this or that act. And hence in other saints these graces are divided, but not in Christ.

Reply Obj. 2. Christ is said to be the power of God and the wisdom of God, inasmuch as He is the Eternal Son of God. But in this respect it does not pertain to Him to have grace, but rather to be the bestower of grace; but it pertains to Him in His human nature to have grace.

Reply Obj. 3. The gift of tongues was bestowed on the apostles, because they were sent to teach all nations; but

Christ wished to preach personally only in the one nation of the Jews, as He Himself says (Matt. xv. 24): *I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel;* and the Apostle says (Rom. xv. 8): *I say that Christ Jesus was minister of the circumcision.* And hence it was not necessary for Him to speak several languages. Yet was a knowledge of all languages not wanting to Him, since even the secrets of hearts, of which all words are signs, were not hidden from Him, as will be shown (Q. X., A. 2). Nor was this knowledge uselessly possessed; just as it is not useless to have a habit, which we do not use when there is no occasion.

Eighth Article.

Whether in Christ there was the gift of prophecy?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of prophecy. For prophecy implies a certain obscure and imperfect knowledge, according to Num. xii. 6: *If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.* But Christ had full and unveiled knowledge, much more than Moses, of whom it is subjoined that *plainly and not by riddles and figures doth he see God* (verse 8). Therefore we ought not to admit prophecy in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, as faith has to do with what is not seen, and hope with what is not possessed, so prophecy has to do with what is not present, but distant; for a prophet means, as it were, a teller of far-off things. But in Christ there could be neither faith nor hope, as was said above (AA. 3 and 4). Hence prophecy also ought not to be admitted in Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, a prophet is in an inferior order to an angel; hence Moses, who was the greatest of the prophets, as was said above (II-II., Q. CLXXIV., A. 4) is said (Acts vii. 38) to have spoken with an angel in the desert.

But Christ was *made lower than the angles,* not as to the knowledge of His soul, but only as regards the sufferings of His body, as is shown Heb. ii. 9. Therefore it seems that Christ was not a prophet.

On the contrary, It is written of Him (Deut. xviii. 15): *Thy God will raise up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren,* and He says of Himself (Matt. xiii. 57 and Jo. iv. 44): *A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country.*

I answer that, A prophet means, as it were, a teller or seer of far-off things, inasmuch as he knows and announces what things are far from men's senses, as Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xvi. 18). Now we must bear in mind that no one can be called a prophet for knowing and announcing what is distant from others, with whom he is not. And this is clear in regard to place and time. For if anyone living in France were to know and announce to others living in France what things were transpiring in Syria, it would be prophetical, as Eliseus told Giezi (4 Kings v. 26) how the man had leapt down from his chariot to meet him. But if anyone living in Syria were to announce what things were there, it would not be prophetical. And the same appears in regard to time. For it was prophetical of Isaias to announce that Cyrus, King of the Persians, would rebuild the temple of God, as is clear from Isa. xliv. 28. But it was not prophetical of Esdras to write it, in whose time it took place. Hence if God or angels, or even the blessed, know and announce what is beyond our knowing, this does not pertain to prophecy, since they nowise touch our state. Now Christ before His passion touched our state, inasmuch as He was not merely a *comprehensor,* but a *wayfarer.* Hence it was prophetical in Him to know and announce what was beyond the knowledge of other *wayfarers:* and for this reason He is called a prophet.

Reply Obj. 1. These words do not prove that enigmatical knowledge—viz., by dream and vision—belongs to the nature of prophecy; but the comparison is drawn

between other prophets, who saw Divine things in dreams and visions, and Moses, who saw God plainly and not by riddles—and who is yet called a prophet, according to Deut. xxiv. 10: *And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses.* Nevertheless it may be said that although Christ had full and unveiled knowledge as regards the intellective part, yet in the imaginative part He had certain similitudes, in which Divine things could be viewed, inasmuch as He was not only a *comprehensor,* but a *wayfarer.*

Reply Obj. 2. Faith regards such things as are unseen by him who believes; and hope, too, is of such things as are not possessed by the one who hopes; but prophecy is of such things as are beyond the sense of men, with whom the prophet dwells and converses in this state of life. And hence faith and hope are repugnant to the perfection of Christ's beatitude; but prophecy is not.

Reply Obj. 3. Angels, being *comprehensors,* are above prophets, who are merely *wayfarers;* but not above Christ, Who was both a *comprehensor* and a *wayfarer.*

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS THE FULNESS OF GRACE?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was not the fulness of grace. For the virtues flow from grace, as was said above (I.-II., Q. CX., A. 4). But in Christ there were not all the virtues; for there was neither faith nor hope in Him, as was shown above (AA. 3 and 4). Therefore in Christ there was not the fulness of grace.

Obj. 2. Further, as is plain from what was said above (I.-II., Q. CXI., A. 2), grace is divided into operating and co-operating. Now operating grace signifies that whereby the ungodly is justified, which has no place in Christ, Who never lay under any sin. Therefore in Christ there was not the fulness of grace.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Jas. i. 17): *Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.* But what comes thus is possessed partially, and not fully. Therefore no creature, not even the soul of Christ, can have the fulness of the gifts of grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. i. 14): *We saw Him* (Vulg., *His glory*) *full of grace and truth.*

I answer that, To have fully is to have wholly and perfectly. Now totality and perfection can be taken in two ways:—First as regards their *intensive* quantity; for instance, I may say that some man has whiteness fully, because he has as much of it as can naturally be in him;—secondly, *as regards power;* for instance, if anyone be said to have life fully, inasmuch as he has it in all the effects or works of life; and thus man has life fully, but senseless animals or plants have not. Now in both these ways Christ has the fulness of grace. First, since He has grace in its highest degree, in the most perfect way it can be had. And this appears, first, from the nearness of Christ's soul to the cause of grace. For it was said above (A. 1) that the nearer a recipient is to the inflowing cause, the more it receives. And hence the soul of Christ, which is more closely united to God than all other rational creatures, receives the greatest outpouring of His grace. Secondly, in His relation to the effect. For the soul of Christ so received grace, that, in a manner, it is poured out from it upon others. And hence it behoved Him to have the greatest grace; as fire which is the cause of heat in other hot things, is of all things the hottest.

Likewise, as regards the *virtue* of grace, He had grace fully, since He had it for all the operations and effects of grace; and this, because grace was bestowed on Him, as upon a universal principle in the genus of such as have grace. Now the virtue of the first principle of a genus universally extends itself to all the effects of that genus; thus the force of the sun, which is the universal cause of generation, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* i.), extends to

all things that come under generation. Hence the second fulness of grace is seen in Christ inasmuch as His grace extends to all the effects of grace, which are the virtues, gifts, and the like.

Reply Obj. 1. Faith and hope signify effects of grace with certain defects on the part of the recipient of grace, inasmuch as faith is of the unseen, and hope of what is not yet possessed. Hence it was not necessary that in Christ, Who is the author of grace, there should be any defects such as faith and hope imply; but whatever perfection is in faith and hope was in Christ most perfectly; as in fire there are not all the modes of heat which are defective by the subject's defect, but whatever belongs to the perfection of heat.

Reply Obj. 2. It pertains essentially to operating grace to justify; but that it makes the ungodly to be just is accidental to it on the part of the subject, in which sin is found. Therefore the soul of Christ was justified by operating grace, inasmuch as it was rendered just and holy by it from the beginning of His conception; not that it was until then sinful, or even not just.

Reply Obj. 3. The fulness of grace is attributed to the soul of Christ according to the capacity of the creature, and not by comparison with the infinite fulness of the Divine goodness.

Tenth Article.

Whether the fulness of grace is proper to Christ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. For what is proper to anyone belongs to him alone. But to be full of grace is attributed to some others; for it was said to the Blessed Virgin (Luke i. 28): *Hail, full of grace;* and again it is written (Acts vi. 8): *Stephen, full of grace and fortitude.* Therefore the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, what can be communicated to others

through Christ does not seem to be proper to Christ. But the fulness of grace can be communicated to others through Christ, since the Apostle says (Eph. iii. 19): *That you may be filled unto all the fulness of God.* Therefore the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, the state of the *wayfarer* seems to be proportioned to the state of the *comprehensor.* But in the state of the comprehensor there will be a certain fulness, since *in our heavenly country with its fulness of all good, although some things are bestowed in a pre-eminent way, yet nothing is possessed singularly,* as is clear from Gregory (*Hom. De Cent. Ovib.;* xxxiv. *in Ev.*). Therefore in the state of the comprehensor the fulness of grace is possessed by everyone, and hence the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.

On the contrary, The fulness of grace is attributed to Christ inasmuch as He is the Only-begotten of the Father, according to John i. 14: *We saw Him* (Vulg., *His glory*) *as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.* But to be the Only-begotten of the Father is proper to Christ. Therefore it is proper to Him to be full of grace and truth.

I answer that, The fulness of grace may be taken in two ways:—First, on the part of grace itself, or secondly on the part of the one who has grace. Now on the part of grace itself there is said to be the fulness of grace when the limit of grace is attained, as to essence and power, inasmuch as grace is possessed in its highest possible excellence and in its greatest possible extension to all its effects. And this fulness of grace is proper to Christ. But on the part of the subject there is said to be the fulness of grace when anyone fully possesses grace according to his condition;—whether *as regards intensity,* by reason of grace being intense in him, to the limit assigned by God, according to Eph. iv. 7: *But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ;*—or *as regards power,* by reason of a man having the help of grace for all that belongs to his office or state,

as the Apostle says (Eph. iii. 8): *To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace, . . . to enlighten all men.* And this fulness of grace is not proper to Christ, but is communicated to others by Christ.

Reply Obj. 1. The Blessed Virgin is said to be full of grace, not on the part of grace itself—since she had not grace in its greatest possible excellence—nor for all the effects of grace; but she is said to be full of grace in reference to herself, *i.e.*, inasmuch as she had sufficient grace for the state to which God had chosen her, *i.e.*, to be the mother of His Only-begotten. So, too, Stephen is said to be full of grace, since he had sufficient grace to be a fit minister and witness of God, to which office he had been called. And the same must be said of others. Of these fulnesses one is greater than another, according as one is divinely pre-ordained to a higher or lower state.

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle is there speaking of that fulness which has reference to the subject, in comparison with what man is divinely pre-ordained to; and this is either something in common, to which all the saints are pre-ordained, or something special, which pertains to the pre-eminence of some. And in this manner a certain fulness of grace is common to all the saints, viz., to have grace enough to merit eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God. And this is the fulness of grace which the Apostle desires for the faithful to whom he writes.

Reply Obj. 3. These gifts which are in common in heaven, viz.: vision, possession and fruition, and the like, have certain gifts corresponding to them in this life which are also common to all the saints. Yet there are certain prerogatives of saints, both in heaven and on earth, which are not possessed by all.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GRACE OF CHRIST IS INFINITE?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's grace is infinite. For everything immeasurable is infinite. But the grace of Christ is immeasurable; since it is written (Jo. iii. 34): *For God doth not give the Spirit by measure to His Son,** namely Christ. Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.

Obj. 2. Further, an infinite effect betokens an infinite power which can only spring from an infinite essence. But the effect of Christ's grace is infinite, since it extends to the salvation of the whole human race; for He is *the propitiation for our sins . . . and for those of the whole world,* as is said (1 Jo. ii. 2). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, every finite thing by addition can attain to the quantity of any other finite thing. Therefore if the grace of Christ is finite the grace of any other man could increase to such an extent as to reach to an equality with Christ's grace, against what is written (Job xxviii. 17): *Gold nor crystal cannot equal it,* as Gregory expounds it (*Moral.* xviii.). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.

On the contrary, Grace is something created in the soul. But every created thing is finite, according to Wisd. xi. 21: *Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight.* Therefore the grace of Christ is not infinite.

I answer that, As was made clear above (Q. II., A. 10), a twofold grace may be considered in Christ; the first being the grace of union, which, as was said (Q. VI., A. 6), is for Him to be personally united to the Son of God, which union has been bestowed gratis on the human nature; and it is clear that this grace is infinite, as the Person of God is infinite. The second is habitual grace; which may be taken in two ways: first as a being, and in

* *To His Son* is lacking in the Vulgate.

this way it must be a finite being, since it is in the soul of Christ, as in a subject, and Christ's soul is a creature having a finite capacity; hence the being of grace cannot be infinite, since it cannot exceed its subject. Secondly it may be viewed in its specific nature of grace; and thus the grace of Christ can be termed infinite, since it is not limited, *i.e.*, it has whatsoever can pertain to the nature of grace, and what pertains to the nature of grace is not bestowed on Him in a fixed measure; seeing that *according to the purpose* of God to Whom it pertains to measure grace, it is bestowed on Christ's soul as on a universal principle for bestowing grace on human nature, according to Eph. i. 5, 6, *He hath graced us in His beloved Son;* thus we might say that the light of the sun is infinite, not indeed in being, but in the nature of light, as having whatever can pertain to the nature of light.

Reply Obj. 1. When it is said that the Father *doth not give the Spirit by measure,* it may be expounded of the gift which God the Father from all eternity gave the Son, viz., the Divine Nature, which is an infinite gift. Hence the comment of a certain gloss: *So that the Son may be as great as the Father is.* Or again, it may be referred to the gift which is given the human nature, to be united to the Divine Person, and this also is an infinite gift. Hence a gloss says on this text: *As the Father begot a full and perfect Word, it is united thus full and perfect to human nature.* Thirdly, it may be referred to habitual grace, inasmuch as the grace of Christ extends to whatever belongs to grace. Hence Augustine expounding this (*Tract.* xiv. *in Joan.*) says: *The division of the gifts is a measurement. For to one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge.* But Christ the giver does not receive by measure.

Reply Obj. 2. The grace of Christ has an infinite effect, both because of the aforesaid infinity of grace, and because of the unity* of the Divine Person, to Whom Christ's soul is united.

* Perhaps we should read *infinity.*—ED.

Reply Obj. 3. The lesser can attain by augment to the quantity of the greater, when both have the same kind of quantity. But the grace of any man is compared to the grace of Christ as a particular to a universal power; hence as the force of fire, no matter how much it increases, can never equal the sun's strength, so the grace of a man, no matter how much it increases, can never equal the grace of Christ.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GRACE OF CHRIST COULD INCREASE?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the grace of Christ could increase. For to every finite thing addition can be made. But the grace of Christ was finite. Therefore it could increase.

Obj. 2. Further, it is by Divine power that grace is increased, according to 2 Cor. ix. 8: *And God is able to make all grace abound in you.* But the Divine power, being infinite, is confined by no limits. Therefore it seems that the grace of Christ could have been greater.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Luke ii. 52) that the child *Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men.* Therefore the grace of Christ could increase.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. i. 14): *We saw Him* (Vulg., *His glory*) *as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.* But nothing can be or can be thought greater than that anyone should be the Only-begotten of the Father. Therefore no greater grace can be or can be thought than that of which Christ was full.

I answer that, For a form to be incapable of increase happens in two ways:—First on the part of the subject; secondly, on the part of the form itself. On the part of the subject, indeed, when the subject reaches the utmost limit wherein it partakes of this form, after its own manner, *e.g.*, if we say that air cannot increase in heat, when it has reached the utmost limit of heat which can exist in the

nature of air, although there may be greater heat in actual existence, viz., the heat of fire. But on the part of the form, the possibility of increase is excluded when a subject reaches the utmost perfection which this form can have by nature, *e.g.*, if we say the heat of fire cannot be increased because there cannot be a more perfect grade of heat than that to which fire attains. Now the proper measure of grace, like that of other forms, is determined by the Divine wisdom, according to Wisd. xi. 21 : *Thou hast ordered all things in number, weight and measure.* And it is with reference to its end that a measure is set to every form; as there is no greater gravity than that of the earth, because there is no lower place than that of the earth. Now the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with God. But there can neither be nor be thought a greater union of the rational creature with God than that which is in the Person. And hence the grace of Christ reached the highest measure of grace. Hence it is clear that the grace of Christ cannot be increased on the part of grace. But neither can it be increased on the part of the subject, since Christ as man was a true and full comprehensor from the first instant of His conception. Hence there could have been no increase of grace in Him, as there could be none in the rest of the blessed, whose grace could not increase, seeing that they have reached their last end. But as regards men who are wholly wayfarers, their grace can be increased not merely on the part of the form, since they have not attained the highest degree of grace, but also on the part of the subject, since they have not yet attained their end.

Reply Obj. 1. If we speak of mathematical quantity, addition can be made to any finite quantity, since there is nothing on the part of finite quantity which is repugnant to addition. But if we speak of natural quantity, there may be repugnance on the part of the form to which a determined quantity is due, even as other accidents are determined. Hence the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii. 41) that *there is naturally a term of all things, and a fixed limit of magnitude and increase.* And hence to the quantity

of the whole there can be no addition. And still more must we suppose a term in the forms themselves, beyond which they may not go. Hence it is not necessary that addition should be capable of being made to Christ's grace, although it is finite in its essence.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the Divine power can make something greater and better than the habitual grace of Christ, yet it could not make it to be ordained to anything greater than the personal union with the only-begotten Son of the Father; and to this union, by the purpose of the Divine wisdom, the measure of grace is sufficient.

Reply Obj. 3. Anyone may increase in wisdom and grace in two ways. First inasmuch as the very habits of wisdom and grace are increased; and in this way Christ did not increase. Secondly, as regards the effects, *i.e.*, inasmuch as they do wiser and greater works; and in this way Christ increased in wisdom and grace even as in age, since in the course of time He did more perfect works, to prove Himself true man, both in the things of God, and in the things of man.

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HABITUAL GRACE OF CHRIST FOLLOWED AFTER THE UNION?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the habitual grace did not follow after the union. For nothing follows itself. But this habitual grace seems to be the same as the grace of union; for Augustine says (*De Predest. Sanct.* xv.): *Every man becomes a Christian from the beginning of his belief, by the same grace whereby this Man from His beginning became Christ;* and of these two the first pertains to habitual grace and the second to the grace of union. Therefore it would seem that habitual grace did not follow upon the union.

Obj. 2. Further, disposition precedes perfection, if not in time, at least in thought. But the habitual grace seems to be a disposition in human nature for the personal union.

Therefore it seems that the habitual grace did not follow but rather preceded the union.

Obj. 3. Further, the common precedes the proper. But habitual grace is common to Christ and other men; and the grace of union is proper to Christ. Therefore habitual grace is prior in thought to the union. Therefore it does not follow it.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xlii. 1): *Behold my servant, I will uphold Him . . .* and farther on: *I have given My Spirit upon Him;* and this pertains to the gift of habitual grace. Hence it remains that the assumption of human nature to the unity of the Person preceded the habitual grace of Christ.

I answer that, The union of the human nature with the Divine Person, which, as we have said above (Q. II., A. 10, and Q. VI., A. 6), is the grace of union, precedes the habitual grace of Christ, not in order of time, but by nature and in thought; and this for a triple reason:—First, with reference to the order of the principles of both. For the principle of the union is the Person of the Son assuming human nature, Who is said to be sent into the world, inasmuch as He assumed human nature; but the principle of habitual grace, which is given with charity, is the Holy Ghost, Who is said to be sent inasmuch as He dwells in the mind by charity. Now the mission of the Son is prior, in the order of nature, to the mission of the Holy Ghost, even as in the order of nature the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, and love from wisdom. Hence the personal union, according to which the mission of the Son took place, is prior in the order of nature to habitual grace, according to which the mission of the Holy Ghost takes place. Secondly, the reason of this order may be taken from the relation of grace to its cause. For grace is caused in man by the presence of the Godhead, as light in the air by the presence of the sun. Hence it is written (Ezech. xliii. 2): *The glory of the God of Israel came in by the way of the east; . . . and the earth shone with His majesty.* But the presence of God in Christ is by the union

of human nature with the Divine Person. Hence the habitual grace of Christ is understood to follow this union, as light follows the sun. Thirdly, the reason of this union can be taken from the end of grace, since it is ordained to acting rightly, and action belongs to the suppositum and the individual. Hence action and, in consequence, grace ordaining thereto, presuppose the hypostasis which operates. Now the hypostasis did not exist in the human nature before the union, as is clear from Q. IV., A. 2. Therefore the grace of union precedes, in thought, habitual grace.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine here means by grace the gratuitous will of God, bestowing benefits gratis; and hence every man is said to be made a Christian by the same grace whereby a Man became Christ, since both take place by the gratuitous will of God without merits.

Reply Obj. 2. As disposition in the order of generation precedes the perfection to which it disposes, in such things as are gradually perfected; so it naturally follows the perfection which one has already obtained; as heat, which was a disposition to the form of fire, is an effect flowing from the form of already existing fire. Now the human nature in Christ is united to the Person of the Word from the beginning without succession. Hence habitual grace is not understood to have preceded the union, but to have followed it; as a natural property. Hence, as Augustine says (*Enchir.* xl.): *Grace is in a manner natural to the Man Christ.*

Reply Obj. 3. The common precedes the proper, when both are of the same genus; but when they are of divers genera, there is nothing to prevent the proper being prior to the common. Now the grace of union is not in the same genus as habitual grace; but is above all genera even as the Divine Person Himself. Hence there is nothing to prevent this proper from being before the common since it does not result from something being added to the common, but is rather the principle and source of that which is common.

QUESTION VIII.

OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AS HE IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE must now consider the grace of Christ as the Head of the Church; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is the Head of the Church? (2) Whether He is the Head of men as regards their bodies or only as regards their souls? (3) Whether He is the Head of all men? (4) Whether He is the Head of the angels? (5) Whether the grace of Christ as Head of the Church is the same as His habitual grace as an individual man? (6) Whether to be Head of the Church is proper to Christ? (7) Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked? (8) Whether Antichrist can be called the head of all the wicked?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to be Head of the Church. For the head imparts sense and motion to the members. Now spiritual sense and motion which are by grace, are not imparted to us by the Man Christ, because, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 12; xv. 24), *not even Christ, as man, but only as God, bestows the Holy Ghost.* Therefore it does not belong to Him as man to be Head of the Church.

Obj. 2. Further, it is not fitting for the head to have a head. But God is the Head of Christ, as man, according to 1 Cor. xi. 3, *The Head of Christ is God.* Therefore Christ Himself is not a head.

Obj. 3. Furthermore, the head of a man is a particular

member, receiving an influx from the heart. But Christ is the universal principle of the whole Church. Therefore He is not the Head of the Church.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. i. 22): *And He . . . hath made Him head over all the Church.*

I answer that, As the whole Church is termed one mystic body from its likeness to the natural body of a man, which in divers members has divers acts, as the Apostle teaches (Rom. xii. and 1 Cor. xii.), so likewise Christ is called the Head of the Church from a likeness with the human head, in which we may consider three things—viz., order, perfection, and power:—*Order,* indeed; for the head is the first part of man, beginning from the higher part; and hence it is that every principle is usually called a head according to Ezech. xvi. 25: *At every head of the way, thou hast set up a sign of thy prostitution:—Perfection,* inasmuch as in the head dwell all the senses, both interior and exterior, whereas in the other members there is only touch, and hence it is said (Isa. ix. 15): *The aged and honourable, he is the head:—Power,* because the power and movement of the other members, together with the direction of them in their acts, is from the head, by reason of the sensitive and motive power there ruling; hence the ruler is called the head of a people, according to 1 Kings xv. 17: *When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel?* Now these three things belong spiritually to Christ. First, on account of His nearness to God His grace is the highest and first, though not in time, since all have received grace on account of His grace, according to Rom. viii. 29: *For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born amongst many brethren.* Secondly, He had perfection as regards the fulness of all graces, according to John i. 14, *We saw Him* (Vulg., *His glory*) . . . *full of grace and truth,* as was shown, Q. VII., A. 9. Thirdly, He has the power of bestowing grace on all the members of the Church, according to John i. 16: *Of His fulness we have all received.*

And thus it is plain that Christ is fittingly called the Head of the Church.

Reply Obj. 1. To give grace or the Holy Ghost belongs to Christ as He is God, authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man, inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial—*i.e.*, by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. But Augustine denies that Christ as man gives the Holy Ghost authoritatively. Even other saints are said to give the Holy Ghost instrumentally, or ministerially, according to Gal. iii. 5: *He . . . who giveth to you the Spirit.*

Reply Obj. 2. In metaphorical speech we must not expect a likeness in all respects; for thus there would be not likeness but identity. Accordingly a natural head has not another head because one human body is not part of another; but a metaphorical body—*i.e.*, an ordered multitude—is part of another multitude as the domestic multitude is part of the civil multitude; and hence the father who is head of the domestic multitude has a head above him—*i.e.*, the civil governor. And hence there is no reason why God should not be the Head of Christ, although Christ Himself is Head of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3. The head has a manifest pre-eminence over the other exterior members; but the heart has a certain hidden influence. And hence the Holy Ghost is likened to the heart, since He invisibly quickens and unifies the Church; but Christ is likened to the Head in His visible nature in which man is set over man.

Second Article.

whether christ is the head of men as to their bodies or only as to their souls?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not the Head of men as to their bodies. For Christ is said to be the Head of the Church inasmuch as He bestows spiritual

sense and the movement of grace on the Church. But a body is not capable of this spiritual sense and movement. Therefore Christ is not the Head of men as regards their bodies.

Obj. 2. Further, we share bodies with the brutes. If therefore Christ was the Head of men as to their bodies, it would follow that He was the Head of brute animals; and this is not fitting.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ took His body from other men, as is clear from Matt. i. and Luke iii. But the head is the first of the members, as was said above (A. 1 *ad* 3). Therefore Christ is not the Head of the Church as regards bodies.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. iii. 21): *Who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory.*

I answer that, The human body has a natural relation to the rational soul, which is its proper form and motor. Inasmuch as the soul is its form, it receives from the soul life and the other properties which belong specifically to man; but inasmuch as the soul is its motor, the body serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore we must hold that the manhood of Christ had the power of *influence,* inasmuch as it is united to the Word of God, to Whom His body is united through the soul, as stated above (Q. VI., A. 1). Hence the whole manhood of Christ—*i.e.,* according to soul and body—influences all, both in soul and body; but principally the soul, and secondarily the body:—First, inasmuch as the *members of the body are presented as instruments of justice* in the soul that lives through Christ, as the Apostle says (Rom. vi. 13):—Secondly, inasmuch as the life of glory flows from the soul on to the body, according to Rom. viii. 11: *He that raised up Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you.*

Reply Obj. 1. The spiritual sense of grace does not reach to the body first and principally, but secondarily and instrumentally, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2. The body of an animal has no relation to

a rational soul, as the human body has. Hence there is no parity.

Reply Obj. 3. Although Christ drew the matter of His body from other men, yet all draw from Him the immortal life of their body, according to 1 Cor. xv. 22: *And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive.*

Third Article.

whether christ is the head of all men?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not the Head of all men. For the head has no relation except to the members of its body. Now the unbaptized are nowise members of the Church which is the body of Christ, as it is written (Eph. i. 23). Therefore Christ is not the Head of all men.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle writes to the Ephesians (v. 25, 27): *Christ delivered Himself up for* the Church *that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing.* But there are many of the faithful in whom is found the spot or the wrinkle of sin. Therefore Christ is not the Head of all the faithful.

Obj. 3. Further, the sacraments of the Old Law are compared to Christ as the shadow to the body, as is written (Col. ii. 17). But the fathers of the Old Testament in their day served unto these sacraments, according to Heb. viii. 5. *Who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things.* Hence they did not pertain to Christ's body, and therefore Christ is not the Head of all men.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. iv. 10): *Who is the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful,* and (1 Jo. ii. 2): *He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.* Now to save men and to be a propitiation for their sins belongs to Christ as Head. Therefore Christ is the Head of all men.

I answer that, This is the difference between the natural body of man and the Church's mystical body, that the members of the natural body are all together, and the members of the mystical are not all together;—neither as regards their natural being, since the body of the Church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of the world until its end;—nor as regards their supernatural being, since, of those who are at any one time, some there are who are without grace, yet will afterwards obtain it, and some have it already. We must therefore consider the members of the mystical body not only as they are in act, but as they are in potentiality. Nevertheless, some are in potentiality who will never be reduced to act, and some are reduced at some time to act; and this according to the triple class, of which the first is by faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third by the fruition of the life to come. Hence we must say that if we take the whole time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely. For, first and principally, He is the Head of such as are united to Him by glory; secondly, of those who are actually united to Him by charity; thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by faith; fourthly, of those who are united to Him merely in potentiality, which is not yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to Divine predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are those men existing in the world, who are not predestined, who, however, on their departure from this world, wholly cease to be members of Christ, as being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ.

Reply Obj. 1. Those who are unbaptized, though not actually in the Church, are in the Church potentially. And this potentiality is rooted in two things—first and principally, in the power of Christ, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race; secondly, in free-will.

Reply Obj. 2. To be *a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle* is the ultimate end to which we are brought by

the Passion of Christ. Hence this will be in heaven, and not on earth, in which *if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves,* as is written (1 Jo. i. 8). Nevertheless, there are some—viz., mortal—sins from which they are free who are members of Christ by the actual union of charity; but such as are tainted with these sins are not members of Christ actually, but potentially; except, perhaps, imperfectly, by formless faith, which unites to God, relatively but not simply—viz., so that man partake of the life of grace. For, as is written (Jas. ii. 20): *Faith without works is dead.* Yet such as these receive from Christ a certain vital act—*i.e.,* to believe—as if a lifeless limb were moved by a man to some extent.

Reply Obj. 3. The holy Fathers made use of the legal sacraments, not as realities, but as images and shadows of what was to come. Now it is the same motion to an image as image, and to the reality, as is clear from the Philosopher (*De Memor. et Remin.* ii.). Hence the ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments, were borne to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also are borne to Him, and hence the ancient Fathers belong to the same Church as we.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST IS THE HEAD OF THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ as man is not the head of the angels. For the head and members are of one nature. But Christ as man is not of the same nature with the angels, but only with men, since, as is written (Heb. ii. 16): *For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels; but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold.* Therefore Christ as man is not the head of the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ is the head of such as belong to the Church, which is His Body, as is written (Eph. i. 23). But the angels do not belong to the Church. For the

Church is the congregation of the faithful: and in the angels there is no faith, for they do not *walk by faith* but *by sight*, otherwise they would be *absent from the Lord*, as the Apostle argues (2 Cor. v. 6, 7). Therefore Christ as man is not head of the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Tract.* xix. and xxiii. *in Joan.*), that as *the Word* which *was in the beginning with the Father* quickens souls, so the *Word made flesh* quickens bodies, which angels lack. But the Word made flesh is Christ as man. Therefore Christ as man does not give life to angels, and hence as man He is not the head of the angels.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. ii. 10), *Who is the head of all Principality and Power*, and the same reason holds good with the other orders of angels. Therefore Christ is the Head of the angels.

I answer that, As was said above (A. 1 *ad* 2), where there is one body we must allow that there is one head. Now a multitude ordained to one end, with distinct acts and duties, may be metaphorically called one body. But it is manifest that both men and angels are ordained to one end, which is the glory of the Divine fruition. Hence the mystical body of the Church consists not only of men but of angels. Now of all this multitude Christ is the Head, since He is nearer God, and shares His gifts more fully, not only than man, but even than angels; and of His influence not only men but even angels partake, since it is written (Eph. i. 20-22): that God the Father set *Him*, namely Christ, *on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all Principality and Power and Virtue and Dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. And He hath subjected all things under His feet.* Therefore Christ is not only the Head of men, but of angels. Hence we read (Matt. iv. 11) that *angels came and ministered to Him.*

Reply Obj. 1. Christ's influence over men is chiefly with regard to their souls; wherein men agree with angels in generic nature, though not in specific nature. By reason

of this agreement Christ can be said to be the Head of the angels, although the agreement falls short as regards the body.

Reply Obj. 2. The Church, on earth, is the congregation of the faithful; but, in heaven, it is the congregation of comprehensors. Now Christ was not merely a wayfarer, but a comprehensor. And therefore He is the Head not merely of the faithful, but of comprehensors, as having grace and glory most fully.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine here uses the similitude of cause and effect—*i.e.*, inasmuch as corporeal things act on bodies, and spiritual things on spiritual things. Nevertheless, the humanity of Christ, by virtue of the spiritual nature—*i.e.*, the Divine—can cause something not only in the spirits of men, but also in the spirits of angels, on account of its most close conjunction with God—*i.e.*, by personal union.

Fifth Article.

WHETHER THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AS HEAD OF THE CHURCH, IS THE SAME AS HIS HABITUAL GRACE, INASMUCH AS HE IS MAN?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the grace whereby Christ is Head of the Church and the individual grace of the Man are not the same. For the Apostle says (Rom. v. 15): *If by the offence of one many died, much more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many.* But the actual sin of Adam is distinct from original sin which he transmitted to his posterity. Hence the personal grace which is proper to Christ is distinct from His grace, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, which flows to others from Him.

Obj. 2. Further, habits are distinguished by acts. But the personal grace of Christ is ordained to one act—viz., the sanctification of His soul; and the capital grace is ordained to another—viz., to sanctifying others. Therefore

the personal grace of Christ is distinct from His grace as He is the Head of the Church.

Obj. 3. Further, as was said above (Q. VI., A. 6), in Christ we distinguish a threefold grace—viz., the grace of union, capital grace, and the individual grace of the Man. Now the individual grace of Christ is distinct from the grace of union. Therefore it is also distinct from the capital grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. i. 16): *Of His fulness we all have received.* Now He is our Head, inasmuch as we receive from Him. Therefore He is our Head, inasmuch as He has the fulness of grace. Now He had the fulness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in Him in its perfection, as was said above (Q. VII., A. 9). Hence His capital and personal grace are not distinct.

I answer that, Since everything acts inasmuch as it is a being in act, it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it acts, as it is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not every act whereby anything is in act suffices for its being the principle of acting upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xii. 16) and the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii. 19), the agent must act on others by reason of a certain pre-eminence. Now it was said above (A. 1, and Q. VII., A. 9) grace was received by the soul of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from this pre-eminence of grace which He received, it is from Him that this grace is bestowed on others,—and this belongs to the nature of head. Hence the personal grace, whereby the soul of Christ is justified, is essentially the same as His grace, as He is the Head of the Church, and justifies others; but there is a distinction of reason between them.

Reply Obj. 1. Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the nature, is derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin, because in him the person corrupted the nature; and by means of this corruption the sin of the first man is transmitted to posterity, inasmuch as the corrupt nature

corrupts the person. Now grace is not vouchsafed us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal action of Christ Himself. Hence we must not distinguish a two-fold grace in Christ, one corresponding to the nature, the other to the person, as in Adam we distinguish the sin of the nature and of the person.

Reply Obj. 2. Different acts, one of which is the reason and the cause of the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the personal grace which is formally to sanctify its subject, is the reason of the justification of others, which pertains to capital grace. Hence it is that the essence of the habit is not diversified by this difference.

Reply Obj. 3. Personal and capital grace are ordained to an act; but the grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the personal being. Hence the personal and the capital grace agree in the essence of the habit; but the grace of union does not, although the personal grace can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch as it brings about a fitness for the union; and thus the grace of union, the capital, and the personal grace are one in essence, though there is a distinction of reason between them.

Sixth Article.

