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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"



Nihil Obstat.

FR. INNOCENTIUS APAP, O.P., S.T.M.

CENSOR THEOL.

Imprimatur.

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THIRD PART (SUPPLEMENT)

QQ. LXIX.—LXXXVI.

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TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

THIRD PART (SUPPLEMENT).

QUESTION LXIX.

OF MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, AND FIRST OF THE PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE AFTER DEATH.

(*In Seven Articles.*)

In sequence to the foregoing we must treat of matters concerning the state of resurrection: for after speaking of the sacraments whereby man is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak of the resurrection whereby man is delivered from the death of punishment. The treatise on the resurrection offers a threefold consideration, namely the things that precede, those that accompany, and those that follow the resurrection. Consequently we must speak (1) of those things which partly, though not wholly, precede the resurrection; (2) of the resurrection itself and its circumstances ; (3) of the things which follow it.

Among the things which precede the resurrection we must consider (1) the places appointed for the reception of bodies after death; (2) the quality of separated souls, and the punishment inflicted on them by fire; (3) the suffrages whereby the souls of the departed are assisted by the living; (4) the prayers of the saints in heaven; (5) the signs preceding the general judgment; (6) the fire of the world's final conflagration which will precede the appearance of the Judge.

Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry: (1) Whether any places are appointed to receive souls after

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death ? (2) Whether souls are conveyed thither immediately after death ? (3) Whether they are able to leave those places ? (4) Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham's bosom ? (5) Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned ? (6) Whether the limbo of the patriarchs is the same as the limbo of children ? (7) Whether so many places should be distinguished ?

First Article.

Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that places are not appointed to receive souls after death. For as Boëthius says (*De Hebdom.*): *Wise men are agreed that incorporeal things are not in a place,* and this agrees with the words of Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii.): *We can answer without hesitation that the soul is not conveyed to corporeal places, except with a body, or that it is not conveyed locally.* Now the soul separated from the body is without a body, as Augustine also says (*ibid.*). Therefore it is absurd to assign any places for the reception of souls.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever has a definite place has more in common with that place than with any other. Now separated souls, like certain other spiritual substances, are indifferent to all places; for it cannot be said that they agree with certain bodies, and differ from others, since they are utterly removed from all corporeal conditions. Therefore places should not be assigned for their reception.

Obj. 3. Further, Nothing is assigned to separated souls after death, except what conduces to their punishment or to their reward. But a corporeal place cannot conduce to their punishment or reward, since they receive nothing from bodies. Therefore definite places should not be assigned to receive them.

On the contrary, The empyrean heaven is a corporeal place, and yet as soon as it was made it was filled with the holy

angels, as Strabus* says. Since then angels even as separated souls are incorporeal, it would seem that some place should also be assigned to receive separated souls.

Further, this appears from Gregory's statement (*Dial.* iv.) that souls after death are conveyed to various corporeal places, as in the case of Paschasius whom Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found at the baths, and of the soul of King Theodoric, which he asserts to have been conveyed to hell. Therefore after death souls have certain places for their reception.

I answer that, Although spiritual substances do not depend on a body in respect of their being, nevertheless the corporeal world is governed by God by means of the spiritual world, as asserted by Augustine (*De Trin.* iii.) and Gregory (*Dial.* iv.). Hence it is that there is a certain fittingness by way of congruity of spiritual substances to corporeal substances, in that the more noble bodies are adapted to the more noble substances: wherefore also the philosophers held that the order of separate substances is according to the order of movables. And though after death souls have no bodies assigned to them whereof they be the forms or determinate motors, nevertheless certain corporeal places are appointed to them by way of congruity in reference to their degree of nobility (wherein they are as though in a place, after the manner in which incorporeal things can be in a place), according as they more or less approach to the first substance (to which the highest place is fittingly assigned), namely God, whose throne the Scriptures proclaim heaven to be (Ps. cii. 19, Isa. lxvi. 1). Wherefore we hold that those souls that have a perfect share of the Godhead are in heaven, and that those souls that are deprived of that share are assigned to a contrary place.

Reply Obj. 1. Incorporeal things are not in place after a manner known and familiar to us, in which way we say that bodies are properly in place; but they are in place after a manner befitting spiritual substances, a manner that cannot be fully manifest to us.

Reply Obj. 2. Things have something in common with or

* Bede, *Hexam.* i. *ad* Gen. i. 2.

a likeness to one another in two ways. First, by sharing a same quality: thus hot things have something in common, and incorporeal things can have nothing in common with corporeal things in this way. Secondly, by a kind of proportionateness, by reason of which the Scriptures apply the corporeal world to the spiritual metaphorically. Thus the Scriptures speak of God as the sun, because He is the principle of spiritual life, as the sun is of corporeal life. In this way certain souls have more in common with certain places: for instance, souls that are spiritually enlightened, with luminous bodies, and souls that are plunged in darkness by sin, with dark places.

Reply Obj. 3. The separated soul receives nothing directly from corporeal places in the same way as bodies which are maintained by their respective places: yet these same souls, through knowing themselves to be appointed to such places, gather joy or sorrow therefrom; and thus their place conduces to their punishment or reward.

Second Article.

whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death. For a gloss on Ps. xxxvi. 10, *Yet a little while and the wicked shall not be,* says that *the saints are delivered at the end of life; yet after this life they will not yet be where the saints will be when it is said to them: Come ye blessed of My Father.* Now those saints will be in heaven. Therefore after this life the saints do not go immediately up to heaven.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Enchir.* cix.) that *the time which lies between man's death and the final resurrection holds the souls in secret receptacles according as each one is worthy of rest or of suffering.* Now these secret abodes cannot denote heaven and hell, since also after the final resurrection the souls will be there together with their

bodies: so that he would have no reason to distinguish between the time before and the time after the resurrection. Therefore they will be neither in hell nor in heaven until the day of judgment.

Obj. 3. Further, the glory of the soul is greater than that of bodies. Now the glory of the body is awarded to all at the same time, so that each one may have the greater joy in the common rejoicing of all, as appears from a gloss on Heb. xi. 40, *God providing some better thing for us—that the common joy may make each one rejoice the more.* Much more, therefore, ought the glory of souls to be deferred until the end, so as to be awarded to all at the same time.

Obj. 4. Further, Punishment and reward, being pronounced by the sentence of the judge, should not precede the judgment. Now hell fire and the joys of heaven will be awarded to all by the sentence of Christ judging them, namely at the last judgment, according to Matth. xxv. Therefore no one will go up to heaven or down to hell before the day of judgment.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. v. 1): *If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that we have . . . a house not made with hands, but reserved in heaven.** Therefore, after the body's dissolution, the soul has an abode, which had been reserved for it in heaven.

Further, the Apostle says (Philip. i. 23): *I desire* (Vulg.,—*Having a desire*) *to be dissolved and to be with Christ.* From these words Gregory argues as follows (*Dial.* iv.): *If there is no doubt that Christ is in heaven, it cannot be denied that Paul's soul is in heaven likewise.* Now it cannot be gainsaid that Christ is in heaven, since this is an article of faith. Therefore neither is it to be denied that the souls of the saints are borne to heaven. That also some souls go down to hell immediately after death is evident from Luke xvi. 22, *And the rich man died, and he was buried in hell.*

I answer that, Even as in bodies there is gravity or levity whereby they are borne to their own place which is the end of their movement, so in souls there is merit or demerit

* Vulg.,—*eternal in heaven.* Cf. 1 Pet. i. 4.

whereby they reach their reward or punishment, which are the ends of their deeds. Wherefore just as a body is conveyed at once to its place, by its gravity or levity, unless there be an obstacle, so too the soul, the bonds of the flesh being broken, whereby it was detained in the state of the way, receives at once its reward or punishment, unless there be an obstacle. Thus sometimes venial sin, though needing first of all to be cleansed, is an obstacle to the receiving of the reward; the result being that the reward is delayed. And since a place is assigned to souls in keeping with their reward or punishment, as soon as the soul is set free from the body it is either plunged into hell or soars to heaven, unless it be held back by some debt, for which its flight must needs be delayed until the soul is first of all cleansed. This truth is attested by the manifest authority of the canonical Scriptures and the doctrine of the holy Fathers: wherefore the contrary must be judged heretical as stated in *Dial.* iv. and in *De Eccl. Dogm.* lxxxviii.

Reply Obj. 1. The gloss explains itself: for it expounds the words, *They will not yet be where the saints will be,* etc., by saying immediately afterwards: *That is to say, they will not have the double stole which the saints will have at the resurrection.*

Reply Obj. 2. Among the secret abodes of which Augustine speaks, we must also reckon hell and heaven, where some souls are detained before the resurrection. The reason why a distinction is drawn between the time before and the time after the resurrection is because before the resurrection they are there without the body whereas afterwards they are with the body, and because in certain places there are souls now which will not be there after the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 3. There is a kind of continuity among men as regards the body, because in respect thereof is verified the saying of Acts xvii. 24, 26, *God . . . hath made of one all mankind:* whereas He has fashioned souls independently of one another. Consequently it is not so fitting that all men should be glorified together in the soul as that they should be glorified together in the body. Moreover the glory of the body is not

so essential as the glory of the soul; wherefore it would be more derogatory to the saints if the glory of the soul were delayed, than that the glory of the body be deferred: nor could this detriment to their glory be compensated on account of the joy of each one being increased by the common joy.

Reply Obj. 4. Gregory proposes and solves this very difficulty (*Dial.* iv.): *If then,* he says, *the souls of the just are in heaven now, what will they receive in reward for their justice on the judgment day?* And he answers: *Surely it will be a gain to them at the judgment, that whereas now they enjoy only the happiness of the soul, afterwards they will enjoy also that of the body, so as to rejoice also in the flesh wherein they bore sorrow and torments for the Lord.* The same is to be said in reference to the damned.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOULS WHO ARE IN HEAVEN OR HELL ARE ABLE TO GO FROM THENCE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the souls in heaven or hell are unable to go from thence. For Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* xiii.): *If the souls of the dead took any part in the affairs of the living, to say nothing of others, there is myself whom not for a single night would my loving mother fail to visit since she followed me by land and sea in order to abide with me:* and from this he concludes that the souls of the departed do not mingle in the affairs of the living. But they would be able to do so if they were to leave their abode. Therefore they do not go forth from their abode.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Ps. xxvi. 4): *That I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life,* and (Job vii. 9): *He that shall go down to hell shall not come up.* Therefore neither the good nor the wicked quit their abode.

Obj. 3. Further, As stated above (A. 2), abodes are awarded to souls after death as a reward or punishment. Now after death neither the rewards of the saints nor the punishments

of the damned are increased. Therefore they do not quit their abodes.

On the contrary, Jerome writing against Vigilantius addresses him thus: *For thou sayest that the souls of the apostles and martyrs have taken up their abode either in Abraham's bosom or in the place of refreshment, or under the altar of God, and that they are unable to visit their graves when they will. Wouldst thou then lay down the law for God? Wouldst thou put the apostles in chains, imprison them until the day of judgment, and forbid them to be with their Lord, them of whom it is written: They follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth? And if the Lamb is everywhere, therefore we must believe that those also who are with Him are everywhere.* Therefore it is absurd to say that the souls of the departed do not leave their abode.

Further, Jerome argues as follows (*ibid.*): *Since the devil and the demons wander throughout the whole world, and are everywhere present with wondrous speed, why should the martyrs, after shedding their blood, be imprisoned and unable to go forth?* Hence we may infer that not only the good sometimes leave their abode, but also the wicked, since their damnation does not exceed that of the demons who wander about everywhere.

Further, The same conclusion may be gathered from Gregory (*Dial.* iv.), where he relates many cases of the dead having appeared to the living.

I answer that, There are two ways of understanding a person to leave hell or heaven. First, that he goes from thence simply, so that heaven or hell be no longer his place: and in this way no one who is finally consigned to hell or heaven can go from thence, as we shall state further on (Q. LXXI., A. 5, *ad* 5). Secondly, they may be understood to go forth for a time: and here we must distinguish what befits them according to the order of nature, and what according to the order of Divine providence; for as Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* xvi.): *Human affairs have their limits other than have the wonders of the Divine power, nature's works differ from those which are done miraculously.* Consequently,

according to the natural course, the separated souls consigned to their respective abodes are utterly cut off from communication with the living. For according to the course of nature men living in mortal bodies are not immediately united to separate substances, since their entire knowledge arises from the senses: nor would it be fitting for them to leave their abode for any purpose other than to take part in the affairs of the living. Nevertheless, according to the disposition of Divine providence separated souls sometimes come forth from their abode and appear to men, as Augustine, in the book quoted above, relates of the martyr Felix who appeared visibly to the people of Nola when they were besieged by the barbarians. It is also credible that this may occur sometimes to the damned, and that for man's instruction and intimidation they be permitted to appear to the living; or again in order to seek our suffrages, as to those who are detained in purgatory, as evidenced by many instances related in the fourth book of the *Dialogues*. There is, however, this difference between the saints and the damned, that the saints can appear when they will to the living, but not the damned; for even as the saints while living in the flesh are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to heal and work wonders, which can only be done miraculously by the Divine power, and cannot be done by those who lack this gift, so it is not unfitting for the souls of the saints to be endowed with a power in virtue of their glory, so that they are able to appear wondrously to the living, when they will: while others are unable to do so unless they be sometimes permitted.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine, as may be gathered from what he says afterwards, is speaking according to the common course of nature. And yet it does not follow, although the dead be able to appear to the living as they will, that they appear as often as when living in the flesh: because when they are separated from the flesh, they are either wholly conformed to the divine will, so that they may do nothing but what they see to be agreeable with the Divine disposition, or else they are so overwhelmed by their punishments that their

grief for their unhappiness surpasses their desire to appear to others.

Reply Obj. 2. The authorities quoted speak in the sense that no one comes forth from heaven or hell simply, and do not imply that one may not come forth for a time.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3) the soul's place conduces to its punishment or reward in so far as the soul, through being consigned to that place, is affected either by joy or by grief. Now this joy or grief at being consigned to such a place remains in the soul even when it is outside that place. Thus a bishop who is given the honour of sitting on a throne in the church incurs no dishonour when he leaves the throne, for though he sits not therein actually, the place remains assigned to him.

We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary sense.

Reply Obj. 4. Jerome is speaking of the apostles and martyrs in reference to that which they gain from their power of glory, and not to that which befits them as due to them by nature. And when he says that they are everywhere, he does not mean that they are in several places or everywhere at once, but that they can be wherever they will.

Reply Obj. 5. There is no parity between demons and angels on the one hand and the souls of the saints and of the damned on the other. For the good or bad angels have allotted to them the office of presiding over men, to watch over them or to try them; but this cannot be said of the souls of men. Nevertheless, according to the power of glory, it is competent to the souls of the saints that they can be where they will; and this is what Jerome means to say.

Reply Obj. 6. Although the souls of the saints or of the damned are sometimes actually present where they appear, we are not to believe that this is always so: for sometimes these apparitions occur to persons whether asleep or awake by the activity of good or wicked angels in order to instruct or deceive the living. Thus sometimes even the living appear to others and tell them many things in their sleep; and yet it is clear that they are not present, as Augustine proves from many instances (*De Cura pro Mort.* xi., xii.).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE LIMBO OF HELL IS THE SAME AS ABRAHAM'S BOSOM?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the limbo of hell is not the same as Abraham's bosom. For according to Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xxxiii.): *I have not yet found Scripture mentioning hell in a favourable sense.* Now Abraham's bosom is taken in a favourable sense, as Augustine goes on to say (*ibid.*): *Surely no one would be allowed to give an unfavourable signification to Abraham's bosom and the place of rest whither the godly poor man was carried by the angels.* Therefore Abraham's bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.

Obj. 2. Further, Those who are in hell see not God. Yet God is seen by those who are in Abraham's bosom, as may be gathered from Augustine (*Conf.* ix. 3) who, speaking of Nebridius, says: *Whatever that be, which is signified by that bosom, there lives my Nebridius,* and further on: *Now lays he not his ear to my mouth, but his spiritual mouth unto Thy fountain, and drinketh as much as he can receive wisdom in proportion to his thirst, endlessly happy.* Therefore Abraham's bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.

Obj. 3. Further, The Church prays not that a man be taken to hell: and yet she prays that the angels may carry the departed soul to Abraham's bosom. Therefore it would seem that Abraham's bosom is not the same as limbo.

On the contrary, The place whither the beggar Lazarus was taken is called Abraham's bosom. Now he was taken to hell, for as a gloss* on Job xxx. 23, *Where a house is appointed for every one that liveth,* says, *hell was the house of all the living until the coming of Christ.* Therefore Abraham's bosom is the same as limbo.

Further, Jacob said to his sons (Gen. xliv. 38): *You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell:* wherefore Jacob knew that he would be taken to hell after his death. There-

* S. Gregory (*Moral.* xx.).

fore Abraham likewise was taken to hell after his death; and consequently Abraham's bosom would seem to be a part of hell.

I answer that, After death men's souls cannot find rest save by the merit of faith, because *he that cometh to God must believe* (Heb. xi. 6). Now the first example of faith was given to men in the person of Abraham, who was the first to sever himself from the body of unbelievers, and to receive a special sign of faith: for which reason *the place of rest given to men after death is called Abraham's bosom,* as Augustine declares (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii.). But the souls of the saints have not at all times had the same rest after death; because, since Christ's coming they have had complete rest through enjoying the vision of God, whereas before Christ's coming they had rest through being exempt from punishment, but their desire was not set at rest by their attaining their end. Consequently the state of the saints before Christ's coming may be considered both as regards the rest it afforded, and thus it is called Abraham's bosom, and as regards its lack of rest, and thus it is called the limbo of hell. Accordingly, before Christ's coming the limbo of hell and Abraham's bosom were one place accidentally and not essentially: and consequently, nothing prevents Abraham's bosom from being after Christ's coming, and from being altogether distinct from limbo, since things that are one accidentally may be parted from one another.

Reply Obj. 1. The state of the holy Fathers as regards what was good in it was called Abraham's bosom, but as regards its deficiencies it was called hell. Accordingly, neither is Abraham's bosom taken in an unfavourable sense, nor hell in a favourable sense, although in a way they are one.

Reply Obj. 2. The place of rest of the holy Fathers was called Abraham's bosom before as well as after Christ's coming, but in different ways. For since before Christ's coming the saints' rest had a lack of rest attached to it, it was called both hell and Abraham's bosom, wherefore God was not seen there. But since after the coming of Christ

the saints' rest is complete through their seeing God, this rest is called Abraham's bosom, but not hell by any means. It is to this bosom of Abraham that the Church prays for the faithful to be brought.