Whether it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be Head of the Church. For it is written (1 Kings xv. 17): *When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel?* Now there is but one Church in the New and the Old Testament. Therefore it seems that with equal reason any other man than Christ might be head of the Church.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ is called Head of the Church from His bestowing grace on the Church's members. But it belongs to others also to grant grace to others, according

to Eph. iv. 29: *Let no evil speech proceed from your mouth; but that which is good to the edification of faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers.* Therefore it seems to belong also to others than Christ to be head of the Church.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ by His ruling over the Church is not only called *Head,* but also *Shepherd* and *Foundation.* Now Christ did not retain for Himself alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1 Pet. v. 4, *And when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive a never-fading crown of glory;* nor the name of Foundation, according to Apoc. xxi. 14: *And the wall of the city had twelve foundations.* Therefore it seems that He did not retain the name of Head for Himself alone.

On the contrary, It is written (Col. ii. 19): *The head* of the Church is that *from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God.* But this belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head of the Church.

I answer that, The head influences the other members in two ways. First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; secondly, by a certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but the influence over the members of the Church, as regards their exterior guidance, can belong to others; and in this way others may be called heads of the Church, according to Amos vi. 1, *Ye great men, heads of the people;* differently, however, from Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ is the Head of all who pertain to the Church in every place and time and state; but all other men are called heads with reference to certain special places, as bishops of their Churches; or with reference to a determined time as the Pope is the head of

the whole Church—viz., during the time of his Pontificate—and with reference to a determined state, inasmuch as they are in the state of wayfarers. Secondly, because Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and authority; while others are called heads, as taking Christ's place, according to 2 Cor. ii. 10, *For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ,* and v. 20, *For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, as it were, exhorting by us.*

Reply Obj. 1. The word *head* is employed in that passage in regard to exterior government; as a king is said to be the head of his kingdom.

Reply Obj. 2. Man does not distribute grace by interior influx, but by exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*Tract.* xlvi. *in Joan.*): *If the rulers of the Church are Shepherds, how is there one Shepherd, except that all these are members of one Shepherd?* So likewise others may be called foundations and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the one Head and Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (*Tract.* xlvii.), *He gave to His members to be shepherds; yet none of us calleth himself the Door. He kept this for Himself alone.* And this because by door is implied the principal authority, inasmuch as it is by the door that all enter the house; and it is Christ alone by *Whom also we have access . . . into this grace, wherein we stand* (Rom. v. 2); but by the other names above-mentioned there may be implied not merely the principal but also the secondary authority.

Seventh Article.

Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked.

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the devil is not the head of the wicked. For it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into the members, as a gloss says, on Eph.

i. 22, *And made Him head,* etc. But the devil has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of the wicked.

Obj. 2. Further, by every sin a man is made evil. But not every sin is from the devil; and this is plain as regards the demons, who did not sin through the persuasion of another; so likewise not every sin of man proceeds from the devil, for it is said (*De Eccles. Dogm.* lxxxii.): *Not all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the suggestion of the devil; but sometimes they spring from the movement of our will.* Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked.

Obj. 3. Further, one head is placed on one body. But the whole multitude of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they are united, for evil is contrary to evil and springs from divers defects, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of all the wicked.

On the contrary, A gloss* on Job xviii. 17, *Let the memory of him perish from the earth,* says: *This is said of every evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head—i.e., the devil.*

I answer that, As was said above (A. 6), the head not only influences the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly, directing their actions to an end. Hence it may be said that anyone is the head of a multitude, either as regards both—*i.e.,* by interior influence and exterior governance—and thus Christ is the Head of the Church, as was stated (A. 6); or as regards exterior governance, and thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude subject to him. And in this way the devil is head of all the wicked. For, as is written (Job xli. 25): *He is king over all the children of pride.* Now it belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end. But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from God; hence from the beginning he has

* S. Gregory, *Moral.* xiv.

endeavoured to lead man from obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of an end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty, according to Jer. ii. 20: *Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, 'I will not serve.'* Hence, inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is called their head.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the devil does not influence the rational mind interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion.

Reply Obj. 2. A governor does not always suggest to his subjects to obey his will; but proposes to all the sign of his will, in consequence of which some are incited by inducement, and some of their own free-will, as is plain in the leader of an army, whose standard all the soldiers follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore in the same way, the first sin of the devil, who *sinneth from the beginning* (1 Jo. iii. 8), is held out to all to be followed, and some imitate at his suggestion, and some of their own will without any suggestion. And hence the devil is the head of all the wicked, inasmuch as they imitate Him, according to Wisd. ii. 24, 25: *By the envy of the devil, death came into the world. And they follow him that are of his side.*

Reply Obj. 3. All sins agree in aversion from God, although they differ by conversion to different changeable goods.

Eighth Article.

Whether Antichrist may be called the head of all the wicked?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the wicked. For there are not several heads of one body. But the devil is the head of the multitude of the wicked. Therefore Antichrist is not their head.

Obj. 2. Further, Antichrist is a member of the devil.

Now the head is distinguished from the members. Therefore Antichrist is not the head of the wicked.

Obj. 3. Further, the head has an influence over the members. But Antichrist has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him. Therefore Antichrist is not the head of the wicked.

On the contrary, A gloss* on Job xxi. 29, *Ask any of them that go by the way,* says: *Whilst he was speaking of the body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to Antichrist the head of all evil-doers.*

I answer that, As was said above (A. 1), in the head are found three things: order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as regards the order of the body, Antichrist is not said to be the head of the wicked as if his sin had preceded, as the sin of the devil preceded. So likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from the power of influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by exterior persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him were not beguiled into wickedness by him nor have imitated his wickedness. Hence he cannot be called the head of all the wicked in this way, but of some. Therefore it remains to be said that he is the head of all the wicked by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2 Thess. ii. 4, *Showing himself as if he were God,* a gloss says: *As in Christ dwelt the fulness of the Godhead, so in Antichrist the fulness of all wickedness.* Not indeed as if his humanity were assumed by the devil into unity of person, as the humanity of Christ by the Son of God; but that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all the wicked who have gone before are signs of Antichrist, according to 2 Thess. ii. 7, *For the mystery of iniquity already worketh.*

Reply Obj. 1. The devil and Antichrist are not two heads, but one; since Antichrist is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness of the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. ii. 4, *Showing himself as if*

* S. Gregory, *Moral.* xv.

he were God, a gloss says: *The head of all the wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of pride will be in him.* Now he is said to be in him not by personal union, nor by indwelling, since *the Trinity alone dwells in the mind* (as is said *De Eccles. Dogm.* lxxxiii.), but by the effect of wickedness.

Reply Obj. 2. As the head of Christ is God, and yet He is the Head of the Church, as was said above (A. 1 *ad* 2), so likewise Antichrist is a member of the devil and yet is head of the wicked.

Reply Obj. 3. Antichrist is said to be the head of all the wicked not by a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection. For in him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in the same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he executes it.

QUESTION IX.

OF CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider Christ's knowledge; concerning which the consideration will be twofold. First, of Christ's knowledge in general; secondly, of each particular kind of knowledge He had.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine? (2) Whether He had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have? (3) Whether He had an imprinted or infused knowledge? (4) Whether He had any acquired knowledge?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE BESIDES THE DIVINE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him.

Obj. 2. Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ no other knowledge except the Divine.

Obj. 3. Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine took place in the Person, as is clear from Q. II., A. 2. Now, according to some there is in Christ a certain *knowledge of the union,* whereby Christ knew

what belongs to the mystery of the Incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since the personal union contains two natures, it would seem that there are not two knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both natures.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Incarnat.* vii.): *God assumed the perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the sense of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh.* But created knowledge pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created knowledge.

I answer that, As said above (Q. V.), the Son of God assumed an entire human nature—*i.e.*, not only a body, but also a soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behoved Him to have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account of the soul's perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potentiality to knowing intelligible things; since it is like *a tablet on which nothing is writen,* and yet it may be written upon through the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said *De Anima* iii. 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole human race was to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence it behoved the soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which would be its proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that there should be another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Secondly, because, since everything is on account of its operation, as stated *De Cœl.* ii. 17, Christ would have had an intellective soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and this pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some created knowledge pertains to the nature of the human soul—viz., that whereby we naturally know first principles; since we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of

the human intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated above (Q. V.). And hence the Sixth Council* condemned the opinion of those who denied that in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge by an uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God's understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (*Metaph.* xii., text 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing; and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is on account of its operation.

Reply Obj. 2. If the two lights are supposed to be in the same order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants and the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the air by the light of the sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the light of the Divine knowledge, which is *the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world,* as is written John i. 9.

Reply Obj. 3. On the part of what are united we hold there is a knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human nature; so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one hypostasis of God and man, the things of God are attributed to man, and the things of man are attributed to God, as was said above (Q. III., AA. 1 and 6). But on the part of the union itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ. For this union is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to a person only by reason of a nature.

* Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4.

Second Article.

WHETHER CHRIST HAD THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH THE BLESSED OR COMPREHENSORS HAVE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is a participation of Divine light, according to Ps. xxxv. 10: *In Thy light we shall see light.* Now Christ had not a participated light, but He had the Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, according to Col. ii. 9: *For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally.* Therefore in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed.

Obj. 2. Further, the knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed, according to John xvii. 3: *This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.* But this Man was blessed through being united to God in person, according to Ps. lxiv. 5: *Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee.* Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed in Him.

Obj. 3. Further, to man belongs a double knowledge—one by nature, one above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God, is not natural to man, but above his nature. But in Christ there was another and much higher supernatural knowledge—*i.e.*, the Divine knowledge. Therefore there was no need of the knowledge of the blessed in Christ.

On the contrary, The knowledge of the blessed consists in the knowledge of God. But He knew God fully, even as He was man, according to John viii. 55: *I do know Him, and do keep His word.* Therefore in Christ there was the knowledge of the blessed.

I answer that, What is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is in act; for that whereby things are heated must itself be hot. Now man is in potentiality to the knowledge

of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God; and is ordained to it as to an end; since the rational creature is capable of that blessed knowledge, inasmuch as he is made in the image of God. Now men are brought to this end of beatitude by the humanity of Christ, according to Heb. ii. 10: *For it became Him, for Whom are all things, and by Whom are all things, Who had brought many children unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His passion.* And hence it was necessary that the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, should belong to Christ pre-eminently, since the cause ought always to be more efficacious than the effect.

Reply Obj. 1. The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in Person, not in essence or nature: yet with the unity of Person remains the distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ, which is a part of human nature, through a light participated from the Divine Nature, is perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it sees God in essence.

Reply Obj. 2. By the union this Man is blessed with the uncreated beatitude, even as by the union He is God; yet besides the uncreated beatitude it was necessary that there should be in the human nature of Christ a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established in the last end of human nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The beatific vision and knowledge are to some extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been made to the likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human soul.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST HAD AN IMPRINTED OR INFUSED KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was not in Christ another infused knowledge besides the beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as the clear *face-to-face* vision removes the enigmatical vision of faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. xiii. 10, 12. Since, therefore, in Christ there was the beatific knowledge, as stated above (A. 2), it would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms, disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms. Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need of the disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary. Hence, since every created cognition is compared to beatific cognition, as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to have any other knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at once, one more perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and the other less perfect;—and hence the same conclusion as above.

On the contrary, It is written (Col. ii. 3) that in Christ *are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it was fitting that the human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now everything in potentiality is imperfect

unless it be reduced to act. But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible things; and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its completive forms, as is plain from what is said *De Anima* iii. 32, 38. And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge, inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which the possible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted intelligible species upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* ii. 8). And therefore, even as in the angels, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* iv. 22, 24, 30), there is a double knowledge—one the morning knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the other the evening knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused species; so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge, whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species proportioned to the human mind.

Reply Obj. 1. The imperfect vision of faith is essentially opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith to have reference to the unseen, as was said above (II.-II., Q. I., A. 4). But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to beatific cognition. Therefore there is no parity.

Reply Obj. 2. Disposition is referred to perfection in two ways—first, as a way leading to perfection;—secondly, as an effect proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still remain the knowledge gained by the dialectical

syllogism, following, so to say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause, since he who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by beatitude.

Reply Obj. 3. The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the First Part (Q. XII., A. 2); but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately, inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine Essence is a form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together with this super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being in the rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST HAD ANY ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters, by which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jo. vii. 15): *The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters, having never learned?* Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no acquired knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing can be added to what is full. But the power of Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species divinely infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could accrue to His soul.

Obj. 3. Further, he who already has the habit of know-

ledge, acquires no new habit, through what he receives from the senses (otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing together); but the habit which previously existed is strengthened and increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge, it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He perceived by the senses.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. v. 8): *Whereas . . . He was the Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered—i.e., experienced,* says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge.

I answer that, As is plain from A. 1, nothing that God planted in our nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect. But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the Philosopher says (*De Cœl.* i. 31; ii. 59), still less in the soul of Christ is there anything in vain. Now what has not its proper operation is useless, as is said in *De Cœl.* ii. 17. Now the proper operation of the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, by abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (*De Anima* iii. 18) that the active intellect is that *whereby everything is made actual.* And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active intellect;—which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote differently (III. *Sent.* D. xiv., A. 3; D. xviii., A. 3), it must be said that in Christ there was acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion, both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause. For such knowledge springs from Christ's active intellect, which is natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the soul, on account of a light infused from on

high, and this manner of knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and natural to God alone, as was said in the First Part (Q. XII., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1. Since there is a twofold way of acquiring knowledge—by discovery and by being taught—the way of discovery is the higher, and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said (*Ethic.* i. 4): *He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself: yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright.* And hence it was more fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by being taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all, according to Joel ii. 23: *Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He hath given you a Teacher of justice.*

Reply Obj. 2. The human mind has two relations;—one to higher things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused knowledge. The other relation is to lower things—*i.e.*, to phantasms, which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect. Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fulness was insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behoved it to be also perfected with regard to phantasms.

Reply Obj. 3. Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits.

QUESTION X.

OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL

(*In Four Articles.*)

Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however, we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the First Part (Q. XIV.), it now remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge; (2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge.

But, again, because much has been said in the First Part (Q. XII.) of the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ.

Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence? (2) Whether it knew all things in the Word? (3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word? (4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any other creature?

First Article.

WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST COMPREHENDED THE WORD OR THE DIVINE ESSENCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* i. 3) that *the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man assumed.* Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity.

Now this is the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ comprehends the Divine Essence.

Obj. 2. Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 6), *the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in Christ.* Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence.

Obj. 3. Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 13). But to comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God. Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 14): *Whatsoever comprehends itself is finite to itself.* But the Divine Essence is not finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.

I answer that, As is plain from Q. II., AA. 1, 6, the union of the two natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the properties of both natures remained unconfused—*i.e., the uncreated remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the creature,* as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 3, 4). Now it is impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was shown in the First Part (Q. XII., AA. 1, 4, 7), seeing that the infinite is not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.

Reply Obj. 1. The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge above the rest of creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. Not even in the union by personal being does the human nature comprehend the Word of God or

the Divine Nature, for although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by the human nature. Hence Augustine says (*Ep. ad Volusian.* cxxxvii.): *I would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the world's government, neither did He narrow or reduce it when He transferred it to that little body.* So likewise the soul of Christ sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend it; since it does not see It totally—*i.e.*, not as perfectly as it is knowable, as was said in the First Part (Q. XII., A. 7).

Reply Obj. 3. This saying of Augustine is to be understood of the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul, but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man is the Creator.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD KNEW ALL THINGS IN THE WORD?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word. For it is written (Mark xiii. 32): *But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father.* Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.

Obj. 2. Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word.

Obj. 3. Further, the extent of knowledge depends on the number of things known. If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would equal the Divine knowledge—*i.e.*, the created would equal the uncreated, which is impossible.

On the contrary, On Apoc. v. 12, *The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive . . . divinity and wisdom,* a gloss says—*i.e., the knowledge of all things.*

I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in the Word, *all things* may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done, said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of all by God, *because He is the Son of Man,* as is said John v. 27; and therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so that what is said of Him (Jo. ii. 25), *For He knew what was in man,* can be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, *all things* may be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do, which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it can do. Some, however, are

not only in the power of God, but also in the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature, and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the power of the creature.

Reply Obj. 1. Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as was said above (Q. IX., A. 1), but of the Divine knowledge of the Son, Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge. But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God, as is said John i. 3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.

He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by the apostles (Acts i. 7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the contrary, we read (Gen. xxii. 12): *Now I know that thou fearest God—i.e., Now I have made thee know.* But the Father is said to know, because He imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying *but the Father,* we are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (*Hom.* lxxviii. *in Matt.*), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to judge—which is greater—much more is it given to Him to know the less—viz., the time of Judgment. Origen, however (*in Matt., Tract.* xxx.), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.

Reply Obj. 2. God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is said to know by knowledge of vision, but also whatever He Himself can do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in the First Part (Q. XIV., A. 9). Therefore the

soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.

Reply Obj. 3. The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge. Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking, the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of things known, as was stated above.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST CAN KNOW THE INFINITE IN THE WORD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is repugnant to the definition of the infinite, which (*Phys.* iii. 63) is said to be that *from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken.* But it is impossible for the definition to be separated from the thing defined, since this would mean that contradictories exist together. Therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ knows the infinite.

Obj. 2. Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its capacity is finite, since it is created. Therefore the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, there can be nothing greater than the infinite. But more is contained in the Divine knowledge, absolutely speaking, than in the knowledge of Christ's soul, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore the soul of Christ does not know the infinite.

On the contrary, The soul of Christ knows all its power and all it can do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 John ii. 2 : *He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.* Therefore the soul of Christ knows the infinite.

I answer that, Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways :—First, simply—*i.e.,* whatever is a being in act;—secondly, relatively—*i.e.,* whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said *Metaph.* ix. 20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being in act, and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is known. Hence, with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number in act, even though we were to reckon all that are in act at any time whatsoever, since the state of generation and corruption will not last for ever :—consequently there is a certain number not only of things lacking generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and corruption. But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above (A. 2), all that is in the power of the creature. Hence, since in the power of the creature there is an infinite number of things, it knows the infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple intelligence, and not by a knowledge of vision.

Reply Obj. 1. As we said in the First Part (Q. VII., A. 1), the infinite is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a form, and thus we have the negatively infinite—*i.e.,* a form or act not limited by being received into matter or a sub-

ject; and this infinite of itself is most knowable on account of the perfection of the act, although it is not comprehensible by the finite power of the creature; for thus God is said to be infinite. And this infinite the soul of Christ knows, yet does not comprehend. Secondly, there is the infinite as regards matter, which is taken privatively—*i.e.*, inasmuch as it has not the form it ought naturally to have, and in this way we have infinite in quantity. Now this infinite as regards matter, which is taken privately—*i.e.*, with privation of form, as is said *Phys.* iii. 65. But all knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if this infinite is to be known according to its mode of being, it cannot be known. For its mode is that part be taken after part, as is said *Phys.* iii. 62, 63. And in this way it is true that, if we take something from it, *i.e.*, taking part after part, there always remains something to be taken. But as material things can be received by the intellect immaterially, and many things unitedly, so can infinite things be received by the intellect, not after the manner of infinite, but finitely; and thus what are in themselves infinite are, in the intellect of the knower, finite. And in this way the soul of Christ knows an infinite number of things, inasmuch as it knows them not by discoursing from one to another, but in a certain unity—*i.e.*, in any creature in whose potentiality infinite things exist, and principally in the Word Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. There is nothing to hinder a thing from being infinite in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we imagine a surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if there were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative infinity—*i.e.*, in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be finite, since the essence of all would be limited to one specific nature. But what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said in the First Part (Q. VII., A. 2). Now the proper object of the intellect is *what a thing is*, as is said *De Anima* iii. 26, to which pertains the notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has a finite capacity, attains to, but

does not comprehend, what is simply infinite in essence, as stated above (A. 1). But the infinite in potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended by the soul of Christ, since it is compared to that soul according to its essence, in which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect understands a universal,—for example, the nature of a genus or species, which in a manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be predicated of an infinite number.

Reply Obj. 3. That which is infinite in every way can be but one. Hence the Philosopher says (*De Cœl.* i. 2, 3) that, since bodies have dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies. Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder the existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to suppose several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite breadth. Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is accidental to things that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* iii. 37, 38); as the infinite is multiplied by different subjects, so, too, a property of the infinite must be multiplied, in such a way that it belongs to each of them according to that particular subject. Now it is a property of the infinite that nothing is greater than it. Hence, if we take one infinite line, there is nothing greater in it than the infinite; so, too, if we take any one of other infinite lines, it is plain that each has infinite parts. Therefore of necessity in this particular line there is nothing greater than all these infinite parts; yet in another or a third line there will be more infinite parts besides these. We observe this in numbers also, for the species of even numbers are infinite, and likewise the species of odd numbers are infinite; yet there are more even and odd numbers than even. And thus it must be said that nothing is greater than the simply and in every way infinite; but than the infinite which is limited in some respect, nothing is greater in that order; yet we may suppose something greater outside that order. In this way, therefore, there are infinite things in the potentiality of the creature, and yet there are more in

the power of God than in the potentiality of the creature. So, too, the soul of Christ knows infinite things by the knowledge of simple intelligence; yet God knows more by this manner of knowledge or understanding.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST SEES THE WORD OR THE DIVINE ESSENCE MORE CLEARLY THAN DOES ANY OTHER CREATURE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection of knowledge depends upon the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we have by means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that which we have by means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed see the Word immediately in the Divine Essence Itself, as was said in the First Part (Q. XII., A. 2). Therefore the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly than any other creature.

Obj. 2. Further, the perfection of vision does not exceed the power of seeing. But the rational power of a soul such as is the soul of Christ is below the intellective power of an angel, as is plain from Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* iv.). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see the Word more perfectly than the angels.

Obj 3. Further, God sees His Word infinitely more perfectly than does the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible mediate degrees between the manner in which God sees His Word, and the manner in which the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert that the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more perfectly than does every other creature.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. i. 20, 21) that God set Christ *on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and power and virtue and dominion, and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come.* But in that heavenly glory

the higher anyone is the more perfectly does he know God. Therefore the soul of Christ sees God more perfectly than does any other creature.

I answer that, The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all the blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon them from the fountain of the Word of God, according to Ecclus. i. 5 : *The Word of God on high is the fountain of Wisdom.* Now the soul of Christ, since it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light in which God is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence it is written (Jo. i. 14): *And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full* not only *of grace* but also of *truth.*

Reply Obj. 1. Perfection of knowledge, on the part of the thing known, depends on the medium; but as regards the knower, it depends on the power or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a conclusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. And in this way the soul of Christ, which is filled with a more abundant light, knows the Divine Essence more perfectly than do the other blessed, although all see the Divine Essence in itself.

Reply Obj. 2. The vision of the Divine Essence exceeds the natural power of any creature, as was said in the First Part (Q. XII., A. 4). And hence the degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace in which Christ is supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the angelic nature is placed before the human.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. VII., A. 12), there cannot be a greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union with the Word; and the same is to be said of the perfection of the Divine vision; although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher and more sublime degree by the infinity of the Divine power.

QUESTION XI.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE IMPRINTED OR INFUSED IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST.

(In Six Articles.)

WE must now consider the knowledge imprinted or infused in the soul of Christ, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ knows all things by this knowledge? (2) Whether He could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms? (3) Whether this knowledge was collative? (4) Of the comparison of this knowledge with the angelic knowledge. (5) Whether it was a habitual knowledge? (6) Whether it was distinguished by various habits?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY THIS IMPRINTED OR INFUSED KNOWLEDGE CHRIST KNEW ALL THINGS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that by this knowledge Christ did not know all things. For this knowledge is imprinted upon Christ for the perfection of the passive intellect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul does not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply, but only to those things with regard to which it can be reduced to act by the active intellect, which is its proper motor; and these are knowable by natural reason. Therefore by this knowledge Christ did not know what exceeded the natural reason.

Obj. 2. Further, phantasms are to the human intellect as colours to sight, as is said *De Anima* iii. 18, 31, 39. But it does not pertain to the perfection of the power of seeing

to know what is without colour. Therefore it does not pertain to the perfection of human intellect to know things of which there are no phantasms, such as separate substances. Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for the perfection of His intellective soul, it seems that by this knowledge He did not know separate substances.

Obj. 3. Further, it does not belong to the perfection of the intellect to know singulars. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know singulars.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xi. 2) that *the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, of knowledge and counsel shall fill Him,** under which are included all that may be known; for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to wisdom, the knowledge of all immaterial things to understanding, the knowledge of all conclusions to knowledge (*scientia*), the knowledge of all practical things to counsel. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge Christ had the knowledge of all things.

I answer that, As was said above (Q. IX., A. 1), it was fitting that the soul of Christ should be wholly perfected by having each of its powers reduced to act. Now it must be borne in mind that in the human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one in comparison with a natural agent;—the other in comparison with the first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential power of a creature. Now both powers of Christ's soul were reduced to act by this divinely imprinted knowledge. And hence, by it the soul of Christ knew:—First, whatever can be known by force of a man's active intellect—*e.g.*, whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly, by this knowledge Christ knew all things made known to man by Divine revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of prophecy, or any other

* Vulg.: *The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel . . . the Spirit of knowledge . . . Cf.* Ecclus. xv. 5.

gift of the Holy Ghost; since the soul of Christ knew these things more fully and completely than others. Yet He did not know the Essence of God by this knowledge, but by the first alone, of which we spoke above (Q. X.).

Reply Obj. 1. This reason refers to the natural power of an intellective soul in comparison with its natural agent, which is the active intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The human soul in the state of this life, since it is somewhat fettered by the body, so as to be unable to understand without phantasms, cannot understand separate substances. But after the state of this life the separated soul will be able, in a measure, to know separate substances by itself, as was said in the First Part (Q. LXXXIX., AA. 1, 2), and this is especially clear as regards the souls of the blessed. Now before His Passion, Christ was not merely a wayfarer but also a comprehensor; hence His soul could know separate substances in the same way that a separated soul could.

Reply Obj. 3. The knowledge of singulars pertains to the perfection of the intellective soul, not in speculative knowledge, but in practical knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of singulars, in which operations exist, as is said *Ethic.* vi. 7. Hence for prudence are required the remembrance of past things, knowledge of present things, and foresight of future things, as Tully says (*De Invent.* ii.). Therefore, since Christ had the fulness of prudence by the gift of counsel, He consequently knew all singular things—present, past, and future.

Second Article.

whether christ could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ could not understand by this knowledge except by turning to phantasms, because, as is stated *De Anima* iii. 18, 31, 39,

phantasms are compared to man's intellective soul as colours to sight. But Christ's power of seeing could not become actual save by turning to colours. Therefore His intellective soul could understand nothing except by turning to phantasms.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ's soul is of the same nature as ours; otherwise He would not be of the same species as we, contrary to what the Apostle says (Phil. ii. 7) . . . *being made in the likeness of men.* But our soul cannot understand except by turning to phantasms. Hence, neither can Christ's soul otherwise understand.

Obj. 3. Further, senses are given to man to help his intellect. Hence, if the soul of Christ could understand without turning to phantasms, which arise in the senses, it would follow that in the soul of Christ the senses were useless, which is not fitting. Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ can only understand by turning to phantasms.

On the contrary, The soul of Christ knew certain things which could not be known by the senses—viz., separate substances. Therefore it could understand without turning to phantasms.

I answer that, In the state before His Passion Christ was at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as will be more clearly shown (Q. XV., A. 10). Especially had He the conditions of a wayfarer on the part of the body, which was passible; but the conditions of a comprehensor He had chiefly on the part of the soul. Now this is the condition of the soul of a comprehensor—viz., that it is nowise subject to its body, or dependent upon it, but wholly dominates it. Hence after the resurrection glory will flow from the soul to the body. But the soul of man on earth needs to turn to phantasms, because it is fettered by the body and in a measure subject to and dependent upon it. And hence the blessed both before and after the resurrection can understand without turning to phantasms. And this must be said of the soul of Christ, which had fully the capabilities of a comprehensor.

Reply Obj. 1. This likeness which the Philosopher asserts is not with regard to everything. For it is manifest that the end of the power of seeing is to know colours; but the end of the intellective power is not to know phantasms, but to know intelligible species, which it apprehends from and in phantasms, according to the state of the present life. Therefore there is a likeness in respect of what both powers regard, but not in respect of that in which the condition of both powers is terminated. Now nothing prevents a thing in different states from reaching its end by different ways: albeit there is never but one proper end of a thing. Hence, although the sight knows nothing without colour; nevertheless in a certain state the intellect can know without phantasms, but not without intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the soul of Christ was of the same nature as our souls, yet it had a state which our souls have not yet in fact, but only in hope—*i.e.*, the state of comprehension.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the soul of Christ could understand without turning to phantasms, yet it could also understand by turning to phantasms. Hence the senses were not useless in it; especially as the senses are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge, but for the need of animal life.

Third Article.

whether this knowledge was collative?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ had not this knowledge by way of comparison. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 14): *We do not uphold counsel or choice in Christ.* Now these things are withheld from Christ only inasmuch as they imply comparison and discursion. Therefore it seems that there was no collative or discursive knowledge in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, man needs comparison and discursion of reason in order to find out the unknown. But the soul of Christ knew everything, as was said above (Q. X., A. 2). Hence there was no discursive or collative knowledge in Him.

Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge in Christ's soul was like that of comprehensors, who are likened to the angels, according to Matt. xxii. 30. Now there is no collative or discursive knowledge in the angels, as Dionysius shows (*Div. Nom.* vii.). Therefore there was no discursive or collative knowledge in the soul of Christ.

On the contrary, Christ had a rational soul, as was shown (Q. V., A. 4). Now the proper operation of a rational soul consists in comparison and discursion from one thing to another. Therefore there was collative and discursive knowledge in Christ.

I answer that, Knowledge may be discursive or collative in two ways. First, in the acquisition of the knowledge, as happens to us, who proceed from one thing to the knowledge of another, as from causes to effects, and conversely. And in this way the knowledge in Christ's soul was not discursive or collative, since this knowledge which we are now considering was divinely infused, and not acquired by a process of reasoning. Secondly, knowledge may be called discursive or collative in use; as at times those who know, reason from cause to effect, not in order to learn anew, but wishing to use the knowledge they have. And in this way the knowledge in Christ's soul could be collative or discursive; since it could conclude one thing from another, as it pleased, as in Matt. xvii. 24, 25, when Our Lord asked Peter: *Of whom do the kings of the earth receive tribute, of their own children, or of strangers?* on Peter replying: *Of strangers,* He concluded: *Then the children are free.*

Reply Obj. 1. From Christ is excluded that counsel which is with doubt; and consequently choice, which essentially includes such counsel; but the practice of using counsel is not excluded from Christ.

Reply Obj. 2. This reason rests upon discursion and comparison, as used to acquire knowledge.

Reply Obj. 3. The blessed are likened to the angels in the gifts of graces; yet there still remains the difference of natures. And hence to use comparison and discursion is connatural to the souls of the blessed, but not to angels.

Fourth Article.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THIS KNOWLEDGE WAS GREATER THAN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this knowledge was not greater in Christ than in the angels. For perfection is proportioned to the thing perfected. But the human soul in the order of nature is below the angelic nature. Therefore since the knowledge we are now speaking of is imprinted upon Christ's soul for its perfection, it seems that this knowledge is less than the knowledge by which the angelic nature is perfected.

Obj. 2. Further, the knowledge of Christ's soul was in a measure comparative and discursive, which cannot be said of the angelic knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of Christ's soul was less than the knowledge of the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, the more immaterial knowledge is, the greater it is. But the knowledge of the angels is more immaterial than the knowledge of Christ's soul, since the soul of Christ is the act of a body, and turns to phantasms, which cannot be said of the angels. Therefore the knowledge of angels is greater than the knowledge of Christ's soul.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. ii. 9): *For we see Jesus, Who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour;* from which it is plain that Christ is said to be lower than the angels only in regard to the suffering of death. And hence, not in knowledge.

I answer that, The knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul may be looked at in two ways: First, as regards what it has from the inflowing cause; secondly, as regards what it has from the subject receiving it. Now with regard to the first, the knowledge imprinted upon the soul of Christ was more excellent than the knowledge of the angels, both in the number of things known and in the certainty of the knowledge; since the spiritual light, which is imprinted on the soul of Christ, is much more excellent than the light which pertains to the angelic nature. But as regards the second, the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ is less than the angelic knowledge, in the manner of knowing that is natural to the human soul—*i.e.*, by turning to phantasms, and by comparison and discursion.

And hereby the reply to the objections is made clear.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS KNOWLEDGE WAS HABITUAL?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no habitual knowledge. For it has been said (Q. IX., A. 1) that the highest perfection of knowledge befitted Christ's soul. But the perfection of an actually existing knowledge is greater than that of a potentially or habitually existing knowledge. Therefore it was fitting for Him to know all things actually. Therefore He had not habitual knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, since habits are ordained to acts, a habitual knowledge which is never reduced to act would seem useless. Now, since Christ knew all things, as was said Q. X., A. 2, He could not have considered all things actually, thinking over one after another, since the infinite cannot be passed over by enumeration. Therefore the habitual knowledge of certain things would have been useless to Him,—which is unfitting. Therefore He had an actual and not a habitual knowledge of what He knew.

Obj. 3. Further, habitual knowledge is a perfection of

the knower. But perfection is more noble than the thing perfected. If, therefore, in the soul of Christ there was any created habit of knowledge, it would follow that this created thing was nobler than the soul of Christ. Therefore there was no habitual knowledge in Christ's soul.

On the contrary, The knowledge of Christ we are now speaking about was univocal with our knowledge, even as His soul was of the same species as ours. But our knowledge is in the genus of habit. Therefore the knowledge of Christ was habitual.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), the mode of the knowledge impressed on the soul of Christ befitted the subject receiving it. For the received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient. Now the connatural mode of the human soul is that it should understand sometimes actually, and sometimes potentially. But the medium between a pure power and a completed act is a habit: and extremes and medium are of the same genus. Thus it is plain that it is the connatural mode of the human soul to receive knowledge as a habit. Hence it must be said that the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ was habitual, for He could use it when He pleased.

Reply Obj. 1. In Christ's soul there was a twofold knowledge—each most perfect of its kind:—the first exceeding the mode of human nature, as by it He saw the Essence of God, and other things in It, and this was the most perfect, simply. Nor was this knowledge habitual, but actual with respect to everything He knew in this way. But the second knowledge was in Christ in a manner proportioned to human nature—*i.e.*, inasmuch as He knew things by species divinely imprinted upon Him, and of this knowledge we are now speaking. Now this knowledge was not most perfect, simply, but merely in the genus of human knowledge; hence it did not behove it to be always in act.

Reply Obj. 2. Habits are reduced to act by the command of the will, since a habit is that *with which we act when we wish.* Now the will is indeterminate in regard to

infinite things. Yet it is not useless, even when it does not actually tend to all; provided it actually tends to everything in fitting place and time. And hence neither is a habit useless, even if all that it extends to is not reduced to act; provided that that which befits the due end of the will be reduced to act according as the matter in hand and the time require.

Reply Obj. 3. Goodness and being are taken in two ways: First, simply; and thus a substance, which subsists in its being and goodness, is a good and a being; secondly, being and goodness are taken relatively, and in this way an accident is a being and a good, not that it has being and goodness, but that its subject is a being and a good. And hence habitual knowledge is not simply better or more excellent than the soul of Christ; but relatively, since the whole goodness of habitual knowledge is added to the goodness of the subject.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS KNOWLEDGE WAS DISTINGUISHED BY DIVERS HABITS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the soul of Christ there was only one habit of knowledge. For the more perfect knowledge is, the more united it is; hence the higher angels understand by the more universal forms, as was said in the First Part (Q. LV., A. 3). Now Christ's knowledge was most perfect. Therefore it was most one. Therefore it was not distinguished by several habits.

Obj. 2. Further, our faith is derived from Christ's knowledge; hence it is written (Heb. xii. 2): *Looking on Jesus the author and finisher of faith.* But there is only one habit of faith about all things believed, as was said in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. IV., A. 6). Much more, therefore, was there only one habit of knowledge in Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, knowledge is distinguished by the divers formalities of knowable things. But the soul of

Christ knew everything under one formality—*i.e.*, by a divinely infused light. Therefore in Christ there was only one habit of knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (*Zach.* iii. 9) that on *one stone, i.e.,* Christ, *there are seven eyes.* Now by the eye is understood knowledge. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were several habits of knowledge.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 4, 5), the knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul has a mode connatural to a human soul. Now it is connatural to a human soul to receive species of a lesser universality than the angels receive; so that it knows different specific natures by different intelligible species. But it so happens that we have different habits of knowledge, because there are different classes of knowable things, inasmuch as what are in one genus are known by one habit; thus it is said (*Poster.* i. 42) that *one science is of one class of object.* And hence the knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul was distinguished by different habits.

Reply Obj. 1. As was said (A. 4), the knowledge of Christ's soul is most perfect, and exceeds the knowledge of angels with regard to what is in it on the part of God's gift; but it is below the angelic knowledge as regards the mode of the recipient. And it pertains to this mode that this knowledge is distinguished by various habits, inasmuch as it regards more particular species.

Reply Obj. 2. Our faith rests upon the First Truth; and hence Christ is the author of our faith by the Divine knowledge, which is simply one.

Reply Obj. 3. The divinely infused light is the common formality for understanding what is divinely revealed, as the light of the active intellect is with regard to what is naturally known. Hence, in the soul of Christ there must be the proper species of singular things, in order to know each with proper knowledge; and in this way there must be divers habits of knowledge in Christ's soul, as stated above.

QUESTION XII.

OF THE ACQUIRED OR EMPIRIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider the acquired or empiric knowledge of Christ's soul; and under this head there are four points of inquiry. (1) Whether Christ knew all things by this knowledge? (2) Whether He advanced in this knowledge? (3) Whether He learnt anything from man? (4) Whether He received anything from angels?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST KNEW ALL THINGS BY THIS ACQUIRED OR EMPIRIC KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not know everything by this knowledge. For this knowledge is acquired by experience. But Christ did not experience everything. Therefore He did not know everything by this knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, man acquires knowledge through the senses. But not all sensible things were subjected to Christ's bodily senses. Therefore Christ did not know everything by this knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, the extent of knowledge depends on the things knowable. Therefore if Christ knew all things by this knowledge, His acquired knowledge would have been equal to His infused and beatific knowledge; which is not fitting. Therefore Christ did not know all things by this knowledge.

On the contrary, Nothing imperfect was in Christ's soul.

Now this knowledge of His would have been imperfect if He had not known all things by it, since the imperfect is that to which addition may be made. Hence Christ knew all things by this knowledge.

I answer that, Acquired knowledge is held to be in Christ's soul, as we have said Q. IX., A. 4, by reason of the active intellect, lest its action, which is to make things actually intelligible, should be wanting; even as imprinted or infused knowledge is held to be in Christ's soul for the perfection of the passive intellect. Now as the passive intellect is that by which *all things are in potentiality,* so the active intellect is that by which *all are in act,* as is said *De Anima* iii. 18. And hence, as the soul of Christ knew by infused knowledge all things to which the passive intellect is in any way in potentiality, so by acquired knowledge it knew whatever can be known by the action of the active intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. The knowledge of things may be acquired not merely by experiencing the things themselves, but by experiencing other things; since by virtue of the light of the active intellect man can go on to understand effects from causes, and causes from effects, like from like, contrary from contrary. Therefore Christ, though He did not experience all things, came to the knowledge of all things from what He did experience.

Reply Obj. 2. Although all sensible things were not subjected to Christ's bodily senses, yet other sensible things were subjected to His senses; and from this He could come to know other things by the most excellent force of His reason, in the manner described in the previous reply; just as in seeing heavenly bodies He could comprehend their powers and the effects they have upon things here below, which were not subjected to His senses; and for the same reason, from any other things whatsoever, He could come to the knowledge of yet other things.

Reply Obj. 3. By this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know all things simply, but all such as are knowable

by the light of man's active intellect. Hence by this knowledge He did not know the essences of separate substances, nor past, present, or future singulars, which, nevertheless, He knew by infused knowledge, as was said above (Q. XI.).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST ADVANCED IN ACQUIRED OR EMPIRIC KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ did not advance in this knowledge. For even as Christ knew all things by His beatific and His infused knowledge, so also did He by this acquired knowledge, as is plain from what has been said (A. 1). But He did not advance in these knowledges. Therefore neither in this.

Obj. 2. Further, to advance belongs to the imperfect, since the perfect cannot be added to. Now we cannot suppose an imperfect knowledge in Christ. Therefore Christ did not advance in this knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 22): *Whoever say that Christ advanced in wisdom and grace, as if receiving additional sensations, do not venerate the union which is in hypostasis.* But it is impious not to venerate this union. Therefore it is impious to say that His knowledge received increase.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke ii. 52): *Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men;* and Ambrose says (*De Incar. Dom.* vii.) that *He advanced in human wisdom.* Now human wisdom is that which is acquired in a human manner—*i.e.*, by the light of the active intellect. Therefore Christ advanced in this knowledge.

I answer that, There is a twofold advancement in knowledge:—one in essence, inasmuch as the habit of knowledge is increased;—the other in effect—*e.g.*, if someone were with one and the same habit of knowledge to prove

to someone else some minor truths at first, and afterwards greater and more subtle conclusions. Now in this second way it is plain that Christ advanced in knowledge and grace, even as in age, since as His age increased He wrought greater deeds, and showed greater knowledge and grace.

But as regards the habit of knowledge, it is plain that His habit of infused knowledge did not increase, since from the beginning He had perfect infused knowledge of all things; and still less could His beatific knowledge increase; while in the First Part (Q. XIV., A. 15) we have already said that His Divine knowledge could not increase. Therefore, if in the soul of Christ there was no habit of acquired knowledge, beyond the habit of infused knowledge, as appears to some,* and sometime appeared to me (III. *Sent.* D. xiv), no knowledge in Christ increased in essence, but merely by experience—*i.e.*, by comparing the infused intelligible species with phantasms. And in this way they maintain that Christ's knowledge grew in experience—*e.g.*, by comparing the infused intelligible species with what He received through the senses for the first time. But because it seems unfitting that any natural intelligible action should be wanting to Christ, and because to extract intelligible species from phantasms is a natural action of man's active intellect, it seems becoming to place even this action in Christ. And it follows from this that in the soul of Christ there was a habit of knowledge which could increase by this abstraction of species; inasmuch as the active intellect, after abstracting the first intelligible species from phantasms, could abstract others, and others again.

Reply Obj. 1. Both the infused knowledge and the beatific knowledge of Christ's soul were the effects of an agent of infinite power, which could produce the whole at once; and thus in neither knowledge did Christ advance; since from the beginning He had them perfectly. But the acquired knowledge of Christ is caused by the active intel-

* Blessed Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, S. Bonaventure.

lect which does not produce the whole at once, but successively; and hence by this knowledge Christ did not know everything from the beginning, but step by step, and after a time—*i.e.*, in His perfect age;—and this is plain from what the Evangelist says, viz., that He increased in *knowledge and age* together.

Reply Obj. 2. Even this knowledge was always perfect for the time being, although it was not always perfect, simply and in comparison to the nature; hence it could increase.

Reply Obj. 3. This saying of Damascene regards those who say absolutely that addition was made to Christ's knowledge—*i.e.*, as regards any knowledge of His, and especially as regards the infused knowledge which is caused in Christ's soul by union with the Word; but it does not regard the increase of knowledge caused by the natural agent.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST LEARNED ANYTHING FROM MAN?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ learned something from man. For it is written (Luke ii. 46, 47) that, *They found Him in the temple in the midst of the doctors, hearing them, and asking them questions.* But to ask questions and to reply pertains to a learner. Therefore Christ learned something from man.

Obj. 2. Further, to acquire knowledge from a man's teaching seems more noble than to acquire it from sensible things, since in the soul of the man who teaches the intelligible species are in act; but in sensible things the intelligible species are only in potentiality. Now Christ received empiric knowledge from sensible things, as stated above (A. 2). Much more, therefore, could He receive knowledge by learning from men.

Obj. 3. Further, by empiric knowledge Christ did not know everything from the beginning, but advanced in it, as was said above (A. 2). But anyone hearing words which

mean something, may learn something he does not know. Therefore Christ could learn from men something He did not know by this knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lv. 4): *Behold, I have given Him for a witness to the people, for a leader and a master to the Gentiles.* Now a master is not taught, but teaches. Therefore Christ did not receive any knowledge by the teaching of any man.

I answer that, In every genus that which is the first mover is not moved according to the same species of movement; just as the first alterative is not itself altered. Now Christ is established by God the Head of the Church—yea, of all men, as was said above (Q. VIII., A. 3), so that not only all might receive grace through Him, but that all might receive the doctrine of Truth from Him. Hence He Himself says (Jo. xviii. 37): *For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth.* And thus it did not befit His dignity that He should be taught by any man.

Reply Obj. 1. As Origen says (*Hom.* xix. *in Luc.*): *Our Lord asked questions not in order to learn anything, but in order to teach by questioning. For from the same well of knowledge came the question and the wise reply.* Hence the Gospel goes on to say that *all that heard Him were astonished at His wisdom and His answers.*

Reply Obj. 2. Whoever learns from man does not receive knowledge immediately from the intelligible species which are in his mind, but through sensible words, which are signs of intelligible concepts. Now as words formed by a man are signs of his intellectual knowledge; so are creatures, formed by God, signs of His wisdom. Hence it is written (Ecclus. i. 10) that God *poured* wisdom *out upon all His works.* Hence, just as it is better to be taught by God than by man, so it is better to receive our knowledge from sensible creatures and not by man's teaching.

Reply Obj. 3. Jesus advanced in empiric knowledge, as in age, as stated above (A. 2). Now as a fitting age is

required for a man to acquire knowledge by discovery, so also that he may acquire it by being taught. But our Lord did nothing unbecoming to His age; and hence He did not give ear to hearing the lessons of doctrine until such time as He was able to have reached that grade of knowledge by way of experience. Hence Gregory says (*Sup. Ezech.* Lib. i., Hom. ii.): *In the twelfth year of His age He deigned to question men on earth, since in the course of reason, the word of doctrine is not vouchsafed before the age of perfection.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST RECEIVED KNOWLEDGE FROM THE ANGELS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ received knowledge from the angels. For it is written (Luke xxii. 43) that *there appeared to Him an angel from heaven, strengthening Him.* But we are strengthened by the comforting words of a teacher, according to Job iv. 3, 4: *Behold thou hast taught many and hast strengthened the weary hand. Thy words have confirmed them that were staggering.* Therefore Christ was taught by angels.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iv.): *For I see that even Jesus,—the supersubstantial substance of supercelestial substances—when without change He took our substance upon Himself, was subject in obedience to the instructions of the Father and God by the angels.* Hence it seems that even Christ wished to be subject to the ordinations of the Divine law, whereby men are taught by means of angels.

Obj. 3. Further, as in the natural order the human body is subject to the celestial bodies, so likewise is the human mind to angelic minds. Now Christ's body was subject to the impressions of the heavenly bodies, for He felt the heat in summer and the cold in winter, and other human passions. Therefore His human mind was subject to the illuminations of supercelestial spirits.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) that *the highest angels question Jesus, and learn the knowledge of His Divine work, and of the flesh assumed for us; and Jesus teaches them directly.* Now to teach and to be taught do not belong to the same. Therefore Christ did not receive knowledge from the angels.

I answer that, Since the human soul is midway between spiritual substances and corporeal things, it is perfected naturally in two ways. First by knowledge received from sensible things; secondly, by knowledge imprinted or infused by the illumination of spiritual substances. Now in both these ways the soul of Christ was perfected; first by empirical knowledge of sensible things, for which there is no need of angelic light, since the light of the active intellect suffices; secondly, by the higher impression of infused knowledge, which He received directly from God. For as His soul was united to the Word above the common mode, in unity of person, so above the common manner of men was it filled with knowledge and grace by the Word of God Himself; and not by the medium of angels, who in their beginning received the knowledge of things by the influence of the Word, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* ii. 8).

Reply Obj. 1. This strengthening by the angel was for the purpose not of instructing Him, but of proving the truth of His human nature. Hence Bede says (on Luke xxii. 43): *In testimony of both natures are the angels said to have ministered to Him and to have strengthened Him. For the Creator did not need help from His creature; but having become man, even as it was for our sake that He was sad, so was it for our sake that He was strengthened—i.e.,* in order that our faith in the Incarnation might be strengthened.

Reply Obj. 2. Dionysius says that Christ was subject to the angelic instructions, not by reason of Himself, but by reason of what happened at His Incarnation, and as regards the care of Him whilst He was a child. Hence in the same place he adds that *Jesus' withdrawal to Egypt*

decreed by the Father is announced to Joseph by angels, and again His return to Judæa from Egypt.

Reply Obj. 3. The Son of God assumed a passible body (as will be said hereafter, Q. XIV., A. 1) and a soul perfect in knowledge and grace (Q. XIV., A. 1 *ad* 1; A. 4). Hence His body was rightly subject to the impression of heavenly bodies; but His soul was not subject to the impression of heavenly spirits.

QUESTION XIII.

OF THE POWER OF CHRIST'S SOUL.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider the power of Christ's soul; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether He had omnipotence simply? (2) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to corporeal creatures? (3) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to His own body? (4) Whether He had omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST HAD OMNIPOTENCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence. For Ambrose* says on Luke i. 32: *The power which the Son of God had naturally, the Man was about to receive in time.* Now this would seem to regard the soul principally, since it is the chief part of man. Hence since the Son of God had omnipotence from all eternity, it would seem that the soul of Christ received omnipotence in time.

Obj. 2. Further, as the power of God is infinite, so is His knowledge. But the soul of Christ in a manner had the knowledge of all that God knows, as was said above (Q. X., A. 2). Therefore He had all power; and thus He was omnipotent.

Obj. 3. Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now knowledge is either practical or speculative. Therefore He has a practical knowledge of what He knows—*i.e.*, He knew how to do what He knows; and thus it seems that He can do all things.

* Gloss. Ord.

On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot belong to any creature. But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to Exod. xv. 2, 3: *He is my God and I will glorify Him,* and further on, *Almighty is His name.* Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a creature, has not omnipotence.

I answer that, As was said above (Q. II., A. 1; Q. X., A. 1) in the mystery of the Incarnation the union in person so took place that there still remained the distinction of natures, each nature still retaining what belonged to it. Now the active principle of a thing follows its form, which is the principle of action. But the form is either the very nature of the thing, as in simple things; or is the constituent of the nature of the thing; as in such as are composed of matter and form. And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, from the Divine Nature. For since the Divine Nature is the very uncircumscribed Being of God, as is plain from Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* v.), It has an active power over everything that can have the nature of being; and this is to have omnipotence; just as every other thing has an active power over such things as the perfection of its nature extends to; as what is hot gives heat. Therefore since the soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it cannot possibly have omnipotence.

Reply Obj. 1. By union with the Person, the Man receives omnipotence in time, which the Son of God had from eternity; the result of which union is that as the Man is said to be God, so is He said to be omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because there is one Person of God and man.

Reply Obj. 2. According to some, knowledge and active power are not in the same ratio; for an active power flows from the very nature of the thing, inasmuch as action is considered to come forth from the agent; but knowledge is not always possessed by the very essence or form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation of the knower to the thing known by the aid of received species. But

this reason seems not to suffice, because even as we may understand by a likeness obtained from another, so also may we act by a form obtained from another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all things by the similitudes of all things impressed upon it by God, cannot do these things by the same similitudes.

It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in the lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner; for heat is not received by water in the perfection and strength it had in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature to the Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not received in the soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they had in the Divine Nature. And hence it is that the knowledge of Christ's soul is inferior to Divine knowledge as regards the manner of knowing, for God knows (things) more perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it knows all things present, past, and future, which God knows by the knowledge of vision. So, too, the similitudes of things infused into Christ's soul do not equal the Divine power in acting—*i.e.*, so as to do all that God can do, or to do in the same manner as God does, Who acts with an infinite might whereof the creature is not capable. Now there is no thing, to know which in some way an infinite power is needed, although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power; yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite power, as creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said in the First Part (Q. XLV.). Hence Christ's soul which, being a creature, is finite in might, can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way; yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it cannot create itself.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ's soul has practical and specu-

lative knowledge; yet it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of those things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of the knower to the thing known suffices; whereas for practical knowledge it is required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something else is more than merely to have the form; as to be lightsome and to enlighten is more than merely to be lightsome. Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows the mode of God's creation), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode, since it has no knowledge operative of creation.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST HAD OMNIPOTENCE WITH REGARD TO THE TRANSMUTATION OF CREATURES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. For He Himself says (Matt. xxviii. 18): *All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth.* Now by the words *heaven and earth* are meant all creatures, as is plain from Gen. i. 1: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth.* Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul of Christ is the most perfect of all creatures. But every creature can be moved by another creature; for Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 4) that *even as the denser and lower bodies are ruled in a fixed way by the subtler and stronger bodies; so are all bodies by the spirit of life, and the irrational spirit of life by the rational spirit of life, and the truant and sinful rational spirit of life by the rational, loyal, and righteous spirit of life.* But the soul of Christ moves even the highest spirits, enlightening them, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). Therefore it

seems that the soul of Christ has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ's soul had in its highest degree the *grace of miracles* or works of might. But every transmutation of the creature can belong to the grace of miracles; since even the heavenly bodies were miraculously changed from their course, as Dionysius proves (*Ep. ad Polycarp.*). Therefore Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

On the contrary, To transmute creatures belongs to Him Who preserves them. Now this belongs to God alone, according to Heb. i. 3: *Upholding all things by the word of His power.* Therefore God alone has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. Therefore this does not belong to Christ's soul.

I answer that, Two distinctions are here needed. Of these the first is with respect to the transmutation of creatures, which is threefold. The first is natural, being brought about by the proper agent naturally; the second is miraculous, being brought about by a supernatural agent above the wonted order and course of nature, as to raise the dead; the third is inasmuch as every creature may be brought to nothing.

The second distinction has to do with Christ's soul, which may be looked at in two ways: first in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace; secondly, as it is the instrument of the Word of God, personally united to Him. Therefore if we speak of the soul of Christ in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace, it had power to cause those effects proper to a soul (*e.g.,* to rule the body and direct human acts, and also, by the fulness of grace and knowledge to enlighten all rational creatures falling short of its perfection), in a manner befitting a rational creature. But if we speak of the soul of Christ as it is the instrument of the Word united to Him, it had an instrumental power to effect all the miraculous transmutations ordainable to the end of the Incarnation, which is *to re-establish all things that are in heaven and on*

earth.* But the transmutation of creatures, inasmuch as they may be brought to nothing, corresponds to their creation, whereby they were brought from nothing. And hence even as God alone can create, so, too, He alone can bring creatures to nothing, and He alone upholds them in being, lest they fall back to nothing. And thus it must be said that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

Reply Obj. 1. As Jerome says (on the text quoted): *Power is given Him—i.e.*, to Christ as man—*Who a little while before was crucified, buried in the tomb, and afterwards rose again.* But power is said to have been given Him, by reason of the union whereby it was brought about that a Man was omnipotent, as was said above (A. 1 *ad* 1). And although this was made known to the angels before the Resurrection, yet after the Resurrection it was made known to all men, as Remigius says (*cf. Catena Aurea*). Now, *things are said to happen when they are made known*.† Hence after the Resurrection our Lord says *that all power is given* to Him *in heaven and on earth*.

Reply Obj. 2. Although every creature is transmutable by some other creature, except, indeed, the highest angel, and even it can be enlightened by Christ's soul; yet not every transmutation that can be made in a creature can be made by a creature; since some transmutations can be made by God alone. Yet all transmutations that can be made in creatures can be made by the soul of Christ, as the instrument of the Word, but not in its proper nature and power, since some of these transmutations pertain to the soul neither in the order of nature nor in the order of grace.

Reply Obj. 3. As was said in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. CLXXVIII., A. 1 *ad* 1), the grace of mighty works or miracles is given to the soul of a saint, so that these miracles are wrought not by his own, but by Divine power. Now this grace was bestowed on Christ's soul most excellently—*i.e.*, not only that He might work miracles,

* Eph. i. 10. † Hugh of S. Victor: Qq. in *Ep. ad Philip.*

but also that He might communicate this grace to others. Hence it is written (Matt. x. 1) that, *having called His twelve disciples together, He gave them power over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of diseases, and all manner of infirmities.*

Third Article.

WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST HAD OMNIPOTENCE WITH REGARD TO HIS OWN BODY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to His own body. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 20, 23) that *all natural things were voluntary to Christ; He willed to hunger, He willed to thirst, He willed to fear, He willed to die.* Now God is called omnipotent because *He hath done all things whatsoever He would* (Ps. cxiii. 11). Therefore it seems that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to the natural operations of the body.

Obj. 2. Further, human nature was more perfect in Christ than in Adam, who had a body entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing could happen to the body against the will of the soul—and this on account of the original justice which it had in the state of innocence. Much more, therefore, had Christ's soul omnipotence with regard to His body.

Obj. 3. Further, the body is naturally changed by the imaginations of the soul; and so much more changed, the stronger the soul's imagination, as was said in the First Part (Q. CXVII., A. 3 *ad* 3). Now the soul of Christ had most perfect strength as regards both the imagination and the other powers. Therefore the soul of Christ was omnipotent with regard to His own body.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. ii. 17) that *it behoved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren,* and especially as regards what belongs to the condition of human nature. But it belongs to the condition of human

nature that the health of the body and its nourishment and growth are not subject to the bidding of reason or will, since natural things are subject to God alone Who is the author of nature. Therefore they were not subject in Christ. Therefore Christ's soul was not omnipotent with regard to His own body.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), Christ's soul may be viewed in two ways. First, in its proper nature and power; and in this way, as it was incapable of making exterior bodies swerve from the course and order of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its own body from its natural disposition, since the soul, of its own nature, has a determinate relation to its body. Secondly, Christ's soul may be viewed as an instrument united in person to God's Word; and thus every disposition of His own body was wholly subject to His power. Nevertheless, since the power of an action is not properly attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, this omnipotence is attributed to the Word of God rather than to Christ's soul.

Reply Obj. 1. This saying of Damascene refers to the Divine will of Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter (ch. 19, *cf.* 14, 15), *it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what was proper to it.*

Reply Obj. 2. It was no part of the original justice which Adam had in the state of innocence that a man's soul should have the power of changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it from any hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had wished. But since man has three states—viz., innocence, sin, and glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed comprehension, and from the state of innocence, freedom from sin—so also from the state of sin did He assume the necessity of being under the penalties of this life, as will be said (Q. XIV., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. If the imagination be strong, the body obeys naturally in some things—*e.g.,* as regards falling

from a beam set on high—since the imagination was formed to be a principle of local motion, as is said *De Anima* iii. 9, 10. So, too, as regards alteration in heat and cold, and their consequences; for the passions of the soul, wherewith the heart is moved, naturally follow the imagination, and thus by commotion of the spirits the whole body is altered. But the other corporeal dispositions which have no natural relation to the imagination are not transmuted by the imagination, however strong it is—*e.g.*, the shape of the hand, or foot, or such-like.

Fourth Article.

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence as regards the execution of His will?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will. For it is written (Mark vii. 24) that *entering into a house, He would that no man should know it, and He could not be hid.* Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things.

Obj. 2. Further, a command is a sign of will, as was said in the First Part (Q. XIX., A. 12). But our Lord commanded certain things to be done, and the contrary came to pass, for it is written (Matt. ix. 30, 31) that Jesus strictly charged them whose eyes had been opened, saying: *See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country.* Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in everything.

Obj. 3. Further, a man does not ask from another for what he can do himself. But our Lord besought the Father, praying for what He wished to be done, for it is written (Luke vi. 12): *He went out into a mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God.* Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test.*,

qu. 77): *It is impossible for the will of the Saviour not to be fulfilled: nor is it possible for Him to will what He knows ought not to come to pass.*

I answer that, Christ's soul willed things in two ways. First, what was to be brought about by Himself; and it must be said that He was capable of whatever He willed thus, since it would not befit His wisdom if He willed to do anything of Himself that was not subject to His will. Secondly, He wished things to be brought about by the Divine power, as the resurrection of His own body and such-like miraculous deeds, which He could not effect by His own power, except as the instrument of the Godhead, as was said above (A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*ibid., loc. cit.*): *What came to pass, this Christ must be said to have willed. For it must be remarked that this happened in the country of the Gentiles, to whom it was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been invidious not to welcome such as came spontaneously for the faith. Hence He did not wish to be heralded by His own, and yet He wished to be sought; and so it came to pass.* Or it may be said that this will of Christ was not with regard to what was to be carried out by it, but with regard to what was to be done by others, which did not come under His human will. Hence in the letter of Pope Agatho, which was approved in the Sixth Council,* we read: *When He, the Creator and Redeemer of all, wished to be hid and could not, must not this be referred only to His human will which He deigned to assume in time?*

Reply Obj. 2. As Gregory says (Moral. xix.), by the fact that *Our Lord charged His mighty works to be kept secret, He gave an example to His servants coming after Him that they should wish their miracles to be hidden; and yet, that others may profit by their example, they are made public against their will.* And thus this command signified His will to fly from human glory, according to John viii. 50, *I seek not My own glory.* Yet He wished

* Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4.

absolutely, and especially by His Divine will, that the miracle wrought should be published for the good of others.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ prayed both for things that were to be brought about by the Divine power, and for what He Himself was to do by His human will, since the power and operation of Christ's soul depended on God, *Who works in all* (Vulg., *you*), *both to will and to accomplish* (Phil. ii. 13).

QUESTION XIV.

OF THE DEFECTS OF BODY ASSUMED BY THE SON OF GOD.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider the defects Christ assumed in the human nature; and, first, of the defects of body; secondly, of the defects of soul.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Son of God should have assumed in human nature defects of body? (2) Whether He assumed the obligation of being subject to these defects? (3) Whether He contracted these defects? (4) Whether He assumed all these defects?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SON OF GOD IN HUMAN NATURE OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED DEFECTS OF BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Son of God ought not to have assumed human nature with defects of body. For as His soul is personally united to the Word of God, so also is His body. But the soul of Christ had every perfection, both of grace and truth, as was said above (Q. VII., A. 9, and Q. IX. *seqq.*). Hence, His body also ought to have been in every way perfect, not having any imperfection in it.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul of Christ saw the Word of God by the vision wherein the blessed see, as was said above (Q. IX., A. 2), and thus the soul of Christ was blessed. Now by the beatification of the soul the body is glorified; since, as Augustine says (*Ep. ad Dios.* cxviii.), *God made the soul of a nature so strong that from the fulness of its*

blessedness there pours over even into the lower nature (*i.e.*, the body), *not indeed the bliss proper to the beatific fruition and vision, but the fulness of health* (*i.e.*, the vigour of incorruptibility). Therefore the body of Christ was incorruptible and without any defect.

Obj. 3. Further, penalty is the consequence of fault. But there was no fault in Christ, according to 1 Pet. ii. 22: *Who did no guile.* Therefore defects of body, which are penalties, ought not to have been in Him.

Obj. 4. Further, no reasonable man assumes what keeps him from his proper end. But by such-like bodily defects, the end of the Incarnation seems to be hindered in many ways. First, because by these infirmities men were kept back from knowing Him, according to Isa. liii. 2, 3: [*There was no sightliness*] *that we should be desirous of Him. Despised and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity, and His look was, as it were, hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed Him not.* Secondly, because the desire of the Fathers would not seem to be fulfilled, in whose person it is written (Isa. li. 9): *Arise, arise, put on Thy strength, O Thou Arm of the Lord.* Thirdly, because it would seem more fitting for the devil's power to be overcome and man's weakness healed, by strength than by weakness. Therefore it does not seem to have been fitting that the Son of God assumed human nature with infirmities or defects of body.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. ii. 18): *For in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succour them also that are tempted.* Now He came to succour us; hence David said of Him (Ps. cxx. 1): *I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me.* Therefore it was fitting for the Son of God to assume flesh subject to human infirmities, in order to suffer and be tempted in it and so bring succour to us.

I answer that, It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to be subject to human infirmities and defects; and especially for three reasons. First, because it was in

order to satisfy for the sin of the human race that the Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the world. Now one satisfies for another's sin by taking on himself the punishment due to the sin of the other. But these bodily defects, to wit, death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are the punishment of sin, which was brought into the world by Adam, according to Rom. v. 12 : *By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.* Hence it was useful for the end of the Incarnation that He should assume these penalties in our flesh and in our stead, according to Isa. liii. 4, *Surely He hath borne our infirmities.* Secondly, in order to cause belief in the Incarnation. For since human nature is known to men only as it is subject to these defects, if the Son of God had assumed human nature without these defects, He would not have seemed to be true man, nor to have true, but imaginary, flesh, as the Manicheans held. And so, as is said, Phil. ii. 7 : *He . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.* Hence, Thomas, by the sight of His wounds, was recalled to the faith, as related John xx. 26. Thirdly, in order to show us an example of patience by valiantly bearing up against human passibility and defects. Hence it is said (Heb. xii. 3) that He *endured such opposition from sinners against Himself, that you be not wearied, fainting in your minds.*

Reply Obj. 1. The penalties one suffers for another's sin are the matter, as it were, of the satisfaction for that sin; but the principle is the habit of soul, whereby one is inclined to wish to satisfy for another, and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy, for satisfaction would not be efficacious unless it proceeded from charity, as will be explained (Suppl. Q. XIV., A. 2). Hence, it behoved the soul of Christ to be perfect as regards the habit of knowledge and virtue, in order to have the power of satisfying; but His body was subject to infirmities, that the matter of satisfaction should not be wanting.

Reply Obj. 2. From the natural relationship which is between the soul and the body, glory flows into the body

from the soul's glory. Yet this natural relationship in Christ was subject to the will of His Godhead, and thereby it came to pass that the beatitude remained in the soul, and did not flow into the body; but the flesh suffered what belongs to a passible nature; thus Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 15) that, *it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it.*

Reply Obj. 3. Punishment always follows sin actual or original, sometimes of the one punished, sometimes of the one for whom he who suffers the punishment satisfies. And so it was with Christ, according to Isa. liii. 5: *He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins.*

Reply Obj. 4. The infirmity assumed by Christ did not impede, but greatly furthered the end of the Incarnation, as above stated. And although these infirmities concealed His Godhead, they made known His Manhood, which is the way of coming to the Godhead, according to Rom. v. 1, 2: *By Jesus Christ we have access to God.* Moreover, the ancient Fathers did not desire bodily strength in Christ, but spiritual strength, wherewith He vanquished the devil and healed human weakness.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST WAS OF NECESSITY SUBJECT TO THESE DEFECTS.

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not of necessity subject to these defects. For it is written (Isa. liii. 7): *He was offered because it was His own will;* and the prophet is speaking of the offering of the Passion. But will is opposed to necessity. Therefore Christ was not of necessity subject to bodily defects.

Obj. 2. Further, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 20): *Nothing obligatory is seen in Christ: all is*

voluntary. Now what is voluntary is not necessary. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, necessity is induced by something more powerful. But no creature is more powerful than the soul of Christ, to which it pertained to preserve its own body. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. viii. 3) that *God* sent *His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh*. Now it is a condition of sinful flesh to be under the necessity of dying, and suffering other like passions. Therefore the necessity of suffering these defects was in Christ's flesh.

I answer that, Necessity is twofold. One is a necessity of *constraint*, brought about by an external agent; and this necessity is contrary to both nature and will, since these flow from an internal principle. The other is *natural* necessity, resulting from the natural principles—either the form (as it is necessary for fire to heat), or the matter (as it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be dissolved). Hence, with this necessity, which results from the matter, Christ's body was subject to the necessity of death and other like defects, since, as was said (A. 1 *ad* 2), *it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to do and suffer what belonged to it*. And this necessity results from the principles of human nature, as was said above in this article. But if we speak of necessity of constraint, as repugnant to the bodily nature, thus again was Christ's body in its own natural condition subject to necessity in regard to the nail that pierced and the scourge that struck. Yet inasmuch as such necessity is repugnant to the will, it is clear that in Christ these defects were not of necessity as regards either the Divine will, or the human will of Christ considered absolutely, as following the deliberation of reason; but only as regards the natural movement of the will, inasmuch as it naturally shrinks from death and bodily hurt.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ is said to be *offered because it was His own will—i.e.*, Divine will and deliberate human will;

although death was contrary to the natural movement of His human will, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 23, 24).

Reply Obj. 2. This is plain from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing was more powerful than Christ's soul, absolutely; yet there was nothing to hinder a thing being more powerful in regard to this or that effect, as a nail for piercing. And this I say, in so far as Christ's soul is considered in its own proper nature and power.

Third Article.

whether christ contracted these defects.

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ contracted bodily defects. For we are said to contract what we derive with our nature from birth. But Christ, together with human nature, derived His bodily defects and infirmities through His birth from His mother, whose flesh was subject to these defects. Therefore it seems that He contracted these defects.

Obj. 2. Further, what is caused by the principles of nature is derived together with nature, and hence is contracted. Now these penalties are caused by the principles of human nature. Therefore Christ contracted them.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ is likened to other men in these defects, as is written Heb. ii. 17. But other men contract these defects. Therefore it seems that Christ contracted these defects.

On the contrary, These defects are contracted through sin, according to Rom. v. 12: *By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin, death.* Now sin had no place in Christ. Therefore Christ did not contract these defects.

I answer that, In the verb *to contract* is understood the relation of effect to cause—*i.e.*, that is said to be contracted which is derived of necessity together with its cause. Now the cause of death and such-like defects in

human nature is sin, since *by sin death entered into this world,* according to Rom. v. 12. And hence they who incur these defects, as due to sin, are properly said to contract them. Now Christ had not these defects, as due to sin, since, as Augustine,* expounding John iii. 31, *He that cometh from above, is above all,* says: *Christ came from above—i.e., from the height of human nature, which it had before the fall of the first man.* For He received human nature without sin, in the purity which it had in the state of innocence. In the same way He might have assumed human nature without defects. Thus it is clear that Christ did not contract these defects as if taking them upon Himself as due to sin, but by His own will.