Hence the *Reply* to the *Third Objection* is evident: and the same meaning applies to a gloss on Luke xvi. 22, *It came to pass that the beggar died*, etc., which says: *Abraham's bosom is the rest of the blessed poor, whose is the kingdom of heaven.*

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIMBO IS THE SAME AS THE HELL OF THE DAMNED?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the limbo of hell is the same as the hell of the damned. For Christ is said to have *bitten** hell, but not to have swallowed it, because He took some from thence but not all. Now He would not be said to have *bitten* hell if those whom He set free were not part of the multitude shut up in hell. Therefore since those whom He set free were shut up in hell, the same were shut up in limbo and in hell. Therefore limbo is either the same as hell, or is a part of hell.

Obj. 2. Further, In the Creed Christ is said to have descended into hell. But He did not descend save to the limbo of the Fathers. Therefore the limbo of the Fathers is the same as hell.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Job xvii. 16): *All that I have shall go down into the deepest hell* (Douay,—*pit*). Now since Job was a holy and just man, he went down to limbo. Therefore limbo is the same as the deepest hell.

On the contrary, In hell there is no redemption.† But the saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as hell.

Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii.): *I do not see how we can believe that the rest which Lazarus received was in hell.* Now the soul of Lazarus went down into limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as hell.

* Allusion to Osee xiii. 14. † Office of the Dead, *Resp.* vii.

I answer that, The abodes of souls after death may be distinguished in two ways; either as to their situation, or as to the quality of the places, inasmuch as souls are punished or rewarded in certain places. Accordingly if we consider the limbo of the Fathers and hell in respect of the aforesaid quality of the places, there is no doubt that they are distinct, both because in hell there is sensible punishment, which was not in the limbo of the Fathers, and because in hell there is eternal punishment, whereas the saints were detained but temporally in the limbo of the Fathers. On the other hand, if we consider them as to the situation of the place, it is probable that hell and limbo are the same place, or that they are continuous as it were, yet so that some higher part of hell be called the limbo of the Fathers. For those who are in hell receive diverse punishments according to the diversity of their guilt, so that those who are condemned are consigned to darker and deeper parts of hell according as they have been guilty of graver sins, and consequently the holy Fathers in whom there was the least amount of sin were consigned to a higher and less darksome part than all those who were condemned to punishment.

Reply Obj. 1. When Christ, by His descent, delivered the Fathers from limbo, He is said to have *bitten* hell and to have descended into hell, in so far as hell and limbo are the same as to situation.

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *Second Objection.*

Reply Obj. 3. Job descended, not to the hell of the damned, but to the limbo of the Fathers. The latter is called the deepest place, not in reference to the places of punishment, but in comparison with other places, as including all penal places under one head.—Again we may reply with Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii.) who says of Jacob: *When Jacob said to his sons, "You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell," he seems to have feared most, lest he should be troubled with so great a sorrow as to obtain, not the rest of good men, but the hell of sinners.* The saying of Job may be expounded in the same way, as being the utterance of one in fear, rather than an assertion.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE LIMBO OF CHILDREN IS THE SAME AS THE LIMBO OF THE FATHERS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers. For punishment should correspond to sin. Now the Fathers were detained in limbo for the same sin as children, namely for original sin. Therefore the place of punishment should be the same for both.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Enchir.* xciii.): *The punishment of children who die in none but original sin is most lenient.* But no punishment is more lenient than that of the holy Fathers. Therefore the place of punishment is the same for both.

On the contrary, Even as temporal punishment in purgatory and eternal punishment in hell are due to actual sin, so temporal punishment in the limbo of the Fathers and eternal punishment in the limbo of the children were due to original sin. If, therefore, hell and purgatory be not the same it would seem that neither are the limbo of children and the limbo of the Fathers the same.

I answer that, The limbo of the Fathers and the limbo of children, without any doubt, differ as to the quality of punishment or reward. For children have no hope of the blessed life, as the Fathers in limbo had, in whom, moreover, shone forth the light of faith and grace. But as regards their situation, there is reason to believe that the place of both is the same; except that the limbo of the Fathers is placed higher than the limbo of children, just as we have stated in reference to limbo and hell (A. 5).

Reply Obj. 1. The Fathers did not stand in the same relation to original sin as children. For in the Fathers original sin was expiated in so far as it infected the person, while there remained an obstacle on the part of nature, on account of which their satisfaction was not yet complete. On the other hand, in children there is an

obstacle both on the part of the person and on the part of nature: and for this reason different abodes are appointed to the Fathers and to children.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is speaking of punishments due to some one by reason of his person. Of these the most lenient are due to those who are burdened with none but original sin. But lighter still is the punishment due to those who are debarred from the reception of glory by no personal defect but only by a defect of nature, so that this very delay of glory is called a kind of punishment.

Seventh Article.

whether so many abodes should be distinguished?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that we should not distinguish so many abodes. For after death, just as abodes are due to souls on account of sin, so are they due on account of merit. Now there is only one abode due on account of merit, namely paradise. Therefore neither should there be more than one abode due on account of sin, namely hell.

Obj. 2. Further, Abodes are appointed to souls after death on account of merits or demerits. Now there is one place where they merit or demerit. Therefore only one abode should be assigned to them after death.

Obj. 3. Further, The places of punishment should correspond to the sins. Now there are only three kinds of sin, namely original, venial, and mortal. Therefore there should only be three penal abodes.

Obj. 4. *On the other hand,* it would seem that there should be many more than those assigned. For this darksome air is the prison house of the demons (2 Pet. ii. 17), and yet it is not reckoned among the five abodes which are mentioned by certain authors. Therefore there are more than five abodes.

Obj. 5. Further, The earthly paradise is distinct from the heavenly paradise. Now some were borne away to the earthly paradise after this state of life, as is related of Enoch

and Elias. Since then the earthly paradise is not counted among the five abodes, it would seem that there are more than five.

Obj. 6. Further, Some penal place should correspond to each state of sinners. Now if we suppose a person to die in original sin who has committed only venial sins, none of the assigned abodes will be befitting to him. For it is clear that he would not be in heaven, since he would be without grace, and for the same reason neither would he be in the limbo of the Fathers; nor again, would he be in the limbo of children, since there is no sensible punishment there, which is due to such a person by reason of venial sin: nor would he be in purgatory, where there is none but temporal punishment, whereas everlasting punishment is due to him: nor would he be in the hell of the damned, since he is not guilty of actual mortal sin. Therefore a sixth abode should be assigned.

Obj. 7. Further, Rewards and punishments vary in quantity according to the differences of sins and merits. Now the degrees of merit and sin are infinite. Therefore we should distinguish an infinite number of abodes, in which souls are punished or rewarded after death.

Obj. 8. Further, Souls are sometimes punished in the places where they sinned, as Gregory states (*Dial.* iv.). But they sinned in the place which we inhabit. Therefore this place should be reckoned among the abodes, especially since some are punished for their sins in this world, as the Master said above (iv. *Sent.* D. 21).

Obj. 9. Further, Just as some die in a state of grace and have some venial sins for which they deserve punishment, so some die in mortal sin and have some good for which they would deserve a reward. Now to those who die in grace with venial sins an abode is assigned where they are punished ere they receive their reward, which abode is purgatory. Therefore, on the other hand, there should be equally an abode for those who die in mortal sin together with some good works.

Obj. 10. Further, Just as the Fathers were delayed from

obtaining full glory of the soul before Christ's coming, so are they now detained from receiving the glory of the body. Therefore as we distinguish an abode of the saints before the coming of Christ from the one where they are received now, so ought we to distinguish the one in which they are received now from the one where they will be received after the resurrection.

I answer that, The abodes of souls are distinguished according to the souls' various states. Now the soul united to a mortal body is in the state of meriting, while the soul separated from the body is in the state of receiving good or evil for its merits; so that after death it is either in the state of receiving its final reward, or in the state of being hindered from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either in the respect of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and thus as regards actual sin it is hell, and as regards original sin it is the limbo of children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is hindered from receiving its final reward, this is either on account of a defect of the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are detained from receiving their reward at once on account of the sins they have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature, and thus we have the limbo of the Fathers, where the Fathers were detained from obtaining glory on account of the guilt of human nature which could not yet be expiated.

Reply Obj. 1. *Good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,* according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.) and the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 6): wherefore it is not unfitting if there be one place of blissful reward and several places of punishment.

Reply Obj. 2. The state of meriting and demeriting is one state, since the same person is able to merit and demerit: wherefore it is fitting that one place should be assigned to all: whereas of those who receive according to their merits there are various states, and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. One may be punished in two ways for

original sin, as stated above, either in reference to the person, or in reference to nature only. Consequently there is a twofold limbo corresponding to that sin.

Reply Obj. 4. This darksome air is assigned to the demons, not as the place where they receive retribution for their merits, but as a place befitting their office, in so far as they are appointed to try us. Hence it is not reckoned among the abodes of which we are treating now: since hell fire is assigned to them in the first place (Matth. xxv.).

Reply Obj. 5. The earthly paradise belongs to the state of the wayfarer rather than to the state of those who receive for their merits; and consequently it is not reckoned among the abodes whereof we are treating now.

Reply Obj. 6. This supposition is impossible.* If, however, it were possible, such a one would be punished in hell eternally: for it is accidental to venial sin that it be punished temporally in purgatory, through its having grace annexed to it: wherefore if it be annexed to a mortal sin, which is without grace, it will be punished eternally in hell. And since this one who dies in original sin has a venial sin without grace, it is not unfitting to suppose that he be punished eternally.

Reply Obj. 7. Diversity of degrees in punishments or rewards does not diversify the state, and it is according to the diversity of state that we distinguish various abodes. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 8. Although separated souls are sometimes punished in the place where we dwell, it does not follow that this is their proper place of punishment: but this is done for our instruction, that seeing their punishment we may be deterred from sin. That souls while yet in the flesh are punished here for their sins has nothing to do with the question, because a punishment of this kind does not place a man outside the state of meriting or demeriting: whereas we are treating now of the abodes to which souls are assigned after the state of merit or demerit.

Reply Obj. 9. It is impossible for evil to be pure and

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXIX., A. 6.

without the admixture of good, just as the supreme good is without any admixture of evil. Consequently those who are to be conveyed to beatitude which is a supreme good must be cleansed of all evil; wherefore there must needs be a place where such persons are cleansed if they go hence without being perfectly clean. But those who will be thrust into hell will not be free from all good: and consequently the comparison fails, since those who are in hell can receive the reward of their goods, in so far as their past goods avail for the mitigation of their punishment.

Reply Obj. 10. The essential reward consists in the glory of the soul, but the body's glory, since it overflows from the soul, is entirely founded as it were on the soul: and consequently lack of the soul's glory causes a difference of state, whereas lack of the body's glory does not. For this reason, too, the same place, namely the empyrean, is assigned to the holy souls separated from their bodies and united to glorious bodies: whereas the same place was not assigned to the souls of the Fathers both before and after the glorification of souls.

QUESTION LXX.

OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE BODY, AND OF THE PUNISHMENT INFLICTED ON IT BY MATERIAL FIRE.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must next consider the general quality of the soul after leaving the body, and the punishment inflicted on it by material fire. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? (2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid powers remain in the soul? (3) Whether the separated soul can suffer from a material fire?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE POWERS REMAIN IN THE SEPARATED SOUL?*

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive powers remain in the sensitive soul. For Augustine says (*De Spir. et Anim.* xv.): *The soul withdraws from the body taking all with itself, sense and imagination, reason, understanding and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible powers.* Now sense, imagination, concupiscible and irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Eccl. Dogm.* xvi.): *We believe that man alone has a substantial soul, which lives though separated from the body, and clings keenly to its senses*

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXVII., A. 8.

and wits. Therefore the soul retains its senses after being separated from the body.

Obj. 3. Further, The soul's powers are either its essential parts as some maintain, or at least are its natural properties. Now that which is in a thing essentially cannot be separated from it, nor is a subject severed from its natural properties. Therefore it is impossible for the soul to lose any of its powers after being separated from the body.

Obj. 4. Further, A whole is not entire if one of its parts be lacking. Now the soul's powers are called its parts. Therefore, if the soul lose any of its powers after death, it will not be entire after death: and this is unfitting.

Obj. 5. Further, The soul's powers co-operate in merit more even than the body, since the body is a mere instrument of action, while the powers are principles of action. Now the body must of necessity be rewarded together with the soul, since it co-operated in merit. Much more, therefore, is it necessary that the powers of the soul be rewarded together with it. Therefore the separated soul does not lose them.

Obj. 6. Further, If the soul after separation from the body loses its sensitive power, that must needs come to naught. For it cannot be said that it is dissolved into some matter, since it has no matter as a part of itself. Now that which entirely comes to naught is not restored in identity; wherefore at the resurrection the soul will not have the same identical sensitive powers. Now according to the Philosopher (*De Anima*, ii.), as the soul is to the body so are the soul's powers to the parts of the body, for instance the sight to the eye. But if it were not identically the same soul that returns to the body, it would not be identically the same man. Therefore for the same reason it would not be identically the same eye, if the visual power were not identically the same; and in like manner no other part would rise again in identity, and consequently neither would the whole man be identically the same. Therefore it is impossible for the separated soul to lose its sensitive powers.

Obj. 7. Further, If the sensitive powers were to be cor-

rupted when the body is corrupted, it would follow that they are weakened when the body is weakened. Yet this is not the case, for according to *De Anima*, i., *if an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would, without doubt, see as well as a young man.* Therefore neither are the sensitive powers corrupted when the body is corrupted.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Eccl. Dogm.* xix.): *Of two substances alone does man consist, soul and body; the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses.* Therefore the sensitive powers belong to the body: and consequently when the body is corrupted the sensitive powers remain not in the soul.

Further, The Philosopher, speaking of the separation of the soul, expresses himself thus (*Met.* xii.): *If, however, anything remain at last, we must ask what this is: because in certain subjects it is not impossible, for instance if the soul be of such a disposition, not the whole soul but the intellect; for as regards the whole soul this is probably impossible.* Hence it seems that the whole soul is not separated from the body, but only the intellective powers of the soul, and consequently not the sensitive or vegetative powers.

Further, The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (*De Anima*, ii.): *This alone is ever separated, as the everlasting from the corruptible: for it is hereby clear that the remaining parts are not separable as some maintain.* Therefore the sensitive powers do not remain in the separated soul.

I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some, holding the view that all the powers are in the soul in the same way as colour is in a body, hold that the soul separated from the body takes all its powers away with it: because, if it lacked any one of them, it would follow that the soul is changed in its natural properties, since these cannot change so long as their subject remains. But the aforesaid view is false, for since a power is so called because it enables us to do or suffer something, and since to do and to be able belong to the same subject, it follows that the subject of a power is the same as that which is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher says (*De Somn. et Vigil.*) that *where*

we find power there we find action. Now it is evident that certain operations, whereof the soul's powers are the principles, do not belong to the soul properly speaking but to the soul as united to the body, because they are not performed except through the medium of the body,—such as to see, to hear, and so forth. Hence it follows that suchlike powers belong to the united soul and body as their subject, but to the soul as their quickening principle, just as the form is the principle of the properties of a composite being. Some operations, however, are performed by the soul without a bodily organ,—for instance to understand, to consider, to will: wherefore, since these actions are proper to the soul, the powers that are the principles thereof belong to the soul not only as their principle but also as their subject. Therefore, since so long as the proper subject remains its proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted they also must be corrupted, it follows that these powers which use no bodily organ for their actions must needs remain in the separated body, while those which use a bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the body is corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the sensitive and the vegetative soul. On this account some draw a distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for they say that they are of two kinds—some being acts of organs and emanating from the soul into the body are corrupted with the body; others, whence the former originate, are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes the body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and these primary powers remain in the separated soul. But this statement seems unreasonable: because the soul, by its essence and not through the medium of certain other powers, is the origin of those powers which are the acts of organs, even as any form, from the very fact that by its essence it informs its matter, is the origin of the properties which result naturally in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose other powers in the soul, by means of which the powers that perfect the organs may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same reason it would be necessary to suppose other powers by

means of which these mean powers flow from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity, and if we have to stop it is better to do so at the first step.

Hence others say that the sensitive and other like powers do not remain in the separated soul except in a restricted sense, namely radically, in the same way as a result is in its principle: because there remains in the separated soul the ability to produce these powers if it should be reunited to the body; nor is it necessary for this ability to be anything in addition to the essence of the soul, as stated above. This opinion appears to be the more reasonable.

Reply Obj. 1. This saying of Augustine is to be understood as meaning that the soul takes away with it some of those powers actually, namely understanding and intelligence, and some radically, as stated above.*

Reply Obj. 2. The senses which the soul takes away with it are not these external senses, but the internal, those, namely, which pertain to the intellective part, for the intellect is sometimes called sense, as Basil states in his commentary on the Proverbs, and again the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 11). If, however, he means the external senses we must reply as above to the first objection.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above the sensitive powers are related to the soul, not as natural passions to their subject, but as compared to their origin: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4. The powers of the soul are not called its integral but its potential parts. Now the nature of suchlike wholes is that the entire energy of the whole is found perfectly in one of the parts, but partially in the others; thus in the soul the soul's energy is found perfectly in the intellective part, but partially in the others. Wherefore, as the powers of the intellective part remain in the separated soul, the latter will remain entire and undiminished, although the sensitive powers do not remain actually: as neither is the king's power decreased by the death of a mayor who shared his authority.

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXVII., A. 8, *ad* 1, and *infra* A. 2, *ad* 1.

Reply Obj. 5. The body co-operates in merit, as an essential part of the man who merits. The sensitive powers, however, do not co-operate thus, since they are of the genus of accidents. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 6. The powers of the sensitive soul are said to be acts of the organs, not as though they were the essential forms of those organs, except in reference to the soul whose powers they are. But they are the acts of the organs, by perfecting them for their proper operations, as heat is the act of fire by perfecting it for the purpose of heating. Wherefore, just as a fire would remain identically the same, although another individual heat were in it (even so the cold of water that has been heated returns not identically the same, although the water remains the same in identity), so the organs will be the same identically, although the powers be not identically the same.

Reply Obj. 7. The Philosopher is speaking there of these powers as being rooted in the soul. This is clear from his saying that *old age is an affection not of the soul, but of that in which the soul is,* namely the body. For in this way the powers of the soul are neither weakened nor corrupted on account of the body.

Second Article.

whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul. For Augustine says (*De Spiritu et Anima,* xv.): *When the soul leaves the body it derives pleasure or sorrow through being affected with these* (namely the imagination, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties) *according to its merits.* But the imagination, the concupiscible, and the irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul will be affected as regards the sensitive powers, and consequently will be in some act by reason of them.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii.) that *the body feels not, but the soul through the body,* and further on: *The soul feels certain things, not through the body but without the body.* Now that which befits the soul without the body can be in the soul separated from the body. Therefore the soul will then be able to feel actually.