Reply Obj. 1. The flesh of the Virgin was conceived in original sin,† and therefore contracted these defects. But from the Virgin, Christ's flesh assumed the nature without sin, and He might likewise have assumed the nature without its penalties. But He wished to bear its penalties in order to carry out the work of our redemption, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore He had these defects—not that He contracted them, but that He assumed them.

Reply Obj. 2. The cause of death and other corporeal defects of human nature is twofold: the first is remote, and results from the material principles of the human body, inasmuch as it is made up of contraries. But this cause was held in check by original justice. Hence the proximate cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby original justice is withdrawn. And thus, because Christ was without sin, He is said not to have contracted these defects, but to have assumed them.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ was made like to other men in the quality and not in the cause of these defects; and hence, unlike others, He did not contract them.

* Alcuin in the Gloss. Ord.

† See introductory note to Q. XXVII.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED ALL THE BODILY DEFECTS OF MEN?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 6, 18): *What is unassumable is incurable.* But Christ came to cure all our defects. Therefore He ought to have assumed all our defects.

Obj. 2. Further, it was said (A. 1), that in order to satisfy for us, Christ ought to have had perfective habits of soul and defects of body. Now as regards the soul, He assumed the fulness of all grace. Therefore as regards the body, He ought to have assumed all defects.

Obj. 3. Further, amongst all bodily defects death holds the chief place. Now Christ assumed death. Much more, therefore, ought He to have assumed other defects.

On the contrary, Contraries cannot take place simultaneously in the same. Now some infirmities are contrary to each other, being caused by contrary principles. Hence it could not be that Christ assumed all human infirmities.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1 and 2), Christ assumed human defects in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature, and for this it was necessary for Him to have the fulness of knowledge and grace in His soul. Hence Christ ought to have assumed those defects which flow from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are not incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace. And thus it was not fitting for Him to assume all human defects or infirmities. For there are some defects that are incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace, as ignorance, a proneness towards evil, and a difficulty in well-doing. Some other defects do not flow from the whole of human nature in common on account of the sin of our first parent, but are caused in some men by certain particular causes, as leprosy, epilepsy, and the like; and these

defects are sometimes brought about by the fault of the man—*e.g.*, from inordinate eating; sometimes by a defect in the formative power. Now neither of these pertains to Christ, since His flesh was conceived of the Holy Ghost, Who has infinite wisdom and power, and cannot err or fail; and He Himself did nothing wrong in the order of His life. But there are some third defects, to be found amongst all men in common, by reason of the sin of our first parent, as death, hunger, thirst, and the like; and all these defects Christ assumed, which Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* i. 11; iii. 20) calls *natural and indetractible passions*—natural, as following all human nature in common; indetractible, as implying no defect of knowledge or grace.

Reply Obj. 1. All particular defects of men are caused by the corruptibility and passibility of the body, some particular causes being added; and hence, since Christ healed the passibility and corruptibility of our body by assuming it, He consequently healed all other defects.

Reply Obj. 2. The fulness of all grace and knowledge was due to Christ's soul of itself, from the fact of its being assumed by the Word of God; and hence Christ assumed all the fulness of knowledge and wisdom absolutely. But He assumed our defects economically, in order to satisfy for our sin, and not that they belonged to Him of Himself. Hence it was not necessary for Him to assume them all, but only such as sufficed to satisfy for the sin of the whole nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Death comes to all men from the sin of our first parent; but not other defects, although they are less than death. Hence there is no parity.

QUESTION XV.

OF THE DEFECTS OF SOUL ASSUMED BY CHRIST.

(In Ten Articles.)

WE must now consider the defects pertaining to the soul; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether there was sin in Christ? (2) Whether there was the *fomes* of sin in Him? (3) Whether there was ignorance? (4) Whether His soul was passible? (5) Whether in Him there was sensible pain? (6) Whether there was sorrow? (7) Whether there was fear? (8) Whether there was wonder? (9) Whether there was anger? (10) Whether He was at once wayfarer and comprehensor?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS SIN IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was sin in Christ. For it is written (Ps. xxi. 2): *O God, My God, . . . why hast Thou forsaken Me? Far from My salvation are the words of My sins.* Now these words are said in the person of Christ Himself, as appears from His having uttered them on the cross. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were sins.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. v. 12) that *in Adam all have sinned*—namely, because all were in Adam by origin. Now Christ also was in Adam by origin. Therefore He sinned in him.

Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle says (Heb. ii. 18) that *in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succour them also that are tempted.* Now

above all do we require His help against sin. Therefore it seems that there was sin in Him.

Obj. 4. Further, it is written (2 Cor. v. 21) that *Him that knew no sin* (*i.e.*, Christ), *for us* God *hath made sin.* But that really is, which has been made by God. Therefore there was really sin in Christ.

Obj. 5. Further, as Augustine says (*De Agone Christ.* xi.), *in the man Christ the Son of God gave Himself to us as a pattern of living.* Now man needs a pattern not merely of right living, but also of repentance for sin. Therefore it seems that in Christ there ought to have been sin, that He might repent of His sin, and thus afford us a pattern of repentance.

On the contrary, He Himself says (Jo. viii. 46): *Which of you shall convince Me of sin?*

I answer that, As was said above (Q. XIV., A. 1), Christ assumed our defects that He might satisfy for us, that He might prove the truth of His human nature, and that He might become an example of virtue to us. Now it is plain that by reason of these three things He ought not to have assumed the defect of sin. First, because sin nowise works our satisfaction; rather, it impedes the power of satisfying, since, as it is written (Ecclus. xxxiv. 23), *The Most High approveth not the gifts of the wicked.* Secondly, the truth of His human nature is not proved by sin, since sin does not belong to human nature, whereof God is the cause; but rather has been sown in it against its nature by the devil, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 20). Thirdly, because by sinning He could afford no example of virtue, since sin is opposed to virtue. Hence Christ nowise assumed the defect of sin—either original or actual—according to what is written (1 Pet. ii. 22): *Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth.*

Reply Obj. 1. As Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 25), things are said of Christ, first, with reference to His natural and hypostatic property, as when it is said that God became man, and that He suffered for us; secondly, with reference to His personal and relative

property, when things are said of Him in our person which nowise belong to Him of Himself. Hence, in the seven rules of Tichonius which Augustine quotes in *De Doctr. Christ.* iii. 31, the first regards *Our Lord and His Body,* since *Christ and His Church are taken as one person.* And thus Christ, speaking in the person of His members, says (Ps. xxi. 2): *The words of My sins*—not that there were any sins in the Head.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* x. 20), Christ was in Adam and the other fathers not altogether as we were. For we were in Adam as regards both seminal virtue and bodily substance, since, as he goes on to say: *As in the seed there is a visible bulk and an invisible virtue, both have come from Adam. Now Christ took the visible substance of His flesh from the Virgin's flesh; but the virtue of His conception did not spring from the seed of man, but far otherwise—from on high.* Hence He was not in Adam according to seminal virtue, but only according to bodily substance. And therefore Christ did not receive human nature from Adam actively, but only materially—and from the Holy Ghost actively; even as Adam received his body materially from the slime of the earth—actively from God. And thus Christ did not sin in Adam, in whom He was only as regards His matter.

Reply Obj. 3. In His temptation and passion Christ has succoured us by satisfying for us. Now sin does not further satisfaction, but hinders it, as has been said. Hence, it behoved Him not to have sin, but to be wholly free from sin; otherwise the punishment He bore would have been due to Him for His own sin.

Reply Obj. 4. God *made Christ sin,*—not, indeed, in such sort that He had sin, but that He made Him a sacrifice for sin: even as it is written (Osee iv. 8): *They shall eat the sins of My people*—they—*i.e.,* the priests, who by the law ate the sacrifices offered for sin. And in that way it is written (Isa. liii. 6) that *the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all* (*i.e.,* He gave Him up to be a victim for the sins of all men); or *He made Him sin* (*i.e.,*

made Him to have *the likeness of sinful flesh*), as is written (Rom. viii. 3), and this on account of the passible and mortal body He assumed.

Reply Obj. 5. A penitent can give a praiseworthy example, not by having sinned, but by freely bearing the punishment of sin. And hence Christ set the highest example to penitents, since He willingly bore the punishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS THE 'FOMES' OF SIN IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was the *fomes* of sin. For the *fomes* of sin, and the passibility and mortality of the body spring from the same principle, to wit, from the withdrawal of original justice, whereby the inferior powers of the soul were subject to the reason, and the body to the soul. Now passibility and mortality of body were in Christ. Therefore there was also the *fomes* of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 19), *it was by consent of the Divine will that the flesh of Christ was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it.* But it is proper to the flesh to lust after its pleasures. Now since the *fomes* of sin is nothing more than concupiscence, as the gloss says on Rom. vii. 8, it seems that in Christ there was the *fomes* of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, it is by reason of the *fomes* of sin that *the flesh lusteth against the spirit,* as is written (Gal. v. 17). But the spirit is shown to be so much the stronger and worthier to be crowned according as the more completely it overcomes its enemy—to wit, the concupiscence of the flesh, according to 2 Tim. ii. 5, he *is not crowned except he strive lawfully.* Now Christ had a most valiant and conquering spirit, and one most worthy of a crown, according to Apoc. vi. 2: *There was a crown given Him, and He*

went forth conquering that He might conquer. Therefore it would especially seem that the *fomes* of sin ought to have been in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Matt. i. 20): *That which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.* Now the Holy Ghost drives out sin and the inclination to sin, which is implied in the word *fomes.* Therefore in Christ there ought not to have been the *fomes* of sin.

I answer that, As was said above (Q. VII., AA. 2, 9), Christ had grace and all the virtues most perfectly. Now moral virtues, which are in the irrational part of the soul, make it subject to reason, and so much the more as the virtue is more perfect; thus, temperance controls the concupiscible appetite, fortitude and meekness the irascible appetite, as was said in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. LVI., A. 4). But there belongs to the very nature of the *fomes* of sin an inclination of the sensual appetite to what is contrary to reason. And hence it is plain that the more perfect the virtues are in any man, the weaker the *fomes* of sin becomes in him. Hence, since in Christ the virtues were in their highest degree, the *fomes* of sin was nowise in Him; inasmuch, also, as this defect cannot be ordained to satisfaction, but rather inclined to what is contrary to satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 1. The inferior powers pertaining to the sensitive appetite have a natural capacity to be obedient to reason; but not the bodily powers, nor those of the bodily humours, nor those of the vegetative soul, as is made plain *Ethic* i. 13. And hence perfection of virtue, which is in accordance with right reason, does not exclude passibility of body; yet it excludes the *fomes* of sin, the nature of which consists in the resistance of the sensitive appetite to reason.

Reply Obj. 2. The flesh naturally seeks what is pleasing to it by the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite; but the flesh of man, who is a rational animal, seeks this after the manner and order of reason. And thus with the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite Christ's flesh naturally

sought food, drink, and sleep, and all else that is sought in right reason, as is plain from Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 14). Yet it does not therefore follow that in Christ there was the *fomes* of sin, for this implies the lust after pleasurable things against the order of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. The spirit gives evidence of fortitude to some extent by resisting that concupiscence of the flesh which is opposed to it; yet a greater fortitude of spirit is shown, if by its strength the flesh is thoroughly overcome, so as to be incapable of lusting against the spirit. And hence this belonged to Christ, whose spirit reached the highest degree of fortitude. And although He suffered no internal assault on the part of the *fomes* of sin, He sustained an external assault on the part of the world and the devil, and won the crown of victory by overcoming them.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS IGNORANCE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was ignorance in Christ. For that is truly in Christ which belongs to Him in His human nature, although it does not belong to Him in His Divine Nature, as suffering and death. But ignorance belongs to Christ in His human nature; for Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 21) that *He assumed an ignorant and enslaved nature.* Therefore ignorance was truly in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, one is said to be ignorant through defect of knowledge. Now some kind of knowledge was wanting to Christ, for the Apostle says (2 Cor. v. 21) *Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made sin.* Therefore there was ignorance in Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Isa. viii. 4): *For before the child know to call his father and his mother, the strength of Damascus . . . shall be taken away.* Therefore in Christ there was ignorance of certain things.

On the contrary, Ignorance is not taken away by ignorance. But Christ came to take away our ignorance; for *He came to enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death* (Luke i. 79). Therefore there was no ignorance in Christ.

I answer that, As there was the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ, so too there was the fulness of all knowledge, as is plain from what has been said above (Q. VII., A. 9; Q. IX.). Now as the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ excluded the *fomes* of sin, so the fulness of knowledge excluded ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge. Hence, even as the *fomes* of sin was not in Christ, neither was there ignorance in Him.

Reply Obj. 1. The nature assumed by Christ may be viewed in two ways. First, in its specific nature, and thus Damascene calls it *ignorant and enslaved;* hence he adds: *For man's nature is a slave of Him* (*i.e.,* God) *Who made it; and it has no knowledge of future things.* Secondly, it may be considered with regard to what it has from its union with the Divine hypostasis, from which it has the fulness of knowledge and grace, according to John i. 14: *We saw Him* (Vulg., *His glory*) *as it were the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth;* and in this way the human nature in Christ was not affected with ignorance.

Reply Obj. 2. Christ is said not to have known sin, because He did not know it by experience; but He knew it by simple cognition.

Reply Obj 3. The prophet is speaking in this passage of the human knowledge of Christ; thus he says: *Before the Child* (*i.e.,* in His human nature) *know to call His father* (*i.e.,* Joseph, who was His reputed father), *and His mother* (*i.e.,* Mary), *the strength of Damascus . . . shall be taken away.* Nor are we to understand this as if He had been some time a man witnout knowing it; but *before He know* (*i.e.,* before He is a man having human knowledge),—literally, *the strength of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria shall be taken away* by the King of the Assyrians —or spiritually, *before His birth He will save His people*

solely by invocation, as a gloss expounds it. Augustine however (*Serm.* xxxii. *de Temp.*) says that this was fulfilled in the adoration of the Magi. For he says: *Before He uttered human words in human flesh, He received the strength of Damascus, i.e., the riches which Damascus vaunted (for in riches the first place is given to gold). They themselves were the spoils of Samaria. Because Samaria is taken to signify idolatry; since this people, having turned away from the Lord, turned to the worship of idols. Hence these were the first spoils which the child took from the domination of idolatry.* And in this way *before the child know* may be taken to mean *before he show himself to know.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST'S SOUL WAS PASSIBLE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul of Christ was not passible. For nothing suffers except by reason of something stronger; since *the agent is greater than the patient,* as is clear from Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* xii. 16), and from the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii. 5). Now no creature was stronger than Christ's soul. Therefore Christ's soul could not suffer at the hands of any creature; and hence it was not passible; for its capability of suffering would have been to no purpose if it could not have suffered at the hands of anything.

Obj. 2. Further, Tully (*De Tusc. Quæs.* iii.) says that the soul's passions are ailments.* But Christ's soul had no ailment; for the soul's ailment results from sin, as is plain from Ps. xl. 5: *Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee.* Therefore in Christ's soul there were no passions.

Obj. 3. Further, the soul's passions would seem to be the same as the *fomes* of sin, hence the Apostle (Rom. vii. 5)

* *Cf.* I.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 2.

calls them the *passions of sins*. Now the *fomes* of sin was not in Christ, as was said A. 2. Therefore it seems that there were no passions in His soul; and hence His soul was not passible.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lxxxvii. 4) in the person of Christ: *My soul is filled with evils*—not sins, indeed, but human evils—*i.e., pains,* as a gloss expounds it. Hence the soul of Christ was passible.

I answer that, A soul placed in a body may suffer in two ways: first with a bodily passion; secondly, with an animal passion. It suffers with a bodily passion through bodily hurt; for since the soul is the form of the body, soul and body have but one being; and hence, when the body is disturbed by any bodily passion, the soul, too, must be disturbed—*i.e.,* in the being which it has in the body. Therefore, since Christ's body was passible and mortal, as was said above (Q. XIV., A. 2), His soul also was of necessity passible in like manner. But the soul suffers with an animal passion, in its operations,—either in such as are proper to the soul, or in such as are of the soul more than of the body. And although the soul is said to suffer in this way through sensation and intelligence, as was said in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. XXII., A. 3; Q. XLI., A. 1); nevertheless the affections of the sensitive appetite are most properly called passions of the soul. Now these were in Christ, even as all else pertaining to man's nature. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 9): *Our Lord having deigned to live in the form of a servant, took these upon Himself whenever He judged they ought to be assumed; for there was no false human affection in Him Who had a true body and a true human soul.*

Nevertheless we must know that these passions were in Christ otherwise than in us, in three ways. First, as regards the object, since in us these passions very often tend towards what is unlawful, but not so in Christ. Secondly, as regards the principle, since these passions in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all movements of the sensitive appetite sprang from

the disposition of the reason. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv., *loc. cit.*), that *Christ assumed these movements, in His human soul, by an unfailing dispensation, when He willed; even as He became man when He willed.* Thirdly, as regards the effect, because in us these movements, at times, do not remain in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason; but not so in Christ, since by His disposition the movements that are naturally becoming to human flesh so remained in the sensitive appetite that the reason was nowise hindered in doing what was right. Hence Jerome says (on Matt. xxvi. 37) that *Our Lord, in order to prove the reality of the assumed manhood, 'was sorrowful' in very deed; yet lest a passion should hold sway over His soul, it is by a propassion that He is said to have 'begun to grow sorrowful and to be sad';* so that it is a perfect *passion* when it dominates the soul—*i.e.*, the reason; and a *propassion* when it has its beginning in the sensitive appetite, but goes no further.

Reply Obj. 1. The soul of Christ could have prevented these passions from coming upon it, and especially by the Divine power; yet of His own will He subjected Himself to these corporeal and animal passions.

Reply Obj. 2. Tully is speaking there according to the opinions of the Stoics, who did not give the name of passions to all, but only to the disorderly movements of the sensitive appetite. Now, it is manifest that passions like these were not in Christ.

Reply Obj. 3. The *passions of sins* are movements of the sensitive appetite that tend to unlawful things; and these were not in Christ, as neither was the *fomes* of sin.

Fifth Article.

Whether there was sensible pain in Christ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was no true sensible pain in Christ. For Hilary says (*De Trin.* x.): *Since with Christ to die was life, what pain may He be*

supposed to have suffered in the mystery of His death, Who bestows life on such as die for Him? And further on he says: *The Only-begotten assumed human nature, not ceasing to be God; and although blows struck Him and wounds were inflicted on Him, and scourges fell upon Him, and the cross lifted Him up, yet these wrought in deed the vehemence of the passion, but brought no pain; as a dart piercing the water.* Hence there was no true pain in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, it would seem to be proper to flesh conceived in original sin, to be subject to the necessity of pain. But the flesh of Christ was not conceived in sin, but of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin's womb. Therefore it lay under no necessity of suffering pain.

Obj. 3. Further, the delight of the contemplation of Divine things dulls the sense of pain; hence the martyrs in their passions bore up more bravely by thinking of the Divine love. But Christ's soul was in the perfect enjoyment of contemplating God, Whom He saw in essence, as was said above (Q. IX., A. 2). Therefore He could feel no pain.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. liii. 4): *Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows.*

I answer that, As is plain from what has been said in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. XXXV., A. 7), for true bodily pain are required bodily hurt and the sense of hurt. Now Christ's body was able to be hurt, since it was passible and mortal, as above stated (Q. XIV., AA. 1, 2); neither was the sense of hurt wanting to it, since Christ's soul possessed perfectly all natural powers. Therefore no one should doubt but that in Christ there was true pain.

Reply Obj. 1. In all these and similar words, Hilary does not intend to exclude the reality of the pain, but the necessity of it. Hence after the foregoing he adds: *Nor, when He thirsted, or hungered, or wept, was the Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to prove the reality of the body, the body's customs were assumed, so that the custom of our body was atoned for by the custom of our*

nature. Or when He took drink or food, He acceded, not to the body's necessity, but to its custom. And he uses the word *necessity* in reference to the first cause of these defects, which is sin, as above stated (Q. XIV., AA. 1, 3), so that Christ's flesh is said not to have lain under the necessity of these defects, in the sense that there was no sin in it. Hence he adds: *For He* (*i.e.*, Christ) *had a body—one proper to His origin, which did not exist through the unholiness of our conception, but subsisted in the form of our body by the strength of His power.* But as regards the proximate cause of these defects, which is composition of contraries, the flesh of Christ lay under the necessity of these defects, as was said above (Q. XIV., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. Flesh conceived in sin is subject to pain, not merely on account of the necessity of its natural principles, but from the necessity of the guilt of sin. Now this necessity was not in Christ; but only the necessity of natural principles.

Reply Obj. 3. As was said above (Q. XIV., A. 1 *ad* 2), by the power of the Godhead of Christ the beatitude was economically kept in the soul, so as not to overflow into the body, lest His passibility and mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight of contemplation was so kept in the mind as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should thereby be prevented.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS SORROW IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow. For it is written of Christ (Isa. xlii. 4): *He shall not be sad nor troublesome.*

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Prov. xii. 21): *Whatever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad.* And the reason of this the Stoics asserted to be that no one is

saddened save by the loss of his goods. Now the just man esteems only justice and virtue as his goods, and these he cannot lose; otherwise the just man would be subject to fortune if he was saddened by the loss of the goods fortune has given him. But Christ was most just, according to Jer. xxiii. 6: *This is the name that they shall call Him: The Lord, our just one.* Therefore there was no sorrow in Him.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 13, 14) that all sorrow is *evil, and to be shunned.* But in Christ there was no evil to be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow in Christ.

Obj. 4. Furthermore, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 6): *Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwillingly.* But Christ suffered nothing against His will, for it is written (Isa. liii. 7): *He was offered because it was His own will.* Hence there was no sorrow in Christ.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matt. xxvi. 38): *My soul is sorrowful even unto death.* And Ambrose says (*De Trin.* ii.) that *as a man He had sorrow; for He bore my sorrow. I call it sorrow, fearlessly, since I preach the cross.*

I answer that, As was said above (A. 5 *ad* 3), by Divine dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in Christ's mind so as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby shut out sensible pain. Now even as sensible pain is in the sensitive appetite, so also is sorrow. But there is a difference of motive or object; for the object and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the sense of touch, as when anyone is wounded; but the object and motive of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly, apprehended by the reason or the imagination, as was said in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. XXXV., AA. 2, 7), as when anyone grieves over the loss of grace or money. Now Christ's soul could apprehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as His passion and death,—or to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the Jews that killed Him. And hence, as there could be true pain in Christ, so too could there be true sorrow;

otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three ways above stated (A. 4), when we were speaking of the passions of Christ's soul in general.

Reply Obj. 1. Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect passion; yet it was inchoatively in Him as a *propassion.* Hence it is written (Matt. xxvi. 37): *He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad.* For *it is one thing to be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful,* as Jerome says, on this text.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 8), *for the three passions*—desire, joy, and fear—the Stoics held three εὐπαθείας—*i.e.*, good passions—in the soul of the wise man—viz., for desire, will—for joy, delight—for fear, caution. But as regards sorrow, they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could befall a wise man; and for this reason, because they believed that only the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing is evil, except what is sinful, whereby men become wicked. Now although what is virtuous is man's chief good, and what is sinful is man's chief evil, since these pertain to reason which is supreme in man, yet there are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to the exterior things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of the wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by his apprehending these evils; without this sorrow disturbing the reason. And in this way are we to understand that *whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad,* because his reason is troubled by no misfortune. And thus Christ's sorrow was a propassion, and not a passion.

Reply Obj. 3. All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 9): *Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and where needed, who will dare to call them diseases or vicious passions?*

Reply Obj. 4. There is no reason why a thing may not of itself be contrary to the will, and yet be willed by reason

of the end, to which it is ordained, as bitter medicine is not of itself desired, but only as it is ordained to health. And thus Christ's death and passion were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they were voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the redemption of the human race.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS FEAR IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was no fear in Christ. For it is written (Prov. xxviii. 1): *The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread.* But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, Hilary says (*De Trin.* x.): *I ask those who think thus, does it stand to reason that He should dread to die, Who by expelling all dread of death from the Apostles, encouraged them to the glory of martyrdom?* Therefore it is unreasonable that there should be fear in Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot avoid. Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which He endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Mark xiv. 33): Jesus *began to fear and to be heavy.*

I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the apprehension of a present evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil. Now the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says (*Rhet.* ii. 5) that we do not fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For when there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence fear may be considered in two ways. First, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite naturally shrinks from bodily hurt, by sorrow if it is present, and by fear if it is future; and thus fear was in

Christ, even as sorrow. Secondly, fear may be considered in the uncertainty of the future event, as when at night we are frightened at a sound, not knowing what it is; and in this way there was no fear in Christ, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 23).

Reply Obj. 1. The just man is said to be *without dread,* in so far as dread implies a perfect passion drawing man from what reason dictates. And thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion. Hence it is said (Mark xiv. 33) that Jesus *began to fear and to be heavy,* with a propassion, as Jerome expounds (Matt. xxvi. 37).

Reply Obj. 2. Hilary excludes fear from Christ in the same way that he excludes sorrow—*i.e.,* as regards the necessity of fearing. And yet to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed fear, even as sorrow.

Reply Obj. 3. Although Christ could have avoided future evils by the power of His Godhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily avoidable by the weakness of the flesh.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS WONDER IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. For the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* i. 2) that wonder results when we see an effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the ignorant. Now there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said A. 3. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 15) that *wonder is fear springing from the imagination of something great;* and hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3) that the *magnanimous man does not wonder.* But Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, no man wonders at what he himself

can do. Now Christ could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He wondered at nothing.

On the contrary, It is written (Matt. viii. 10): *Jesus hearing this—i.e.,* the words of the centurion—*marvelled.*

I answer that, Wonder properly regards what is new and unwonted. Now there could be nothing new and unwonted as regards Christ's Divine knowledge, whereby He saw things in the Word; nor as regards the human knowledge, whereby He saw things by infused species. Yet things could be new and unwonted with regard to His empiric knowledge, in regard to which new things could occur to Him day by day. Hence, if we speak of Christ with respect to His Divine knowledge, and His beatific and even His infused knowledge, there was no wonder in Christ. But if we speak of Him with respect to empiric knowledge, wonder could be in Him; and He assumed this affection for our instruction—*i.e.,* in order to teach us to wonder at what He Himself wondered at. Hence Augustine says (*Super Gen. cont. Manich.* i. 8): *Our Lord wondered in order to show us that we, who still need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these emotions are not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master teaching.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although Christ was ignorant of nothing, yet new things might occur to His empiric knowledge, and thus wonder would be caused.

Reply Obj. 2. Christ did not marvel at the Centurion's faith as if it was great with respect to Himself, but because it was great with respect to others.

Reply Obj. 3. He could do all things by the Divine power, for with respect to this there was no wonder in Him, but only with respect to His human empiric knowledge, as was said above.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS ANGER IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was no anger in Christ. For it is written (Jas. i. 20): *The anger of man worketh not the justice of God.* Now whatever was in Christ pertained to the justice of God, since of Him it is written (1 Cor. i. 30): *For He* (Vulg., *Who*) *of God is made unto us . . . justice.* Therefore it seems that there was no anger in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, anger is opposed to meekness, as is plain from *Ethic.* iv. 5. But Christ was most meek. Therefore there was no anger in Him.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* v. 45) that *anger that comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal disturbs it.* Now the mind's eye in Christ was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor zealous anger.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. ii. 17) that the words of Ps. lxviii. 10, *the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up,* were fulfilled in Him.

I answer that, As was said in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. XLVI., A. 3 *ad* 3, and II.-II., Q. CLVIII., A. 2 *ad* 3), anger is an effect of sorrow. For when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there arises within him a desire of the sensitive appetite to repel this injury brought upon himself or others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of revenge. Now it was said (A. 6) that sorrow could be in Christ. As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with sin—*i.e.*, when anyone seeks revenge beyond the order of reason: and in this way anger could not be in Christ, for this kind of anger is sinful. Sometimes, however, this desire is without sin—nay, is praiseworthy—*e.g.*, when anyone seeks revenge according to justice, and this is zealous anger. For Augustine says (on Jo. ii. 17) that *he is eaten up by zeal for the house of God, who seeks to*

better whatever He sees to be evil in it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs. Such was the anger that was in Christ.

Reply Obj. 1. As Gregory says (*Moral.* v.), anger is in man in two ways,—sometimes it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate, and in this way it is properly said to work, for operations are attributed to the principal agent. It is in this way that we must understand that *the anger of man worketh not the justice of God.* Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed to anger but to reason.

Reply Obj. 2. It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of reason that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is controlled and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness holds the mean in anger.

Reply Obj. 3. In us the natural order is that the soul's powers mutually impede each other—*i.e.*, if the operation of one power is intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason why any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason, dims the mind's eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ, by control of the Divine power, *every faculty was allowed to do what was proper to it,* and one power was not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the inferior part nowise impeded the act of reason.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST WAS AT ONCE A WAYFARER AND A COMPREHENSOR?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end. Now to be

moving towards the end and to be resting in the end cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once wayfarer and comprehensor.

Obj. 2. Further, to tend to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not pertain to man's body, but to his soul; hence Augustine says (*Ep. ad Dios.* cxviii.) that *upon the inferior nature, which is the body, there overflows, not indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as enjoy and understand, the fulness of health, i.e., the vigour of incorruption.* Now although Christ had a passible body, He fully enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor.

Obj. 3. Further, the Saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude in their souls, although their bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that Christ was a pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind enjoyed God although His body was mortal.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. xiv. 8): *Why wilt Thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge?*

I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beatitude, and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude, according to 1 Cor. ix. 24: *So run that you may comprehend* (Douay, *obtain*); and Phil. iii. 12: *I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend* (Douay, *obtain*). Now man's perfect beatitude consists in both soul and body, as stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. IV., A. 6). In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys God;—in the body, inasmuch as the body *will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption,* as is written 1 Cor. xv. 42. Now before His passion Christ's mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude as far as it regards what is proper to the soul; but beatitude was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear from the above (A. 4; Q. XIV., AA. 1, 2). Hence He was

at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the beatitude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch as He was tending to beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His beatitude.

Reply Obj. 1. It is impossible to be moving towards the end and resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against this under a different respect—as when a man is at once acquainted with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he does not know.

Reply Obj. 2. Beatitude principally and properly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beatitude; thus the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 8), that exterior goods minister *organically* to beatitude.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no parity between the soul of a saint and of Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are not passible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do nothing by which they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily sufferings tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body.

QUESTION XVI.

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO CHRIST IN HIS BEING AND BECOMING.

(In Twelve Articles.)

We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation with His Father; thirdly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to us.

Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether this is true; *God is man?* (2) Whether this is true; *Man is God?* (3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man? (4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son of God, and conversely? (5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature? (6) Whether this is true; *The Son of God was made man?* (7) Whether this is true; *Man became God?* (8) Whether this is true; *Christ is a creature?* (9) Whether this is true; *This man*, pointing out Christ, *began to be?* or *always was?* (10) Whether this is true; *Christ as man is a creature?* (11) Whether this is true; *Christ as man is God?* (12) Whether this is true; *Christ as man is a hypostasis or person?*

First Article.

Whether this is true; 'God is man'?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this is false; *God is man.* For every affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this proposition, *God is man,* is on remote matter, since the forms signified by the subject and predicate are most widely apart. Therefore, since the aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would seem to be false.

Obj. 2. Further, the three Divine Persons are in greater mutual agreement than the human nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another; for we do not say that the Father is the Son, or conversely. Therefore it seems that the human nature ought not to be predicated of God by saying that God is man.

Obj. 3. Further, Athanasius says (*Symb. Fid.*) that, *as the soul and the flesh are one man, so are God and man one Christ.* But this is false; *The soul is the body.* Therefore this also is false; *God is man.*

Obj. 4. Further, it was said in the First Part (Q. XXXIX., A. 4) that what is predicated of God not relatively but absolutely, belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the Persons. But this word *man* is not relative, but absolute. Hence, if it is predicated of God, it would follow that the whole Trinity and each of the Persons is man; and this is clearly false.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. ii. 6, 7): *Who being in the form of God, . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of man, and in habit found as a man;* and thus He Who is in the form of God is man. Now He Who is in the form of God is God. Therefore God is man.

I answer that, This proposition, *God is man,* is admitted by all Christians, yet not in the same way by all. For some admit the proposition, but not in the proper accepta-

tion of the terms. Thus the Manicheans say the Word of God is man, not indeed true, but fictitious man, inasmuch as they say that the Son of God assumed an imaginary body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure is called man if it has the figure of a man. So, too, those who held that Christ's body and soul were not united, could not say that God is true man, but that He is figuratively called man by reason of the parts. Now both these opinions were disproved above (Q. II., A. 5; Q. V., A. 1).

Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny the reality on the part of God. For they say that Christ, Who is God and man, is God not naturally, but by participation—*i.e.*, by grace; even as all other holy men are called gods;—Christ being more excellently so than the rest, on account of His more abundant grace. And thus, when it is said that *God is man*, God does not stand for the true and natural God. And this is the heresy of Photinus, which was disproved above (Q. II., AA. 10, 11). But some admit this proposition, together with the reality of both terms, holding that Christ is true God and true man; yet they do not preserve the truth of the predication. For they say that man is predicated of God by reason of a certain conjunction either of dignity, or of authority, or of affection or indwelling. It was thus that Nestorius held God to be man;—nothing further being meant than that God is joined to man by such a conjunction that man is dwelt in by God, and united to Him in affection, and in a share of the Divine authority and honour. And into the same error fall those who suppose two supposita or hypostases in Christ, since it is impossible to understand how, of two things distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, one can be properly predicated of the other: unless merely by a figurative expression, inasmuch as they are united in something, as if we were to say that Peter is John because they are somehow mutually joined together. And these opinions also were disproved above (Q. II., AA. 3, 6).

Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true Divine Nature is united with true human nature

not only in person, but also in suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is true and proper, *God is man* —not only by the truth of its terms—*i.e.*, because Christ is true God and true man—but by the truth of the predication. For a word signifying the common nature in the concrete may stand for all contained in the common nature, as this word *man* may stand for any individual man. And thus this word *God*, from its very mode of signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the First Part (Q. XXXIX., A. 4). Now of every suppositum of any nature we may truly and properly predicate a word signifying that nature in the concrete, as *man* may properly and truly be predicated of Socrates and Plato. Hence, since the Person of the Son of God for Whom this word *God* stands, is a suppositum of human nature, this word *man* may be truly and properly predicated of this word *God*, as it stands for the Person of the Son of God.

Reply Obj. 1. When different forms cannot come together in one suppositum, the proposition is necessarily in remote matter, the subject signifying one form and the predicate another. But when two forms can come together in one suppositum, the matter is not remote, but natural or contingent, as when I say; *Something white is musical.* Now the Divine and human natures, although most widely apart, nevertheless come together by the mystery of the Incarnation in one suppositum, in which neither exists accidentally, but [both] essentially. Hence this proposition is neither in remote nor in contingent, but in natural matter; and man is not predicated of God accidentally, but essentially, as being predicated of its hypostasis—not, indeed, by reason of the form signified by this word *God*, but by reason of the suppositum, which is a hypostasis of human nature.