Obj. 3. Further, To see images of bodies, as occurs in sleep, belongs to imaginary vision which is in the sensitive part. Now it happens that the separated soul sees images of bodies in the same way as when we sleep. Thus Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii.): *For I see not why the soul has an image of its own body when, the body lying senseless, yet not quite dead, it sees some things which many have related after returning to life from this suspended animation and yet has it not when it has left the body through death having taken place.* For it is unintelligible that the soul should have an image of its body, except in so far as it sees that image: wherefore he said before of those who lie senseless that *they have a certain image of their own body, by which they are able to be borne to corporeal places and by means of sensible images to take cognizance of such things as they see.* Therefore the separated soul can exercise the acts of the sensitive powers.

Obj. 4. Further, The memory is a power of the sensitive part, as proved in *De Memor. et Remin.* i. Now separated souls will actually remember the things they did in this world: wherefore it is said to the rich glutton (Luke xvi. 25): *Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.* Therefore the separated soul will exercise the act of a sensitive power.

Obj. 5. Further, According to the Philosopher (*De Anima,* iii.) the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. But joy and sorrow, love and hatred, fear and hope, and similar emotions which according to our faith we hold to be in separated souls, are in the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore separated souls will not be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.

On the contrary, That which is common to soul and body cannot remain in the separated soul. Now all the operations

of the sensitive powers are common to the soul and body: and this is evident from the fact that no sensitive power exercises an act except through a bodily organ. Therefore the separated soul will be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.

Further, The Philosopher says (*De Anima*, i.) that *when the body is corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves*, and the same applies to all the acts of the sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul does not exercise the act of any sensitive power.

I answer that, Some distinguish two kinds of acts in the sensitive powers: external acts which the soul exercises through the body; and these do not remain in the separated soul: and internal acts which the soul performs by itself; and these will be in the separated soul. This statement would seem to have originated from the opinion of Plato, who held that the soul is united to the body, as a perfect substance nowise dependant on the body, and merely as a mover is united to the thing moved. This is an evident consequence of transmigration which he held. And since according to him nothing is in motion except what is moved, and lest he should go on indefinitely, he said that the first mover moves itself, and he maintained that the soul is the cause of its own movement. Accordingly there would be a twofold movement of the soul, one by which it moves itself, and another whereby the body is moved by the soul: so that this act *to see* is first of all in the soul itself as moving itself, and secondly in the bodily organ in so far as the soul moves the body. This opinion is refuted by the Philosopher (*De Anima*, i.) who proves that the soul does not move itself, and that it is nowise moved in respect of such operations as seeing, feeling, and the like, but that such operations are movements of the composite only. We must therefore conclude that the acts of the sensitive powers nowise remain in the separated soul, except perhaps as in their remote origin.

Reply Obj. 1. Some deny that this book is Augustine's: for it is ascribed to a Cistercian who compiled it from Augustine's works, and added things of his own. Hence we are

not to take what is written there, as having authority. If, however, its authority should be maintained, it must be said that the meaning is that the separated soul is affected with imagination and other like powers, not as though such affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that the soul will be affected in the future life for good or ill, according to the things which it committed in the body through the imagination and other like powers: so that the imagination and suchlike powers are not supposed to elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body the merit of that affection.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul is said to feel through the body, not as though the act of feeling belonged to the soul by itself, but as belonging to the whole composite by reason of the soul, just as we say that heat heats. That which is added, namely that the soul feels some things without the body, such as fear and so forth, means that it feels such things without the outward movement of the body that takes place in the acts of the proper senses: since fear and like passions do not occur without any bodily movement.

It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine speaks there as nearly throughout that book, as one inquiring and not deciding. For it is clear that there is no comparison between the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul: since the soul of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein corporeal images are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated soul. Or we may reply that images of things are in the soul, both as to the sensitive and imaginative power and as to the intellective power, with greater or lesser abstraction from matter and material conditions. Wherefore Augustine's comparison holds in this respect that just as the images of corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who is carried out of his mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated soul intellectively: but not that they are in the separated soul imaginatively.

Reply Obj. 4. As stated in the first book of Sentences, memory has a twofold signification. Sometimes it means a power of the sensitive part, in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and in this way the act of the memory will not be in the separated soul. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*De Anima*, i., text. 66) that *when this*, the body to wit, *is corrupted, the soul remembers not.* In another way memory is used to designate that part of the imagination which pertains to the intellective faculty, in so far namely as it abstracts from all differences of time, since it regards not only the past but also the present, and the future as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv.). Taking memory in this sense the separated soul will remember.*

Reply Obj. 5. Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, have a twofold signification. Sometimes they denote passions of the sensitive appetite, and thus they will not be in the separated soul, because in this way they are not exercised without a definite movement of the heart. In another way they denote acts of the will which is in the intellective part: and in this way they will be in the separated soul, even as delight will be there without bodily movement, even as it is in God, namely in so far as it is a simple movement of the will. In this sense the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 14) that *God's joy is one simple delight.*

Third Article.

whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a bodily fire. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii.): *The things that affect the soul well or ill after its separation from the body, are not corporeal but resemble corporeal things.* Therefore the separated soul is not punished with a bodily fire.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (*ibid.*) says that *the agent is*

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXVII., A. 8; Q. LXXXIX., A. 6.

always more excellent than the patient. But it is impossible for any body to be more excellent than the separated soul. Therefore it cannot suffer from a body.

Obj. 3. Further, According to the Philosopher (*De Gener.* i.) and Boëthius (*De Duab. Natur.*) only those things that agree in matter are active and passive in relation to one another. But the soul and corporeal fire do not agree in matter, since there is no matter common to spiritual and corporeal things: wherefore they cannot be changed into one another, as Boëthius says (*ibid.*). Therefore the separated soul does not suffer from a bodily fire.

Obj. 4. Further, Whatsoever is patient receives something from the agent. Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily fire, it will receive something therefrom. Now whatsoever is received in a thing is received according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore that which is received in the soul from the fire, is in it not materially but spiritually. Now the forms of things existing spiritually in the soul are its perfections. Therefore though it be granted that the soul suffer from the bodily fire, this will not conduce to its punishment, but rather to its perfection.

Obj. 5. Further, If it be said that the soul is punished merely by seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem to say (*Dial.* iv.); on the contrary,—If the soul sees the fire of hell, it cannot see it save by intellectual vision, since it has not the organs by which sensitive or imaginative vision is effected. But it would seem impossible for intellectual vision to be the cause of sorrow, since *there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of considering*, according to the Philosopher (*Top.* i.). Therefore the soul is not punished by that vision.

Obj. 6. Further, If it be said that the soul suffers from the corporeal fire, through being held thereby, even as now it is held by the body while living in the body; on the contrary,—The soul while living in the body is held by the body in so far as there results one thing from the soul and the body, as from form and matter. But the soul will not be the form of that corporeal fire. Therefore it cannot be held by the fire in the manner aforesaid.

Obj. 7. Further, Every bodily agent acts by contact. But a corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the soul, since contact is only between corporeal things whose bounds come together. Therefore the soul suffers not from that fire.

Obj. 8. Further, An organic agent does not act on a remote object, except through acting on the intermediate objects; wherefore it is able to act at a fixed distance in proportion to its power. But souls, or at least the demons to whom this equally applies, are sometimes outside the place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in this world: and yet they are not then free from punishment, for just as the glory of the saints is never interrupted, so neither is the punishment of the damned. And yet we do not find that all the intermediate things suffer from the fire of hell: nor again is it credible that any corporeal thing of an elemental nature has such a power that its action can reach to such a distance. Therefore it does not seem that the pains suffered by the souls of the damned are inflicted by a corporeal fire.

On the contrary, The possibility of suffering from a corporeal fire is equally consistent with separated souls and with demons. Now demons suffer therefrom since they are punished by that fire into which the bodies of the damned will be cast after the resurrection, and which must needs be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our Lord (Matth. xxv. 41), *Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil,* etc. Therefore separated souls also can suffer from that fire.

Further, Punishment should correspond to sin. Now in sinning the soul subjected itself to the body by sinful concupiscence. Therefore it is just that it should be punished by being made subject to a bodily thing by suffering therefrom.

Further, There is greater union between form and matter than between agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore neither is it an obstacle to its suffering from a body.

I answer that, Given that the fire of hell is not so called metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we must needs say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal fire, since our Lord said (Matth. xxv. 41) that this fire was prepared for the devil and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But how it is that they can thus suffer is explained in many ways. For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gregory (*Dial.* iv.) says: *The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it.* But this does not seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is seen, is a perfection of the seer; wherefore it cannot conduce to his punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or unpleasant nature accidentally, in so far, to wit, as it is apprehended as something hurtful, and consequently, besides the fact that the soul sees the fire, there must needs be some relation of the soul to the fire, according to which the fire is hurtful to the soul. Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn the soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful to itself, and in consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in fulfilment of Ps. xiii. 5, *They have trembled for fear, where there was no fear.* Hence Gregory says (*Dial.* iv.) that *the soul burns through seeing itself aflame.* But this, again, seems insufficient, because in this case the soul would suffer from the fire, not in reality but only in apprehension: for although a real passion of sorrow or pain may result from a false imagination, as Augustine observes (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii.), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that one really suffers from the thing, but from the image of the thing that is present to one's fancy. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be more unlike real suffering than that which results from imaginary vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former results from false fancies which the erring soul imagines: and furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are endowed with keen intelligence, would think it possible for

a corporeal fire to hurt them, if they were nowise distressed thereby. Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers even really from the corporeal fire: wherefore Gregory says (*Dial.* iv.): *We can gather from the words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it.* They explain the possibility of this as follows. They say that this corporeal fire can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of Divine justice demands that the soul which by sinning subjected itself to corporeal things should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now an instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in virtue of the principal agent: wherefore it is not unreasonable if that fire seeing that it acts in virtue of a spiritual agent should act on the spirit of a man or demon, in the same way as we have explained the sanctification of the soul by the sacraments (P. III., Q. LXII., AA. 1, 4). But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in acting on that on which it is used instrumentally, has its own connatural action besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the principal agent: in fact it is by fulfilling the former that it effects the latter action, even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the shape of a house. Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul an action connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the instrument of Divine justice in the punishment of sin: and for this reason we must say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some way united to a body: for thus we observe that *the corruptible body is a load upon the soul* (Wis. ix. 15). Now a spirit is united to a body in two ways. In one way as form to matter, so that from their union there results one thing simply: and the spirit that is thus united to a body both quickens the body and is somewhat burdened by the body: but it is not thus that the spirit of man or demon is

united to the corporeal fire. In another way as the mover is united to the things moved, or as a thing placed is united to place, even as incorporeal things are in a place. In this way created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place, being in one place in such a way as not to be in another. Now although of its nature a corporeal thing is able to confine an incorporeal spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to detain an incorporeal spirit in the place to which it is confined, and so to tie it to that place that it be unable to seek another, since a spirit is not by nature in a place so as to be subject to place. But the corporeal fire is enabled as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it, by hindering it from fulfilling its own will, that is by hindering it from acting where it will and as it will. This way is asserted by Gregory (*Dial.* iv.). For in explaining how the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself as follows: *Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are imprisoned in flames?* Julian* says the same as quoted by the Master (iv. *Sent.* D. 44): *If the incorporeal spirit of a living man is held by the body, why shall it not be held after death by a corporeal fire?* and Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi.) that *just as, although the soul is spiritual and the body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is united to the body as giving it life, and on account of this union conceives a great love for its body, so it is chained to the fire, as receiving punishment therefrom, and from this union conceives a loathing.* Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid modes together, in order to understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire: so as to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit united to it as a thing placed is united to a place: that as the instrument of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained as it were, and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to the spirit, and thus the soul seeing the fire as something hurtful to it is tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory

* Bishop of Toledo, *Prognostic* ii.

(*Dial.* iv.) mentions all these in order, as may be seen from the above quotations.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine speaks there as one inquiring: wherefore he expresses himself otherwise when deciding as quoted above (*De Civ. Dei*, xxi.). Or we may reply that Augustine means to say that the things which are the proximate occasion of the soul's pain or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it apprehended the fire as hurtful to it: wherefore the fire as apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its distress.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the soul is simply more excellent than the fire, the fire is relatively more excellent than the soul, in so far, to wit, as it is the instrument of Divine justice.

Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher and Boëthius are speaking of the action whereby the patient is changed into the nature of the agent. Such is not the action of the fire on the soul: and consequently the argument is not conclusive.

Reply Obj. 4. By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the point.

Reply Obj. 5. In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can nowise be contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the thing seen, by its very action on the sight so as to be seen, there may be accidentally something corruptive of the sight, in so far as it destroys the harmony of the organ. Nevertheless, intellectual vision may cause sorrow, in so far as the thing seen is apprehended as hurtful, not that it hurts through being seen, but in some other way no matter which. It is thus that the soul in seeing the fire is distressed.

Reply Obj. 6. The comparison does not hold in every respect, but it does in some, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 7. Although there is no bodily contact between the soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact be-

tween them (even as the mover of the heaven, being spiritual, touches the heaven, when it moves it, with a spiritual contact) in the same way as a painful object is said to touch, as stated in *De Generat.* i. This mode of contact is sufficient for action.

Reply Obj. 8. The souls of the damned are never outside hell, except by Divine permission, either for the instruction or for the trial of the elect. And wherever they are outside hell they nevertheless always see the fire thereof as prepared for their punishment. Wherefore, since this vision is the immediate cause of their distress, as stated above, wherever they are, they suffer from hell-fire. Even so prisoners, though outside the prison, suffer somewhat from the prison, seeing themselves condemned thereto. Hence just as the glory of the elect is not diminished, neither as to the essential, nor as to the accidental reward, if they happen to be outside the empyrean, in fact this somewhat conduces to their glory, so the punishment of the damned is nowise diminished, if by God's permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on James iii. 6, *inflameth the wheel of our nativity*, etc., is in agreement with this, for it is worded thus: *The devil, wherever he is, whether in the air or under the earth, drags with him the torments of his flames.* But the objection argues as though the corporeal fire tortured the spirit immediately in the same way as it torments bodies.

QUESTION LXXI.

OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD.

(*In Fourteen Articles.*)

WE must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under this head there are fourteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether suffrages performed by one person can profit others? (2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living? (3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the dead? (4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those who perform them? (5) Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell? (6) Whether they profit those who are in purgatory? (7) Whether they avail the children in limbo? (8) Whether in any way they profit those who are in heaven? (9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and almsgiving profit the departed? (10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them? (11) Whether the burial service profits the departed? (12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that person more than others? (13) Whether suffrages for many avail each one as much as if they were offered for each individual? (14) Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special and general suffrages together avail those for whom they are offered?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SUFFRAGES OF ONE PERSON CAN PROFIT OTHERS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the suffrages of one person cannot profit others. For it is written (Gal. vi. 8): *What*

things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap. Now if one person reaped fruit from the suffrages of another, he would reap from another's sowing. Therefore a person receives no fruit from the suffrages of others.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to God's justice, that each one should receive according to his merits, wherefore the psalm (lxi. 13) says: *Thou wilt render to every man according to his works.* Now it is impossible for God's justice to fail. Therefore it is impossible for one man to be assisted by the works of another.

Obj. 3. Further, A work is meritorious on the same count as it is praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it is voluntary. Now one man is not praised for the work of another. Therefore neither can the work of one man be meritorious and fruitful for another.

Obj. 4. Further, It belongs to Divine justice to repay good for good in the same way as evil for evil. But no man is punished for the evildoings of another; indeed, according to Ezech. xviii. 4, *the soul that sinneth, the same shall die.* Therefore neither does one person profit by another's good.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. cxviii. 63): *I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee,* etc.

Further, All the faithful united together by charity are members of the one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted by another. Therefore one man can be assisted by the merits of another.

I answer that, Our actions can avail for two purposes. First, for acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the state of bliss. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus by some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of punishment. And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two ways: first, by way of merit; secondly, by way of prayer: the difference being that merit relies on justice, and prayer on mercy; since he who prays obtains his petition from the mere liberality of the one he prays. Accordingly we must say that the work of one person nowise can avail another for acquiring a state by way of merit, so that, to wit, a man be

able to merit eternal life by the works which I do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of the recipient, and each one is disposed by his own and not by another's actions,—disposed, that is to say, by being worthy of reward. By way of prayer, however, the work of one may profit another while he is a wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may obtain the first grace for another:* and since the impetration of prayer depends on the liberality of God Whom we pray, it may extend to whatever is ordinately subject to the Divine power. On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or accessory to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only by way of prayer but even by way of merit: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, which root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all who are united together by charity acquire some benefit from one another's works, albeit according to the measure of each one's state, since even in heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that the communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. Secondly, through the intention of the doer who does certain works specially for the purpose that they may profit such persons: so that those works become somewhat the works of those for whom they are done, as though they were bestowed on them by the doer. Wherefore they can avail them either for the fulfilment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose that does not change their state.

Reply Obj. 1. This reaping is the receiving of eternal life, as stated in Jo. iv. 36, *And he that reapeth . . . gathereth fruit unto life everlasting.* Now a share of eternal life is not given to a man save for his own works, for although we may impetrate for another that he obtain life, this never happens except by means of his own works, when namely, at the prayers of one, another is given the grace whereby he merits eternal life.

Reply Obj. 2. The work that is done for another becomes his for whom it is done: and in like manner the work done

* Cf. I.-II., Q. CXIV., A. 6.

by a man who is one with me is somewhat mine. Hence it is not contrary to Divine justice if a man receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is one with him in charity, or of works done for him. This also happens according to human justice, so that the satisfaction offered by one is accepted in lieu of another's.

Reply Obj. 3. Praise is not given to a person save according to his relation to an act, wherefore praise is *in relation to something* (*Ethic.* i. 12). And since no man is made or shown to be well or ill disposed to something, by another's deed, it follows that no man is praised for another's deeds save accidentally, in so far as he is somewhat the cause of those deeds, by giving counsel, assistance, inducement, or by any other means. On the other hand, a work is meritorious to a person, not only by reason of his disposition, but also in view of something consequent upon his disposition or state, as evidenced by what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4. It is directly contrary to justice to take away from a person that which is his due: but to give a person what is not his due is not contrary to justice, but surpasses the bounds of justice, for it is liberality. Now a person cannot be hurt by the ills of another, unless he be deprived of something of his own. Consequently it is not becoming that one should be punished for another's sins, as it is that one should acquire some advantage from the good deeds of another.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEAD CAN BE ASSISTED BY THE WORKS OF THE LIVING?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the works of the living. First, because the Apostle says (2 Cor. v. 10): *We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done.* Therefore nothing can accrue to a man from the works of others, which are done after his death and when he is no longer in the body.

Obj. 2. Further, This also seems to follow from the words of Apoc. xiv. 13, *Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord . . . for their works follow them.*

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs only to one who is on the way to advance on account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer wayfarers, because to them the words of Job xix. 8, refer: *He hath hedged in my path round about, and I cannot pass.* Therefore the dead cannot be assisted by a person's suffrages.