Reply Obj. 2. The three Divine Persons agree in one Nature, and are distinguished in suppositum; and hence they are not predicated one of another. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the natures, being distinct, are not predicated one of the other, in the abstract. For

the Divine Nature is not the human nature. But because they agree in suppositum, they are predicated of each other in the concrete.

Reply Obj. 3. *Soul* and *flesh* are taken in the abstract, even as Godhead and manhood; but in the concrete we say *animate* and *carnal* or *corporeal*, as, on the other hand, *God* and *man*. Hence in both cases the abstract is not predicated of the abstract, but only the concrete of the concrete.

Reply Obj. 4. This word *man* is predicated of God, because of the union in person, and this union implies a relation. Hence it does not follow the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of God from eternity.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS IS TRUE; 'MAN IS GOD'?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this is false; *Man is God*. For God is an incommunicable name; hence (Wisd. xiii. 10; xiv. 21) idolaters are rebuked for giving the name of God, which is incommunicable, to wood and stones. Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this word *God* should be predicated of man.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be predicated of the subject. But this is true; *God is the Father*, or; *God is the Trinity*. Therefore, if it is true that *Man is God*, it seems that this also is true; *Man is the Father*, or; *Man is the Trinity*. But these are false. Therefore the first is false.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Ps. lxxx. 10): *There shall be no new God in thee*. But man is something new; for Christ was not always man. Therefore this is false; *Man is God*.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. ix. 5): *Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, Who is over all things, God blessed for ever*. Now Christ, according to the flesh, is man. Therefore this is true; *Man is God*.

I answer that, Granted the reality of both natures—*i.e.*, Divine and human—and of the union in person and hypostasis, this is true and proper; *Man is God,* even as this; *God is man.* For this word *man* may stand for any hypostasis of human nature; and thus it may stand for the Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hypostasis of human nature. Now it is manifest that the word *God* is truly and properly predicated of the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the First Part (Q. XXXIX., A. 4). Hence it remains that this is true and proper; *Man is God.*

Reply Obj. 1. Idolaters attributed the name of the Deity to stones and wood, considered in their own nature, because they thought there was something divine in them. But we do not attribute the name of the Deity to the man in His human nature, but in the eternal suppositum, which by union is a suppositum of human nature, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. This word *Father* is predicated of this word *God,* inasmuch as this word *God* stands for the Person of the Father. And in this way it is not predicated of the Person of the Son, because the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And, consequently, it is not necessary that this word *Father* be predicated of this word *Man,* of which the word *God* is predicated, inasmuch as *Man* stands for the Person of the Son.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the human nature in Christ is something new, yet the suppositum of the human nature is not new, but eternal. And because this word *God* is predicated of man not on account of the human nature, but by reason of the suppositum, it does not follow that we assert a new God. But this would follow, if we held that *Man* stands for a created suppositum: even as must be said by those who assert that there are two supposita in Christ.*

* *Cf.* Q. II., AA. 3, 6.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST CAN BE CALLED A LORDLY MAN* ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man. For Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii. qu. 36) that *we are to be counselled to hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man;* and he is speaking of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man.

Obj. 2. Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by reason of His Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is said to be *humanized,* as is plain from Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 11), where he says that *being humanized manifests the conjunction with man.* Hence with like reason may it be said denominatively that this man is lordly.

Obj. 3. Further, as *lordly* is derived from *lord,* so is *Divine* derived from *Deus* (*God*). But Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* iv.) calls Christ the *most Divine Jesus.* Therefore with like reason may Christ be called a lordly man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Retract.* i. 19): *I do not see that we may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly man, since He is the Lord Himself.*

I answer that, As was said above (A. 2 *ad* 3), when we say *the Man Christ Jesus,* we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the Person of the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both natures. Now *God* and *Lord* are predicated essentially of the Son of God; and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively, since this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we say *lordly* denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we say *the Man Christ Jesus,* we

* The question is hardly apposite in English. S. Thomas explains why we can say in Latin, *e.g., oratio dominica* (the Lord's Prayer) or *passio dominica* (Our Lord's Passion), but not speak of our Lord as *homo dominicus* (a lordly man).

mean a created suppositum, as those who assert two suppositа in Christ, this man might be called lordly, inasmuch as he is assumed to a participation of Divine honour, as the Nestorians said. And, even in this way, the human nature is not called *divine* by essence, but *deified*—not, indeed, by its being converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as is plain from Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 11, 17).

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine retracts these and the like words (*Retract.* i. 19); hence, after the foregoing words (*Retract. ibid.*), he adds: *Wherever I have said this*—viz., that Christ Jesus is a lordly man—*I wish it unsaid, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be said, although it may be defended with some reason*—*i.e.*, because one might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human nature, which this word *man* signifies, and not by reason of the suppositum.

Reply Obj. 2. This one suppositum, which is of the human and Divine natures, was first of the Divine Nature—*i.e.*, from eternity. Afterwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be *humanized*—not that it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nature. But the converse of this is not true—viz., that a suppositum of human nature assumed the Divine Nature; hence we may not say a *deified* or *lordly* man.

Reply Obj. 3. This word Divine is wont to be predicated even of things of which the word God is predicated essentially; thus we say that *the Divine Essence is God,* by reason of identity; and that *the Essence belongs to God,* or is *Divine,* on account of the different way of signifying; and we speak of the *Divine Word,* though the Word is God. So, too, we say *a Divine Person,* just as we say *the person of Plato,* on account of its different mode of signification. But *lordly* is not predicated of those of which *lord* is predicated; for we are not wont to call a man who is a lord, lordly; but whatsoever belongs to a lord is called lordly, as the *lordly will,* or the *lordly hand,* or the *lordly*

possession. And hence the man Christ, Who is Our Lord, cannot be called lordly; yet His flesh can be called *lordly flesh* and His passion the *lordly passion*.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHAT BELONGS TO THE HUMAN NATURE CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the same. Now, what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper to God, since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the human nature to be created temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.

Obj. 2. Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be derogatory to the Divine honour, and to be a blasphemy. Now what pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer, to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human nature can nowise be said of God.

Obj. 3. Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 4) that *God assumed the idioms—i.e.*, the properties—*of flesh, since God is said to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified.*

I answer that, On this question there was a difference of opinion between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide words predicated of Christ, in this way—viz., that such as pertained to human nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as pertained to the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man. Hence Nestorius said: *If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings*

*to the Word, let him be anathema.** But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what pertained to both natures, as *Christ* or *Lord*. Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but they did not say that God was born of a Virgin, or that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His Divine or in His human nature may be said either of God or of man. Hence Cyril says:† *If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances—i.e.,* hypostases *—such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and believes that some are to be applied to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone—let him be anathema.* And the reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus whether we say *man* or *God,* the hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature.

Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to the human nature are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 11): *We must distinguish what is said by Scripture in reference to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the Father, and what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is less than the Father:* and further on he says (13): *The*

* Council of Ephesus, Part I., ch. 29. † *Ibid,* ch. 26.

prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of what is said.

Reply Obj. 1. It is impossible for contraries to be predicated of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.

Reply Obj. 2. If the things pertaining to defect were attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be derogatory to His honour. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a discourse of the Council of Ephesus* it is said: *God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's salvation. For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the Divine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion of harm to God?*

Reply Obj. 3. To be assumed pertains to human nature, not in its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to God.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHAT BELONGS TO THE HUMAN NATURE CAN BE PREDICATED OF THE DIVINE NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can be said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature. Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the Divine Nature.

* Part III., ch. 10.

Obj. 2. Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 6), *we say, after the blessed Athanasius and Cyril, that the Nature of the Word was incarnate.* Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human nature may be said of the Divine Nature.

Obj. 3. Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to Christ's human nature; such as to know future things and to possess saving power. Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human may be said of the Divine Nature.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 4): *When we mention the Godhead we do not predicate of it the idioms—i.e.,* the properties—*of the humanity; for we do not say that the Godhead is passible or creatable.* Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature. Therefore what is proper to the human nature cannot be said of the Divine Nature.

I answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said of another, unless they are both the same; thus *risible* can be predicated only of man. Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the Divine and human natures are not the same; but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words we may predicate indifferently what belongs to either nature—whether the word of which they are predicated refers to one nature, as the word *Christ,* by which is signified *both the Godhead anointing and the manhood anointed;*—or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word *God* or *the Son of God;*—or to the manhood alone, as this word *Man* or *Jesus.* Hence Pope Leo says (*Ep. ad Palæst.* cxxiv.): *It is of no consequence from what substance we name Christ; because since the unity of person remains inseparably, one and the same is altogether Son of Man by His flesh, and altogether Son of God by the Godhead which He has with the Father.*

Reply Obj. 1. In God, Person and Nature are really the same; and by reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the Son of God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different; and hence certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of the Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the First Part (Q. XXXIX., A. 5). So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered.

Reply Obj. 2. Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than any property of flesh. Now in Christ each nature is united to the other in person; and by reason of this union the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate and the human nature deified, as stated above (Q. II., A. 1 *ad* 3).

Reply Obj. 3. What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated of the human nature—not, indeed, as it belongs essentially to the Divine Nature, but as it is participated by the human nature. Hence, whatever cannot be participated by the human nature (as to be uncreated and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature. But the Divine Nature received nothing by participation from the human nature; and hence what belongs to the human nature can nowise be predicated of the Divine Nature.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS IS TRUE; 'GOD WAS MADE MAN'?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this is false; *God was made man.* For since man signifies a substance, to be made man is to be made simply. But this is false; *God was made simply.* Therefore this is false; *God was made man.*

Obj. 2. Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of change, according to Mal. iii. 6: *I am the Lord, and I change not.* Hence this is false; *God was made man.*

Obj. 3. Further, man as predicated of Christ stands for the Person of the Son of God. But this is false; *God was made the Person of the Son of God.* Therefore this is false; *God was made man.*

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. i. 14): *The Word was made flesh:* and as Athanasius says (*Ep. ad Epictetum*), *when he said, 'The Word was made flesh,' it is as if it were said that God was made man.*

I answer that, A thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of God, as stated above (A. 1), yet in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming human nature. Hence, this is true, *God was made man;* though it is understood differently by some: even as this, *God is man,* as we said above (A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. To be made man is to be made simply, in all those in whom human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But God is said to have been made man, inasmuch as the human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. And hence for God to be made man does not mean that God was made simply.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above, to be made implies that something is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated of another, and there is a change in that of which it is predicated, then to be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed, and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases, not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of God: *Lord, Thou art made* (Douay, *hast been*) *our refuge* (Ps. lxxxix. 1). Now to be

man belongs to God by reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, *God was made man*, we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of God, but inasmuch as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is false, *God was made the Person of the Son of God*, yet this is true; *God was made man* by being united to human nature.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS IS TRUE; 'MAN WAS MADE GOD'?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this is true; *Man was made God.* For it is written (Rom. i. 2, 3): *Which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh.* Now Christ, as man, is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the Son of God.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 13) that *such was this assumption, which made God man, and man God.* But by reason of this assumption this is true; *God was made man.* Therefore, in like manner, this is true; *Man was made God.*

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (*Ep. ad Chelid.* ci.): *God was humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call it.* Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and thus it is true that *Man was made God.*

Obj. 4. Further, when it is said that *God was made man*, the subject of the making or uniting is not God, but human nature, which the word *man* signifies. Now that seems to

be the subject of the making, to which the making is attributed. Hence *Man was made God* is truer than *God was made man.*

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 2): *We do not say that man was deified, but that God was humanized.* Now to be made God is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false; *Man was made God.*

I answer that, This proposition, *Man was made God,* may be understood in three ways. First, so that the participle *made* absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate; and in this sense it is false, since neither the Man of Whom it is predicated was made, nor is God made, as will be said (AA. 8, 9). And in the same sense this is false; *God was made man.* But it is not of this sense that we are now speaking. Secondly, it may be so understood that the word *made* determines the composition, with this meaning: *Man was made God—i.e., it was brought about that Man is God.* And in this sense both are true—viz., that *Man was made God* and that *God was made Man.* But this is not the proper sense of these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to understand that *man* has not a personal, but a simple supposition. For although *this man* was not made God, because this suppositum—viz., the Person of the Son of God—was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always God. Thirdly, properly understood, this participle *made* attaches making to man with relation to God, as the term of the making. And in this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of God and Man, as was shown (Q. II., AA. 2, 3), this proposition is false, because, when it is said, *Man was made God, man* has a personal suppositum: because, to be God is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom *to be God* is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be God, or is made God, or that He was made God.

But if there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that *to be God* was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason might it be said that Man was made God—*i.e.*, joined to God—and that God was made Man—*i.e.*, joined to man.

Reply Obj. 1. In these words of the Apostle the relative *Who* which refers to the Person of the Son of God ought not to be considered as affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the *seed of David according to the flesh* was made the Son of God—and it is in this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken as affecting the subject, with this meaning—that the *Son of God was made to Him* ('*namely to the honour of the Father,*' as a gloss expounds it), *being of the seed of David according to the flesh,* as if to say *the Son of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honour of God.*

Reply Obj. 2. This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense that by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was brought about that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both sayings are true, as stated above.

The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be deified is the same as to be made God.

Reply Obj. 4. A term placed in the subject is taken materially—*i.e.*, for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally—*i.e.*, for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that *Man was made God,* the being made is not attributed to the human nature but to the suppositum of the human nature, Which is God from eternity, and hence it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said that *God was made Man,* the making is taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence, properly speaking, this is true; *God was made Man,* and this is false; *Man was made God;* even as if Socrates, who was already a man, were made white, and were pointed out, this would be true; *This man was made white to-day,* and

this would be false; *This white thing was made man to-day.* Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the making—*e.g.*, if it were said that *human nature was made the Son of God's.*

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS IS TRUE; 'CHRIST IS A CREATURE'?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this is true; *Christ is a creature.* For Pope Leo says:* *A new and unheard of covenant: God Who is and was, is made a creature.* Now we may predicate of Christ whatever the Son of God became by the Incarnation. Therefore this is true; *Christ is a creature.*

Obj. 2. Further, the properties of both natures may be predicated of the common hypostasis of both natures, no matter by what word they are signified, as stated above (A. 5). But it is the property of human nature to be created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature to be Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ—viz., that He is a creature and that he is uncreated and Creator.

Obj. 3. Further, the principal part of a man is the soul rather than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the Virgin, is said simply to be born of the Virgin. Therefore by reason of the soul which is created by God, it ought simply to be said that He is a creature.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Trin.* i.): *Was Christ made by a word? Was Christ created by a command?* as if to say; *No!* Hence he adds; *How can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a composite Nature.* Therefore it must not be granted that *Christ is a creature.*

* *Cf.* Append. Opp. August., *Serm.* xii. *de Nativ.*

I answer that, As Jerome* says, *words spoken amiss lead to heresy;* hence with us and heretics the very words ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person. And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a *creature* or *less than the Father;* but with a qualification—viz., *in His human nature.* But such things as could not be considered to belong to the Divine Person in Itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of His human nature; thus we say simply that Christ suffered, died and was buried: even as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole simply—*i.e.,* without qualification, for we do not say that the Ethiopian is white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but we say without qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong to him as regards his hair.

Reply Obj. 1. Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, the holy doctors use the word *creature* of Christ, without any qualifying term; we should however take as understood the qualification, *as man.*

Reply Obj. 2. All the properties of the human, just as of the Divine Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 4) that *Christ, Who is God and Man, is called created and uncreated, passible and impassible.* Nevertheless things of which we may doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated without a qualification. Hence he afterwards adds (*De Fide Orthod.* iv. 5) that *the one hypostasis—i.e.,* of Christ—*is uncreated in its Godhead and created in its manhood:* even so conversely, we may not say without qualification, *Christ is incorporeal* or *impassible;* in order to avoid the error of Manes, who held that Christ had not a true body, nor truly suffered, but we must say, with a

* Gloss. Ord. in Osee ii. 16.

qualification, that Christ was incorporeal and impassible *in His Godhead.*

Reply Obj. 3. There can be no doubt how the birth from the Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the case of creation; and hence there is no parity.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS MAN, *I.E.* CHRIST, BEGAN TO BE?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this Man, *i.e.* Christ, began to be. For Augustine says (*Tract* cv. *in Joan.*) that *before the world was, neither were we, nor the Mediator of God and men—the Man Jesus Christ.* But what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, *i.e.* Christ, began to be.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be simply. Therefore this man began to be, simply.

Obj. 3. Further, *man* implies a suppositum of human nature. But Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man began to be.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. xiii. 8): *Jesus Christ yesterday and to-day: and the same for ever.*

I answer that, We must not say that *this Man*—pointing to Christ—*began to be,* unless we add something. And this for a twofold reason. First, for this proposition is simply false, in the judgment of the Catholic Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to this, when we say *this Man,* pointing to Christ, the eternal suppositum is necessarily meant, with Whose eternity a beginning in time is incompatible. Hence this is false; *This Man began to be.* Nor does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature, which is signified by this word *man;* because the term placed in the subject is not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially so as to signify the suppositum, as was said

(A. 7 *ad* 4). Secondly, because even if this proposition were true, it ought not to be made use of without qualification; in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who, since he pretended that the Person of the Son of God is a creature, and less than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying *there was a time when He was not.*

Reply Obj. 1. The words quoted must be qualified—*i.e.*, we must say that the Man Jesus Christ was not, before the world was, *in His humanity.*

Reply Obj. 2. With this word *begin* we cannot argue from the lower species to the higher. For it does not follow if *this began to be white,* that therefore *it began to be coloured.* And this because *to begin* implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not follow if *this was not white hitherto* that *therefore it was not coloured hitherto.* Now, to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this does not follow; *Christ began to be Man—therefore He began to be.*

Reply Obj. 3. This word *Man,* as it is taken for Christ, although it signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless signifies the eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence, since it signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject, and refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is false; *The Man Christ began to be:* but this is true; *Christ began to be Man.*

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS IS TRUE; 'CHRIST AS MAN IS A CREATURE'?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this is false; *Christ as Man is a creature,* or *began to be.* For nothing in Christ is created except the human nature. But this is false; *Christ as Man is the human nature.* Therefore this is also false; *Christ as Man is a creature.*

Obj. 2. Further, the predicate is predicated of the term placed in reduplication, rather than of the subject of the

proposition; as when I say; *A body as coloured is visible,* it follows that the coloured is visible. But as stated (AA. 8, 9) we must not absolutely grant that *the Man Christ is a creature;* nor consequently that *Christ as Man is a creature.*

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is predicated of a man as man is predicated of him *per se* and simply, for *per se* is the same as *inasmuch as itself,* as is said *Metaph.* v. text. 23. But this is false; *Christ as Man is per se and simply a creature.* Hence this, too, is false; *Christ as Man is a creature.*

On the contrary, Whatever is, is either Creator or creature. But this is false; *Christ as Man is Creator.* Therefore this is true; *Christ as Man is a creature.*

I answer that, When we say *Christ as Man* this word *man* may be added in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by reason of the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this will be false; *Christ as Man is a creature.* But if it be added by reason of the human nature, it is true, since by reason of the human nature or in the human nature, it belongs to Him to be a creature, as was said (A. 8).

It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to say *Christ as Man* and to say *Christ as He is a Man.* Hence this is to be granted rather than denied; *Christ as Man is a creature.* But if something further be added whereby [the term covered by the reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to be denied rather than granted, for instance were one to say; *Christ as 'this' Man is a creature.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although Christ is not the human nature, He has human nature. Now the word *creature* is naturally predicated not only of abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that *manhood is a creature* and that *man is a creature.*

Reply Obj. 2. Man as placed in the subject refers to the suppositum—and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature, as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted that *this man is a creature,* yet it is granted that *Christ as Man is a creature.*

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of human nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of every such suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is a creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He is a creature simply.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS IS TRUE; 'CHRIST AS MAN IS GOD'?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. For Christ is God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union. Therefore Christ as Man is God.

Obj. 2. Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, according to Isa. xliii. 25: *I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake.* But Christ as Man forgives sin, according to Matt. ix. 6: *But that you may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins,* etc. Therefore Christ as Man is God.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this particular Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is God, since by *this Man* we signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ as Man is God.

On the contrary, Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every man. Now, if Christ as Man is God, it follows that every man is God—which is clearly false.

I answer that, This term *man* when placed in the re-

duplication may be taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this way it is not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person of the Son of God, to Whom it essentially belongs to be God, it is true that Christ, as Man, is God. Nevertheless because the term placed in the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, as stated above (A. 10), hence this is to be denied rather than granted; *Christ as Man is God.*

Reply Obj. 1. It is not with regard to the same, that a thing moves towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a thing because of its matter or subject—and to be in act belongs to it because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it belongs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union, and to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true; *Christ as Man has the grace of union;* yet not this; *Christ as Man is God.*

Reply Obj. 2. *The Son of Man has on earth the power of forgiving sins,* not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving sins authoritatively; whereas in the human nature it resides instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this passage says:* *He said pointedly 'on earth to forgive sins,' in order to show that by an indivisible union He united human nature to the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He remained the Word of God.*

Reply Obj. 3. When we say *this man,* the demonstrative pronoun *this* attracts *man* to the suppositum; and hence *Christ as this Man, is God,* is a truer proposition than *Christ as Man is God.*

* Implicitly. *Hom.* xxx. *in Matt.; cf.* S. Thomas, *Catena Aurea* on Mark ii. 10.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS IS TRUE; 'CHRIST AS MAN IS A HYPOSTASIS OR PERSON'?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since He is like other men according to Phil. ii. 7: *Being made in the likeness of men.* But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature. But He is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of rational nature; as Boëthius says (*De Duab. Nat.*). Therefore Christ as Man is a person.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.

On the contrary, Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore if Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two persons—one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as was said above (Q. II., A. 6; Q. IV., A. 2).

I answer that, As was said (AA. 10, 11), the term *Man* placed in the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature. Hence when it is said; *Christ as Man is a person,* if it is taken as referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so understand it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way it is true, for whatever

subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality, caused by the principles of the human nature, is due to the human nature; and in this way Christ as Man is not a person, since the human nature does not exist of itself apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the notion of person requires this.

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch as everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now, this is proper to the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature is not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal. Hence in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is not, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. The *individual substance*, which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man's hand might be called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and singular.

Reply Obj. 3. As a person signifies something complete and self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the sense in which we deny that *Christ as Man is a person* we must deny all the other propositions.

QUESTION XVII.

OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF BEING.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in common. For, in their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and plurality in detail: thus we concluded (Q. IX.) that there is only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter (Q. XXXV., A. 2) that there is not only one nativity in Christ.

Hence we must consider Christ's unity (1) of being; (2) of will; (3) of operation.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is one or two? (2) Whether there is only one being in Christ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST IS ONE OR TWO?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 7): *Because the form of God took the form of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet both are Man by reason of the man assumed.* Now '*both*' may only be said when there are two. Therefore Christ is two.

Obj. 2. Further, where there is one thing and another there are two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says (*Enchir.* xxxv.): *Being in the form of God . . . He took the form of a servant . . . being both in one; but He was one of these as Word, and the other as man.* Therefore Christ is two.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ is not only man; for, if He were

a mere man, He would not be God. Therefore He is something else than man, and thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.

Obj. 4. Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.

Obj. 5. Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity there are three Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature, notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one, according to John x. 30: *I and the Father are one.* Therefore, notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the duality of nature.

Obj. 6. Further, the Philosopher says (*Phys.* iii. text. 18) that *one* and *two* are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a duality of nature. Therefore Christ is two.

Obj. 7. Further, as accidental form makes a thing otherwise (*alterum*) so does substantial form make another thing (*aliud*) as Porphyry says (*Prædic.*). Now in Christ there are two substantial natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (*De Duab. Nat.*): *Whatever is, inasmuch as it is, is one.* But we confess that Christ is. Therefore Christ is one.

I answer that, Nature, considered in itself, as it is used in the abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person, except in God, in Whom *what it is* and *whereby it is* do not differ, as stated in the First Part (Q. XXIX., A. 4 *ad* 1). But in Christ, since there are two natures—viz., the Divine and the human—one of them—viz., the Divine—may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is signified by the word Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. But the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only in the concrete—*i.e.*, as it is signified by the suppositum. For we

cannot truly say that *Christ is human nature*, because human nature is not naturally predicated of its suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is God. Now God signifies one having the Godhead, and man signifies one having manhood. Yet one having manhood is differently signified by the word *man* and by the word *Jesus* or *Peter*. For this word *man* implies one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word *God* implies indistinctly one having the Godhead; but the word *Peter* or *Jesus* implies one having manhood distinctly—*i.e.*, with its determinate individual properties—as *Son of God* implies one having the Godhead under a determinate personal property. Now the dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were predicated in the abstract of Christ, it would follow that Christ is two. But because the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except as they are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the suppositum that *one* or *two* be predicated of Christ.

Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final completion. Hence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they said that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one Person, they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the neuter gender signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the masculine signifies something formed and perfect. On the other hand, the Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ, said that Christ is two not only in the neuter, but also in the masculine. But since we maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is clear from Q. II., AA. 2, 3, it follows that we say that Christ is one not merely in the masculine, but also in the neuter.

Reply Obj. 1. This saying of Augustine is not to be taken as if *both* referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both; but it refers to the subject. And thus *both* does not stand for two supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete. For I can say that

both—viz., *God and Man—are God* on account of God Who assumes; and *both*—viz., *God and Man*—are Man on account of the man assumed.

Reply Obj. 2. When it is said that *Christ is one thing and another,* this saying is to be explained in this sense—*having this nature and another.* And it is in this way that Augustine explains it (*Contra Felic.* xi.), where, after saying, *In the mediator of God and man, the Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another,* he adds; *I say another thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not another thing by reason of the unity of person.* Hence Gregory Nazianzen says (*Ep. ad Chelid.* ci.): *If we must speak briefly, that of which the Saviour is, is one thing and another; thus the invisible is not the same as the visible; and what is without time is not the same as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another: far from it; for both these are one.*

Reply Obj. 3. This is false, *Christ is only man;* because it does not exclude another suppositum, but another nature, since terms placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if anything is added whereby it is drawn to the suppositum, it would be a true proposition—for instance, *Christ is only that which is man.* Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is *any other thing than man,* because *another thing,* inasmuch as it refers to a diversity of substance, properly refers to the suppositum, even as all relative things bearing a personal relation. But it does follow; *Therefore He has another nature.*

Reply Obj. 4. When it is said, *Christ is something that the Father is; something* signifies the Divine Nature, which is predicated even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when it is said; *Christ is something that is not the Father; something* signifies, not the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is in the concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct, but in an indistinct suppositum—*i.e.*, inasmuch as it underlies the nature and not the individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that Christ is one thing and another, or that He is two, since the suppositum

of the human nature in Christ, which is the Person of the Son of God, does not reckon numerically with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of the Father and Son.

Reply Obj. 5. In the mystery of the Divine Trinity the Divine Nature is predicated, even in the abstract of the three Persons; hence it may be said simply that the three Persons are one. But in the mystery of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the abstract of Christ; hence it cannot be said simply that Christ is two.

Reply Obj. 6. Two signifies what has duality, not in another, but in the same thing of which *two* is predicated. Now what is predicated is said of the suppositum, which is implied by the word *Christ*. Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He has not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two.

Reply Obj. 7. *Otherwise* implies diversity of accident. Hence diversity of accident suffices for anything to be called *otherwise* simply. But *another thing* implies diversity of substance. Now not merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said to be a substance, as is said *Metaph.* v. text. 15. Hence diversity of nature does not suffice for anything to be called *another thing* simply, unless there is diversity of suppositum. But diversity of nature makes *another thing* relatively—*i.e.*, in nature—if there is no diversity of suppositum.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE BEING IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there is not merely one being, but two. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 13) that whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ. But being follows the nature, for being is from the form. Hence in Christ there are two beings.

Obj. 2. Further, the being of the Son of God is the Divine Nature itself, and is eternal: whereas the being of

the Man Christ is not the Divine Nature, but is a temporal being. Therefore there is not only one being in Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, in the Trinity, although there are three Persons, yet on account of the unity of nature there is only one being. But in Christ there are two natures, though there is one Person. Therefore in Christ there is not only one being.

Obj. 4. Further, in Christ the soul gives some being to the body, since it is its form. But it does not give the Divine being, since this is uncreated. Therefore in Christ there is another being besides the Divine being; and thus in Christ there is not only one being.

On the contrary, Everything is said to be a being, inasmuch as it is one, for one and being are convertible. Therefore, if there were two beings in Christ, and not one only, Christ would be two, and not one.

I answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures and one hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being—and to the nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man. Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis, this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively; as to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why this being should not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for the being whereby Socrates is white is distinct from the being whereby he is a musician. But the being which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, since it is impossible that there should not be one being for one thing.

If, therefore, the human nature accrued to the Son of God, not hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as some maintained, it would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ—one, inasmuch as He is God—the other, inasmuch as He is Man; even as in Socrates we place one being inasmuch as he is white, and another inasmuch as he is a man, since *being white* does not pertain to the personal being of Socrates. But being possessed of a head, being corporeal, being animated,—all these pertain to the one person of Socrates, and hence there arises from these only the one being of Socrates. And if it so happened that after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands or feet or eyes, as happened to him who was born blind, no new being would be thereby added to Socrates, but only a relation to these—*i.e.*, inasmuch as he would be said to be, not only with reference to what he had previously, but also with reference to what accrued to him afterwards. And thus, since the human nature is united to the Son of God, hypostatically or personally as was said above (Q. II., AA. 5, 6), and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature there accrued to Him no new personal being, but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the human nature.

Reply Obj. 1. Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that which has being, but as upon that whereby a thing is: whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being. Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality from the duality of the nature.

Reply Obj. 2. The eternal being of the Son of God, which is the Divine Nature, becomes the being of man, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God to unity of Person.

Reply Obj. 3. As was said in the First Part (Q. L., A. 2 *ad* 3; Q. LXXV., A. 5 *ad* 4), since the Divine Person is the same as the Nature, there is no distinction in the

Divine Persons between the being of the Person and the being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three Persons have only one being. But they would have a triple being if the being of the Person were distinct in them from the being of the Nature.

Reply Obj. 4. In Christ the soul gives being to the body, inasmuch as it makes it actually animated, which is to give it the complement of its nature and species. But if we consider the body perfected by the soul, without the hypostasis having both—this whole, composed of soul and body, as signified by the word *humanity*, does not signify *what is*, but *whereby it is*. Hence being belongs to the subsisting person, inasmuch as it has a relation to such a nature, and of this relation the soul is the cause, inasmuch as it perfects human nature by informing the body.

QUESTION XVIII.

OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF WILL.

(In Six Articles.)

WE must now consider unity as regards the will; and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct in Christ? (2) Whether in Christ's human nature the will of sensuality is distinct from the will of reason? (3) Whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ? (4) Whether there was free-will in Christ? (5) Whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed? (6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE TWO WILLS IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and first commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and commander was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will, viz., the Divine.

Obj. 2. Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.

Obj. 3. Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which

belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ.

Obj. 4. Further, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 14) that *to will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect—i.e.,* our personal intellect. But every will is this or that will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person. But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ there is only one will.

On the contrary, Our Lord says (Luke xxii. 42): *Father, if Thou wilt, remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done.* And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (*De Fide* ii. 7) says: *As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;* and on Luke (*loc. cit.*) he says: *His will He refers to the Man—the Father's, to the Godhead. For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal.*

I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem to have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since *the will is in the reason,* as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii. 9), it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one composite nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too, who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and will, held only one will in Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some of their followers, held that there is one will in Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because they believed that Christ's human nature never moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch as it was

moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho.*

And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople† it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the following passage: *In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in Him and two natural operations.* And this much it was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above (Q. V.; Q. IX., A. 1). Now the will pertains to the perfection of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as the intellect, as was stated in the First Part (QQ. LXXIX., LXXX). Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in the First Part (Q. XIX., A. 1). Hence it must be said that there are two wills in Christ—*i.e.*, one human, the other Divine.

Reply Obj. 1. Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the good wills of other saints are moved by God's will, *Who worketh* in them *both to will and to accomplish*, as is written Phil. ii. 13. For although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the First Part (Q. CV., A. 4). And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine will according to Ps. xxxix. 9; *That I should do Thy will, O my God, I have desired it.* Hence Augustine says (*Contra Maxim.* ii. 20): *Where the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou willest,' what do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that His will was*

* Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4.
† Act. 18.

truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's will ought to be subject to God's will?

Reply Obj. 2. It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the Philosopher says (*Polit.* i. 2, 4; *Ethic.* viii. 11). And hence it was in this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will.

Reply Obj. 3. The power of the will is natural, and necessarily follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power—which is also called will—is sometimes natural and necessary—*e.g.*, with respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. X., AA. 1, 2).* And yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural movement, but even as a rational movement.

Reply Obj. 4. When we say *to will in a certain way*, we signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the nature, *to will in a certain way* belongs to the nature, not indeed considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine hypostasis—*i.e.*, it was always moved in accordance with the bidding of the Divine will.

* *Cf.* I., Q. LXXXII., A. 2.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS A WILL OF SENSUALITY BESIDES THE WILL OF REASON?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no will of sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii. text. 42) that *the will is in the reason, and in the sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupiscible parts.* Now sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (*De Trin.* xii. 12, 13) the sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal without the venom, as Augustine says (*De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.* i. 32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.

Obj. 3. Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said (A. 1). But in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Fide* ii. 7): *Mine is the will which He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow.* From this we are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 1; Q. XXV., A. 1). Therefore, seemingly, in Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason.

I answer that, As was said (Q. IX., A. 1), the Son of God assumed human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which things is the sensitive appetite, which is called

the sensuality. Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual appetite, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensual appetite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said to be *rational by participation*, as is clear from the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 13). And because *the will is in the reason*, as stated above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is *a will by participation*.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument is based on the will, essentially so called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by participation car be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys reason.

Reply Obj. 2. The sensuality is signified by the serpent —not as regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ assumed, but as regards the corruption of the *fomes*, which was not in Christ.

Reply Obj. 3. *Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one* (Aristot., *Topic.* iii.); thus a surface which is visible by colour is one visible thing with the colour. So, too, because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as there is but one human nature.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WERE TWO WILLS AS REGARDS THE REASON?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 22) that there is a double will in man—viz., the natural will which is called *θέλησις*, and the rational will which is called *βούλησις*. Now Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, the appetitive power is diversified in

man by the difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one intellectual and the other rational.

Obj. 3. Further, some* ascribe to Christ *a will of piety,* which can only be on the part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several wills.

On the contrary, In every order there is one first mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one human will.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1 *ad* 3), the will is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills—*i.e.,* two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said in the Second Part (I.-II., Q. VIII., AA. 2, 3), regards both the end and the means; and is affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is good in itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something else. Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene *θέλησις*—*i.e.,* simple will—and by the masters *will as nature,* is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene calls *βούλησις*—*i.e.,* counselling will, and the masters, *will as reason.* But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is goodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of the will, in Christ there is but one human will,

* Hugh of S. Victor, *De Quat. Volunt. Christ.*

essentially so called and not by participation; but if we are speaking of the will as an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is called *θέλησις*, and a will as reason, which is called *βούλησις*.