Obj. 4. Further, No one is assisted by the deed of another, unless there be some community of life between them. Now there is no community between the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 11). Therefore the suffrages of the living do not profit the dead.

On the contrary are the words of 2 Machab. xii. 46: *It is . . . a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins.* But this would not be profitable unless it were a help to them. Therefore the suffrages of the living profit the dead.

Further, Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* i.): *Of no small weight is the authority of the Church whereby she clearly approves of the custom whereby a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar.* This custom was established by the apostles themselves according to the Damascene in a sermon on suffrages for the dead, where he expresses himself thus: *Realizing the nature of the Mysteries the disciples of the Saviour and His holy apostles sanctioned a commemoration of those who had died in the faith, being made in the awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries.* This is also confirmed by the authority of Dionysius (*Hier. Eccl.*), where he mentions the rite of the Early Church in praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts that the suffrages of the living profit the dead. Therefore we must believe this without any doubt.

I answer that, Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the Church, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who die in charity. For charity which is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body,

has no end: *Charity never falleth away* (1 Cor. xiii. 8). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the living: wherefore the intention of the living can be directed to them. Hence the suffrages of the living profit the dead in two ways even as they profit the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of the intention being directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not believe that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their state from unhappiness to happiness or *vice versa*; but they avail for the diminution of punishment or something of the kind that involves no change in the state of the dead.

Reply Obj. 1. Man while living in the body merited that such things should avail him after death. Wherefore if he is assisted thereby after this life, this is, nevertheless, the result of the things he has done in the body.

Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the sermon quoted above, that these words refer to the retribution which will be made at the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the living.

Reply Obj. 2. The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of eternal retribution as is clear from the opening words: *Blessed are the dead*, etc. Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat their own, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. Although, strictly speaking, after death souls are not in the state of the way, yet in a certain respect they are still on the way, in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance towards their final award. Wherefore, strictly speaking, their way is hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is not so hedged around that they cannot be helped by others in the matter of their being delayed from receiving their final award, because in this respect they are still wayfarers.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the communion of civic deeds, whereof the Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the

dead and the living, because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the spiritual life is possible between them, for that life is founded on charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live.

Third Article.

whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages performed by sinners do not profit the dead. For, according to Jo. ix. 31, *God doth not hear sinners.* Now if their prayers were to profit those for whom they pray, they would be heard by God. Therefore the suffrages performed by them do not profit the dead.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Pastoral,* i. 11) that *when an offensive person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered party is provoked to harsher measures.* Now every sinner is offensive to God. Therefore God is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, and consequently their suffrages are of no avail.

Obj. 3. Further, A person's deed would seem to be more fruitful to the doer than to another. But a sinner merits naught for himself by his deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another.

Obj. 4. Further, Every meritorious work must be a living work, that is to say, informed by charity. Now works done by sinners are dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted thereby.

Obj. 5. *On the contrary,* No man can know for certain about another man whether the latter be in a state of sin or of grace. If, therefore, only those suffrages were profitable that are done by those who are in a state of grace, a man could not know of whom to ask suffrages for his dead, and consequently many would be deterred from obtaining suffrages.

Obj. 6. Further, According to Augustine (*Enchir.* cix.),

as quoted in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 45), the dead are assisted by suffrages according as while living they merited to be assisted after death. Therefore the worth of suffrages is measured according to the disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore it would appear that it differs not whether they be performed by good or by wicked persons.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the suffrages performed by the wicked. First, the deed done, for instance the sacrifice of the altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of the wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider the deed of the doer, and then we must draw a distinction; because the deed of a sinner who offers suffrage may be considered—in one way in so far as it is his own deed, and thus it can nowise be meritorious either to himself or to another; in another way in so far as it is another's deed, and this happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering suffrages, represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead a thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts (*Cœl. Hier.* xiii.), it follows that the suffrages of that priest, albeit a sinner, profit the departed. Secondly, when he acts as the instrument of another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to the principal agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on account of the principal agent: for instance if a servant being in sin do any work of mercy at the command of his master who has charity. Hence, if a person dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if those persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious on two counts.

Reply Obj. 1. The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not his but another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be heard by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, to wit, they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His goods not only to the righteous but also to sinners (Matth. v. 45), not indeed on account of their merits, but of His loving kindness. Hence a gloss on Jo. ix. 31, *God doth not hear sinners*, says that *he speaks as one unanointed and as not seeing clearly*.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the sinner's prayer is not acceptable in so far as he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God on account of another in whose stead or at whose command he offers the prayer.

Reply Obj. 3. The reason why the sinner who performs these suffrages gains nothing thereby is because he is not capable of profiting by reason of his own indisposition. Nevertheless, as stated above, it may in some way profit another, who is disposed.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the sinner's deed is not living in so far as it is his own, it may be living in so far as it is another's, as stated above.

Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from good or from evil persons, we must reply to them also.

Reply Obj. 5. Although one cannot know for certain about another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with probability from what one sees outwardly of a man: for a tree is known by its fruit (Matth. vii. 16).

Reply Obj. 6. In order that suffrage avail another, it is requisite that the one for whom it is performed be capable of availing by it: and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he did in his life-time. This is what Augustine means to say. Nevertheless, those works must be such that they can profit him, and this depends not on the person for whom the suffrage is performed, but rather on the one who offers the suffrages whether by performing them or by commanding them.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SUFFRAGES OFFERED BY THE LIVING FOR THE DEAD PROFIT THOSE WHO OFFER THEM?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages offered by the living for the dead do not profit those who offer them. For according to human justice a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pay a debt for another man. Therefore a man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason that by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for whom he offered them.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever a man does, he should do it as best he can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who by suffrages has paid the debt of a dead person is freed from his own debt, it would seem that one ought never to satisfy for oneself, but always for another.

Obj. 3. Further, If the satisfaction of one who satisfies for another profits him equally with the one for whom he satisfies, it will likewise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the same time, and likewise a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy for all by one work of satisfaction; which is absurd.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xxxiv. 13): *My prayer shall be turned into my bosom.* Therefore, in like manner, suffrages that are offered for others profit those who satisfy.

Further, The Damascene says in the sermon *On those who fell asleep in the faith: Just as when about to anoint a sick man with the ointment or other holy oil, first of all he,* namely the anointer, *shares in the anointing and thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever strives for his neighbour's salvation first of all profits himself and afterwards his neighbour.* And thus the question at issue is answered.

I answer that, The work of suffrage that is done for another may be considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of compensation which is a condition of satisfaction: and in this way the work of suffrage that is counted

as belonging to the person for whom it is done, while absolving him from the debt of punishment, does not absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this compensation we have to consider the equality of justice: and this work of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satisfaction than the debt of one. Secondly, it may be considered as meriting eternal life, and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity: and in this way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but also and still more the doer.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections:* for the first considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction, while the others consider it as meritorious.

Fifth Article.

whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages profit those who are in hell. For it is written (2 Machab. xii. 40): *They found under the coats of the slain some of the donaries of the idols . . ., which the law forbiddeth to the Jews,* and yet we read further on (*verse* 43) that Judas *sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem . . . to be offered for the sins of the dead.* Now it is clear that they sinned mortally through acting against the Law, and consequently that they died in mortal sin, and were taken to hell. Therefore suffrages profit those who are in hell.

Obj. 2. Further, The text (iv. *Sent.* D. 45) quotes the saying of Augustine (*Enchir.* cx.) that *those whom suffrages profit gain either entire forgiveness, or at least an abatement of their damnation.* Now only those who are in hell are said to be damned. Therefore suffrages profit even those who are in hell.

Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.* cap ult.): *If here the prayers of the righteous avail those who are alive, how much more do they, after death, profit those alone who are*

worthy of their holy prayers? Hence we may gather that suffrages are more profitable to the dead than to the living. Now they profit the living even though they be in mortal sin, for the Church prays daily for sinners that they be converted to God. Therefore suffrages avail also for the dead who are in mortal sin.

Obj. 4. Further, In the Lives of the Fathers (iii. 172: vi. 16) we read, and the Damascene relates in a sermon of his (*De Defunct.*), that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man on the road, and that after praying he asked whose head it was, and the head replied that it had belonged to a pagan priest who was condemned to hell; and yet he confessed that he and others were assisted by the prayers of Macarius. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit even those who are in hell.

Obj. 5. Further, The Damascene in the same sermon relates that Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from heaven saying to him: *I have heard thy voice, and I pardon Trajan:* and of this fact the Damascene adds in the same sermon, *the whole East and West are witnesses.* Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since *he put many martyrs to a cruel death* (*ibid.*). Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail even for those who are in hell.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.* vii.): *The high priest prays not for the unclean, because by so doing he would act counter to the Divine order,* and consequently he says (*ibid.*) that *he prays not that sinners be forgiven, because his prayer for them would not be heard.* Therefore suffrages avail not those who are in hell.

Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxiv.): *There is the same reason for not praying then* (namely after the judgment day) *for men condemned to the everlasting fire, as there is now for not praying for the devil and his angels who are sentenced to eternal punishment, and for this same reason the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because, forsooth, knowing them to be already condemned to eternal punishment, they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their prayers before they are summoned to the presence of the just Judge.*

Further, The text (iv. *Sent.* D. 45) quotes the words of Augustine (*Serm.* xxxii. *de Verb. Apost.*): *If a man depart this life without the faith that worketh by charity and its sacraments, in vain do his friends have recourse to suchlike acts of kindness.* Now all the damned come under that head. Therefore suffrages profit them not.

I answer that, There have been three opinions about the damned. For some have said that a twofold distinction must be made in this matter. First, as to time; for they said that after the judgment day no one in hell will be assisted by any suffrage, but that before the judgment day some are assisted by the suffrages of the Church. Secondly, they made a distinction among those who are detained in hell. Some of these, they said, are very bad, those namely who have died without faith and the sacraments, and these, since they were not of the Church, neither by grace nor by name,* the suffrages of the Church cannot avail; while others are not very bad, those namely who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had the faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works generically good, and for these the suffrages of the Church ought to avail. Yet they were confronted with a difficulty which troubled them, for it would seem to follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity although infinite in duration) that a multiplicity of suffrages would take away that punishment altogether, which is the error of Origen (*Peri Archon.* i.; cf. Gregory, *Moral.* xxxiv.): and consequently they endeavoured in various ways to avoid this difficulty. For Præpositivus† said that suffrages for the damned can be so multiplied that they are entirely freed from punishment, not absolutely as Origen maintained, but for a time, namely till the judgment day: for their souls will be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the punishments of hell without hope of pardon. But this opinion seems incompatible with Divine providence, which leaves nothing inordinate in the world. For guilt cannot be

* Cf. *Oratio ad Vesperas, Fer. ii. post Dom. Pass.*

† Gilbertus Præpositivus, Chancellor of the See of Paris, A.D. 1206.

restored to order save by punishment: wherefore it is impossible for punishment to cease, unless first of all guilt be expiated: so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned, their punishment will nowise be interrupted. For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porrée devised another explanation. These said that the process in the diminution of punishments by suffrages is as the process in dividing a line, which though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is never destroyed by division, if it be diminished not by equal but by proportionate quantities, for instance if we begin by taking away a quarter of the whole and, secondly, a quarter of that quarter, and then a quarter of this second quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say by the first suffrage a certain proportion of the punishment is taken away, and by the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder. But this explanation is in many ways defective. First, because it seems that indefinite division which is applicable to continuous quantity cannot be transferred to spiritual quantity: secondly, because there is no reason why the second suffrage, if it be of equal worth, should diminish the punishment less than the first: thirdly, because punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, even as it cannot be done away unless the guilt be done away: fourthly, because in the division of a line we come at length to something which is not sensible, for a sensible body is not indefinitely divisible: and thus it would follow that after many suffrages the remaining punishment would be so little as not to be felt, and thus would no longer be a punishment. Hence others found another explanation. For Antissiodorensis* (iv. *Sent. Tract.* 14) said that suffrages profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their punishment, but by fortifying the person punished: even as a man who is carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would be enabled to carry it better, and yet his load would be none the lighter. But this again is impossible, because according to Gregory (*Moral.* ix.) a man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according as

* William of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais.

his guilt deserves; and consequently some suffer more, some less, from the same fire; wherefore since the guilt of the damned remains unchanged, it cannot be that he suffers less punishment. Moreover, the aforesaid opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the statements of holy men, and groundless as being based on no authority. It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off from the bond of charity in virtue of which the departed are in touch with the works of the living. Secondly, because they have entirely come to the end of life, and have received the final award for their merits, even as the saints who are in heaven. For the remaining punishment or glory of the body does not make them to be wayfarers, since glory essentially and radically resides in the soul. It is the same with the unhappiness of the damned, wherefore their punishment cannot be diminished as neither can the glory of the saints be increased as to the essential reward. However, we may admit, in a certain measure, the manner in which, according to some, suffrages profit the damned, if it be said that they profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor again by diminishing their sense of punishment, but by withdrawing from the damned some matter of grief, which matter they might have if they knew themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one; and this matter of grief is withdrawn from them when suffrages are offered for them. Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because as Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* xiii.)—and this applies especially to the damned—*the spirits of the departed are where they see nothing of what men do or of what happens to them in this life,* and consequently they know not when suffrages are offered for them, unless this relief be granted from above to some of the damned in despite of the general law. This, however, is a matter of great uncertainty; wherefore it is safer to say simply that suffrages profit not the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as appears from the authors quoted above.

Reply Obj. 1. The donaries to the idols were not found on those dead so that they might be taken as a sign that they

were carried off in reverence to the idols: but they took them as conquerors because they were due to them by right of war. They sinned, however, venially by covetousness: and consequently they were not damned in hell, and thus suffrages could profit them. Or we may say, according to some, that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, they repented of their sin, according to Ps. lxxvii. 34, *When He slew them, then they sought Him:* and this is a probable opinion. Wherefore the offering was made for them.

Reply Obj. 2. In these words damnation is taken in a broad sense for any kind of punishment, so as to include also the punishment of purgatory which is sometimes entirely expiated by suffrages, and sometimes not entirely, but diminished.

Reply Obj. 3. Suffrage for a dead person is more acceptable than for a living person, as regards his being in greater want, since he cannot help himself as a living person can. But a living person is better off in that he can be taken from the state of mortal sin to the state of grace, which cannot be said of the dead. Hence there is not the same reason for praying for the dead as for the living.

Reply Obj. 4. This assistance did not consist in a diminishment of their punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the same place) that when he prayed they were permitted to see one another, and in this they had a certain joy, not real but imaginary, in the fulfilment of their desire. Even so the demons are said to rejoice when they draw men into sin, although this nowise diminishes their punishment, as neither is the joy of the angels diminished by the fact that they take pity on our ills.

Reply Obj. 5. Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers of blessed Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the pardon of his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The same applies to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead, many of whom were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must

needs say likewise of all such persons that they were consigned to hell, not finally, but as was actually due to their own merits according to justice: and that according to higher causes, in view of which it was foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.

Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not simply freed from the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a time, that is, until the judgment day. Nor does it follow that this is the general result of suffrages, because things happen differently in accordance with the general law from that which is permitted in particular cases and by privilege. Even so the bounds of human affairs differ from those of the miracles of the Divine power as Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* xvi.).

Sixth Article.

Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages do not profit even those who are in purgatory. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now *there is no redemption in hell,** and it is written (Ps. vi. 6), *Who shall confess to Thee in hell?* Therefore suffrages do not profit those who are in purgatory.

Obj. 2. Further, The punishment of purgatory is finite. Therefore if some of the punishment is abated by suffrages, it would be possible to have such a great number of suffrages, that the punishment would be entirely remitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished: and this would seem incompatible with Divine justice.

Obj. 3. Further, Souls are in purgatory in order that they may be purified there, and being pure may come to the kingdom. Now nothing can be purified, unless something be done to it. Therefore suffrages offered by the living do not diminish the punishment of purgatory.

Obj. 4. Further, If suffrages availed those who are in

* Office of the dead, *Resp.* vii.

purgatory, those especially would seem to avail them which are offered at their behest. Yet these do not always avail: for instance, if a person before dying were to provide for so many suffrages to be offered for him that if they were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire punishment. Now supposing these suffrages to be delayed until he is released from punishment, they will profit him nothing. For it cannot be said that they profit him before they are discharged; and after they are fulfilled, he no longer needs them, since he is already released. Therefore suffrages do not avail those who are in purgatory.

On the contrary, As quoted in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 45), Augustine says (*Enchir.* cx.): *Suffrages profit those who are not very good or not very bad.* Now such are those who are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.

Further, Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.* vii.) that the *godlike priest in praying for the departed prays for those who lived a holy life, and yet contracted certain stains through human frailty.* Now such persons are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, The punishment of purgatory is intended to supplement the satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body. Consequently, since, as stated above (AA. 1, 2: Q. XIII., A. 2), the works of one person can avail for another's satisfaction, whether the latter be living or dead, the suffrages of the living, without any doubt, profit those who are in purgatory.

Reply Obj. 1. The words quoted refer to those who are in the hell of the damned, where there is no redemption for those who are finally consigned to that punishment. We may also reply with Damascene (*Serm. de Dormientibus*) that such statements are to be explained with reference to the lower causes, that is according to the demands of the merits of those who are consigned to those punishments. But according to the Divine mercy which transcends human merits, it happens otherwise through the prayers of the righteous, than is implied by the expressions quoted in the aforesaid authorities. Now *God changes His sentence but*

not his counsel, as Gregory says (*Moral.* xx.): wherefore the Damascene (*loc. cit.*) quotes as instances of this the Ninevites, Achab and Ezechias, in whom it is apparent that the sentence pronounced against them by God was commuted by the Divine mercy.*

Reply Obj. 2. It is not unreasonable that the punishment of those who are in purgatory be entirely done away by the multiplicity of suffrages. But it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished, because the punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited to that other.

Reply Obj. 3. The purifying of the soul by the punishment of purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that hinders it from obtaining glory. And since, as stated above (Q. XIII., A. 2), the guilt of one person can be expiated by the punishment which another undergoes in his stead, it is not unreasonable that one person be purified by another satisfying for him.

Reply Obj. 4. Suffrages avail on two counts, namely the action of the agent† and the action done. By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, but the effect incidental to that action,—thus from the giving of alms there follow the relief of the poor and their prayer to God for the deceased. In like manner the action of the agent may be considered in relation either to the principal agent or to the executor. I say, then, that the dying person, as soon as he provides for certain suffrages to be offered for him, receives the full meed of those suffrages, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of the suffrages that results from the action as proceeding from the principal agent. But as regards the efficacy of the suffrages arising from the action done or from the action as proceeding from the executor, he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are discharged. And if, before this, he happens to be released from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived of the fruit of the suffrages, and this will fall back upon those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it

* Cf. P. I., Q. XIX., A. 7, *ad* 2.

† *Ex opere operante* and *ex opere operato.*

is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded in temporal matters by another's fault,—and the punishment of purgatory is temporal,—although as regards the eternal retribution none can be defrauded save by his own fault.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SUFFRAGES AVAIL THE CHILDREN WHO ARE IN LIMBO?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages avail the children who are in limbo. For they are not detained there except for another's sin. Therefore it is most becoming that they should be assisted by the suffrages of others.

Obj. 2. Further, In the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 45) the words of Augustine (*Enchir.* cx.) are quoted: *The suffrages of the Church obtain forgiveness for those who are not very bad.* Now children are not reckoned among those who are very bad, since their punishment is very light. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail them.

On the contrary, The text (*ibid.*) quotes Augustine as saying (*Serm.* xxxii. *De Verb Ap.*) that *suffrages avail not those who have departed hence without the faith that works by love.* Now the children departed thus. Therefore suffrages avail them not.

I answer that, Unbaptized children are not detained in limbo save because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since the state of the dead cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as regards the merit of the essential reward or punishment, the suffrages of the living cannot profit the children in limbo.

Reply Obj. 1. Although original sin is such that one person can be assisted by another on its account, nevertheless the souls of the children in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be assisted, because after this life there is no time for obtaining grace.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is speaking of those who are not very bad, but have been baptized. This is clear from what

precedes: *Since these sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any alms whatsoever, are offered for those who have been baptized,* etc.

Eighth Article.

Whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in some way suffrages profit the saints in heaven; on account of the words of the collect in the mass:* *Even as they* (i.e., the sacraments) *avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us unto healing.* Now foremost among all suffrages is the sacrifice of the altar. Therefore suffrages profit the saints in heaven.

Obj. 2. Further, The sacraments cause what they signify. Now the third part of the host, that namely which is dropped into the chalice, signifies those who lead a happy life in heaven. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit those who are in heaven.

Obj. 3. Further, The saints rejoice in heaven not only in their own goods, but also in the goods of others: hence it is written (Luke xv. 10): *There is* (Vulg.,—*shall be*) *joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance.* Therefore the joy of the saints in heaven increases on account of the good works of the living: and consequently our suffrages also profit them.

Obj. 4. Further, The Damascene says (*Serm. de Dormient.*) quoting the words of Chrysostom: *For if the heathens,* he says, *burn the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much more shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer together with what has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought to ashes like him, but that thou mayest surround him with greater glory by so doing; and if he be a sinner who has died, that thou mayest loose him from his sins, and if he be righteous, that thou mayest add to his meed and reward!* And thus the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, As quoted in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 15), Augustine says (*De Verb. Ap. Serm.* xvii.): *It is insulting*

* Postcommunion, Feast of S. Andrew, Apostle.

to pray for a martyr in church, since we ought to commend ourselves to his prayers.

Further, To be assisted belongs to one who is in need. But the saints in heaven are without any need whatever. Therefore they are not assisted by the suffrages of the Church.

I answer that, Suffrage by its very nature implies the giving of some assistance, which does not apply to one who suffers no default: since no one is competent to be assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as the saints in heaven are free from all need, being inebriated with the plenty of God's house (Ps. xxxv. 10), they are not competent to be assisted by suffrages.

Reply Obj. 1. Suchlike expressions do not mean that the saints receive an increase of glory in themselves through our observing their feasts, but that we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with greater solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising God, and through His glory thus increasing somewhat in us, there accrues something, not to God, but to us.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the sacraments cause what they signify, they do not produce this effect in respect of everything that they signify: else, since they signify Christ, they would produce something in Christ (which is absurd). But they produce their effect on the recipient of the sacrament in virtue of that which is signified by the sacrament. Thus it does not follow that the sacrifices offered for the faithful departed profit the saints, but that by the merits of the saints which we commemorate, or which are signified in the sacrament, they profit others for whom they are offered.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all our goods, it does not follow, that if our joys be increased their joy is also increased formally, but only materially, because every passion is increased formally in respect of the formal aspect of its object. Now the formal aspect of the saints' joy, no matter what they rejoice in, is God Himself, in Whom they cannot rejoice more and less, for otherwise their essential reward, consisting of their joy in God, would vary. Hence from the fact that the goods are multiplied,

wherein they rejoice with God as the formal aspect of their joy, it does not follow that their joy is intensified, but that they rejoice in more things. Consequently it does not follow that they are assisted by our works.

Reply Obj. 4. The sense is not that an increase of meed or reward accrues to the saint from the suffrages offered by a person, but that this accrues to the offerer. Or we may reply that the blessed departed may derive a reward from suffrages through having, while living, provided for suffrage to be offered for himself, and this was meritorious for him.

Ninth Article.

Whether the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms profit the departed?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the souls of the departed are not assisted only by the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms, or that they are not assisted by them chiefly. For punishment should compensate for punishment. Now fasting is more penal than almsgiving or prayer. Therefore fasting profits more as suffrage than any of the above.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory reckons fasting together with these three, as stated in the Decretals (xiii., Q. ii., cap. 22): *The souls of the departed are released in four ways, either by the offerings of priests, or the alms of their friends, or the prayers of the saints, or the fasting of their kinsfolk.* Therefore the three mentioned above are insufficiently reckoned by Augustine (*De Cura pro Mort.* xviii.).

Obj. 3. Further, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments, especially as regards its effect. Therefore Baptism and other sacraments ought to be offered for the departed equally with or more than the sacrament of the altar.

Obj. 4. Further, This would seem to follow from the words of 1 Cor. xv. 29, *If the dead rise not again at all, why are they then baptized for them?* Therefore Baptism avails as suffrage for the dead.

Obj. 5. Further, In different masses there is the same sacrifice of the altar. If, therefore, sacrifice, and not the mass, be reckoned among the suffrages, it would seem that the effect would be the same whatever mass be said for a deceased person, whether in honour of the Blessed Virgin or of the Holy Ghost, or any other. Yet this seems contrary to the ordinance of the Church which has appointed a special mass for the dead.

Obj. 6. Further, The Damascene (*Serm. de Dormient.*) teaches that candles and oil should be offered for the dead. Therefore not only the offering of the sacrifice of the altar, but also other offerings should be reckoned among suffrages for the dead.

I answer that, The suffrages of the living profit the dead in so far as the latter are united to the living in charity, and in so far as the intention of the living is directed to the dead. Consequently those whose works are by nature best adapted to assist the dead, which pertain chiefly to the communication of charity, or to the directing of one's intention to another person. Now the sacrament of the Eucharist belongs chiefly to charity, since it is the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity, inasmuch as it contains Him in Whom the whole Church is united and incorporated, namely Christ: wherefore the Eucharist is as it were the origin and bond of charity. Again, chief among the effects of charity is the work of almsgiving: wherefore on the part of charity these two, namely the sacrifice of the Church and almsgiving are the chief suffrages for the dead. But on the part of the intention directed to the dead the chief suffrage is prayer, because prayer by its very nature implies relation not only to the person who prays, even as other works do, but more directly still to that which we pray for. Hence these three are reckoned the principal means of succouring the dead, although we must allow that any other goods whatsoever that are done out of charity for the dead are profitable to them.

Reply Obj. 1. When one person satisfies for another, the point to consider, in order that the effect of his satisfaction reach the other, is the thing whereby the satisfaction of one

passes to another, rather than even the punishment undergone by way of satisfaction; although the punishment expiates more the guilt of the one who satisfies, in so far as it is a kind of medicine. And consequently the three aforesaid are more profitable to the departed than fasting.

Reply Obj. 2. It is true that fasting can profit the departed by reason of charity, and on account of the intention being directed to the departed. Nevertheless, fasting does not by its nature contain anything pertaining to charity or to the directing of the intention, and these things are extrinsic thereto as it were, and for this reason Augustine did not reckon, while Gregory did reckon, fasting among the suffrages for the dead.

Reply Obj. 3. Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, wherefore just as by generation being does not accrue save to the object generated, so Baptism produces its effect only in the person baptized, as regards the deed done: and yet as regards the deed of the doer whether of the baptizer or of the baptized, it may profit others even as other meritorious works. On the other hand, the Eucharist is the sign of ecclesiastical unity, wherefore by reason of the deed done its effect can pass to another, which is not the case with the other sacraments.

Reply Obj. 4. According to a gloss this passage may be expounded in two ways. First, thus: *If the dead rise not again, nor did Christ rise again, why are they baptized for them?* i.e. *for sins, since they are not pardoned if Christ rose not again, because in Baptism not only Christ's passion but also His resurrection operates, for the latter is in a sense the cause of our spiritual resurrection.* Secondly, thus: There have been some misguided persons who were baptized for those who had departed this life without baptism, thinking that this would profit them: and according to this explanation the Apostle is speaking, in the above words, merely according to the opinion of certain persons.

Reply Obj. 5. In the office of the mass there is not only a sacrifice but also prayers. Hence the suffrage of the mass contains two of the things mentioned by Augustine (*loc. cit.*),

namely *prayer* and *sacrifice*. As regards the sacrifice offered the mass profits equally the departed, no matter in whose honour it be said: and this is the principal thing done in the mass. But as regards the prayers, that mass is most profitable in which the prayers are appointed for this purpose. Nevertheless, this defect may be supplied by the greater devotion, either of the one who says mass, or of the one who orders the mass to be said, or again, by the intercession of the saint whose suffrage is besought in the mass.

Reply Obj. 6. This offering of candles or oil may profit the departed in so far as they are a kind of alms: for they are given for the worship of the Church or for the use of the faithful.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INDULGENCES OF THE CHURCH PROFIT THE DEAD?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the indulgences granted by the Church profit even the dead. First, on account of the custom of the Church, who orders the preaching of a crusade in order that some one may gain an indulgence for himself and for two or three and sometimes even ten souls, both of the living and of the dead. But this would amount to a deception unless they profited the dead. Therefore indulgences profit the dead.

Obj. 2. Further, The merit of the whole Church is more efficacious than that of one person. Now personal merit serves as a suffrage for the departed, for instance in the case of almsgiving. Much more therefore does the merit of the Church whereon indulgences are founded.

Obj. 3. Further, The indulgences of the Church profit those who are members of the Church. Now those who are in purgatory are members of the Church, else the suffrages of the Church would not profit them. Therefore it would seem that indulgences profit the departed.

On the contrary, In order that indulgences may avail a person, there must be a fitting cause for granting the indul-

gence.* Now there can be no such cause on the part of the dead, since they can do nothing that is of profit to the Church, and it is for such a cause that indulgences are chiefly granted. Therefore, seemingly, indulgences profit not the dead.

Further, Indulgences are regulated according to the decision of the party who grants them. If, therefore, indulgences could avail the dead, it would be in the power of the party granting them to release a deceased person entirely from punishment: which is apparently absurd.

I answer that, An indulgence may profit a person in two ways: in one way, principally; in another, secondarily. It profits principally the person who avails himself of an indulgence, who, namely, does that for which the indulgence is granted, for instance one who visits the shrine of some saint. Hence since the dead can do none of those things for which indulgences are granted, indulgences cannot avail them directly. However, they profit secondarily and indirectly the person for whom one does that which is the cause of the indulgence. This is sometimes feasible and sometimes not, according to the different forms of indulgence. For if the form of indulgence be such as this: *Whosoever does this or that shall gain so much indulgence,* he who does this cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another, because it is not in his power to apply to a particular person the intention of the Church who dispenses the common suffrages whence indulgences derive their value, as stated above (Q. XXVII., A. 3, *ad* 2). If, however, the indulgence be granted in this form: *Whosoever does this or that, he, his father, or any other person connected with him and detained in purgatory, will gain so much indulgence,* an indulgence of this kind will avail not only a living but also a deceased person. For there is no reason why the Church is able to transfer the common merits, whereon indulgences are based, to the living and not to the dead. Nor does it follow that a prelate of the Church can release souls from purgatory just as he lists, since for indulgences to avail there must be a fitting cause for granting them, as stated above (Q. XXVI., A. 3).

* Cf. Q. XXV., A. 2.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BURIAL SERVICE PROFITS THE DEAD?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the burial service profits the dead. For Damascene (*Serm. de Dormient.*) quotes Athanasius as saying: *Even though he who has departed in godliness be taken up to heaven, do not hesitate to call upon God and to burn oil and wax at his tomb; for such things are pleasing to God and receive a great reward from Him.* Now the like pertain to the burial service. Therefore the burial service profits the dead.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Augustine (*De Cura pro Mort.* iii.), *In olden times the funerals of just men were cared for with dutiful piety, their obsequies celebrated, their graves provided, and themselves while living charged their children touching the burial or even the translation of their bodies.* But they would not have done this unless the tomb and things of this kind conferred something on the dead. Therefore the like profit the dead somewhat.

Obj. 3. Further, No one does a work of mercy on some one's behalf unless it profit him. Now burying the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy, therefore Augustine says (*ibid.*): *Tobias, as attested by the angel, is declared to have found favour with God by burying the dead.* Therefore such-like burial observances profit the dead.

Obj. 4. Further, It is unbecoming to assert that the devotion of the faithful is fruitless. Now some, out of devotion, arrange for their burial in some religious locality. Therefore the burial service profits the dead.

Obj. 5. Further, God is more inclined to pity than to condemn. Now burial in a sacred place is hurtful to some if they be unworthy: wherefore Gregory says (*Dial.* iv.): *If those who are burdened with grievous sins are buried in the church this will lead to their more severe condemnation rather than to their release.* Much more, therefore, should we say that the burial service profits the good.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* iii.): *Whatever service is done the body is no aid to salvation, but an office of humanity.*

Further, Augustine says (*ibid.; De Civ. Dei,* i.): *The funereal equipment, the disposition of the grave, the solemnity of the obsequies are a comfort to the living rather than a help to the dead.*

Further, Our Lord said (Luke xii. 4): *Be not afraid of them who kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do.* Now after death the bodies of the saints can be hindered from being buried, as we read of having been done to certain martyrs at Lyons in Gaul (Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* v. 1). Therefore the dead take no harm if their bodies remain unburied: and consequently the burial service does not profit them.

I answer that, We have recourse to burial for the sake of both the living and the dead. For the sake of the living, lest their eyes be revolted by the disfigurement of the corpse, and their bodies be infected by the stench, and this as regards the body. But it profits the living also spiritually inasmuch as our belief in the resurrection is confirmed thereby. It profits the dead in so far as one bears the dead in mind and prays for them through looking on their burial place, wherefore a *monument* takes its name from remembrance, for a monument is something that recalls the mind (*monens mentem*), as Augustine observes (*De Civ. Dei,* i.; *De Cura pro Mort.* iv.). It was, however, a pagan error that burial was profitable to the dead by procuring rest for his soul: for they believed that the soul could not be at rest until the body was buried, which is altogether ridiculous and absurd.

That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the dead, does not result from the action done, but rather from the action itself of the doer: when, to wit, the dead person himself, or another, arranges for his body to be buried in a sacred place, and commends him to the patronage of some saint, by whose prayers we must believe that he is assisted, as well as to the suffrages of those who serve the holy place, and pray more

frequently and more specially for those who are buried in their midst. But such things as are done for the display of the obsequies are profitable to the living, as being a consolation to them; and yet they can also profit the dead, not directly but indirectly, in so far as men are aroused to pity thereby and consequently to pray, or in so far as the outlay on the burial brings either assistance to the poor or adornment to the church: for it is in this sense that the burial of the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy.

Reply Obj. 1. By bringing oil and candles to the tombs of the dead we profit them indirectly, either as offering them to the Church and as giving them to the poor, or as doing this in reverence of God. Hence, after the words quoted we read: *For oil and candles are a holocaust.*

Reply Obj. 2. The fathers of old arranged for the burial of their bodies, so as to show that *the bodies of the dead* are the object of Divine providence, not that there is any feeling in a dead body, but in order to confirm the belief in the resurrection, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, i.). Hence, also, they wished to be buried in the land of promise, where they believed Christ's birth and death would take place, Whose resurrection is the cause of our rising again.

Reply Obj. 3. Since flesh is a part of man's nature, man has a natural affection for his flesh, according to Eph. v. 29, *No man ever hated his own flesh.* Hence in accordance with this natural affection a man has during life a certain solicitude for what will become of his body after death: and he would grieve if he had a presentiment that something untoward would happen to his body. Consequently those who love a man, through being conformed to the one they love in his affection for himself, treat his body with loving care. For as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, i.): *If a father's garment and ring, and whatever such like is the more dear to those whom they leave behind the greater their affection is towards their parents, in no wise are the bodies themselves to be spurned which truly we wear in more familiar and close conjunction than anything else we put on.*

Reply Obj. 4. As Augustine says (*De Cura pro Mort.* iv.), the

devotion of the faithful is not fruitless when they arrange for their friends to be buried in holy places, since by so doing they commend their dead to the suffrages of the saints, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 5. The wicked man dead takes no harm by being buried in a holy place, except in so far as he rendered such a burial place unfitting for him by reason of human glory.

Twelfth Article.

Whether suffrages offered for one deceased person profit the person for whom they are offered more than others?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages offered for one deceased person are not more profitable to the one for whom they are offered, than to others. For spiritual light is more communicable than a material light. Now a material light, for instance of a candle, though kindled for one person only, avails equally all those who are gathered together, though the candle be not lit for them. Therefore, since suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, though they be offered for one person in particular, do not avail him any more than the others who are in purgatory.

Obj. 2. Further, As stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 45), suffrages avail the dead *in so far as during this life they merited that they might avail them afterwards.** Now some merited that suffrages might avail them more than those for whom they are offered. Therefore they profit more by those suffrages, else their merits would be rendered unavailing.

Obj. 3. Further, The poor have not so many suffrages given them as the rich. Therefore if the suffrages offered for certain people profit them alone, or profit them more than others, the poor would be worse off: yet this is contrary to our Lord's saying (Luke vi. 20): *Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God.*

* S. Augustine, *Enchiridion* cx.

On the contrary, Human justice is copied from Divine justice. But if a person pay another's debt human justice releases the latter alone. Therefore since he who offers suffrages for another pays the debt, in a sense, of the person for whom he offers them, they profit this person alone.

Further, just as a man by offering suffrages satisfies somewhat for a deceased person, so, too, sometimes a person can satisfy for a living person. Now where one satisfies for a living person the satisfaction counts only for the person for whom it is offered. Therefore one also who offers suffrages profits him alone for whom he offers them.