Reply Obj. 1. These two wills do not diversify the power but only the act, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as was said in the First Part (Q. LXXIX., A. 8).

Reply Obj. 3. The *will of piety* would not seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another's evil, absolutely considered.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS FREE-WILL IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 14) that *γνώμη—i.e.*, opinion, thinking or cogitation, and *προαίρεσις—i.e.*, choice, *cannot possibly be attributed to Our Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety.* But in the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free-will, of which choice is the act.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 2) that choice is *a desire of something after taking counsel.* Now counsel does not appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning such things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything. Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will in Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ's will was determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above (Q. XV., AA. 1, 2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. vii. 15): *He shall eat butter and honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and*

to choose the good, which is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was free-will in Christ.

I answer that, As was said above (A. 3), there was a twofold act of the will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in itself, which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to another—which pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 2) choice differs from will in this, that will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means. And thus simple *will* is the same as the *will as nature;* but choice is the same as the *will as reason,* and is the proper act of free-will, as was said in the First Part (Q. LXXXIII., A. 3). Hence, since *will as reason* is placed in Christ, we must also place choice, and consequently free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in the First Part (*ibid.; cf.* I.-II., Q. XIII., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself to choose, according to Eph. i. 4: *He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world,* although in God there is no doubt. Yet doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage quoted.

Reply Obj. 2. Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows counsel only as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done, we choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (*Ethic.* iii. 2, 3). Hence if anything is judged necessary to be done, without any preceding doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only when it is in an ignorant nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The will of Christ, though determined to good, is not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN WILL OF CHRIST WAS ALTOGETHER CONFORMED TO THE DIVINE WILL IN THE THING WILLED?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the human will in Christ did not will anything except what God willed. For it is written (Ps. xxxix. 9) in the person of Christ: *That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it.* Now he who desires to do another's will, wills what the other wills. Hence it seems that Christ's human will willed nothing but what was willed by His Divine will.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ's soul had most perfect charity, which, indeed, surpasses the comprehension of all our knowledge, according to Eph. iii. 19, *the charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.* Now charity makes men will what God wills; hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 4) that one mark of friendship is *to will and choose the same.* Therefore the human will in Christ willed nothing else than was willed by His Divine will.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ was a true comprehensor. But the Saints who are comprehensors in heaven will only what God wills, otherwise they would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, for *blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss,* as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii. 5). Hence in His human will Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Contra Maxim.* ii. 20): *When Christ says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt' He shows Himself to have willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into His Divine but into His human will.*

I answer that, As was said (AA. 2, 3), in Christ according to His human nature there is a twofold will—viz., the will of sensuality, which is called will by participation, and the rational will, whether considered after the manner of nature, or after the manner of reason. Now it was said

above (Q. XIII., A. 3 *ad* 1; Q. XIV., A. 1 *ad* 2) that by a certain dispensation the Son of God before His Passion *allowed His flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it.* And in like manner He allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them. Now it is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature turns from what is against nature and what is evil in itself, as death and the like; yet the will as reason may at time choose these things in relation to an end, as in a mere man the sensuality and the will absolutely considered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless, the will as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now it was the will of God that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of man's salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what God did not; but in His will as reason He always willed the same as God, which appears from what He says (Matt. xxvi. 39): *Not as I will, but as Thou wilt.* For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another will.

Reply Obj. 1. By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to the will of God —nor by His will considered as nature which regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to the Divine Will.

Reply Obj. 2. The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards the will of reason: according to which the wills even of friends agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its relation to the will of a friend.

Reply Obj. 3. Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, inasmuch as He was enjoying God in His mind and had a passible body. Hence things repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive appetite could happen to Him in His passible flesh.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE WAS CONTRARIETY OF WILLS IN CHRIST?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is plain from the Philosopher (*Phys.* v. text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in His different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence Athanasius says:* *When Christ says 'Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,' and again, 'The spirit indeed is willing but the flesh weak,' He denotes two wills—the human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from the passion—and His Divine will eager for the passion.* Hence there was contrariety of wills in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Gal. v. 17) that *the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.* Now when the spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion, according to Isa. liii. 7; *He was offered because it was His own will,* yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was contrariety of wills in Him.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Luke xxii. 43) that *being in an agony, He prayed the longer.* Now agony seems to imply a certain struggle† in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ.

On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Council‡ it is said: *We confess two natural wills, not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics assert, but following His human*

* *De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos,* written against Apollinarius.
† Greek, *ἀγωνία.*
‡ Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 18.

will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will.

I answer that, Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition in the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of contradiction—*e.g.*, if a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the diversity of wills should regard the same. For if the will of one regards the doing of something with reference to some universal reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same with reference to some particular reason, there is not complete contrariety of will—*e.g.*, when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's kindred wishes him not to be hanged on account of a private love, there is no contrariety of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the public good for the private good—in that case the opposition of wills would regard the same.

Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational appetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to change or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would reach the rational will.

And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion. For the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the human race, although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of something further; but the movement of

sensuality could nowise extend so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or the appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded the movement of the natural human will and the movement of the sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine will, and in His will of reason, that His natural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature. Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition or contrariety of wills.

Reply Obj. 1. The fact of any will in Christ willing something else than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper movements, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 15, 18, 19).

Reply Obj. 2. In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ. Hence in Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.

Reply Obj. 3. The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul, in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of motives, as when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His passion. Nevertheless, there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 15; iii. 18, 23).

QUESTION XIX.

OF THE UNITY OF CHRIST'S OPERATION.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider the unity of Christ's operation; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether in Christ there was one or several operations of the Godhead and Manhood? (2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of the human nature? (3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited anything for Himself? (4) Whether He merited anything for us by it?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE IS ONLY ONE OPERATION OF THE GODHEAD AND MANHOOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there is but one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* ii.): *The most loving operation of God is made manifest to us by the supersubstantial Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and having operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and Divine operation.* But he here mentions only one human and Divine operation, which is written in Greek *θεανδρική*—*i.e.*, God-man-like. Hence it seems that there is but one composite operation in Christ.

Obj. 2. Further, there is but one operation of the principal and instrumental agent. Now the human nature in Christ was the instrument of the Divine, as was said above (Q. VII., A. 1 *ad* 3; Q. VIII., A. 1 *ad* 1; Q. XVIII., A. 1 *ad* 2). Hence the operations of the Divine and human natures in Christ are the same.

Obj. 3. Further, since in Christ there are two natures in one hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to the hypostasis or person is one and the same. But operation pertains to the hypostasis or person, for it is only a subsisting suppositum that operates; hence, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* i. 1), acts belong to singulars. Hence in Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood.

Obj. 4. Further, as being belongs to a subsisting hypostasis, so also does operation. But on account of the unity of hypostasis there is only one being in Christ, as was above stated (Q. XVII., A. 2). Hence, on account of the same unity, there is one operation in Christ.

Obj. 5. Further, where there is one thing operated there is one operation. But the same thing was operated by the Godhead and the Manhood, as the healing of the lepers or the raising of the dead. Hence it seems that in Christ there is but one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Fide* ii. 8): *How can the same operation spring from different powers? Cannot the lesser operate as the greater? And can there be one operation where there are different substances?*

I answer that, As was said above (Q. XVIII., A. 1), the aforesaid heretics who placed one will in Christ placed one operation in Christ. Now in order better to understand their erroneous opinion, we must bear in mind that wherever there are several mutually ordained agents, the inferior is moved by the superior, as in man the body is moved by the soul and the lower powers by the reason. And thus the actions and movements of the inferior principle are things operated rather than operations. Now what pertains to the highest principle is properly the operation; thus we say of man that to walk, which belongs to the feet, and to touch, which belongs to the hand, are things operated by the man—one of which is operated by the soul through the feet, the other through the hands. And because it is the same soul that operates in both cases, there is only one indifferent operation, on the part of the

thing operating, which is the first moving principle; but difference is found on the part of what is operated. Now, as in a mere man the body is moved by the soul, and the sensitive by the rational appetite, so in the Lord Jesus Christ the human nature is moved and ruled by the Divine. Hence they said that there is one indifferent operation on the part of the Godhead operating, but divers things operated, inasmuch as the Godhead of Christ did one thing by Itself, as to uphold all things by the word of His power—and another thing by His human nature, as to walk in body. Hence the Sixth Council* quotes the words of Severus the heretic, who said: *What things were done and wrought by the one Christ, differ greatly; for some are becoming to God, and some are human, as to walk bodily on the earth is indeed human, but to give hale steps to sickly limbs, wholly unable to walk on the ground, is becoming to God. Yet One—i.e., the Incarnate Word—wrought one and the other—neither was this from one nature, and that from another; nor can we justly affirm that because there are distinct things operated there are therefore two operating natures and forms.*

But herein they were deceived, for what is moved by another has a twofold action—one which it has from its own form—the other, which it has inasmuch as it is moved by another: thus the operation of an axe of itself is to cleave; but inasmuch as it is moved by the craftsman, its operation is to make benches. Hence the operation which belongs to a thing by its form is proper to it, nor does it belong to the mover, except in so far as he makes use of this kind of thing for his work: thus to heat is the proper operation of fire, but not of a smith, except in so far as he makes use of fire for heating iron. But the operation which belongs to the thing, as moved by another, is not distinct from the operation of the mover; thus to make a bench is not the work of the axe independently of the workman. Hence, wheresoever the mover and the moved have different forms or operative faculties, there must the opera-

* Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 10.

tion of the mover and the proper operation of the moved be distinct; although the moved shares in the operation of the mover, and the mover makes use of the operation of the moved, and, consequently, each acts in communion with the other.

Therefore in Christ the human nature has its proper form and power whereby it acts; and so has the Divine. Hence the human nature has its proper operation distinct from the Divine, and conversely. Nevertheless, the Divine Nature makes use of the operation of the human nature, as of the operation of its instrument; and in the same way the human nature shares in the operation of the Divine Nature, as an instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent. And this is what Pope Leo says (*Ep. ad Flavian,* xxviii.): *Both forms* (*i.e.,* both the Divine and the human nature in Christ) *do what is proper to each in union with the other—i.e., the Word operates what belongs to the Word, and the flesh carries out what belongs to flesh.*

But if there were only one operation of the Godhead and manhood in Christ, it would be necessary to say either that the human nature had not its proper form and power (for this could not possibly be said of the Divine), whence it would follow that in Christ there was only the Divine operation; or it would be necessary to say that from the Divine and human power there was made up one power. Now both of these are impossible. For by the first the human nature in Christ is supposed to be imperfect; and by the second a confusion of the natures is supposed. Hence it is with reason that the Sixth Council (Act. 18) condemned this opinion, and decreed as follows: *We confess two natural, indivisible, unconvertible, unconfused, and inseparable operations in the same Lord Jesus Christ our true God; i.e.,* the Divine operation and the human operation.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius places in Christ a theandric—*i.e.,* a God-manlike or Divino-human—operation not by any confusion of the operations or powers of both natures, but inasmuch as His Divine operation employs the human,

and His human operation shares in the power of the Divine. Hence, as he says in a certain epistle (*Ad Caium*, iv.), *what is of man He works beyond man; and this is shown by the Virgin conceiving supernaturally and by the unstable waters bearing up the weight of bodily feet.* Now it is clear that to be begotten belongs to human nature, and likewise to walk; yet both were in Christ supernaturally. So, too, He wrought Divine things humanly, as when He healed the leper with a touch. Hence in the same epistle he adds: *He performed Divine works not as God does, and human works not as man does, but, God having been made man, by a new operation of God and man.*

Now, that he understood two operations in Christ, one of the Divine and the other of the human nature, is clear from what he says, *Div. Nom.* ii.: *Whatever pertains to His human operation the Father and the Holy Ghost nowise share in, except, as one might say, by their most gracious and merciful will—i.e.,* inasmuch as the Father and the Holy Ghost in their mercy wished Christ to do and to suffer human things. And he adds: *He is truly the unchangeable God, and God's Word by the sublime and unspeakable operation of God, which, being made man for us, He wrought.* Hence it is clear that the human operation, in which the Father and the Holy Ghost do not share, except by Their merciful consent, is distinct from His operation, as the Word of God, wherein the Father and the Holy Ghost share.

Reply Obj. 2. The instrument is said to act through being moved by the principal agent; and yet, besides this, it can have its proper operation through its own form, as stated above of fire. And hence the action of the instrument as instrument is not distinct from the action of the principal agent; yet it may have another operation, inasmuch as it is a thing. Hence the operation of Christ's human nature, as the instrument of the Godhead, is not distinct from the operation of the Godhead; for the salvation wherewith the manhood of Christ saves us and that

wherewith His Godhead saves us are not distinct; nevertheless, the human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it is a certain nature, has a proper operation distinct from the Divine, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. To operate belongs to a subsisting hypostasis; in accordance, however, with the form and nature from which the operation receives its species. Hence from the diversity of forms or natures spring the divers species of operations, but from the unity of hypostasis springs the numerical unity as regards the operation of the species: thus fire has two operations specifically different, namely, to illuminate and to heat, from the difference of light and heat, and yet the illumination of the fire that illuminates at one and the same time is numerically one. So, likewise, in Christ there are necessarily two specifically different operations by reason of His two natures; nevertheless, each of the operations at one and the same time is numerically one, as one walking and one healing.

Reply Obj. 4. Being and operation belong to the person by reason of the nature; yet in a different manner. For being belongs to the very constitution of the person, and in this respect it has the nature of a term; consequently, unity of person requires unity of the complete and personal being. But operation is an effect of the person by reason of a form or nature. Hence plurality of operations is not incompatible with personal unity.

Reply Obj. 5. The proper work of the Divine operation is different from the proper work of the human operation. Thus to heal a leper is a proper work of the Divine operation, but to touch him is the proper work of the human operation. Now both these operations concur in one work, inasmuch as one nature acts in union with the other.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE ARE SEVERAL HUMAN OPERATIONS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there are several human operations. For Christ as man communicates with plants by His nutritive soul, with the brutes by His sensitive soul, and with the angels by His intellective soul, even as other men do. Now the operations of a plant as plant and of an animal as animal are different. Therefore Christ as man has several operations.

Obj. 2. Further, powers and habits are distinguished by their acts. Now in Christ's soul there were divers powers and habits; therefore also divers operations.

Obj. 3. Further, instruments ought to be proportioned to their operations. Now the human body has divers members of different form, and consequently fitted to divers operations. Therefore in Christ there are divers operations in the human nature.

On the contrary, As Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 15), *operation is consequent upon the nature.* But in Christ there is only one human nature. Therefore in Christ there is only one human operation.

I answer that, Since it is by his reason that man is what he is; that operation is called human simply, which proceeds from the reason through the will, which is the rational appetite. Now if there is any operation in man which does not proceed from the reason and the will, it is not simply a human operation, but belongs to man by reason of some part of human nature:—sometimes by reason of the nature of elementary bodies, as to be borne downwards:—sometimes by reason of the force of the vegetative soul, as to be nourished, and to grow:—sometimes by reason of the sensitive part, as to see and hear, to imagine and remember, to desire and to be angry. Now between these operations there is a difference. For the operations of the sensitive

soul are to some extent obedient to reason, and consequently they are somewhat rational and human inasmuch as they obey reason, as is clear from the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 13). But the operations that spring from the vegetative soul, or from the nature of elemental bodies, are not subject to reason; consequently they are nowise rational; nor simply human, but only as regards a part of human nature. Now it was said (A. 1) that when a subordinate agent acts by its own form, the operations of the inferior and of the superior agent are distinct; but when the inferior agent acts only as moved by the superior agent, then the operation of the superior and the inferior agent is one.

And hence in every mere man the operations of the elemental body and of the vegetative soul are distinct from the will's operation, which is properly human; so likewise the operations of the sensitive soul inasmuch as it is not moved by reason; but inasmuch as it is moved by reason, the operations of the sensitive and the rational part are the same. Now there is but one operation of the rational part if we consider the principle of the operation, which is the reason and the will; but the operations are many if we consider their relationship to various objects. And there were some who called this a diversity of things operated rather than of operations, judging the unity of the operation solely from the operative principle. And it is in this respect that we are now considering the unity and plurality of operations in Christ.

Hence in every mere man there is but one operation, which is properly called human; but besides this there are in a mere man certain other operations, which are not strictly human, as was said above. But in the Man Jesus Christ there was no motion of the sensitive part which was not ordered by reason. Even the natural and bodily operations pertained in some respects to His will, inasmuch as it was His will *that His flesh should do and suffer what belonged to it,* as stated above (Q. XVIII., A. 5). Much more, therefore, is there one operation in Christ, than in any other man whatsoever.

Reply Obj. 1. The operations of the sensitive and nutritive parts are not strictly human, as stated above; yet in Christ these operations were more human than in others.

Reply Obj. 2. Powers and habits are diversified by comparison with their objects. Hence in this way the diversity of operations corresponds to the divers powers and habits, as likewise to the divers objects. Now we do not wish to exclude this diversity of operations from Christ's humanity, nor that which springs from a diversity of time, but only that which regards the first active principle, as was said above.

(*St. Thomas gives no reply to Obj.* 3; *some codices add:* Hence may be gathered the reply to the third objection.)

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN ACTION OF CHRIST COULD BE MERITORIOUS TO HIM?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the human action of Christ could not be meritorious to Him. For before His death Christ was a comprehensor even as He is now. But comprehensors do not merit: because the charity of the comprehensor belongs to the reward of beatitude, since fruition depends upon it. Hence it does not seem to be the principle of merit, since merit and reward are not the same. Therefore Christ before His passion did not merit, even as He does not merit now.

Obj. 2. Further, no one merits what is due to him. But because Christ is the Son of God by nature, the eternal inheritance is due to Him, which other men merit by their works. And hence Christ Who, from the beginning, was the Word of God, could not merit anything for Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, whoever has the principal does not properly merit what flows from its possession. But Christ has the glory of the soul, whence, in the natural course, flowed the glory of the body, as Augustine says (*Ep. ad*

Dios. cxviii.); though by a dispensation it was brought about that in Christ the glory of the soul should not overflow to the body. Hence Christ did not merit the glory of the body.

Obj. 4. Further, the manifestation of Christ's excellence is a good, not of Christ Himself, but of those who know Him. Hence it is promised as a reward to such as love Christ that He will be manifested to them, according to John xiv. 21: *He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him.* Therefore Christ did not merit the manifestation of His greatness.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. ii. 8, 9): *Becoming obedient unto death. . . . For which cause God also hath exalted Him.* Therefore by obeying He merited His exaltation and thus He merited something for Himself.

I answer that, To have any good thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it from another, for *what is of itself a cause is always more excellent than what is a cause through another,* as is said *Phys.* viii. 5. Now a thing is said to have, of itself, that of which it is to some extent the cause. But of whatever good we possess the first cause by authority is God; and in this way no creature has any good of itself, according to 1 Cor. iv. 7: *What hast thou that thou hast not received?* Nevertheless, in a secondary manner anyone may be a cause, to himself, of having certain good things, inasmuch as he co-operates with God in the matter, and thus whoever has anything by his own merit has it, in a manner, of himself. Hence it is better to have a thing by merit than without merit.

Now since all perfection and greatness must be attributed to Christ, consequently He must have by merit what others have by merit; unless it be of such a nature that its want would detract from Christ's dignity and perfection more than would accrue to Him by merit. Hence He merited neither grace nor knowledge nor the beatitude of His soul, nor the Godhead, because, since merit regards only what is

not yet possessed, it would be necessary that Christ should have been without these at some time; and to be without them would have diminished Christ's dignity more than His merit would have increased it. But the glory of the body, and the like, are less than the dignity of meriting, which pertains to the virtue of charity. Hence we must say that Christ had, by merit, the glory of His body and whatever pertained to His outward excellence, as His Ascension, veneration, and the rest. And thus it is clear that He could merit for Himself.

Reply Obj. 1. Fruition, which is an act of charity, pertains to the glory of the soul, which Christ did not merit. Hence if He merited by charity, it does not follow that the merit and the reward are the same. Nor did He merit by charity inasmuch as it was the charity of a comprehensor, but inasmuch as it was that of a wayfarer. For He was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as was said above (Q. XV., A. 10). And therefore, since He is no longer a wayfarer, He is not in the state of meriting.

Reply Obj. 2. Because by nature Christ is God and the Son of God, the Divine glory and the lordship of all things are due to Him, as to the first and supreme Lord. Nevertheless a glory is due to Him as a beatified man; and this He has partly without merit, and partly with merit, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3. It is by Divine appointment that there is an overflow of glory from the soul to the body, in keeping with human merit; so that as man merits by the act of the soul which he performs in the body, so he may be rewarded by the glory of the soul overflowing to the body. And hence not only the glory of the soul, but also the glory of the body falls under merit, according to Rom. viii. 11: *He . . . shall quicken also our* (Vulg., *your*) *mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in us* (Vulg., *you*). And thus it could fall under Christ's merit.

Reply Obj. 4. The manifestation of Christ's excellence is His good as regards the being which it has in the knowledge of others; although in regard to the being

which they have in themselves it chiefly belongs to the good of those who know Him. Yet even this is referred to Christ inasmuch as they are His members.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST COULD MERIT FOR OTHERS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ could not merit for others. For it is written (Ezech. xviii. 4): *The soul that sinneth, the same shall die.* Hence, for a like reason, the soul that meriteth, the same shall be recompensed. Therefore it is not possible that Christ merited for others.

Obj. 2. Further, of the fulness of Christ's grace we all receive, as is written John i. 16. Now other men having Christ's grace cannot merit for others. For it is written (Ezech. xiv. 20) that if *Noe and Daniel and Job be in the city* (Vulg., *in the midst thereof*) . . . *they shall deliver neither son nor daughter; but they shall only deliver their own souls by their justice.* Hence Christ could not merit anything for us.

Obj. 3. Further, the *reward* that we merit is due *according to justice* (Vulg., *debt*) *and not according to grace,* as is clear from Rom. iv. 4. Therefore if Christ merited our salvation it follows that our salvation is not by God's grace but by justice, and that He acts unjustly with those whom He does not save, since Christ's merit extends to all.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. v. 18): *As by the offence of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life.* But Adam's demerits reached to the condemnation of others. Much more, therefore, does the merit of Christ reach others.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. VIII., AA. 1, 5), grace was in Christ not merely as in an individual, but also as in the Head of the whole Church, to Whom all are united, as members to a head, who constitute one mystical person.

And hence it is that Christ's merit extends to others inasmuch as they are His members; even as in a man the action of the head reaches in a manner to all his members, since it perceives not merely for itself alone, but for all the members.

Reply Obj. 1. The sin of an individual harms himself alone; but the sin of Adam, who was appointed by God to be the principle of the whole nature, is transmitted to others by carnal propagation. So, too, the merit of Christ, Who has been appointed by God to be the head of all men in regard to grace, extends to all His members.

Reply Obj. 2. Others receive of Christ's fulness not indeed the fount of grace, but some particular grace. And hence it need not be that men merit for others, as Christ did.

Reply Obj. 3. As the sin of Adam reaches others only by carnal generation, so, too, the merit of Christ reaches others only by spiritual regeneration, which takes place in baptism; wherein we are incorporated with Christ, according to Gal. iii. 27, *As many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ;* and it is by grace that it is granted to man to be incorporated with Christ. And thus man's salvation is from grace.

QUESTION XX.

OF CHRIST'S SUBJECTION TO THE FATHER.

(In Two Articles.)

WE must now consider such things as belong to Christ in relation to the Father. Some of these things are predicated of Him because of His relation to the Father—*e.g.*, that He was subject to Him, that He prayed to Him, that He ministered to Him by priesthood. And some are predicated, or may be predicated, of Him because of the Father's relation to Him—*e.g.*, that the Father adopted Him and that He predestined Him.

Hence we must consider (1) Christ's subjection to the Father; (2) His prayer; (3) His priesthood; (4) Adoption —whether it is becoming to Him; (5) His predestination.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is subject to the Father? (2) Whether He is subject to Himself?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE MAY SAY THAT CHRIST IS SUBJECT TO THE FATHER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that we may not say that Christ was subject to the Father. For everything subject to the Father is a creature, since, as is said in *De Eccles. Dogm.* iv., *in the Trinity there is no dependence or subjection.* But we cannot say simply that Christ is a creature, as was stated above (Q. XVI., A. 8). Therefore we cannot say simply that Christ is subject to God the Father.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is said to be subject to God when it is subservient to His dominion. But we cannot

attribute subservience to the human nature of Christ; for Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 21): *We must bear in mind that we may not call it* (*i.e.*, Christ's human nature) *a servant; for the words 'subservience' and 'domination' are not names of the nature, but of relations, as the words 'paternity' and 'filiation.'* Hence Christ in His human nature is not subject to God the Father.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (1 Cor. xv. 28): *And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him.* But, as is written (Heb. ii. 8): *We see not as yet all things subject to Him.* Hence He is not yet subject to the Father, Who has subjected all things to Him.

On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jo. xiv. 28), *The Father is greater than I;* and Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 7): *It is not without reason that the Scripture mentions both, that the Son is equal to the Father and the Father greater than the Son, for the first is said on account of the form of God, and the second on account of the form of a servant, without any confusion.* Now the less is subject to the greater. Therefore in the form of a servant Christ is subject to the Father.

I answer that, Whoever has a nature is competent to have what is proper to that nature. Now human nature from its beginning has a threefold subjection to God. The first regards the degree of goodness, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the very essence of goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* i.), while a created nature has a participation of the Divine goodness, being subject, so to say, to the rays of this goodness. Secondly, human nature is subject to God, as regards God's power, inasmuch as human nature, even as every creature, is subject to the operation of the Divine ordinance. Thirdly, human nature is especially subject to God through its proper act, inasmuch as by its own will it obeys His command. This triple subjection to God Christ professes of Himself. The first (Matt. xix. 17): *Why askest thou Me concerning good? One is good, God.* And on this Jerome remarks:

He who had called Him a good master, and had not confessed Him to be God or the Son of God, learns that no man, however holy, is good in comparison with God. And hereby He gave us to understand that He Himself, in His human nature, did not attain to the height of Divine goodness. And because *in such things as are great, but not in bulk, to be great is the same as to be good,* as Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi. 8), for this reason the Father is said to be greater than Christ in His human nature. The second subjection is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as all that befell Christ is believed to have happened by Divine appointment; hence Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iv.) that Christ *is subject to the ordinance of God the Father.* And this is the subjection of subservience. whereby *every creature serves God* (Judith xvi. 17), being subject to His ordinance, according to Wis. xvi. 24: *The creature serving Thee the Creator.* And in this way the Son of God (Phil. ii. 7) is said to have taken *the form of a servant.* The third subjection He attributes to Himself, saying (Jo. viii. 29): *I do always the things that please Him.* And this is the subjection to the Father, of obedience unto death. Hence it is written (Phil. ii. 8) that he became *obedient* to the Father *unto death.*

Reply Obj. 1. As we are not to understand that Christ is a creature simply, but only in His human nature, whether this qualification be added or not, as stated above (Q. XVI., A. 8), so also we are to understand that Christ is subject to the Father not simply but in His human nature, even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is better to add this qualification in order to avoid the error of Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father.

Reply Obj. 2. The relation of subservience and dominion is based upon action and passion, inasmuch as it belongs to a servant to be moved by the will of his master. Now to act is not attributed to the nature as agent, but to the person, since *acts belong to supposita and to singulars,* according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* i. 1). Nevertheless action is attributed to the nature as to that whereby the person or hypostasis acts. Hence, although the nature is

not properly said to rule or serve, yet every hypostasis or person may be properly said to be ruling or serving in this or that nature. And in this way nothing prevents Christ being subject or servant to the Father in human nature.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 8): *Christ will give the kingdom to God and the Father, when He has brought the faithful, over whom He now reigns by faith, to the vision—i.e.,* to see the essence common to the Father and the Son: and then He will be totally subject to the Father not only in Himself, but also in His members by the full participation of the Godhead. And then all things will be fully subject to Him by the final accomplishment of His will concerning them; although even now all things are subject to Him as regards His power, according to Matt. xxviii. 18: *All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST IS SUBJECT TO HIMSELF?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not subject to Himself. For Cyril says in a synodal letter which the Council of Ephesus* received: *Christ is neither servant nor master of Himself. It is foolish, or rather impious, to think or say this.* And Damascene says the same (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 21): *The one Being, Christ, cannot be the servant or master of Himself.* Now Christ is said to be the servant of the Father inasmuch as He is subject to Him. Hence Christ is not subject to Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, servant has reference to master. Now nothing has a relation to itself, hence Hilary says (*De Trin.* vii.) that nothing is like or equal to itself. Hence Christ cannot be said to be the servant of Himself, and consequently to be subject to Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, *as the rational soul and flesh are one man; so God and man are one Christ,* as Athanasius says (*Symb. Fid.*). Now man is not said to be subject to him-

* Part I., ch. xxvi.

self or servant to himself or greater than himself because his body is subject to his soul. Therefore, Christ is not said to be subject to Himself because His Manhood is subject to His Godhead.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* i. 7): *Truth shows in this way* (*i.e.*, whereby the Father is greater than Christ in human nature) *that the Son is less than Himself.*

Further, as he argues (*ibid.*), the form of a servant was so taken by the Son of God that the form of God was not lost. But because of the form of God, which is common to the Father and the Son, the Father is greater than the Son in human nature. Therefore the Son is greater than Himself in human nature.

Further, Christ in His human nature is the servant of God the Father, according to John xx. 17: *I ascend to My Father and to your Father, to My God and your God.* Now whoever is the servant of the Father is the servant of the Son; otherwise not everything that belongs to the Father would belong to the Son. Therefore Christ is His own servant and is subject to Himself.

I answer that, As was said above (A. 1 *ad* 2), to be master or servant is attributed to a person or hypostasis according to a nature. Hence when it is said that Christ is the master or servant of Himself, or that the Word of God is the Master of the Man Christ, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that this is understood to be said by reason of another hypostasis or person, as if there was the person of the Word of God ruling and the person of the man serving; and this is the heresy of Nestorius. Hence in the condemnation of Nestorius it is said in the Council of Ephesus:* *If anyone say that the Word begotten of God the Father is the God or Lord of Christ, and does not rather confess the same to be at once God and man as the Word made flesh, according to the Scriptures, let him be anathema.* And in this sense it is denied by Cyril and Damascene (*Obj.* 1); and in the same sense must it be denied that Christ is less than Himself or subject

* Part III., ch. i., anath. 6.

to Himself. Secondly, it may be understood of the diversity of natures in the one person or hypostasis. And thus we may say that in one of them, in which He agrees with the Father, He presides and rules together with the Father; and in the other nature, in which He agrees with us, He is subject and serves, and in this sense Augustine says that *the Son is less than Himself.*

Yet it must be borne in mind that since this name *Christ* is the name of a Person, even as the name *Son,* those things can be predicated essentially and absolutely of Christ which belong to Him by reason of the Person, Which is eternal; and especially those relations which seem more properly to pertain to the Person or the hypostasis. But whatever pertains to Him in His human nature is rather to be attributed to Him with a qualification; so that we say that Christ is simply greatest, Lord, Ruler, whereas to be subject or servant or less is to be attributed to Him with the qualification, *in His human nature.*

Reply Obj. 1. Cyril and Damascene deny that Christ is the head of Himself inasmuch as this implies a plurality of supposita, which is required in order that anyone may be the master of another.

Reply Obj. 2. Simply speaking it is necessary that the master and the servant should be distinct; yet a certain notion of mastership and subservience may be preserved inasmuch as the same one is master of Himself in different respects.

Reply Obj. 3. On account of the divers parts of man, one of which is superior and the other inferior, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v. 11) that there is justice between a man and himself inasmuch as the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason. Hence this way a man may be said to be subject and subservient to Himself as regards His different parts.

To the other arguments, the reply is clear from what has been said. For Augustine asserts that the Son is less than, or subject to, Himself in His human nature, and not by a diversity of supposita.

QUESTION XXI.

OF CHRIST'S PRAYER.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider Christ's prayer; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is becoming that Christ should pray? (2) Whether it pertains to Him in respect of His sensuality? (3) Whether it is becoming to Him to pray for Himself or only for others? (4) Whether every prayer of His was heard?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS BECOMING TO CHRIST TO PRAY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem unbecoming that Christ should pray. For, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 24), *prayer is the asking for becoming things from God.* But since Christ could do all things, it does not seem becoming to Him to ask anything from anyone. Therefore it does not seem fitting that Christ should pray.

Obj. 2. Further, we need not ask in prayer for what we know for certain will happen; thus, we do not pray that the sun may rise to-morrow. Nor is it fitting that anyone should ask in prayer for what he knows will not happen. But Christ in all things knew what would happen. Therefore it was not fitting that He should ask anything in prayer.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. *loc cit.*) that *prayer is the raising up of the mind to God.* Now Christ's mind needed no uplifting to God, since His mind was always united to God, not only by the union of the hypostasis, but by the fruition of beatitude. Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should pray.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke vi. 12) *And it came to pass in those days, that He went out into a mountain, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God.*

I answer that, As was said in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. LXXXIII., AA. 1, 2), prayer is the unfolding of our will to God, that He may fulfil it. If, therefore, there had been but one will in Christ—viz., the Divine—it would nowise belong to Him to pray, since the Divine will of itself is effective of whatever He wishes by it, according to Ps. cxxxiv. 6: *Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.* But because the Divine and the human wills are distinct in Christ, and the human will of itself is not efficacious enough to do what it wishes, except by Divine power, hence to pray belongs to Christ as man and as having a human will.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ as God and not as man was able to carry out all He wished, since as man He was not omnipotent, as stated above (Q. XIII., A. 1). Nevertheless being both God and man, He wished to offer prayers to the Father, not as though He were incompetent, but for our instruction. First, that He might show Himself to be from the Father; hence He says (Jo. xi. 42): *Because of the people who stand about I have said it* (*i.e.*, the words of the prayer) *that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me.* Hence Hilary says (*De Trin.* x.): *He did not need prayer. It was for us He prayed, lest the Son should be unknown.* Secondly, to give us an example of prayer; hence Ambrose says (on Luke vi. 12): *Be not deceived, nor think that the Son of God prays as a weakling, in order to beseech what He cannot effect. For the Author of power, the Master of obedience persuades us to the precepts of virtue by His example.* Hence Augustine says (*Tract.* civ. *in Joan.*): *Our Lord in the form of a servant could have prayed in silence, if need be, but He wished to show Himself a suppliant of the Father, in such sort as to bear in mind that He was our Teacher.*

Reply Obj. 2. Amongst the other things which He knew

would happen, He knew that some would be brought about by His prayer; and for these He not unbecomingly besought God.