I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question. For some, like Præpositivus, have said that suffrages offered for one particular person do avail chiefly, not the person for whom they are offered, but those who are most worthy. And they instanced a candle which is lit for a rich man and profits those who are with him no less than the rich man himself, and perhaps even more, if they have keener sight. They also gave the instance of a lesson which profits the person to whom it is given no more than others who listen with him, but perhaps profits these others more, if they be more intelligent. And if it were pointed out to them that in this case the Church's ordinance in appointing certain special prayers for certain persons is futile, they said that the Church did this to excite the devotion of the faithful, who are more inclined to offer special than common suffrages, and pray more fervently for their kinsfolk than for strangers. Others, on the contrary, said that suffrages avail more those for whom they are offered. Now both opinions have a certain amount of truth: for the value of suffrages may be gauged from two sources. For their value is derived in the first place from the virtue of charity, which makes all goods common, and in this respect they avail more the person who is more full of charity, although they are not offered specially for him. In this way the value of suffrages regards more a certain inward consolation by reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the goods of another after death in respect of the diminution of

punishment; for after death there is no possibility of obtaining or increasing grace, whereas during life the works of others avail for this purpose by the virtue of charity. In the second place suffrages derive their value from being applied to another person by one's intention. In this way the satisfaction of one person counts for another, and there can be no doubt that thus they avail more the person for whom they are offered: in fact, they avail him alone in this way, because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed to the remission of punishment. Consequently, as regards the remission of punishment, suffrages avail chiefly the person for whom they are offered, and accordingly there is more truth in the second opinion than in the first.

Reply Obj. 1. Suffrages avail, after the manner of a light, in so far as they reach the dead, who thereby receive a certain amount of consolation: and this is all the greater according as they are endowed with a greater charity. But in so far as suffrages are a satisfaction applied to another by the intention of the offerer, they do not resemble a light, but rather the payment of a debt: and it does not follow, if one person's debt be paid, that the debt of others is paid likewise.

Reply Obj. 2. Such a merit is conditional, for in this way they merited that suffrages would profit them if offered for them, and this was merely to render themselves fit recipients of those suffrages. It is therefore clear that they did not directly merit the assistance of those suffrages, but made themselves fit by their preceding merits to receive the fruit of suffrages. Hence it does not follow that their merit is rendered unavailing.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing hinders the rich from being in some respects better off than the poor, for instance as regards the expiation of their punishment. But this is as nothing in comparison with the kingdom of heaven, where the poor are shown to be better off by the authority quoted.

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SUFFRAGES OFFERED FOR SEVERAL ARE OF AS MUCH VALUE TO EACH ONE AS IF THEY HAD BEEN OFFERED FOR EACH IN PARTICULAR?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in particular. For it is clear that if one person receives a lesson he loses nothing if others receive the lesson with him. Therefore in like manner a person for whom a suffrage is offered loses nothing if some one else is reckoned together with him: and consequently if it be offered for several, it is of as much value to each one as if it were offered for each in particular.

Obj. 2. Further, It is to be observed that according to the common practice of the Church, when Mass is said for one deceased person, other prayers are added for other deceased persons. Now this would not be done, if the dead person for whom the Mass is said were to lose something thereby. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.

Obj. 3. Further, Suffrages, especially of prayers, rely on the Divine power. But with God, just as it makes no difference whether He helps by means of many or by means of a few, so it differs not whether He assists many or a few. Therefore if the one same prayer be said for many, each one of them will receive as much assistance as one person would if that same prayer were said for him alone.

On the contrary, It is better to assist many than one. If therefore a suffrage offered for several is of as much value to each one as if it were offered for one alone, it would seem that the Church ought not to have appointed a Mass and prayer to be said for one person in particular, but that Mass ought always to be said for all the faithful departed: and this is evidently false.

Further, A suffrage has a finite efficiency. Therefore if

it be divided among many it avails less for each one than if it were offered for one only.

I answer that, If the value of suffrages be considered according as it is derived from the virtue of charity uniting the members of the Church together, suffrages offered for several persons avail each one as much as if they were offered for one alone, because charity is not diminished if its effect be divided among many, in fact rather is it increased; and in like manner joy increases through being shared by many, as Augustine says (*Conf.* viii.). Consequently many in purgatory rejoice in one good deed no less than one does. On the other hand, if we consider the value of suffrages, inasmuch as they are a kind of satisfaction applied to the dead by the intention of the person offering them, then the suffrage for some person in particular avails him more than that which is offered for him in common with many others; for in this case the effect of the suffrages is divided in virtue of Divine justice among those for whom the suffrages are offered. Hence it is evident that this question depends on the first; and, moreover, it is made clear why special suffrages are appointed to be offered in the Church.

Reply Obj. 1. Suffrages considered as works of satisfaction do not profit after the manner of an action as teaching does; for teaching, like any other action, produces its effect according to the disposition of the recipient. But they profit after the manner of the payment of a debt, as stated above (A. 12, *ad* 1); and so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2. Since suffrages offered for one person avail others in a certain way, as stated (A. 1), it follows that when Mass is said for one person, it is not unfitting for prayers to be said for others also. For these prayers are said, not that the satisfaction offered by one suffrage be applied to those others chiefly, but that the prayer offered for them in particular may profit them also.

Reply Obj. 3. Prayer may be considered both on the part of the one who prays, and on the part of the person prayed: and its effect depends on both. Consequently though it is

no more difficult to the Divine power to absolve many than to absolve one, nevertheless the prayer of one who prays thus is not as satisfactory for many as for one.

FOURTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GENERAL SUFFRAGES AVAIL THOSE FOR WHOM SPECIAL SUFFRAGES ARE NOT OFFERED, AS MUCH AS SPECIAL SUFFRAGES AVAIL THOSE FOR WHOM THEY ARE OFFERED IN ADDITION TO GENERAL SUFFRAGES?

We proceed thus to the Fourteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages. For in the life to come each one will be rewarded according to his merits. Now a person for whom no suffrages are offered merited to be assisted after death as much as one for whom special suffrages are offered. Therefore the former will be assisted by general suffrages as much as the latter by special and general suffrages.

Obj. 3. Further, The Eucharist is the chief of the suffrages of the Church. Now the Eucharist, since it contains Christ whole, has infinite efficacy so to speak. Therefore one offering of the Eucharist for all in general is of sufficient value to release all who are in purgatory: and consequently general suffrages alone afford as much assistance as special and general suffrages together.

On the contrary, Two goods are more eligible than one. Therefore special suffrages, together with general suffrages, are more profitable to the person for whom they are offered than general suffrages alone.

I answer that, The reply to this question depends on that which is given to the twelfth inquiry (A. 12): for if the suffrages offered for one person in particular avail indifferently for all, then all suffrages are common; and consequently one for whom the special suffrages are not offered will be assisted as much as the one for whom they are

offered, if he be equally worthy. On the other hand, if the suffrages offered for a person do not profit all indifferently, but those chiefly for whom they are offered, then there is no doubt that general and special suffrages together avail a person more than general suffrages alone. Hence the Master, in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 45), mentions two opinions: one, when he says that a rich man derives from general, together with special suffrages, an equal profit to that which a poor man derives from special suffrages alone; for although the one receives assistance from more sources than the other, he does not receive a greater assistance: the other opinion he mentions when he says that a person for whom special suffrages are offered obtains a more speedy but not a more complete release, because each will be finally released from all punishment.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 12, *ad* 2) the assistance derived from suffrages is not directly and simply an object of merit, but conditionally as it were: hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the power of Christ Who is contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist is infinite, yet there is a definite effect to which that sacrament is directed. Hence it does not follow that the whole punishment of those who are in purgatory is expiated by one sacrifice of the altar: even so, by the one sacrifice which a man offers, he is not released from the whole satisfaction due for his sins, wherefore sometimes several Masses are enjoined in satisfaction for one sin. Nevertheless, if anything from special suffrages be left over for those for whom they are offered (for instance if they need them not) we may well believe that by God's mercy this is granted to others for whom those suffrages are not offered, if they need them: as affirmed by Damascene (*Serm. de Dormient.*) who says: *Truly God, forasmuch as He is just will adapt ability to the disabled, and will arrange for an exchange of deficiencies:* and this exchange is effected when what is lacking to one is supplied by another.

QUESTION LXXII.

OF PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN.

(In Three Articles.)

WE must now consider prayer with regard to the saints in heaven. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers? (2) Whether we should beseech them to pray for us? (3) Whether the prayers they pour forth for us are always granted?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SAINTS HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR PRAYERS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the saints have no knowledge of our prayers. For a gloss on Isa. lxiii. 16, *Thou art our father and Abraham hath not known us, and Israel hath been ignorant of us,* says that *the dead saints know not what the living, even their own children, are doing.* This is taken from Augustine (*De Cura pro Mort.* xiii.), where he quotes the aforesaid authority, and the following are his words: *If such great men as the patriarchs knew not what was happening to the people begotten of them, how can the dead occupy themselves in watching and helping the affairs and actions of the living?* Therefore the saints cannot be cognizant of our prayers.

Obj. 2. Further, the following words are addressed to King Joas (4 Kings xxii. 20): *Therefore* (i.e., because thou hast wept before Me), *I will gather thee to thy fathers . . . that thy eyes may not see all the evils which I will bring upon*

this place. But Joas would have gained no such advantage from his death if he were to know after death what was happening to his people. Therefore the saints after death know not our actions, and thus they are not cognizant of our prayers.

Obj. 3. Further, The more perfect a man is in charity, the more he succours his neighbour when the latter is in danger. Now the saints, in this life, watch over their neighbour, especially their kinsfolk, when these are in danger, and manifestly assist them. Since then, after death, their charity is much greater, if they were cognizant of our deeds, much more would they watch over their friends and kindred and assist them in their needs: and yet, seemingly, they do not. Therefore it would seem that our deeds and prayers are not known to them.

Obj. 4. Further, Even as the saints after death see the Word, so do the angels of whom it is stated (Matth. xviii. 10) that *their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father.* Yet the angels through seeing the Word do not therefore know all things, since the lower angels are cleansed from their lack of knowledge by the higher angels,* as Dionysius declares (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). Therefore although the saints see the Word, they do not see therein our prayers and other things that happen in our regard.

Obj. 5. Further, God alone is the searcher of hearts. Now prayer is seated chiefly in the heart. Therefore it belongs to God alone to know our prayers. Therefore our prayers are unknown to the saints.

On the contrary, Gregory, commenting on Job xiv. 21, *Whether his children come to honour or dishonour, he shall not understand,* says (*Moral.* xii.): *This does not apply to the souls of the saints, for since they have an insight of Almighty God's glory we must nowise believe that anything outside that glory is unknown to them.* Therefore they are cognizant of our prayers.

Further, Gregory says (*Dial.* ii.): *All creatures are little to the soul that sees God: because however little it sees of the*

* Cf. P. I., Q. CVI., A. 1.

Creator's light, every created thing appears foreshortened to it. Now apparently the chief obstacle to the souls of the saints being cognizant of our prayers and other happenings in our regard is that they are far removed from us. Since then distance does not prevent these things, as appears from the authority quoted, it would seem that the souls of the saints are cognizant of our prayers and of what happens here below.

Further, Unless they were aware of what happens in our regard they would not pray for us, since they would be ignorant of our needs. But this is the error of Vigilantius, as Jerome asserts in his letter against him. Therefore the saints are cognizant of what happens in our regard.

I answer that, The Divine essence is a sufficient medium for knowing all things, and this is evident from the fact that God, by seeing His essence, sees all things. But it does not follow that whoever sees God's essence knows all things, but only those who comprehend the essence of God:* even as the knowledge of a principle does not involve the knowledge of all that follows from that principle, unless the whole virtue of the principle be comprehended. Wherefore, since the souls of the saints do not comprehend the Divine essence, it does not follow that they know all that can be known by the Divine essence,—for which reason the lower angels are taught concerning certain matters by the higher angels, though they all see the essence of God; but each of the blessed must needs see in the Divine essence as many other things as the perfection of his happiness requires. For the perfection of a man's happiness requires him to have whatever he will, and to will nothing amiss: and each one wills with a right will, to know what concerns himself. Hence since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish to know what concerns themselves, and consequently it follows that they know it in the Word. Now it pertains to their glory that they assist the needy for their salvation: for thus they become God's co-operators, *than which nothing is more Godlike,* as Dionysius declares (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.). Wherefore it is evident that the saints are cognizant of such

* Cf. P. I., Q. XII., AA. 7, 8.

things as are required for this purpose; and so it is manifest that they know in the Word the vows, devotions, and prayers of those who have recourse to their assistance.

Reply Obj. 1. The saying of Augustine is to be understood as referring to the natural knowledge of separated souls, which knowledge is devoid of obscurity in holy men. But he is not speaking of their knowledge in the Word, for it is clear that when Isaias said this, Abraham had no such knowledge, since no one had come to the vision of God before Christ's passion.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the saints, after this life, know what happens here below, we must not believe that they grieve through knowing the woes of those whom they loved in this world: for they are so filled with heavenly joy, that sorrow finds no place in them. Wherefore if after death they know the woes of their friends, their grief is forestalled by their removal from this world before their woes occur. Perhaps, however, the non-glorified souls would grieve somewhat, if they were aware of the distress of their dear ones: and since the soul of Josias was not glorified as soon as it went out from his body, it is in this respect that Augustine uses this argument to show that the souls of the dead have no knowledge of the deeds of the living.

Reply Obj. 3. The souls of the saints have their will fully conformed to the Divine will even as regards the things willed; and consequently, although they retain the love of charity towards their neighbour, they do not succour him otherwise than they see to be in conformity with the disposition of Divine justice. Nevertheless, it is to be believed that they help their neighbour very much by interceding for him to God.

Reply Obj. 4. Although it does not follow that those who see the Word see all things in the Word, they see those things that pertain to the perfection of their happiness, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 5. God alone of Himself knows the thoughts of the heart: yet others know them, in so far as these are revealed to them, either by their vision of the Word or by any other means.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER WE OUGHT TO CALL UPON THE SAINTS TO PRAY FOR US?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to call upon the saints to pray for us. For no man asks anyone's friends to pray for him, except in so far as he believes he will more easily find favour with them. But God is infinitely more merciful than any saint, and consequently His will is more easily inclined to give us a gracious hearing, than the will of a saint. Therefore it would seem unnecessary to make the saints mediators between us and God, that they may intercede for us.

Obj. 2. Further, If we ought to beseech them to pray for us, this is only because we know their prayer to be acceptable to God. Now among the saints the holier a man is, the more is his prayer acceptable to God. Therefore we ought always to bespeak the greater saints to intercede for us with God, and never the lesser ones.

Obj. 3. Further, Christ, even as man, is called the *Holy of Holies*, and, as man, it is competent to Him to pray. Yet we never call upon Christ to pray for us. Therefore neither should we ask the other saints to do so.

Obj. 4. Further, Whenever one person intercedes for another at the latter's request, he presents his petition to the one with whom he intercedes for him. Now it is unnecessary to present anything to one to whom all things are present. Therefore it is unnecessary to make the saints our intercessors with God.

Obj. 5. Further, It is unnecessary to do a thing if, without doing it, the purpose for which it is done would be achieved in the same way, or else not achieved at all. Now the saints would pray for us just the same, or would not pray for us at all, whether we pray to them or not: for if we be worthy of their prayers, they would pray for us even though we prayed not to them, while if we be unworthy they pray

not for us even though we ask them to. Therefore it seems altogether unnecessary to call on them to pray for us.

On the contrary, It is written (Job v. 1): *Call . . . if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints.* Now, as Gregory says (*Moral.* v. 30) on this passage, *we call upon God when we beseech Him in humble prayer.* Therefore when we wish to pray God, we should turn to the saints, that they may pray God for us.

Further, The saints who are in heaven are more acceptable to God than those who are on the way. Now we should make the saints, who are on the way, our intercessors with God, after the example of the Apostle, who said (Rom. xv. 30): *I beseech you . . . brethren, through our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the charity of the Holy Ghost, that you help me in your prayers for me to God.* Much more, therefore, should we ask the saints who are in heaven to help us by their prayers to God.

Further, An additional argument is provided by the common custom of the Church which asks for the prayers of the saints in the Litany.

I answer that, According to Dionysius (*Eccl. Hier.* v.) the order established by God among things is that *the last should be led to God by those that are midway between.* Wherefore, since the saints who are in heaven are nearest to God, the order of the Divine law requires that we, who while we remain in the body are pilgrims from the Lord, should be brought back to God by the saints who are between us and Him: and this happens when the Divine goodness pours forth its effect into us through them. And since our return to God should correspond to the outflow of His boons upon us, just as the Divine favours reach us by means of the saints' intercession, so should we, by their means, be brought back to God, that we may receive His favours again. Hence it is that we make them our intercessors with God, and our mediators as it were, when we ask them to pray for us.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not on account of any defect in God's power that He works by means of second causes, but it is for the perfection of the order of the universe, and the more

manifold outpouring of His goodness on things, through His bestowing on them not only the goodness which is proper to them, but also the faculty of causing goodness in others. Even so it is not through any defect in His mercy, that we need to bespeak His clemency through the prayers of the saints, but to the end that the aforesaid order in things be observed.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the greater saints are more acceptable to God than the lesser, it is sometimes profitable to pray to the lesser; and this for five reasons. First, because sometimes one has greater devotion for a lesser saint than for a greater, and the effect of prayer depends very much on one's devotion. Secondly, in order to avoid tediousness, for continual attention to one thing makes a person weary; whereas by praying to different saints, the fervour of our devotion is aroused anew as it were. Thirdly, because it is granted to some saints to exercise their patronage in certain special cases, for instance to Saint Anthony against the fire of hell. Fourthly, that due honour be given by us to all. Fifthly, because the prayers of several sometimes obtain that which would not have been obtained by the prayers of one.

Reply Obj. 3. Prayer is an act, and acts belong to particular persons (*supposita*). Hence, were we to say: *Christ, pray for us,* except we added something, this would seem to refer to Christ's person, and consequently to agree with the error either of Nestorius, who distinguished in Christ the person of the son of man from the person of the Son of God, or of Arius, who asserted that the person of the Son is less than the Father. Wherefore to avoid these errors the Church says not: *Christ, pray for us,* but *Christ, hear us,* or *have mercy on us.*

Reply Obj. 4. As we shall state further on (A. 3) the saints are said to present our prayers to God, not as though they notified things unknown to Him, but because they ask God to grant those prayers a gracious hearing, or because they seek the Divine truth about them, namely what ought to be done according to His providence.

Reply Obj. 5. A person is rendered worthy of a saint's prayers for him by the very fact that in his need he has recourse to him with pure devotion. Hence it is not unnecessary to pray to the saints.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PRAYERS WHICH THE SAINTS POUR FORTH TO GOD FOR US ARE ALWAYS GRANTED?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are not always granted. For if they were always granted, the saints would be heard especially in regard to matters concerning themselves. But they are not heard in reference to these things; wherefore it is stated in the Apocalypse (vi. 11) that on the martyrs beseeching vengeance on them that dwell on earth, *it was said to them that they should rest for a little while till the number of their brethren should be filled up.** Much less therefore, are they heard in reference to matters concerning others.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Jer. xv. 1): *If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people.* Therefore, the saints are not always heard when they pray God for us.

Obj. 3. Further, The saints in heaven are stated to be equal to the angels of God (Matth. xxii. 30). But the angels are not always heard in the prayers which they offer up to God. This is evident from Dan. x. 12, 13, where it is written: *I am come for thy words: but the prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one-and-twenty days.* But the angel who spoke had not come to Daniel's aid except by asking of God to be set free; and yet the fulfilment of his prayer was hindered. Therefore neither are other saints always heard by God when they pray for us.

Obj. 4. Further, Whosoever obtains something by prayer merits it in a sense. But the saints in heaven are not in the

* Vulg.,—*till their fellow-servants and their brethren . . . should be filled up.*

state of meriting. Therefore they cannot obtain anything for us from God by their prayers.

Obj. 5. Further, The saints, in all things, conform their will to the will of God. Therefore they will nothing but what they know God to will. But no one prays save for what he wills. Therefore they pray not save for what they know God to will. Now that which God wills would be done even without their praying for it. Therefore their prayers are not efficacious for obtaining anything.

Obj. 6. Further, The prayers of the whole heavenly court, if they could obtain anything, would be more efficacious than all the petitions of the Church here below. Now if the suffrages of the Church here below for some one in purgatory were to be multiplied, he would be wholly delivered from punishment. Since then the saints in heaven pray for those who are in purgatory on the same account as for us, if they obtain anything for us, their prayers would deliver entirely from punishment those who are in purgatory. But this is not true, because then the Church's suffrages for the dead would be unnecessary.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Machab. xv. 14): *This is he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God:* and that his prayer was granted is clear from what follows (*verse* 15): *Jeremias stretched forth his right hand, and gave to Judas a sword of gold, saying: Take this holy sword, a gift from God,* etc.

Further, Jerome says (*Ep. contra Vigilant.*): *Thou sayest in thy pamphlets, that while we live, we can pray for one another, but that when we are dead no one's prayer for another will be heard:* and afterwards he refutes this in the following words: *If the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body can pray for others, while they are still solicitous for themselves, how much more can they do so when the crown, the victory, the triumph is already theirs!*

Further, This is confirmed by the custom of the Church, which often asks to be assisted by the prayers of the saints.

I answer that, The saints are said to pray for us in two ways. First, by *express* prayer, when by their prayers they

seek a hearing of the Divine clemency on our behalf: secondly, by *interpretive* prayer, namely by their merits which, being known to God, avail not only them unto glory, but also us as suffrages and prayers, even as the shedding of Christ's blood is said to ask pardon for us. In both ways the saints' prayers considered in themselves avail to obtain what they ask, yet on our part they may fail so that we obtain not the fruit of their prayers, in so far as they are said to pray for us by reason of their merits availing on our behalf. But in so far as they pray for us by asking something for us in their prayers, their prayers are always granted, since they will only what God wills, nor do they ask save for what they will to be done; and what God wills is always fulfilled,—unless we speak of His *antecedent* will, whereby *He wishes all men to be saved.** For this will is not always fulfilled; wherefore no wonder if that also which the saints will according to this kind of will be not fulfilled sometimes.

Reply Obj. 1. This prayer of the martyrs is merely their desire to obtain the robe of the body and the fellowship of those who will be saved, and their consent to God's justice in punishing the wicked. Hence a gloss on Apoc. vi. 11, *How long, O Lord,* says: *They desire an increase of joy and the fellowship of the saints, and they consent to God's justice.*

Reply Obj. 2. The Lord speaks there of Moses and Samuel according to their state in this life. For we read that they withstood God's anger by praying for the people. And yet even if they had been living at the time in question, they would have been unable to placate God towards the people by their prayers, on account of the wickedness of this same people: and it is thus that we are to understand this passage.

Reply Obj. 3. This dispute among the good angels does not mean that they offered contradictory prayers to God, but that they submitted contrary merits on various sides to the Divine inquiry, with a view of God's pronouncing sentence thereon. This, in fact, is what Gregory says (*Moral.* xvii.) in explanation of the aforesaid words of

* Cf. P. I., Q. XIX., A. 6, *ad* 1.

Daniel: *The lofty spirits that are set over the nations never fight in behalf of those that act unjustly, but they justly judge and try their deeds. And when the guilt or innocence of any particular nation is brought into the debate of the court above, the ruling spirit of that nation is said to have won or lost in the conflict. Yet the supreme will of their Maker is victorious over all, for since they have it ever before their eyes, they will not what they are unable to obtain,* wherefore neither do they seek for it. And consequently it is clear that their prayers are always heard.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the saints are not in a state to merit for themselves, when once they are in heaven, they are in a state to merit for others, or rather to assist others by reason of their previous merit: for while living they merited that their prayers should be heard after their death.

Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one count, and impetratory on another. For merit consists in a certain equation of the act to the end for which it is intended, and which is given to it as its reward; while the impetration of a prayer depends on the liberality of the person supplicated. Hence prayer sometimes, through the liberality of the person supplicated, obtains that which was not merited either by the suppliant, or by the person supplicated for: and so, although the saints are not in the state of meriting, it does not follow that they are not in the state of impetrating.

Reply Obj. 5. As appears from the authority of Gregory quoted above (*ad* 3), the saints and angels will nothing but what they see to be in the Divine will: and so neither do they pray for aught else. Nor is their prayer fruitless, since as Augustine says (*De Præd. Sanct.**): The prayers of the saints profit the predestinate, because it is perhaps preordained that they shall be saved through the prayers of those who intercede for them: and consequently God also wills that what the saints see Him to will shall be fulfilled through their prayers.

* *De Dono Persever.* xxii.

Reply Obj. 6. The suffrages of the Church for the dead are as so many satisfactions of the living in lieu of the dead: and accordingly they free the dead from the punishment which the latter have not paid. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of making satisfaction; and consequently the parallel fails between their prayers and the suffrages of the Church.

QUESTION LXXIII.

OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must next consider the signs that will precede the judgment: and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment? (2) Whether in very truth the sun and moon will be darkened? (3) Whether the powers of the heavens will be moved when the Lord shall come?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY SIGNS WILL PRECEDE THE LORD'S COMING TO JUDGMENT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the Lord's coming to judgment will not be preceded by any signs. Because it is written (1 Thess. v. 3): *When they shall say: Peace and security; then shall sudden destruction come upon them.* Now there would be no peace and security if men were terrified by previous signs. Therefore signs will not precede that coming.

Obj. 2. Further, Signs are ordained for the manifestation of something. But His coming is to be hidden; wherefore it is written (1 Thess. v. 2): *The day of the Lord shall come as a thief in the night.* Therefore signs ought not to precede it.

Obj. 3. Further, The time of His first coming was foreknown by the prophets, which does not apply to His second coming. Now no such signs preceded the first coming of Christ. Therefore neither will they precede the second.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke xxi. 25): *There shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars,* etc.

Further, Jerome* mentions fifteen signs preceding the judgment. He says that on the *first* day all the seas will rise fifteen cubits above the mountains; in the *second* day all the waters will be plunged into the depths, so that scarcely will they be visible; on the *third* day they will be restored to their previous condition; on the *fourth* day all the great fishes and other things that move in the waters will gather together and, raising their heads above the sea, roar at one another contentiously; on the *fifth* day, all the birds of the air will gather together in the fields, wailing to one another, with neither bite nor sup; on the *sixth* day rivers of fire will arise towards the firmament rushing together from the west to the east; on the *seventh* day all the stars, both planets and fixed stars, will throw out fiery tails like comets; on the *eighth* day there will be a great earthquake, and all animals will be laid low; on the *ninth* day all the plants will be bedewed as it were with blood; on the *tenth* day all stones, little and great, will be divided into four parts dashing against one another; on the *eleventh* day all hills and mountains and buildings will be reduced to dust; on the *twelfth* day all animals will come from forest and mountain to the fields, roaring and tasting of nothing; on the *thirteenth* day all graves from east to west will open to allow the bodies to rise again; on the *fourteenth* day all men will leave their abode, neither understanding nor speaking, but rushing hither and thither like madmen; on the *fifteenth* day all will die and will rise again with those who died long before.

I answer that, When Christ shall come to judge He will appear in the form of glory, on account of the authority becoming a judge. Now it pertains to the dignity of judicial power to have certain signs that induce people to reverence and subjection: and consequently many signs will precede the advent of Christ when He shall come to judg-

* S. Peter Damian, *Opuscul.* xlix. 4. He quotes S. Jerome, but the reference is not known.

ment, in order that the hearts of men be brought to subjection to the coming judge, and be prepared for the judgment, being forewarned by those signs. But it is not easy to know what these signs may be: for the signs of which we read in the gospels, as Augustine says, writing to Hesychius about the end of the world (*Ep.* lxxx.), refer not only to Christ's coming to judgment, but also to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, and to the coming of Christ in ceaselessly visiting His Church. So that, perhaps, if we consider them carefully, we shall find that none of them refers to the coming advent, as he remarks: because these signs that are mentioned in the gospels, such as wars, fears, and so forth, have been from the beginning of the human race: unless perhaps we say that at that time they will be more prevalent: although it is uncertain in what degree this increase will foretell the imminence of the advent. The signs mentioned by Jerome are not asserted by him; he merely says that he found them written in the annals of the Hebrews: and, indeed, they contain very little likelihood.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine (*Ad Hesych.; loc. cit.*) towards the end of the world there will be a general persecution of the good by the wicked: so that at the same time some will fear, namely the good, and some will be secure, namely the wicked. The words: *When they shall say: Peace and security*, refer to the wicked, who will pay little heed to the signs of the coming judgment: while the words of Luke xxi. 26, *men withering away*, etc., should be referred to the good.

We may also reply that all these signs that will happen about the time of the judgment are reckoned to occur within the time occupied by the judgment, so that the judgment day contains them all. Wherefore although men be terrified by the signs appearing about the judgment day, yet before those signs begin to appear the wicked will think themselves to be in peace and security, after the death of Antichrist and before the coming of Christ, seeing that the world is not at once destroyed, as they thought hitherto.

Reply Obj. 2. The day of the Lord is said to come as a

thief, because the exact time is not known, since it will not be possible to know it from those signs: although, as we have already said, all these most manifest signs which will precede the judgment immediately may be comprised under the judgment day.

Reply Obj. 3. At His first advent Christ came secretly, although the appointed time was known beforehand by the prophets. Hence there was no need for such signs to appear at His first coming, as will appear at His second advent, when He will come openly, although the appointed time is hidden.

Second Article.

Whether towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth. For, as Rabanus says, commenting on Matth. xxiv. 29, *nothing hinders us from gathering that the sun, moon, and stars will then be deprived of their light, as we know happened to the sun at the time of our Lord's passion.*

Obj. 2. Further, The light of the heavenly bodies is directed to the generation of inferior bodies, because by its means and not only by their movement they act upon this lower world, as Averroes says (*De Subst. Orbis.*). But generation will cease then. Therefore neither will light remain in the heavenly bodies.

Obj. 3. Further, According to some the inferior bodies will be cleansed of the qualities by which they act. Now heavenly bodies act not only by movement, but also by light, as stated above (*Obj.* 2). Therefore as the movement of heaven will cease, so will the light of the heavenly bodies.

On the contrary, According to astronomers the sun and moon cannot be eclipsed at the same time. But this darkening of the sun and moon is stated to be simultaneous, when the Lord shall come to judgment. Therefore the darkening will not be in very truth due to a natural eclipse.

Further, It is not seemly for the same to be the cause of a thing's failing and increasing. Now when our Lord shall come the light of the luminaries will increase according to Isa. xxx. 26, *The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold.* Therefore it is unfitting for the light of these bodies to cease when our Lord comes.

I answer that, If we speak of the sun and moon in respect of the very moment of Christ's coming, it is not credible that they will be darkened through being bereft of their light, since when Christ comes and the saints rise again the whole world will be renewed, as we shall state further on (Q. LXXIV.). If, however, we speak of them in respect of the time immediately preceding the judgment, it is possible that by the Divine power the sun, moon, and other luminaries of the heavens will be darkened, either at various times or all together, in order to inspire men with fear.

Reply Obj. 1. Rabanus is speaking of the time preceding the judgment: wherefore he adds that when the judgment day is over the words of Isaias shall be fulfilled.

Reply Obj. 2. Light is in the heavenly bodies not only for the purpose of causing generation in these lower bodies, but also for their own perfection and beauty. Hence it does not follow that where generation ceases, the light of the heavenly bodies will cease, but rather that it will increase.

Reply Obj. 3. It does not seem probable that the elemental qualities will be removed from the elements, although some have asserted this. If, however, they be removed, there would still be no parallel between them and light, since the elemental qualities are in opposition to one another, so that their action is corruptive: whereas light is a principle of action not by way of opposition, but by way of a principle regulating things in opposition to one another and bringing them back to harmony. Nor is there a parallel with the movement of heavenly bodies, for movement is the act of that which is imperfect, wherefore it must needs cease when the imperfection ceases: whereas this cannot be said of light.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE VIRTUES OF HEAVEN WILL BE MOVED WHEN OUR LORD SHALL COME?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues of heaven will not be moved when our Lord shall come. For the virtues of heaven can denote only the blessed angels. Now immobility is essential to blessedness. Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved.

Obj. 2. Further, Ignorance is the cause of wonder (*Met.* i. 2). Now ignorance, like fear, is far from the angels, for as Gregory says (*Dial.* iv.; *Moral.* xii.), *what do they not see, who see Him Who sees all.* Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved with wonder, as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 48).

Obj. 3. Further, All the angels will be present at the Divine judgment; wherefore it is stated (Apoc. vii. 11): *All the angels stood round about the throne.* Now the virtues denote one particular order of angels. Therefore it should not be said of them rather than of others, that they are moved.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xxvi. 11): *The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck.* Now the pillars of heaven can denote only the virtues of heaven. Therefore the virtues of heaven will be moved.

Further, It is written (Matth. xxiv. 29): *The stars shall fall from heaven, and the virtues* (Douay,—*powers*) *of heaven shall be moved.*

I answer that, Virtue is twofold as applied to the angels,* as Dionysius states (*Cœl. Hier.* xi.). For sometimes the name of *virtues* is appropriated to one order, which according to him, is the middle order of the middle hierarchy, but according to Gregory (*Hom. in Ev.* xxxiv.) is the highest order of the lowest hierarchy. In another sense it is employed to denote all the heavenly spirits in general. In

* Cf. P. I., Q. CVIII., A. 5, *ad* 1.

the question at issue it may be taken either way. For in the text (*loc. cit.*) it is explained according to the second acceptation, so as to denote all the angels: and then they are said to be moved through wonder at the renewing of the world, as stated in the text. It can also be explained in reference to virtue as the name of a particular order; and then that order is said to be moved more than the others by reason of the effect, since according to Gregory (*loc. cit.*) we ascribe to that order the working of miracles which especially will be worked about that time: or again, because that order—since, according to Dionysius (*loc. cit.*), it belongs to the middle hierarchy—is not limited in its power, wherefore its ministry must needs regard universal causes. Consequently the proper office of the virtues is seemingly to move the heavenly bodies which are the cause of what happens in nature here below. And again the very name denotes this, since they are called the *virtues of heaven.* Accordingly they will be moved then, because they will no more produce their effect, by ceasing to move the heavenly bodies: even as the angels who are appointed to watch over men will no longer fulfil the office of guardians.

Reply Obj. 1. This movement changes nothing pertaining to their state; but refers either to their effects which may vary without any change on their part, or to some new consideration of things which hitherto they were unable to see by means of their concreated species, which change of thought is not taken from them by their state of blessedness. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii.) that *God moves the spiritual creature through time.*

Reply Obj. 2. Wonder is wont to be about things surpassing our knowledge or ability: and accordingly the virtues of heaven will wonder at the Divine power doing such things, in so far as they fail to do or comprehend them. In this sense the blessed Agnes said that the *sun and moon wonder at His beauty:* and this does not imply ignorance in the angels, but removes the comprehension of God from them.

The *Reply* to the *Third Objection* is clear from what has been said.

QUESTION LXXIV.

OF THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION.

(*In Nine Articles.*)

WE must now consider the fire of the final conflagration: and under this head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether any cleansing of the world is to take place? (2) Whether it will be effected by fire? (3) Whether that fire is of the same species as elemental fire? (4) Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens? (5) Whether that fire will consume the other elements? (6) Whether it will cleanse all the elements? (7) Whether that fire precedes or follows the judgment? (8) Whether men are to be consumed by that fire? (9) Whether the wicked will be involved therein?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WORLD IS TO BE CLEANSED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is not to be any cleansing of the world. For only that which is unclean needs cleansing. Now God's creatures are not unclean, wherefore it is written (Acts x. 15): *That which God hath cleansed, do not thou call common,* i.e. unclean. Therefore the creatures of the world shall not be cleansed.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Divine justice cleansing is directed to the removal of the uncleanness of sin, as instanced in the cleansing after death. But there can be no stain of sin in the elements of this world. Therefore, seemingly, they need not to be cleansed.

Obj. 3. Further, A thing is said to be cleansed when any foreign matter that depreciates it is removed therefrom: for the removal of that which ennobles a thing is not called a cleansing, but rather a diminishing. Now it pertains to the perfection and nobility of the elements that something of a foreign nature is mingled with them, since the form of a mixed body is more noble than the form of a simple body. Therefore it would seem nowise fitting that the elements of this world can possibly be cleansed.

On the contrary, All renewal is effected by some kind of cleansing. But the elements will be renewed; hence it is written (Apoc. xxi. 1): *I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth was gone.* Therefore the elements shall be cleansed.

Further, a gloss* on 1 Cor. vii. 31, *The fashion of this earth passeth away,* says: *The beauty of this world will perish in the burning of worldly flames.* Therefore the same conclusion follows.

I answer that, Since the world was, in a way, made for man's sake, it follows that, when man shall be glorified in the body, the other bodies of the world shall also be changed to a better state, so that it is rendered a more fitting place for him and more pleasant to look upon. Now in order that man obtain the glory of the body, it behoves first of all those things to be removed which are opposed to glory. There are two, namely the corruption and stain of sin,—because according to 1 Cor. xv. 50, *neither shall corruption possess incorruption,* and all the unclean shall be without the city of glory (Apoc. xxii. 15),—and again, the elements require to be cleansed from the contrary dispositions, ere they be brought to the newness of glory, proportionately to what we have said with regard to man. Now although, properly speaking, a corporeal thing cannot be the subject of the stain of sin, nevertheless, on account of sin corporeal things contract a certain unfittingness for being appointed to spiritual purposes; and for this reason we find that places where crimes have been committed are

* S. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei,* xx. 16.

reckoned unfit for the performance of sacred actions therein, unless they be cleansed beforehand. Accordingly that part of the world which is given to our use contracts from men's sins a certain unfitness for being glorified, wherefore in this respect it needs to be cleansed. In like manner with regard to the intervening space, on account of the contact of the elements, there are many corruptions, generations and alterations of the elements, which diminish their purity: wherefore the elements need to be cleansed from these also, so that they be fit to receive the newness of glory.