Reply Obj. 3. To rise is nothing more than to move towards what is above. Now movement is taken in two ways, as is said *De Anima* iii. 7; first, strictly, according as it implies the passing from potentiality to act, inasmuch as it is the act of something imperfect, and thus to rise pertains to what is potentially and not actually above. Now in this sense, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. *loc. cit.*), *the human mind of Christ did not need to rise to God, since it was ever united to God both by personal being and by the blessed vision.* Secondly, movement signifies the act of something perfect—*i.e.*, something existing in act, as to understand and to feel are called movements; and in this sense the mind of Christ was always raised up to God, since He was always contemplating Him as existing above Himself.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT PERTAINS TO CHRIST TO PRAY ACCORDING TO HIS SENSUALITY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it pertains to Christ to pray according to His sensuality. For it is written (Ps. lxxxiii. 3) in the person of Christ: *My heart and My flesh have rejoiced in the Living God.* Now sensuality is called the appetite of the flesh. Hence Christ's sensuality could ascend to the Living God by rejoicing; and with equal reason by praying.

Obj. 2. Further, prayer would seem to pertain to that which desires what is besought. Now Christ besought something that His sensuality desired when He said (Matt. xxvi. 39): *Let this chalice pass from Me.* Therefore Christ's sensuality prayed.

Obj. 3. Further, it is a greater thing to be united to God

in person than to mount to Him in prayer. But the sensuality was assumed by God to the unity of Person, even as every other part of human nature. Much more, therefore, could it mount to God by prayer.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. ii. 7) that the Son of God in the nature that He assumed was *made in the likeness of men.* But the rest of men do not pray with their sensuality. Therefore, neither did Christ pray according to His sensuality.

I answer that, To pray according to sensuality may be understood in two ways. First as if prayer itself were an act of the sensuality; and in this sense Christ did not pray with His sensuality, since His sensuality was of the same nature and species in Christ as in us. Now in us the sensuality cannot pray for two reasons; first because the movement of the sensuality cannot transcend sensible things, and, consequently, it cannot mount to God, which is required for prayer; secondly, because prayer implies a certain ordering inasmuch as we desire something to be fulfilled by God; and this is the work of reason alone. Hence prayer is an act of the reason, as was said in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. LXXXIII., A. 1).

Secondly, we may be said to pray according to the sensuality when our prayer lays before God what is in our appetite of sensuality; and in this sense Christ prayed with His sensuality inasmuch as His prayer expressed the desire of His sensuality, as if it were the advocate of the sensuality —and this, that He might teach us three things. First, to show that He had taken a true human nature, with all its natural affections: secondly, to show that a man may wish with his natural desire what God does not wish: thirdly, to show that man should subject his own will to the Divine will. Hence Augustine says in the Enchiridion (*Serm.* 1 *in Ps.* xxxii.): *Christ acting as a man, shows the proper will of a man when He says 'Let this chalice pass from Me'; for this was the human will desiring something proper to itself and, so to say, private. But because He wishes man to be righteous and to be directed to God, He adds:*

'Nevertheless not as I will but as Thou wilt,' as if to say, 'See thyself in Me, for thou canst desire something proper to thee, even though God wishes something else."

Reply Obj. 1. The flesh rejoices in the Living God, not by the act of the flesh mounting to God, but by the outpouring of the heart into the flesh, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite follows the movement of the rational appetite.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the sensuality wished what the reason besought, it did not belong to the sensuality to seek this by praying, but to the reason, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. The union in person is according to the personal being, which pertains to every part of the human nature; but the uplifting of prayer is by an act which pertains only to the reason, as stated above. Hence there is no parity.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD PRAY FOR HIMSELF?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should pray for Himself. For Hilary says (*De Trin.* x.): *Although His word of beseeching did not benefit Himself, yet He spoke for the profit of our faith.* Hence it seems that Christ prayed not for Himself but for us.

Obj. 2. Further, no one prays save for what He wishes, because, as was said (A. 1), prayer is an unfolding of our will to God that He may fulfil it. Now Christ wished to suffer what He suffered. For Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxvi.): *A man, though unwilling, is often angry; though unwilling, is sad; though unwilling, sleeps; though unwilling, hungers and thirsts. But He* (*i.e.*, Christ) *did all these things, because He wished.* Therefore it was not fitting that He should pray for Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, Cyprian says (*De Orat. Dom.*): *The Doctor of Peace and Master of Unity did not wish prayers to be offered individually and privately, lest when we prayed*

we should pray for ourselves alone. Now Christ did what He taught, according to Acts i. 1 : *Jesus began to do and to teach.* Therefore Christ never prayed for Himself alone.

On the contrary, Our Lord Himself said while praying (Jo. xvii. 1) : *Glorify Thy Son.*

I answer that, Christ prayed for Himself in two ways. First, by expressing the desire of His sensuality, as stated above (A. 2); or also of His simple will, considered as a nature; as when He prayed that the chalice of His Passion might pass from Him (Matt. xxvi. 39). Secondly, by expressing the desire of His deliberate will, which is considered as reason; as when He prayed for the glory of His Resurrection (Jo. xvii. 1). And this is reasonable. For as we have said above (A. 1 *ad* 1) Christ wished to pray to His Father in order to give us an example of praying; and also to show that His Father is the author both of His eternal procession in the Divine Nature, and of all the good that He possesses in the human nature. Now just as in His human nature He had already received certain gifts from His Father, so there were other gifts which He had not yet received, but which He expected to receive. And therefore, as He gave thanks to the Father for gifts already received in His human nature, by acknowledging Him as the author thereof, as we read (Matt. xxvi. 27 and Jo. xi. 41) : so also, in recognition of His Father, He besought Him in prayer for those gifts still due to Him in His human nature, such as the glory of His body, and the like. And in this He gave us an example, that we should give thanks for benefits received, and ask in prayer for those we have not as yet.

Reply Obj. 1. Hilary is speaking of vocal prayer, which was not necessary to Him for His own sake, but only for ours. Whence he says pointedly that *His word of beseeching did not benefit Himself.* For if *the Lord hears the desire of the poor,* as is said in the Psalm (ix. 38), much more the mere will of Christ has the force of a prayer with the Father : wherefore He said (Jo. xi. 42) : *I know that Thou hearest Me always, but because of the people who*

stand about have I said it, that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me.

Reply Obj. 2. Christ wished indeed to suffer what He suffered, at that particular time: nevertheless He wished to obtain, after His passion, the glory of His body, which as yet He had not. This glory He expected to receive from His Father as the author thereof, and therefore it was fitting that He should pray to Him for it.

Reply Obj. 3. This very glory which Christ, while praying, besought for Himself, pertained to the salvation of others according to Rom. iv. 25: *He rose again for our justification.* Consequently the prayer which He offered for Himself was also in a manner offered for others. So also anyone that asks a boon of God that he may use it for the good of others, prays not only for himself, but also for others.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST'S PRAYER WAS ALWAYS HEARD?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's prayer was not always heard. For He besought that the chalice of His passion might be taken from Him, as we read (Matt. xxvi. 39): and yet it was not taken from Him. Therefore it seems that not every prayer of His was heard.

Obj. 2. Further, He prayed that the sin of those who crucified Him might be forgiven, as is related (Luke xxiii. 34). Yet not all were pardoned this sin, since the Jews were punished on account thereof. Therefore it seems that not every prayer of His was heard.

Obj. 3. Further, Our Lord prayed for them *who would believe in Him through the word* of the apostles, that they *might all be one in Him,* and that they might attain to being with Him (Jo. xvii. 20, 21, 24). But not all attain to this. Therefore not every prayer of His was heard.

Obj. 4. Further, it is said (Ps. xxi. 3) in the person of Christ: *I shall cry by day, and Thou wilt not hear.* Not every prayer of His, therefore, was heard.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. v. 7): *With a strong cry and tears offering up prayers . . . He was heard for His reverence.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), prayer is a certain manifestation of the human will. Wherefore, then is the request of one who prays granted, when his will is fulfilled. Now absolutely speaking the will of man is the will of reason; for we will absolutely that which we will in accordance with reason's deliberation. Whereas what we will in accordance with the movement of sensuality, or even of the simple will, which is considered as nature, is willed not absolutely but conditionally (*secundum quid*)—that is, provided no obstacle be discovered by reason's deliberation. Wherefore such a will should rather be called a *velleity* than an absolute will; because one would will (*vellet*) if there were no obstacle.

But according to the will of reason, Christ willed nothing but what He knew God to will. Wherefore every absolute will of Christ, even human, was fulfilled, because it was in conformity with God; and consequently His every prayer was fulfilled. For in this respect also is it that other men's prayers are fulfilled, in that their will is in conformity with God, according to Rom. viii. 27: *And He that searcheth the hearts knoweth,* that is, approves of, *what the Spirit desireth,* that is, what the Spirit makes the saints to desire: *because He asketh for the saints according to God,* that is, in conformity with the Divine will.

Reply Obj. 1. This prayer for the passing of the chalice is variously explained by the Saints. For Hilary (*super Matth.*, 31) says: *When He asks that this may pass from Him, He does not pray that it may pass by Him, but that others may share in that which passes on from Him to them; so that the sense is: As I am partaking of the chalice of the passion, so may others drink of it, with unfailing hope, with unflinching anguish, without fear of death.*

Or, according to Jerome (on Matt. xxvi. 39): *He says pointedly, 'This chalice,' that is of the Jewish people, who cannot allege ignorance as an excuse for putting Me to*

death, since they have the Law and the Prophets, who foretold concerning Me.

Or, according to Dionysius of Alexandria (*De Martyr. ad Origen.* 7): *When He says 'Remove this chalice from Me,' He does not mean, 'Let it not come to Me'; for if it come not, it cannot be removed. But, as that which passes is neither untouched nor yet permanent, so the Saviour beseeches, that a slightly pressing trial may be repulsed.*

Lastly, Ambrose, Origen and Chrysostom say that He prayed thus *as man,* being reluctant to die according to His natural will.

Thus, therefore, whether we understand, according to Hilary, that He thus prayed that other martyrs might be imitators of His Passion, or that He prayed that the fear of drinking His chalice might not trouble Him, or that death might not withhold Him, His prayer was entirely fulfilled. But if we understand that He prayed that He might not drink the chalice of His passion and death; or that He might not drink it at the hands of the Jews; what He besought was not indeed fulfilled, because His reason which formed the petition did not desire its fulfilment, but for our instruction, it was His will to make known to us His natural will, and the movement of His sensuality, which was His as man.

Reply Obj. 2. Our Lord did not pray for all those who crucified Him, as neither did He for all those who would believe in Him; but for those only who were predestinated to obtain eternal life through Him.

Wherefore the reply to the third objection is also manifest.

Reply Obj. 4. When He says: *I shall cry and Thou wilt not hear,* we must take this as referring to the desire of sensuality, which shunned death. But He is heard as to the desire of His reason, as stated above.

QUESTION XXII.

OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST.

(In Six Articles.)

WE have now to consider the Priesthood of Christ; and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest? (2) Of the victim offered by this priest. (3) Of the effect of this priesthood. (4) Whether the effect of His priesthood pertains to Himself, or only to others? (5) Of the eternal duration of His priesthood. (6) Whether He should be called *a priest according to the order of Melchisedech?*

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE A PRIEST?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that Christ should be a priest. For a priest is less than an angel; whence it is written (Zach. iii. 1): *The Lord showed me the high-priest standing before the angel of the Lord.* But Christ is greater than the angels, according to Heb. i. 4: *Being made so much better than the angels, as He hath inherited a more excellent name than they.* Therefore it is unfitting that Christ should be a priest.

Obj. 2. Further, things which were in the Old Testament were figures of Christ, according to Col. ii. 17: *Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's.* But Christ was not descended from the priests of the Old Law, for the Apostle says (Heb. vii. 14): *It is evident that Our Lord sprang out of Juda, in which tribe Moses spoke nothing concerning priests.* Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should be a priest.

Obj. 3. Further, in the Old Law, which is a figure of Christ, the lawgivers and the priests were distinct: wherefore the Lord said to Moses the lawgiver (Exod. xxviii. 1): *Take unto thee Aaron, thy brother, . . . that he* (Vulg., *they*) *may minister to Me in the priest's office.* But Christ is the giver of the New Law, according to Jer. xxxi. 33: *I will give My law in their bowels.* Therefore it is unfitting that Christ should be a priest.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. iv. 14): *We have* (Vulg., *Having*) *therefore a great high-priest that hath passed into the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God.*

I answer that, The office proper to a priest is to be a mediator between God and the people: to wit, inasmuch as He bestows Divine things on the people, wherefore *sacerdos* (priest) means a giver of sacred things (*sacra dans*), according to Mal. ii. 7: *They shall seek the law at his mouth;* and again, forasmuch as he offers up the people's prayers to God, and, in a manner, makes satisfaction to God for their sins; wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. v. 1): *Every high-priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins.* Now this is most befitting to Christ. For through Him are gifts bestowed on men, according to 2 Pet. i. 4: *By Whom* (*i.e.*, Christ) *He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.* Moreover, He reconciled the human race to God, according to Col. i. 19, 20: *In Him* (*i.e.*, Christ) *it hath well pleased* (*the Father*) *that all fulness should dwell, and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself.* Therefore it is most fitting that Christ should be a priest.

Reply Obj. 1. Hierarchical power appertains to the angels, inasmuch as they also are between God and man, as Dionysius explains (*Cœl. Hier.* ix.), so that the priest himself, as being between God and man, is called an angel, according to Mal. ii. 7: *He is the angel of the Lord of hosts.* Now Christ was greater than the angels, not only in His Godhead, but also in His humanity, as having the

fulness of grace and glory. Wherefore also He had the hierarchical or priestly power in a higher degree than the angels, so that even the angels were ministers of His priesthood, according to Matt. iv. 11: *Angels came and ministered unto Him.* But, in regard to His passibility, He *was made a little lower than the angels,* as the Apostle says (Heb. ii. 9): and thus He was conformed to those wayfarers who are ordained to the priesthood.

Reply Obj. 2. As Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 26): *What is like in every particular must be, of course, identical, and not a copy.* Since, therefore, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, He did not wish to be born of the stock of the figurative priests, that it might be made clear that His priesthood is not quite the same as theirs, but differs therefrom as truth from figure.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. VII., A. 7 *ad* 1), other men have certain graces distributed among them: but Christ, as being the Head of all, has the perfection of all graces. Wherefore, as to others, one is a lawgiver, another is a priest, another is a king; but all these concur in Christ, as the fount of all grace. Hence it is written (Isa. xxxiii. 22): *The Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our King: He will* come and *save us.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST WAS HIMSELF BOTH PRIEST AND VICTIM?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ Himself was not both priest and victim. For it is the duty of the priest to slay the victim. But Christ did not kill Himself. Therefore He was not both priest and victim.

Obj. 2. Further, the priesthood of Christ has a greater similarity to the Jewish priesthood, instituted by God, than to the priesthood of the Gentiles, by which the demons were worshipped. Now in the Old Law man was never offered

up in sacrifice: whereas this was very much to be reprehended in the sacrifices of the Gentiles, according to Ps. cv. 38: *They shed innocent blood; the blood of their sons and of their daughters, which they sacrificed to the idols of Chanaan.* Therefore in Christ's priesthood the Man Christ should not have been the victim.

Obj. 3. Further, every victim, through being offered to God, is consecrated to God. But the humanity of Christ was from the beginning consecrated and united to God. Therefore it cannot be said fittingly that Christ as man was a victim.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. v. 2): *Christ hath loved us, and hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a victim* (Douay, *sacrifice*) *to God for an odour of sweetness.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 5): *Every visible sacrifice is a sacrament, that is a sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice.* Now the invisible sacrifice is that by which a man offers his spirit to God, according to Ps. l. 19: *A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.* Wherefore, whatever is offered to God in order to raise man's spirit to Him, may be called a sacrifice.

Now man requires to offer sacrifice for three reasons. First, for the remission of sin, by which he is turned away from God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. v. 1) that it appertains to the priest *to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins.* Secondly, that man may be preserved in a state of grace, by ever adhering to God, wherein his peace and salvation consist. Wherefore under the Old Law the sacrifice of peace-offerings was offered up for the salvation of the offerers, as is prescribed in the third chapter of Leviticus. Thirdly, in order that the spirit of man be perfectly united to God: which will be most perfectly realized in glory. Hence, under the Old Law, the holocaust was offered, so called because the victim was wholly burnt, as we read in the first chapter of Leviticus.

Now these effects were conferred on us by the humanity of Christ. For, in the first place, our sins were blotted out,

according to Rom. iv. 25: *Who was delivered up for our sins.* Secondly, through Him we received the grace of salvation, according to Heb. v. 9: *He became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation.* Thirdly, through Him we have acquired the perfection of glory, according to Heb. x. 19: *We have* (Vulg., *Having*) *a confidence in the entering into the Holies* (*i.e.*, the heavenly glory) *through His Blood.* Therefore Christ Himself, as man, was not only priest, but also a perfect victim, being at the same time victim for sin, victim for a peace-offering, and a holocaust.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ did not slay Himself, but of His own free-will He exposed Himself to death, according to Is. liii. 7: *He was offered because it was His own will.* Thus He is said to have offered Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. The slaying of the Man Christ may be referred to a twofold will. First, to the will of those who slew Him: and in this respect He was not a victim: for the slayers of Christ are not accounted as offering a sacrifice to God, but as guilty of a great crime: a similitude of which was borne by the wicked sacrifices of the Gentiles, in which they offered up men to idols. Secondly, the slaying of Christ may be considered in reference to the will of the Sufferer, Who freely offered Himself to suffering. In this respect He is a victim, and in this He differs from the sacrifices of the Gentiles.

(*The reply to the third objection is wanting in the original manuscripts, but it may be gathered from the above.*—ED.)*

* Some editions, however, give the following reply: *Reply Obj.* 3. The fact that Christ's manhood was holy from its beginning does not prevent that same manhood, when it was offered to God in the Passion, being sanctified in a new way—namely, as a victim actually offered then. For it acquired then the actual holiness of a victim, from the charity which it had from the beginning, and from the grace of union sanctifying it absolutely.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EFFECT OF CHRIST'S PRIESTHOOD IS THE EXPIATION OF SINS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the effect of Christ's priesthood is not the expiation of sins. For it belongs to God alone to blot out sins, according to Is. xliii. 25: *I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake.* But Christ is priest, not as God, but as man. Therefore the priesthood of Christ does not expiate sins.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (Heb. x. 1-3) that the victims of the Old Testament could not *make* (the comers thereunto) *perfect: for then they would have ceased to be offered; because the worshippers once cleansed should have no conscience of sin any longer; but in them there is made a commemoration of sins every year.* But in like manner under the priesthood of Christ a commemoration of sins is made in the words: *Forgive us our trespasses* (Matt. vi. 12). Moreover, the Sacrifice is offered continuously in the Church; wherefore again we say: *Give us this day our daily bread.* Therefore sins are not expiated by the priesthood of Christ.

Obj. 3. Further, in the sin-offerings of the Old Law, a he-goat was mostly offered for the sin of a prince, a she-goat for the sin of some private individual, a calf for the sin of a priest, as we gather from Lev. iv. 3, 23, 28. But Christ is compared to none of these, but to the lamb, according to Jer. xi. 19: *I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim.* Therefore it seems that His priesthood does not expiate sins.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. ix. 14): *The blood of Christ, Who by the Holy Ghost offered Himself unspotted unto God, shall cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God.* But dead works denote sins. Therefore the priesthood of Christ has the power to cleanse from sins.

I answer that, Two things are required for the perfect cleansing from sins, corresponding to the two things comprised in sin—namely, the stain of sin and the debt of punishment. The stain of sin is, indeed, blotted out by grace, by which the sinner's heart is turned to God: whereas the debt of punishment is entirely removed by the satisfaction that man offers to God. Now the priesthood of Christ produces both these effects. For by its virtue grace is given to us, by which our hearts are turned to God, according to Rom. iii. 24, 25: *Being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood.* Moreover, He satisfied for us fully, inasmuch as *He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows* (Isa. liii. 4). Wherefore it is clear that the priesthood of Christ has full power to expiate sins.

Reply Obj. 1. Although Christ was a priest, not as God, but as man, yet one and the same was both priest and God. Wherefore in the Council of Ephesus* we read: *If anyone say that the very Word of God did not become our High-Priest and Apostle, when He become flesh and a man like us, but altogether another one, the man born of a woman, let him be anathema.* Hence in so far as His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine, that sacrifice was most efficacious for the blotting out of sins. For this reason Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv. 14): *So that, since four things are to be observed in every sacrifice—to whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, for whom it is offered; the same one true Mediator reconciling us to God by the sacrifice of peace, was one with Him to Whom it was offered, united in Himself those for whom He offered it, at the same time offered it Himself, and was Himself that which He offered.*

Reply Obj. 2. Sins are commemorated in the New Law, not on account of the inefficacy of the priesthood of Christ, as though sins were not sufficiently expiated by Him: but in regard to those who either are not willing to be partici-

* Part III., ch. i., anath. 10.

pators in His sacrifice, such as unbelievers, for whose sins we pray that they be converted; or who, after taking part in this sacrifice, fall away from it by whatsoever kind of sin. The Sacrifice which is offered every day in the Church is not distinct from that which Christ Himself offered, but is a commemoration thereof. Wherefore Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x. 20): *Christ Himself both is the priest who offers it and the victim: the sacred token of which He wished to be the daily Sacrifice of the Church.*

Reply Obj. 3. As Origen says (*Sup. Joan.* i. 29), though various animals were offered up under the Old Law, yet the daily sacrifice, which was offered up morning and evening, was a lamb, as appears from Num. xxxviii. 3, 4. By which it was signified that the offering up of the true lamb—*i.e.*, Christ—was the culminating sacrifice of all. Hence (Jo. i. 29) it is said: *Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins* (Vulg., *sin*) *of the world.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EFFECT OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST PERTAINED NOT ONLY TO OTHERS, BUT ALSO TO HIMSELF?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the effect of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others, but also to Himself. For it belongs to the priest's office to pray for the people, according to 2 Mach. i. 23: *The priests made prayer while the sacrifice was consuming.* Now Christ prayed not only for others, but also for Himself, as we have said above (Q. XXI., A. 3), and as expressly stated (Heb. v. 7): *In the days of His flesh, with a strong cry and tears, He offered* (Vulg., *offering*) *up prayers and supplications to Him that was able to save Him from death.* Therefore the priesthood of Christ had an effect not only in others, but also in Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, in His passion Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice. But by His passion He merited, not only for others, but also for Himself, as stated above (Q. XIX.,

AA. 3, 4). Therefore the priesthood of Christ had an effect not only in others, but also in Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ. But the priest of the Old Law offered sacrifice not only for others, but also for himself: for it is written (Lev. xvi. 17) that *the high-priest goeth into the sanctuary to pray for himself and his house, and for the whole congregation of Israel.* Therefore the priesthood of Christ also had an effect not merely in others, but also in Himself.

On the contrary, We read in the acts of the Council of Ephesus:* *If anyone say that Christ offered sacrifice for Himself, and not rather for us alone (for He Who knew not sin needed no sacrifice), let him be anathema.* But the priest's office consists principally in offering sacrifice. Therefore the priesthood of Christ had no effect in Himself.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a priest is set between God and man. Now he needs someone between himself and God, who of himself cannot approach to God; and such a one is subject to the priesthood by sharing in the effect thereof. But this cannot be said of Christ; for the Apostle says (Heb. vii. 25): *Coming of Himself to God, always living to make intercession for us* (Vulg., *He is able to save for ever them that come to God by Him; always living,* etc.). And therefore it is not fitting for Christ to be the recipient of the effect of His priesthood, but rather to communicate it to others. For the influence of the first agent in every genus is such that it receives nothing in that genus: thus the sun gives but does not receive light; fire gives but does not receive heat. Now Christ is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood: for the priest of the Old Law was a figure of Him; while the priest of the New Law works in His person, according to 2 Cor. ii. 10: *For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.* Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should receive the effect of His priesthood.

* Part III., ch. i., anath. 10.

Reply Obj. 1. Although prayer is befitting to priests, it is not their proper office, for it is befitting to everyone to pray both for himself and for others, according to Jas. v. 16: *Pray for one another that you may be saved.* And so we may say that the prayer by which Christ prayed for Himself was not an action of His priesthood. But this answer seems to be precluded by the Apostle, who, after saying (Heb. v. 6), *Thou art a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech,* adds, *Who in the days of His flesh offering up prayers,* etc., as quoted above (*Obj.* 1): so that it seems that the prayer which Christ offered pertained to His priesthood. We must therefore say that other priests partake in the effect of their priesthood, not as priests, but as sinners, as we shall state farther on (*ad* 3). But Christ had, simply speaking, no sin; though He had the *likeness of sin in the flesh* (Vulg., *of sinful flesh*), as is written Rom. viii. 3. And, consequently, we must not say simply that He partook of the effect of His priesthood but with this qualification—in regard to the passibility of the flesh. Wherefore he adds pointedly, *that was able to save Him from death.*

Reply Obj. 2. Two things may be considered in the offering of a sacrifice by any priest—namely, the sacrifice itself which is offered, and the devotion of the offerer. Now the proper effect of priesthood is that which results from the sacrifice itself. But Christ obtained a result from His passion, not as by virtue of the sacrifice, which is offered by way of satisfaction, but by the very devotion with which out of charity He humbly endured the passion.

Reply Obj. 3. A figure cannot equal the reality, wherefore the figural priest of the Old Law could not attain to such perfection as not to need a sacrifice of satisfaction. But Christ did not stand in need of this. Consequently, there is no comparison between the two; and this is what the Apostle says (Heb. vii. 28): *The Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity; but the word of the oath, which was since the Law, the Son Who is perfected for evermore.*

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST ENDURES FOR EVER?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the priesthood of Christ does not endure for ever. For as stated above (A. 4 *ad* 1, 3) those alone need the effect of the priesthood who have the weakness of sin, which can be expiated by the priest's sacrifice. But this will not be for ever. For in the Saints there will be no weakness, according to Isa. lx. 21: *Thy people shall be all just:* while no expiation will be possible for the weakness of sin, since *there is no redemption in hell* (*Office of the Dead,* Resp. vii.). Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever.

Obj. 2. Further, the priesthood of Christ was made manifest most of all in His passion and death, when *by His own blood He entered into the Holies* (*Heb.* ix. 12). But the passion and death of Christ will not endure for ever, as stated Rom. vi. 9: *Christ rising again from the dead, dieth now no more.* Therefore the priesthood of Christ will not endure for ever.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ is a priest, not as God, but as man. But at one time Christ was not man, namely during the three days He lay dead. Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. cix. 4): *Thou art a priest for ever.*

I answer that, In the priestly office, we may consider two things: first, the offering of the sacrifice; secondly, the consummation of the sacrifice, consisting in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is offered, obtain the end of the sacrifice. Now the end of the sacrifice which Christ offered consisted not in temporal but in eternal good, which we obtain through His death, according to Heb. ix. 11: *Christ is* (Vulg., *being come*) *a high-priest of the good things to come;* for which reason the priesthood of Christ is said to be eternal. Now this consummation of Christ's sacrifice

was foreshadowed in this, that the high-priest of the Old Law, once a year, entered into the Holy of Holies with the blood of a he-goat and a calf, as laid down, Lev. xvi. 11, and yet he offered up the he-goat and calf not within the Holy of Holies, but without. In like manner Christ entered into the Holy of Holies—that is, into heaven—and prepared the way for us, that we might enter by the virtue of His blood, which He shed for us on earth.

Reply Obj. 1. The Saints who will be in heaven will not need any further expiation by the priesthood of Christ, but having expiated, they will need consummation through Christ Himself, on Whom their glory depends, as is written (Apoc. xxi. 23): *The glory of God hath enlightened it*—that is, the city of the Saints—*and the Lamb is the lamp thereof.*

Reply Obj. 2. Although Christ's passion and death are not to be repeated, yet the virtue of that Victim endures for ever, for, as it is written (Heb. x. 14), *by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.*

Wherefore the reply to the third objection is clear.

As to the unity of this sacrifice, it was foreshadowed in the Law in that, once a year, the high-priest of the Law entered into the Holies, with a solemn oblation of blood, as set down, Lev. xvi. 11. But the figure fell short of the reality in this, that the victim had not an everlasting virtue, for which reason those sacrifices were renewed every year.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST WAS ACCORDING TO THE ORDER OF MELCHISEDECH?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's priesthood was not according to the order of Melchisedech. For Christ is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood, as being the principal priest. Now that which is principal is not secondary in regard to others, but others are secondary in

its regard. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest according to the order of Melchisedech.

Obj. 2. Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was more akin to Christ's priesthood than was the priesthood that existed before the Law. But the nearer the sacraments were to Christ, the more clearly they signified Him; as is clear from what we have said in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. II., A. 7). Therefore the priesthood of Christ should be denominated after the priesthood of the Law, rather than after the order of Melchisedech, which was before the Law.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Heb. vii. 2, 3): *That is 'king of peace,' without father, without mother, without genealogy; having neither beginning of days nor ending of life:* which can be referred only to the Son of God. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest according to the order of Melchisedech, as of some one else, but according to His own order.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. cix. 4): *Thou art a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech.*

I answer that, As above stated (A. 4 *ad* 3) the priesthood of the Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, not as adequately representing the reality, but as falling far short thereof: both because the priesthood of the Law did not wash away sins, and because it was not eternal, as the priesthood of Christ. Now the excellence of Christ's over the Levitical priesthood was foreshadowed in the priesthood of Melchisedech, who received tithes from Abraham, in whose loins the priesthood of the Law was tithed. Consequently the priesthood of Christ is said to be *according to the order of Melchisedech,* on account of the excellence of the true priesthood over the figural priesthood of the Law.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ is said to be according to the order of Melchisedech not as though the latter were a more excellent priest, but because he foreshadowed the excellence of Christ's over the Levitical priesthood.

Reply Obj. 2. Two things may be considered in Christ's priesthood: namely, the offering made by Christ, and (our)

partaking thereof. As to the actual offering, the priesthood of Christ was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of the Law, by reason of the shedding of blood, than by the priesthood of Melchisedech in which there was no blood-shedding. But if we consider the participation of this sacrifice and the effect thereof, wherein the excellence of Christ's priesthood over the priesthood of the Law principally consists, then the former was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of Melchisedech, who offered bread and wine, signifying, as Augustine says (*Tract.* xxvi. *in Joan.*) ecclesiastical unity, which is established by our taking part in the sacrifice of Christ.* Wherefore also in the New Law the true sacrifice of Christ is presented to the faithful under the form of bread and wine.

Reply Obj. 3. Melchisedech is described as *without father, without mother, without genealogy,* and as *having neither beginning of days nor ending of life,* not as though he had not these things, but because these details in his regard are not supplied by Holy Scripture. And in this it is that, as the Apostle says in the same passage, he is *likened unto the Son of God,* Who had no earthly father, no heavenly mother, and no genealogy, according to Isa. liii. 8: *Who shall declare His generation?* and Who in His Godhead has neither beginning nor end of days.

* *Cf.* Q. LXXIX., A. 1.

QUESTION XXIII.

OF ADOPTION AS BEFITTING TO CHRIST.

(In Four Articles.)

WE now come to consider whether adoption befits Christ: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons? (2) Whether this is fitting to God the Father alone? (3) Whether it is proper to man to be adopted to the sonship of God? (4) Whether Christ can be called the adopted Son?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT GOD SHOULD ADOPT SONS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not fitting that God should adopt sons. For, as jurists say, no one adopts anyone but a stranger as his son. But no one is a stranger in relation to God, Who is the Creator of all. Therefore it seems unfitting that God should adopt.

Obj. 2. Further, adoption seems to have been introduced in default of natural sonship. But in God there is natural sonship, as set down in the First Part (Q. XXVII., A. 2). Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt.

Obj. 3. Further, the purpose of adopting anyone is that he may succeed, as heir, the person who adopts him. But it does not seem possible for anyone to succeed God as heir, for He can never die. Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. i. 5) that *He hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children of God.* But the predestination of God is not ineffectual. Therefore God does adopt some as His sons.

I answer that, A man adopts someone as his son foras-

much as out of goodness he admits him as heir to his estate. Now God is infinitely good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of good things; especially rational creatures, who forasmuch as they are made to the image of God, are capable of Divine beatitude. And this consists in the enjoyment of God, by which also God Himself is happy and rich in Himself—that is, in the enjoyment of Himself. Now a man's inheritance is that which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch as God, of His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude, He is said to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds human adoption, forasmuch as God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy whom he adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already worthy.

Reply Obj. 1. Considered in his nature man is not a stranger in respect to God, as to the natural gifts bestowed on him: but he is as to the gifts of grace and glory; in regard to which he is adopted.

Reply Obj. 2. Man works in order to supply his wants: not so God, Who works in order to communicate to others the abundance of His perfection. Wherefore, as by the work of creation the Divine goodness is communicated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the work of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is communicated to men, according to Rom. viii. 29: *Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son.*

Reply Obj. 3. Spiritual goods can be possessed by many at the same time; not so material goods. Wherefore none can receive a material inheritance except the successor of a deceased person: whereas all receive the spiritual inheritance at the same time in its entirety without detriment to the ever-living Father.

Yet it might be said that God ceases to be, according as He is in us by faith, so as to begin to be in us by vision, as a gloss says on Rom. viii. 17: *If sons, heirs also.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT THE WHOLE TRINITY SHOULD ADOPT?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that the whole Trinity should adopt. For adoption is said of God in likeness to human custom. But among men those only adopt who can beget: and in God this can be applied only to the Father. Therefore in God the Father alone can adopt.

Obj. 2. Further, by adoption men become the brethren of Christ, according to Rom. viii. 29: *That He might be the first-born among many brethren.* Now brethren are the sons of the same father; wherefore Our Lord says (Jo. xx. 17): *I ascend to My Father and to your Father.* Therefore Christ's Father alone has adopted sons.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Gal. iv. 4, 5, 6): *God sent His Son . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are sons of God, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: 'Abba' ('Father').* Therefore it belongs to Him to adopt, Who has the Son and the Holy Ghost. But this belongs to the Father alone. Therefore it befits the Father alone to adopt.

On the contrary, It belongs to Him to adopt us as sons, Whom we can call Father; whence it is written (Rom. viii. 15): *You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: 'Abba' ('Father').* But when we say to God, *'Our Father,'* we address the whole Trinity: as is the case with the other names which are said of God in respect of creatures, as stated in the First Part (Q. XXXIII., A. 3, *Obj.* 1; *cf.* Q. XLV., A. 6). Therefore to adopt is befitting to the whole Trinity.

I answer that, There is this difference between an adopted son of God and the natural Son of God, that the latter is *begotten not made;* whereas the former is made, according to John i. 12: *He gave them power to be made the sons of*

God. Yet sometimes the adopted son is said to be begotten, by reason of the spiritual regeneration which is by grace, not by nature; wherefore it is written (Jas. i. 18): *Of His own will hath He begotten us by the word of truth.* Now although, in God, to beget belongs to the Person of the Father, yet to produce any effect in creatures is common to the whole Trinity, by reason of the oneness of their Nature: since, where there is one nature, there must needs be one power and one operation: whence Our Lord says (Jo. v. 19): *What things soever* the Father *doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.* Therefore it belongs to the whole Trinity to adopt men as sons of God.

Reply Obj. 1. All human individuals are not of one individual nature, so that there need be one operation and one effect of them all, as is the case in God. Consequently in this respect no comparison is possible.

Reply Obj. 2. By adoption we are made the brethren of Christ, as having with Him the same Father: Who, nevertheless, is His Father in one way, and ours in another. Whence pointedly Our Lord says, separately, *My Father,* and *Your Father* (Jo. xx. 17). For He is Christ's Father by natural generation; and this is proper to Him: whereas He is our Father by a voluntary operation, which is common to Him and to the Son and Holy Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity, as we are.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (A. 1 *ad* 2), adoptive sonship is a certain likeness of the eternal Sonship: just as all that takes place in time is a certain likeness of what has been from eternity. Now man is likened to the splendour of the Eternal Son by reason of the light of grace which is attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore adoption, though common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated to the Father as its author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Ghost, as imprinting on us the likeness of this exemplar.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO THE RATIONAL NATURE TO BE ADOPTED?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not proper to the rational nature to be adopted. For God is not said to be the Father of the rational creature, save by adoption. But God is called the Father even of the irrational creature, according to Job xxxviii. 28: *Who is father of the rain? Or who begot the drops of dew?* Therefore it is not proper to the rational creature to be adopted.

Obj. 2. Further, by reason of adoption some are called sons of God. But to be sons of God seems to be properly attributed by the Scriptures to the angels; according to Job i. 6: *On a certain day when the sons of God came to stand before the Lord.* Therefore it is not proper to the rational creature to be adopted.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is proper to a nature, belongs to all that have that nature: just as risibility belongs to all men. But to be adopted does not belong to every rational nature. Therefore it is not proper to human nature.

On the contrary, Adopted sons are the *heirs of God,* as is stated Rom. viii. 17. But such an inheritance belongs to none but the rational nature. Therefore it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2 *ad* 3), the sonship of adoption is a certain likeness of natural sonship. Now the Son of God proceeds naturally from the Father as the Intellectual Word, in oneness of nature with the Father. To this Word, therefore, something may be likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on the part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already built is like the mental word of the builder in its specific form, but not in intelligibility, because the material form of a house is not intelligible, as it was in the mind of the

builder. In this way every creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word. Secondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to its form, but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge which is begotten in the disciple's mind is likened to the word in the mind of the master. In this way the rational creature, even in its nature, is likened to the Word of God. Thirdly, a creature is likened to the Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is by reason of grace and charity: wherefore Our Lord prays (Jo. xvii. 21, 22): *That they may be one in Us . . . as We also are one.* And this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who are thus like Him the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore clear that to be adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not indeed to all, but only to those who have charity; which is *poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost* (Rom. v. 5); for which reason (Rom. viii. 15) the Holy Ghost is called *the Spirit of adoption of sons.*

Reply Obj. 1. God is called the Father of the irrational creature, not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason of creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of likeness.

Reply Obj. 2. Angels are called sons of God by adoptive sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the first to receive the adoption of sons.

Reply Obj. 3. Adoption is a property resulting not from nature, but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature must needs be capable of adoption.

Fourth Article.

Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of God. For Hilary says (*De Trin.* ii.) speaking of Christ: *The dignity of power is not forfeited when*

carnal humanity is adopted.* Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Prædest. Sanct.* xv.) that *by the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man is a Christian.* But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption. Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would seem to be an adopted son.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Incarn.* viii.): *We do not call an adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son.* But Christ is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 John v. 20: *That we may . . . be in His true Son,* Jesus Christ. Therefore Christ, as Man, is not an adopted Son.

I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person, not to the nature; whence in the First Part (Q. XXXII., A. 3) we have stated that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature to be the Son. But it has been said above (A. 1 *ad* 2), that the sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially. Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called an adopted Son.

But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted Son of God.

Reply Obj. 1. As sonship does not properly belong to the nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that *carnal humanity is adopted,* the expression is metaphorical: and adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of the Son.

* Some editions read *humilitas,—the humility or lowliness of the flesh.*

Reply Obj. 2. This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to John i. 14: *We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.*

Reply Obj. 3. To be a creature, as also to be subservient or subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold.

QUESTION XXIV.

OF THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST.

(In Four Articles.)

WE shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ was predestinated? (2) Whether He was predestinated as man? (3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours? (4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS BEFITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE PREDESTINATED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem unfitting that Christ should be predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be the adoption of sons, according to Ephes. i. 5: *Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children.* But it is not befitting to Christ to be an adopted Son, as stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 4). Therefore it is not fitting that Christ be predestinated.

Obj. 2. Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is false—*The human nature is Son of God.* In like manner neither by reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace, but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as stated in the First Part (Q. XXIII., AA. 2, 5). Therefore Christ was not predestinated to be the Son of God.

Obj. 3. Further, just as that which has been made was

not always, so also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of God, it cannot be said that that Man was *made the Son of God.* Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was *predestinated the Son of God.*

On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom. i. 4): *Who was predestinated the Son of God in power.*

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the First Part (Q. XXIII., AA. 1, 2), predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man, is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it be said that God has not from eternity preordained to do this in time: since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For this reason do we say that Christ was predestinated.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle there speaks of that predestination by which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a singular manner is He predestinated.

Reply Obj. 2. As a gloss* says on Rom. i. 4, some understood that predestination to refer to the nature and not to the Person—that is to say, that on human nature was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of Person.

But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person's nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because to be predestinated is to be

* From S. Augustine, *De Præd. Sanct.* xv.

directed towards salvation, which belongs to a suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for this proposition is false:—*The human nature is the Son of God:* unless one were to force from it such an exposition as:—*Who was predestinated the Son of God in power*—that is, *It was predestinated that the Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person.*

Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not, indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying, *Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh,* added, *Who was predestinated the Son of God in power:* so as to give us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power. For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the grace of union.

Reply Obj. 3. Origen commenting on Rom. i. 4 says that the true reading of this passage of the Apostle is: *Who was destined to be the Son of God in power;* so that no antecedence is implied. And so there would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the participle *predestinated,* not to the fact of being the Son of God, but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when they are made known; so that the sense would be—*Christ was predestinated to be made known as the Son of God.* But this is an improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end of beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge thereof.

It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the participle *predestinated* is to be referred to the Per-

son not in Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (*De Prædest. Sanct.* xv.): *Jesus was predestinated, so that He Who according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be nevertheless Son of God in power.*

Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle *predestinated,* just as this participle *made,* implies antecedence, yet there is a difference. For *to be made* belongs to the thing in itself: whereas *to be predestinated* belongs to someone as being in the apprehension of one who preordains. Now that which is the subject of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature, because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition—*Christ was predestinated the Son of God*—is truer than this—*Christ was made the Son of God.*

Second Article.

whether this proposition is false: christ as man was predestinated to be the son of god?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this proposition is false: *Christ as man was predestinated to be the Son of God.* For at some time a man is that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination does not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false.

Obj. 2. Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If, therefore, Christ, as man, was predestin-

ated the Son of God, it will follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false.

Obj. 3. Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to take place at some time. But this proposition, *The Son of God was made man,* is truer than this, *Man was made the Son of God.* Therefore this proposition, *Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man,* is truer than *this, Christ as Man was predestinated to be the Son of God.*

On the contrary, Augustine (*De Prædest. Sanct.* xv.) says: *Forasmuch as God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was predestinated.*

I answer that, Two things may be considered in predestination. One on the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed on it was it united in Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says (*ibid.*): *This human nature of ours was predestinated to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it would be impossible to raise it higher.* Now that is said to belong to anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature. Consequently, we must say that *Christ, as Man, was predestinated the Son of God.*

Reply Obj. 1. When we say, *Christ, as Man, was predestinated the Son of God,* this qualification, *as Man,* can be referred in two ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the sense would be that it was predestinated that Christ as Man,

should be the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.

Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself: that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be predestinated as Man.

Reply Obj. 2. Something may be befitting to a man by reason of human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing may be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination refers to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*loc. cit.*): *The Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the Son of Man, because He assumed Man to Himself; and the Son of God, because it was the Only-begotten God Who assumed human nature.* Consequently, since this *assumption* comes under predestination by reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that *Christ, as Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God,* than that, *Christ, as Son of God, was predestinated to be Man.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST'S PREDESTINATION IS THE EXEMPLAR OF OURS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination is eternal, it seems that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar of ours.

Obj. 2. Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the exemplate. But there was no need for God to be led from something else to knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rom. viii. 29): *Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated.* Therefore Christ's predestination is not the exemplar of ours.

Obj. 3. Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But Christ's predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours: because we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ was predestinated *Son of God in power,* as is written (Rom. i. 4). Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Prædest. Sanct.* xv.): *The Saviour Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is the most splendid light of predestination and grace.* Now He is called the light of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made manifest by His predestination and grace: and this seems to pertain to the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours.

I answer that, Predestination may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ's predestination cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by the same eternal act God predestinated us and Christ.

Secondly, predestination may be considered on the part of that to which anyone is predestinated, and this is the term and effect of predestination. In this sense Christ's

predestination is the exemplar of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which we are predestinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son of God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of sons, which is a participated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written (Rom. viii. 29): *Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son.* Secondly, in respect of the manner of obtaining this good—that is, by grace. This is most manifest in Christ; because human nature in Him, without any antecedent merits, was united to the Son of God: and of the fulness of His grace we all have received, as it is written (Jo. i. 16).

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers the aforesaid act of the predestinator.

The same is to be said of the second objection.

Reply Obj. 3. The exemplate need not be conformed to the exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST'S PREDESTINATION IS THE CAUSE OF OURS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours.

Obj. 2. Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has no other cause but God's will. Now, our predestination depends on the simple will of God, for it is written (Eph. i. 11): *Being predestinated according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.* Therefore Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours.

Obj. 3. Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also taken away. But if we take away Christ's predestination, ours is not taken away; since even if the Son of God

were not incarnate, our salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiii. 10). Therefore Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. i. 5): (*Who*) *hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ.*

I answer that, If we consider predestination on the part of the very act of predestinating, then Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours: because by one and the same act God predestinated both Christ and us. But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and order in which it is to be accomplished in time.

Reply Objs. 1 *and* 2. These arguments consider predestination on the part of the act of predestinating.

Reply Obj. 3. If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God would have decreed men's salvation by other means. But since He decreed the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should be the cause of our salvation.

QUESTION XXV.

OF THE ADORATION OF CHRIST.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in reference to us; and first, the adoration of Christ, by which we adore Him; secondly, we must consider how He is our Mediator with God.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ's Godhead and humanity are to be adored with one and the same adoration? (2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the adoration of *latria?* (3) Whether the adoration of *latria* is to be given to the image of Christ? (4) Whether *latria* is to be given to the Cross of Christ? (5) Whether to His mother? (6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST'S HUMANITY AND GODHEAD ARE TO BE ADORED WITH THE SAME ADORATION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ's Godhead is to be adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (Jo. v. 23): *That all may honour the Son, as they honour the Father.* But Christ's humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same adoration.

Obj. 2. Further, honour is properly *the reward of virtue,* as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 3). But virtue merits its reward by action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature is distinct from that of the human

nature, as stated above (Q. XIX., A. 1), it seems that Christ's humanity is to be adored with a different adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.

Obj. 3. Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the Word, it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the excellence of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it lost nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should receive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration which is given to His Godhead.

On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council:* *If anyone say that Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two distinct adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed down from the beginning; let such a one be anathema.*

I answer that, We may consider two things in a person to whom honour is given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honoured. Now properly speaking honour is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety: for we do not speak of honouring a man's hand, but the man himself. And if at any time it happen that we speak of honouring a man's hand or foot, it is not by reason of these members being honoured of themselves: but by reason of the whole being honoured in them. In this way a man may be honoured even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his image, or his messenger.

The cause of honour is that by reason of which the person honoured has a certain excellence: for honour is reverence given to something on account of its excellence, as stated in the Second Part (II.-II., Q. CIII., A. 1). If therefore in one man there are several causes of honour, for instance, rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honour given to him will be one in respect of the person honoured, but several in respect of the causes of honour: for it is the man that is honoured, both on account of knowledge and by reason of his virtue.

* Second Council of Constantinople, coll. viii., can. 9.

Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given one adoration and one honour on the part of the Person adored: but on the part of the cause for which He is honoured, we can say that there are several adorations, for instance that He receives one honour on account of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His created knowledge.

But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking, several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils. For it is written in the chapters of Cyril:* *If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be adored besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct persons; and does not rather honour the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema.*

Reply Obj. 1. In the Trinity there are three Who are honoured, but only one cause of honour. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is the reverse: and therefore only one honour is given to the Trinity and only one to Christ, but in a different way.

Reply Obj. 2. Operation is not the object but the motive of honour. And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not two adorations, but two causes of adoration.

Reply Obj. 3. If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word of God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honour would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal in him.† But since Christ's soul is united to a Person of greater dignity, to that Person is honour principally due to Whom Christ's soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ's soul hereby diminished, but rather increased, as stated above (Q. II., A. 2 *ad* 2).

* Council of Ephesus, Part I., ch. 26.
† Cf. *Ethic.* ix. 8.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST'S HUMANITY SHOULD BE ADORED WITH THE ADORATION OF 'LATRIA'?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's soul should not be adored with the adoration of *latria*. For on the words of Ps. xcviii. 5, *Adore His foot-stool for it is holy*, a gloss says: *The flesh assumed by the Word of God is rightly adored by us: for no one partakes spiritually of His flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed with the adoration called 'latria,' which is due to the Creator alone.* Now the flesh is part of the humanity. Therefore Christ's humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of *latria*.

Obj. 2. Further, the worship of *latria* is not to be given to any creature: since for this reason were the Gentiles reproved, that they *worshipped and served the creature*, as it is written (Rom. i. 25). But Christ's humanity is a creature. Therefore it should not be adored with the adoration of *latria*.

Obj. 3. Further, the adoration of *latria* is due to God in recognition of His supreme dominion, according to Deut. vi. 13: *Thou shalt adore* (Vulg., *fear; cf.* Matt. iv. 10) *the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only.* But Christ as man is less than the Father. Therefore His humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of *latria*.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iv. 3): *On account of the incarnation of the Divine Word, we adore the flesh of Christ not for its own sake, but because the Word of God is united thereto in person.* And on Ps. xcviii. 5, *Adore His foot-stool,* a gloss says: *He who adores the body of Christ, regards not the earth, but rather Him whose foot-stool it is, in Whose honour he adores the foot-stool.* But the incarnate Word is adored with the adoration of *latria*. Therefore also His body or His humanity.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1) adoration is due to the subsisting hypostasis: yet the reason for honouring may be something non-subsistent, on account of which the

person, in whom it is, is honoured. And so the adoration of Christ's humanity may be understood in two ways. First, so that the humanity is the thing adored: and thus to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the incarnate Word of God: just as to adore a King's robe is nothing else than to adore a robed King. And in this sense the adoration of Christ's humanity is the adoration of *latria*. Secondly, the adoration of Christ's humanity may be taken as given by reason of its being perfected with every gift of grace. And so in this sense the adoration of Christ's humanity is the adoration not of *latria* but of *dulia*. So that one and the same Person of Christ is adored with *latria* on account of His Divinity, and with *dulia* on account of His perfect humanity.

Nor is this unfitting. For the honour of *latria* is due to God the Father Himself on account of His Godhead; and the honour of *dulia* on account of the dominion by which He rules over creatures. Wherefore on Ps. vii. 1, *O Lord my God, in Thee have I hoped,* a gloss says: *Lord of all by power, to Whom 'dulia' is due: God of all by creation, to Whom 'latria' is due.*

Reply Obj. 1. That gloss is not to be understood as though the flesh of Christ were adored separately from its Godhead: for this could happen only, if there were one hypostasis of God, and another of man. But since, as Damascene says (*loc. cit.*): *If by a subtle distinction you divide what is seen from what is understood, it cannot be adored because it is a creature*—that is, with adoration of *latria*. And then thus understood as distinct from the Word of God, it should be adored with the adoration of *dulia;* not any kind of *dulia,* such as is given to other creatures, but with a certain higher adoration, which is called *hyperdulia.*

Hence appear the answers to the second and third objections. Because the adoration of *latria* is not given to Christ's humanity in respect of itself; but in respect of the Godhead to which it is united, by reason of which Christ is not less than the Father.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF CHRIST SHOULD BE ADORED WITH THE ADORATION OF LATRIA?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's image should not be adored with the adoration of *latria*. For it is written (Exod. xx. 4): *Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything.* But no adoration should be given against the commandment of God. Therefore Christ's image should not be adored with the adoration of *latria*.

Obj. 2. Further, we should have nothing in common with the works of the Gentiles; as the Apostle says (Eph. v. 11). But the Gentiles are reproached principally for that *they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man,* as is written (Rom. i. 23). Therefore Christ's image is not to be adored with the adoration of *latria*.

Obj. 3. Further, to Christ the adoration of *latria* is due by reason of His Godhead, not of His humanity. But the adoration of *latria* is not due to the image of His Godhead, which is imprinted on the rational soul. Much less, therefore, is it due to the material image which represents the humanity of Christ Himself.

Obj. 4. Further, it seems that nothing should be done in the Divine worship that is not instituted by God; wherefore the Apostle (1 Cor. xi. 23) when about to lay down the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Church, says: *I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you.* But Scripture does not lay down anything concerning the adoration of images. Therefore Christ's image is not to be adored with the adoration of *latria*.

On the contrary, Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* iv. 16) quotes Basil as saying: *The honour given to an image reaches to the prototype—i.e.,* the exemplar. But the exemplar itself—namely, Christ—is to be adored with the adoration of *latria;* therefore also His image.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (*De Memor. et*

Remin. i.), there is a twofold movement of the mind towards an image: one indeed towards the image itself as a certain thing; another, towards the image in so far as it is the image of something else. And between these movements there is this difference; that the former, by which one is moved towards an image as a certain thing, is different from the movement towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, which is towards the image as an image, is one and the same as that which is towards the thing. Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is shown to Christ's image, as a thing,—for instance, carved or painted wood: because reverence is not due save to a rational creature. It follows therefore that reverence should be shown to it, in so far only as it is an image. Consequently the same reverence should be shown to Christ's image as to Christ Himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the adoration of *latria,* it follows that His image should be adored with the adoration of *latria.*

Reply Obj. 1. This commandment does not forbid the making of any graven thing or likeness, but the making thereof for the purpose of adoration, wherefore it is added: *Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.* And because, as stated above, the movement towards the image is the same as the movement towards the thing, adoration thereof is forbidden in the same way as adoration of the thing whose image it is. Wherefore in the passage quoted we are to understand the prohibition to adore those images which the Gentiles made for the purpose of venerating their own gods—*i.e.,* the demons—and so it is premised: *Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me.* But no corporeal image could be raised to the true God Himself, since He is incorporeal; because, as Damascene observes (*loc. cit.*): *It is the highest absurdity and impiety to fashion a figure of what is Divine.* But because in the New Testament God was made man, He can be adored in His corporeal image.

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle forbids us to have anything in common with the *unfruitful works* of the Gentiles, but not with their useful works. Now the adoration of images

must be numbered among the unfruitful works in two respects. First, because some of the Gentiles used to adore the images themselves, as things, believing that there was something Divine therein, on account of the answers which the demons used to give in them, and on account of other such-like wonderful effects. Secondly on account of the things of which they were images; for they set up images to certain creatures, to whom in these images they gave the veneration of *latria*. Whereas we give the adoration of *latria* to the image of Christ, Who is true God, not for the sake of the image, but for the sake of the thing whose image it is, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. Reverence is due to the rational creature for its own sake. Consequently, if the adoration of *latria* were shown to the rational creature in which this image is, there might be an occasion of error—namely, lest the movement of adoration might stop short at the man, as a thing, and not be carried on to God, Whose image he is. This cannot happen in the case of a graven or painted image in insensible material.

Reply Obj. 4. The Apostles, led by the inward instinct of the Holy Ghost, handed down to the churches certain instructions which they did not put in writing, but which have been ordained, in accordance with the observance of the Church as practised by the faithful as time went on. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. ii. 14): *Stand fast; and hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word*—that is by word of mouth—*or by our epistle*—that is by word put into writing. Among these traditions is the worship of Christ's image. Wherefore it is said that Blessed Luke painted the image of Christ, which is in Rome.

Fourth Article.

Whether Christ's cross should be worshipped with the adoration of 'latria'?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's cross should not be worshipped with the adoration of *latria*. For no dutiful son honours that which dishonours his father, as the scourge with which he was scourged, or the gibbet on which he was hanged; rather does he abhor it. Now Christ underwent the most shameful death on the cross; according to Wisd. ii. 20: *Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death*. Therefore we should not venerate the cross but rather we should abhor it.

Obj. 2. Further, Christ's humanity is worshipped with the adoration of *latria*, inasmuch as it is united to the Son of God in Person. But this cannot be said of the cross. Therefore Christ's cross should not be worshipped with the adoration of *latria*.

Obj. 3. Further, as Christ's cross was the instrument of His passion and death, so were also many other things, for instance, the nails, the crown, the lance; yet to these we do not show the worship of *latria*. It seems, therefore, that Christ's cross should not be worshipped with the adoration of *latria*.

On the contrary, We show the worship of *latria* to that in which we place our hope of salvation. But we place our hope in Christ's cross, for the Church sings:

> Dear Cross, best hope o'er all beside,
> That cheers the solemn passion-tide:
> Give to the just increase of grace,
> Give to each contrite sinner peace.*

Therefore Christ's cross should be worshipped with the adoration of *latria*.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), honour or reverence is due to a rational creature only; while to an insensible creature, no honour or reverence is due save by reason of

* Hymn *Vexilla Regis*: translation of Father Aylward, O.P.

a rational nature. And this in two ways. First, inasmuch as it represents a rational nature: secondly, inasmuch as it is united to it in any way whatsoever. In the first way men are wont to venerate the king's image; in the second way, his robe. And both are venerated by men with the same veneration as they show to the king.

If, therefore, we speak of the cross itself on which Christ was crucified, it is to be venerated by us in both ways—namely, in one way in so far as it represents to us the figure of Christ extended thereon; in the other way, from its contact with the limbs of Christ, and from its being saturated with His blood. Wherefore in each way it is worshipped with the same adoration as Christ—viz., the adoration of *latria*. And for this reason also we speak to the cross and pray to it, as to the Crucified Himself. But if we speak of the effigy of Christ's cross in any other material whatever—for instance, in stone or wood, silver or gold—thus we venerate the cross merely as Christ's image, which we worship with the adoration of *latria*, as stated above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. If in Christ's cross we consider the point of view and intention of those who did not believe in Him, it will appear as His shame: but if we consider its effect, which is our salvation, it will appear as endowed with Divine power, by which it triumphed over the enemy, according to Col. ii. 14, 15: *He hath taken the same out of the way, fastening it to the cross, and despoiling the principalities and powers, He hath exposed them confidently, in open show, triumphing over them in Himself.* Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. i. 18): *The Word of the cross to them indeed that perish is foolishness; but to them that are saved—that is, to us—it is the power of God.*

Reply Obj. 2. Although Christ's cross was not united to the Word of God in Person, yet it was united to Him in some other way—viz., by representation and contact. And for this sole reason reverence is shown to it.

Reply Obj. 3. By reason of the contact of Christ's limbs we worship not only the cross, but all that belongs to Christ. Wherefore Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* iv. 11):

The precious wood, as having been sanctified by the contact of His holy body and blood, should be meetly worshipped; as also His nails, His lance, and His sacred dwelling-places, such as the manger, the cave and so forth. Yet these very things do not represent Christ's image as the cross does, which is called *the Sign of the Son of Man* that *will appear in heaven,* as it is written (Matt. xxiv. 30). Wherefore the angel said to the women (Mark xvi. 6): *You seek Jesus of Nazareth, Who was crucified:* he said not *pierced,* but *crucified.* For this reason we worship the image of Christ's cross in any material, but not the image of the nails or of any such thing.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MOTHER OF GOD SHOULD BE WORSHIPPED WITH THE ADORATION OF 'LATRIA'?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Mother of God is to be worshipped with the adoration of *latria.* For it seems that the same honour is due to the king's mother as to the king: whence it is written (3 Kings ii. 19) that *a throne was set for the king's mother, and she sat on His right hand.* Moreover, Augustine* says: *It is right that the throne of God, the resting-place of the Lord of Heaven, the abode of Christ, should be there where He is Himself.* But Christ is worshipped with the adoration of *latria.* Therefore His Mother also should be.

Obj. 2. Further, Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* iv. 16): *The honour of the Mother reflects on the Son.* But the Son is worshipped with the adoration of *latria.* Therefore the Mother also.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ's Mother is more akin to Him than the cross. But the cross is worshipped with the adoration of *latria.* Therefore also His Mother is to be worshipped with the same adoration.

* *Sermon on the Assumption,* work of an anonymous author.

On the contrary, The Mother of God is a mere creature. Therefore the worship of *latria* is not due to her.

I answer that, Since *latria* is due to God alone, it is not due to a creature so far as we venerate a creature for its own sake. For though insensible creatures are not capable of being venerated for their own sake, yet the rational creature is capable of being venerated for its own sake. Consequently the worship of *latria* is not due to any mere rational creature for its own sake. Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is a mere rational creature, the worship of *latria* is not due to her, but only that of *dulia:* but in a higher degree than to other creatures, inasmuch as she is the Mother of God. For this reason we say that not any kind of *dulia* is due to her, but *hyperdulia.*

Reply Obj. 1. The honour due to the king's mother is not equal to the honour which is due to the king: but is somewhat like it, by reason of a certain excellence on her part. This is what is meant by the authorities quoted.

Reply Obj. 2. The honour given to the Mother reflects on her Son, because the Mother is to be honoured for her Son's sake. But not in the same way as honour given to an image reflects on its exemplar: because the image itself, considered as a thing, is not to be venerated in any way at all.

Reply Obj. 3. The cross, considered in itself, is not an object of veneration, as stated above (AA. 4, 5). But the Blessed Virgin is in herself an object of veneration. Hence there is no comparison.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY KIND OF WORSHIP IS DUE TO THE RELICS OF THE SAINTS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the relics of the saints are not to be worshipped at all. For we should avoid doing what may be the occasion of error. But to worship the relics of the dead seems to savour of the error of the

Gentiles, who gave honour to dead men. Therefore the relics of the saints are not to be honoured.

Obj. 2. Further, it seems absurd to venerate what is insensible. But the relics of the saints are insensible. Therefore it is absurd to venerate them.

Obj. 3. Further, a dead body is not of the same species as a living body: consequently it does not seem to be identical with it. Therefore, after a saint's death, it seems that his body should not be worshipped.

On the contrary, It is written (*De Eccles. Dogm.* xl.): *We believe that the bodies of the saints, above all the relics of the blessed martyrs, as being the members of Christ, should be worshipped in all sincerity:* and further on: *If anyone holds a contrary opinion, he is not accounted a Christian, but a follower of Eunomius and Vigilantius.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* i. 13): *If a father's coat or ring, or anything else of that kind, is so much more cherished by his children, as love for one's parents is greater, in no way are the bodies themselves to be despised, which are much more intimately and closely united to us than any garment; for they belong to man's very nature.* It is clear from this that he who has a certain affection for anyone, venerates whatever of his is left after his death, not only his body and the parts thereof, but even external things, such as his clothes, and such-like. Now it is manifest that we should show honour to the saints of God, as being members of Christ, the children and friends of God, and our intercessors. Wherefore in memory of them we ought to honour any relics of theirs in a fitting manner: principally their bodies, which were temples, and organs of the Holy Ghost dwelling and operating in them, and are destined to be likened to the body of Christ by the glory of the Resurrection. Hence God Himself fittingly honours such relics by working miracles at their presence.

Reply Obj. 1. This was the argument of Vigilantius, whose words are quoted by Jerome in the book he wrote against him (ch. ii.) as follows: *We see something like a pagan rite introduced under pretext of religion; they*

worship with kisses I know not what tiny heap of dust in a mean vase surrounded with precious linen. To him Jerome replies (*Ep. ad Ripar.* cix.): *We do not adore, I will not say the relics of the martyrs, but either the sun or the moon or even the angels*—that is to say, with the worship of *latria*. *But we honour the martyrs' relics, so that thereby we give honour to Him Whose martyrs* they are: we honour the servants, that the honour shown to them may reflect on their Master.* Consequently, by honouring the martyrs' relics we do not fall into the error of the Gentiles, who gave the worship of *latria* to dead men.

Reply Obj. 2. We worship that insensible body, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the soul, which was once united thereto, and now enjoys God; and for God's sake, whose ministers the saints were.

Reply Obj. 3. The dead body of a saint is not identical with that which the saint had during life, on account of the difference of form—viz., the soul: but it is the same by identity of matter, which is destined to be reunited to its form.

* The original meaning of the word *martyr, i.e.*, the Greek μάρτυς, is *a witness.*

QUESTION XXVI.

OF CHRIST AS CALLED THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MAN.

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE have now to consider how Christ is called the Mediator of God and man, and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man? (2) Whether this belongs to Him by reason of His human nature?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO CHRIST TO BE THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MAN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man. For a priest and a prophet seem to be mediators between God and man, according to Deut. v. 5: *I was the mediator and stood between God* (Vulg., *the Lord*) *and you at that time.* But it is not proper to Christ to be a priest and a prophet. Neither, therefore, is it proper to Him to be Mediator.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is fitting to angels, both good and bad, cannot be said to be proper to Christ. But to be between God and man is fitting to the good angels, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv). It is also fitting to the bad angels—that is, the demons: for they have something in common with God—namely, *immortality;* and something they have in common with men—namely, *passibility of soul* and consequently unhappiness; as appears from what Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* ix. 13, 15). Therefore it is not proper to Christ to be a Mediator of God and man.

Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to the office of Mediator to beseech one of those, between whom he mediates, for the other. But the Holy Ghost, as it is written (Rom. viii. 26), *asketh* God *for us with unspeakable groanings*. Therefore the Holy Ghost is a Mediator between God and man. Therefore this is not proper to Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. ii. 5): *There is . . . one Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus.*

I answer that, Properly speaking, the office of a mediator is to join together and unite those between whom he mediates: for extremes are united in the mean (*medio*). Now to unite men to God perfectively belongs to Christ, through Whom men are reconciled to God, according to 2 Cor. v. 19: *God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself*. And, consequently, Christ alone is the perfect Mediator of God and men, inasmuch as, by His death, He reconciled the human race to God. Hence the Apostle, after saying, *Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus,* added: *Who gave Himself a redemption for all.*

However, nothing hinders certain others from being called mediators, in some respect, between God and man, forasmuch as they co-operate in uniting men to God, dispositively or ministerially.

Reply Obj. 1. The prophets and priests of the Old Law were called mediators between God and man, dispositively and ministerially: inasmuch as they foretold and foreshadowed the true and perfect Mediator of God and men. As to the priests of the New Law, they may be called mediators of God and men, inasmuch as they are the ministers of the true Mediator by administering, in His stead, the saving sacraments to men.

Reply Obj. 2. The good angels, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* ix. 13), cannot rightly be called mediators between God and men. *For since, in common with God, they have both beatitude and immortality, and none of these things in common with unhappy and mortal man, how much rather are they not aloof from men and akin to God, than established between them?* Dionysius, however, says that they

do occupy a middle place, because, in the order of nature, they are established below God and above man. Moreover, they fulfil the office of mediator, not indeed principally and perfectively, but ministerially and dispositively: whence (Matt. iv. 11) it is said that *angels came and ministered unto Him*—namely, Christ. As to the demons, it is true that they have immortality in common with God, and unhappiness in common with men. *Hence for this purpose does the immortal and unhappy demon intervene, in order that he may hinder men from passing to a happy immortality,* and may allure them to an unhappy immortality. Whence he is like *an evil mediator, who separates friends.**

But Christ had beatitude in common with God, mortality in common with men. Hence *for this purpose did He intervene, that having fulfilled the span of His mortality, He might from dead men make immortal,—which He showed in Himself by rising again; and that He might confer beatitude on those who were deprived of it,—for which reason He never forsook us.* Wherefore He is *the good Mediator, Who reconciles enemies* (*ibid.*).

Reply Obj. 3. Since the Holy Ghost is in everything equal to God, He cannot be said to be between, or a Mediator of, God and men: but Christ alone, Who, though equal to the Father in His Godhead, yet is less than the Father in His human nature, as stated above (Q. XX., A. 1). Hence on Gal. iii. 20, *Christ is a Mediator* (Vulg., *Now a mediator is not of one, but God is one*), the gloss says: *Not the Father nor the Holy Ghost.* The Holy Ghost, however, is said *to ask for us,* because He makes us ask.

* Augustine, *ibid.*, xv.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHRIST, AS MAN, IS THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MEN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ is not, as man, the Mediator of God and men. For Augustine says (*Contra Felic.* x.): *One is the Person of Christ: lest there be not one Christ, not one substance; lest, the office of Mediator being denied, He be called the Son either of God alone, or merely the Son of a man.* But He is the Son of God and man, not as man, but as at the same time God and man. Therefore neither should we say that, as man alone, He is Mediator of God and man.

Obj. 2. Further, just as Christ, as God, has a common nature with the Father and the Holy Ghost; so, as man, He has a common nature with men. But for the reason that, as God, He has the same nature as the Father and the Holy Ghost, He cannot be called Mediator, as God: for on 1 Tim. ii. 5, *Mediator of God and man,* a gloss says: *As the Word, He is not a Mediator, because He is equal to God, and God 'with God,' and at the same time one God.* Therefore neither, as man, can He be called Mediator, on account of His having the same nature as men.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ is called Mediator, inasmuch as He reconciled us to God: and this He did by taking away sin, which separated us from God. But to take away sin belongs to Christ, not as man, but as God. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, not as man, but as God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* ix. 15): *Not because He is the Word, is Christ Mediator, since He Who is supremely immortal and supremely happy is far from us unhappy mortals; but He is Mediator, as man.*

I answer that, We may consider two things in a mediator: first, that he is a mean; secondly, that he unites others. Now it is of the nature of a mean to be distant from each extreme: while it unites by communicating to one that

which belongs to the other. Now neither of these can be applied to Christ as God, but only as man. For, as God, He does not differ from the Father and the Holy Ghost in nature and power of dominion: nor have the Father and the Holy Ghost anything that the Son has not, so that He be able to communicate to others something belonging to the Father or the Holy Ghost, as though it were belonging to others than Himself. But both can be applied to Him as man. Because, as man, He is distant both from God, by nature, and from man by dignity of both grace and glory. Again, it belongs to Him, as man, to unite men to God, by communicating to men both precepts and gifts, and by offering satisfaction and prayers to God for men. And therefore He is most truly called Mediator, as man.

Reply Obj. 1. If we take the Divine Nature from Christ, we consequently take from Him the singular fulness of grace, which belongs to Him as the Only-begotten of the Father, as it is written (Jo. i. 14). From which fulness it resulted that He was established over all men, and approached nearer to God.

Reply Obj. 2. Christ, as God, is in all things equal to the Father. But even in the human nature He is above all men. Therefore, as man, He can be Mediator, but not as God.

Reply Obj. 3. Although it belongs to Christ as God to take away sin authoritatively, yet it belongs to Him, as man, to satisfy for the sin of the human race. And in this sense He is called the Mediator of God and men.

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