Reply Obj. 1. When it is asserted that every creature of God is clean we are to understand this as meaning that its substance contains no alloy of evil, as the Manichees maintained, saying that evil and good are two substances in some places severed from one another, in others mingled together. But it does not exclude a creature from having an admixture of a foreign nature, which in itself is also good, but is inconsistent with the perfection of that creature. Nor does this prevent evil from being accidental to a creature, although not mingled with it as part of its substance.

Reply Obj. 2. Although corporeal elements cannot be the subject of sin, nevertheless, from the sin that is committed in them they contract a certain unfitness for receiving the perfection of glory.

Reply Obj. 3. The form of a mixed body and the form of an element may be considered in two ways: either as regards the perfection of the species, and thus a mixed body is more perfect,—or as regards their continual endurance; and thus the simple body is more noble, because it has not in itself the cause of corruption, unless it be corrupted by something extrinsic: whereas a mixed body has in itself the cause of its corruption, namely the composition of contraries. Wherefore a simple body, although it be corruptible in part is incorruptible as a whole, which cannot be said of a mixed body. And since incorruption belongs to the perfection of glory, it follows that the perfection of a simple is more in keeping with the perfection of glory, than the perfection of a mixed body, unless the mixed body has also in

itself some principle of incorruption, as the human body has, the form of which is incorruptible. Nevertheless, although a mixed body is somewhat more noble than a simple body, a simple body that exists by itself has a more noble being than if it exist in a mixed body, because in a mixed body simple bodies are somewhat in potentiality, whereas, existing by themselves, they are in their ultimate perfection.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CLEANSING OF THE WORLD WILL BE EFFECTED BY FIRE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this cleansing will not be effected by fire. For since fire is a part of the world, it needs to be cleansed like the other parts. Now the same thing should not be both cleanser and cleansed. Therefore it would seem that the cleansing will not be by fire.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as fire has a cleansing virtue so has water. Since then all things are not capable of being cleansed by fire, and some need to be cleansed by water,—which distinction is moreover observed by the old law,—it would seem that fire will not at any rate cleanse all things.

Obj. 3. Further, This cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the parts of the world by separating them from one another. Now the separation of the parts of the world from one another at the world's beginning was effected by God's power alone, for the work of distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the separation was effected by the act of the intellect which moves all things (cf. Arist. *Phys.* viii., text. 77). Therefore it would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will be done immediately by God and not by fire.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xlix. 3): *A fire shall burn before Him, and a mighty tempest shall be around Him;* and afterwards in reference to the judgment (*verse* 4): *He shall call heaven from above, and the earth to judge His people.*

Therefore it would seem that the final cleansing of the world will be by means of fire.

Further, It is written (2 Pet. iii. 12): *The heavens being on fire will be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat.* Therefore this cleansing will be effected by fire.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1) this cleansing of the world will remove from it the stain contracted from sin, and the impurity resulting from mixture, and will be a disposition to the perfection of glory; and consequently in this threefold respect it will be most fitting for it to be effected by fire. First, because since fire is the most noble of the elements, its natural properties are more like the properties of glory, and this is especially clear in regard to light. Secondly, because fire, on account of the efficacy of its active virtue, is not as susceptible as the other elements to the admixture of a foreign matter. Thirdly, because the sphere of fire is far removed from our abode; nor are we so familiar with the use of fire as with that of earth, water, and air, so that it is not so liable to depreciation. Moreover, it is most efficacious in cleansing and in separating by a process of rarefaction.

Reply Obj. 1. Fire is not employed by us in its proper matter (since thus it is far removed from us), but only in a foreign matter: and in this respect it will be possible for the world to be cleansed by fire as existing in its pure state. But in so far as it has an admixture of some foreign matter it will be possible for it to be cleansed; and thus it will be cleanser and cleansed under different aspects; and this is not unreasonable.

Reply Obj. 2. The first cleansing of the world by the deluge regarded only the stain of sin. Now the sin which was most prevalent then was the sin of concupiscence, and consequently it was fitting that the cleansing should be by means of its contrary, namely water. But the second cleansing regards both the stain of sin and the impurity of mixture, and in respect of both it is more fitting for it to be effected by fire than by water. For the power of water tends to unite rather than to separate; wherefore the

natural impurity of the elements could not be removed by water as by fire. Moreover, at the end of the world the prevalent sin will be that of tepidity, as though the world were already growing old, because then, according to Matth. xxiv. 12, *the charity of many shall grow cold*, and consequently the cleansing will then be fittingly effected by fire. Nor is there any thing that cannot in some way be cleansed by fire: some things, however, cannot be cleansed by fire without being destroyed themselves, such as cloths and wooden vessels, and these the Law ordered to be cleansed with water; yet all these things will be finally destroyed by fire.

Reply Obj. 3. By the work of distinction things received different forms whereby they are distinct from one another: and consequently this could only be done by Him Who is the author of nature. But by the final cleansing things will be restored to the purity wherein they were created, wherefore created nature will be able to minister to its Creator to this effect; and for this reason is a creature employed as a minister, that it is ennobled thereby.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRE WHEREBY THE WORLD WILL BE CLEANSED WILL BE OF THE SAME SPECIES WITH ELEMENTAL FIRE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fire in question is not of the same species as elemental fire. For nothing consumes itself. But that fire will consume the four elements according to a gloss on 2 Pet. iii. 12. Therefore that fire will not be of the same species as elemental fire.

Obj. 2. Further, As power is made known by operation, so is nature made known by power. Now that fire will have a different power from the fire which is an element: because it will cleanse the universe, whereas this fire cannot do that. Therefore it will not be of the same species as this.

Obj. 3. Further, In natural bodies those that are of the same species have the same movement. But that fire will

have a different movement from the fire that is an element, because it will move in all directions so as to cleanse the whole. Therefore it is not of the same species.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei,* xx.), and his words are contained in a gloss on 1 Cor. vii. 31, that *the fashion of this world will perish in the burning of worldly flames.* Therefore that fire will be of the same nature as the fire which is now in the world.

Further, Just as the future cleansing is to be by fire, so was the past cleansing by water; and they are both compared to one another, 2 Pet. iii. 5. Now in the first cleansing the water was of the same species with elemental water. Therefore in like manner the fire of the second cleansing will be of the same species with elemental fire.

I answer that, We meet with three opinions on this question. For some say that the element of fire which is in its own sphere will come down to cleanse the world: and they explain this descent by way of multiplication, because the fire will spread through finding combustible matter on all sides. And this will result all the more then, since the virtue of the fire will be raised over all the elements. Against this, however, would seem to be not only the fact that this fire will come down, but also the statement of the saints that it will rise up; thus (2 Pet. iii. 10) it is declared that the fire of the judgment will rise as high as the waters of the deluge; whence it would seem to follow that this fire is situated towards the middle of the place of generation. Hence others say that this fire will be generated towards the intervening space through the focussing together of the rays of the heavenly bodies, just as we see them focussed together in a burning-glass; for at that time in lieu of glasses there will be concave clouds, on which the rays will strike. But this again does not seem probable: for since the effects of heavenly bodies depend on certain fixed positions and aspects, if this fire resulted from the virtue of the heavenly bodies, the time of this cleansing would be known to those who observe the movements of the stars, and this is contrary to the authority of Scripture. Conse-

quently others, following Augustine, say that *just as the deluge resulted from an outpouring of the waters of the world, so the fashion of this world will perish by a burning of worldly flames* (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.). This burning is nothing else but the assembly of all those lower and higher causes that by their nature have a kindling virtue: and this assembly will take place not in the ordinary course of things, but by the Divine power: and from all these causes thus assembled the fire that will burn the surface of this world will result. If we consider aright these opinions, we shall find that they differ as to the cause producing this fire and not as to its species. For fire, whether produced by the sun or by some lower heating cause, is of the same species as fire in its own sphere, except in so far as the former has some admixture of foreign matter. And this will of necessity be the case then, since fire cannot cleanse a thing, unless this become its matter in some way. Hence we must grant that the fire in question is simply of the same species as ours.

Reply Obj. 1. The fire in question, although of the same species as ours, is not identically the same. Now we see that of two fires of the same species one destroys the other, namely the greater destroys the lesser, by consuming its matter. In like manner that fire will be able to destroy our fire.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as an operation that proceeds from the virtue of a thing is an indication of that virtue, so is its virtue an indication of its essence or nature, if it proceed from the essential principles of the thing. But an operation that does not proceed from the virtue of the operator does not indicate its virtue. This appears in instruments: for the action of an instrument shows forth the virtue of the mover rather than that of the instrument, since it shows forth the virtue of the agent in so far as the latter is the first principle of the action, whereas it does not show forth the virtue of the instrument, except in so far as it is susceptive of the influence of the principal agent as moving that instrument. In like manner a virtue that does not proceed from the essential principles of a thing does not indicate

the nature of that thing except in the point of susceptibility. Thus the virtue whereby hot water can heat is no indication of the nature of water except in the point of its being receptive of heat. Consequently nothing prevents water that has this virtue from being of the same species as water that has it not. In like manner it is not unreasonable that this fire, which will have the power to cleanse the surface of the world, will be of the same species as the fire to which we are used, since the heating power therein arises, not from its essential principles, but from the divine power or operation: whether we say that this power is an absolute quality, such as heat in hot water, or a kind of intention as we have ascribed to instrumental virtue (iv. *Sent.* D. 1, qu. 1, A. 4).* The latter is more probable since that fire will not act save as the instrument of the Divine power.

Reply Obj. 3. Of its own nature fire tends only upwards; but in so far as it pursues its matter, which it requires when it is outside its own sphere, it follows the site of combustible matter. Accordingly it is not unreasonable for it to take a circular or a downward course, especially in so far as it acts as the instrument of the Divine power.

Fourth Article.

Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens. For it is written (Ps. ci. 26, 27): *The heavens are the works of Thy hands : they shall perish but Thou remainest.* Now the higher heavens also are the work of God's hands. Therefore they also shall perish in the final burning of the world.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (2 Pet. iii. 12): *The heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat of fire.* Now the heavens that are distinct from the elements are the higher heavens, wherein

* Cf. P. III., Q. LXII., A. 4, *ad* 1.

the stars are fixed. Therefore it would seem that they also will be cleansed by that fire.

Obj. 3. Further, The purpose of that fire will be to remove from bodies their indisposition to the perfection of glory. Now in the higher heaven we find this indisposition both as regards guilt, since the devil sinned there, and as regards natural deficiency, since a gloss on Rom. viii. 22, *We know that every creature groaneth and is in labour even until now*, says: *All the elements fulfil their duty with labour : even as it is not without labour that the sun and moon travel their appointed course.* Therefore the higher heavens also will be cleansed by that fire.

On the contrary, The heavenly bodies are not receptive of impressions from without.

Further, A gloss on 2 Thess. i. 8, *In a flame of fire giving vengeance*, says: *There will be in the world a fire that shall precede Him, and shall rise in the air to the same height as did the waters of the deluge.* But the waters of the deluge did not rise to the height of the higher heavens but only 15 cubits higher than the mountain summits (Gen. vii. 20). Therefore the higher heavens will not be cleansed by that fire.

I answer that, The cleansing of the world will be for the purpose of removing from bodies the disposition contrary to the perfection of glory, and this perfection is the final consummation of the universe: and this disposition is to be found in all bodies, but differently in different bodies. For in some this indisposition regards something inherent to their substance: as in these lower bodies which by being mixed together fall away from their own purity. In others this indisposition does not regard something inherent to their substance; as in the heavenly bodies, wherein nothing is to be found contrary to the final perfection of the universe, except movement which is the way to perfection, and this not any kind of movement, but only local movement, which changes nothing intrinsic to a thing, such as its substance, quantity, or quality, but only its place which is extrinsic to it. Consequently there is no need to take anything away from the substance of the higher heavens, but only to set

its movement at rest. Now local movement is brought to rest not by the action of a counter agent, but by the mover ceasing to move; and therefore the heavenly bodies will not be cleansed, neither by fire nor by the action of any creature, but in lieu of being cleansed they will be set at rest by God's will alone.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.): Those words of the psalm refer to the aerial heavens which will be cleansed by the fire of the final conflagration. Or we may reply that if they refer also to the higher heavens, these are said to perish as regards their movement whereby now they are moved without cessation.

Reply Obj. 2. Peter explains himself to which heavens he refers. For before the words quoted, he had said (*verses* 5-7): *The heavens . . . first, and the earth . . . through water . . . perished . . . which . . . now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire unto the day of judgment.** Therefore the heavens to be cleansed are those which before were cleansed by the waters of the deluge, namely the aerial heavens.

Reply Obj. 3. This labour and service of the creature, that Ambrose ascribes to the heavenly bodies, is nothing else than the successive movements whereby they are subject to time, and the lack of that final consummation which they will attain in the end. Nor did the empyrean heaven contract any stain from the sin of the demons, because they were expelled from that heaven as soon as they sinned.

Fifth Article.

Whether that fire will consume the other elements?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fire in question will consume the other elements. For a gloss of Bede on 2 Pet. iii. 12 says: *This exceeding great fire will engulf the four elements whereof the world consists : yet it will not so engulf all things that they will cease to be, but it will consume two of*

* The entire text differs somewhat from S. Thomas's quotation; but the sense is the same.

them entirely, and will restore two of them to a better fashion. Therefore it would seem that at least two of the elements are to be entirely destroyed by that fire.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Apoc. xxi. 1): *The first heaven and the first earth have passed away and the sea is no more.* Now the heaven here denotes the air, as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.); and the sea denotes the gathering together of the waters. Therefore it would seem that these three elements will be wholly destroyed.

Obj. 3. Further, Fire does not cleanse except in so far as other things are made to be its matter. If, then, fire cleanses the other elements, they must needs become its matter. Therefore they must pass into its nature, and consequently be voided of their own nature.

Obj. 4. Further, The form of fire is the most noble of the forms to which elemental matter can attain. Now all things will be brought to the most noble state by this cleansing. Therefore the other elements will be wholly transformed into fire.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. vii. 31, *The fashion of this world passeth away,* says: *The beauty, not the substance, passeth.* But the very substance of the elements belongs to the perfection of the world. Therefore the elements will not be consumed as to their substance.

Further, This final cleansing that will be effected by fire will correspond to the first cleansing which was effected by water. Now the latter did not corrupt the substance of the elements. Therefore neither will the former which will be the work of fire.

I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some say that all the elements will remain as to their matter, while all will be changed as regards their imperfection; but that two of them will retain their respective substantial form, namely air and earth, while two of them, namely fire and water, will not retain their substantial form but will be changed to the form of heaven. In this way three elements, namely air, fire, and water, will be called *heaven*; although air will retain the same substantial form

as it has now, since even now it is called *heaven*. Wherefore (Apoc. xxi. 1) only heaven and earth are mentioned: *I saw*, says he, *a new heaven and a new earth*. But this opinion is altogether absurd: for it is opposed both to philosophy—which holds it impossible for the lower bodies to be in potentiality to the form of heaven, since they have neither a common matter, nor mutual contrariety—and to theology, since according to this opinion the perfection of the universe with the integrity of its parts will not be assured on account of two of the elements being destroyed.

Consequently *heaven* is taken to denote the fifth body, while all the elements are designated by *earth*, as expressed in Ps. cxlviii. 7, 8, *Praise the Lord from the earth* and afterwards, *Fire, hail, snow, ice*, etc.

Hence others say that all the elements will remain as to their substance, but that their active and passive qualities will be taken from them: even as they say too, that in a mixed body the elements retain their substantial form without having their proper qualities, since these are reduced to a mean, and a mean is neither of the extremes. And seemingly the following words of Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.) would seem in agreement with this: *In this conflagration of the world the qualities of the corruptible elements that were befitting our corruptible bodies will entirely perish by fire: and the substance itself will have those qualities that become an immortal body.*

However, this does not seem probable, for since the proper qualities of the elements are the effects of their substantial form, it seems impossible, as long as the substantial forms remain, for the aforesaid qualities to be changed, except for a time by some violent action: thus in hot water we see that by virtue of its species it returns to the cold temperature which it had lost by the action of fire, provided the species of water remain. Moreover, these same elemental qualities belong to the second perfection of the elements, as being their proper passions: nor is it probable that in this final consummation the elements will lose anything of their natural perfection.

Wherefore it would seem that the reply to this question

should be that the elements will remain as to their substance and proper qualities, but that they will be cleansed both from the stain which they contracted from the sins of men, and from the impurity resulting in them through their mutual action and passion: because when once the movement of the first movable body ceases, mutual action and passion will be impossible in the lower elements: and this is what Augustine calls the *qualities of corruptible elements*, namely their unnatural dispositions by reason of which they come near to corruption.

Reply Obj. 1. That fire is said to engulf the four elements in so far as in some way it will cleanse them. But when it is said further that *it will consume two entirely*, this does not mean that two of the elements are to be destroyed as to their substance, but that two will be more changed from the property which they have now. Some say that these two are fire and water which excel the others in their active qualities, namely heat and cold, which are the chief principles of corruption in other bodies; and since then there will be no action of fire and water which surpass the others in activity, they would seem especially to be changed from the virtue which they have now. Others, however, say that these two are air and water, on account of the various movements of these two elements, which movements they derive from the movement of the heavenly bodies. And since these movements will cease (such as the ebb and flow of the sea, and the disturbances of winds and so forth), therefore these elements especially will be changed from the property which they have now.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.), when it is stated: *And the sea is no more*, by the sea we may understand the present world of which he had said previously (xx. 13): *The sea gave up the dead that were in it.* If, however, the sea be taken literally we must reply that by the sea two things are to be understood, namely the substance of the waters, and their disposition, as containing salt and as to the movement of the waves. The sea will remain, not as to this second, but as to the first.

Reply Obj. 3. This fire will not act save as the instrument of God's providence and power; wherefore it will not act on the other elements so as to consume them but only so as to cleanse them. Nor is it necessary for that which becomes the matter of fire, to be voided of its proper species entirely, as instanced by incandescent iron, which by virtue of its species that remains returns to its proper and former state as soon as it is taken from the furnace. It will be the same with the elements after they are cleansed by fire.

Reply Obj. 4. In the elemental parts we must consider not only what is befitting a part considered in itself, but also what is befitting it in its relation to the whole. I say, then, that although water would be more noble if it had the form of fire, as likewise would earth and air, yet the universe would be more imperfect, if all elemental matter were to assume the form of fire.

Sixth Article.

Whether all the elements will be cleansed by that fire?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that neither will all the elements be cleansed by that fire. Because that fire, as stated already (A. 3), will not rise higher than the waters of the deluge. But the waters of the deluge did not reach to the sphere of fire. Therefore neither will the element of fire be cleansed by the final cleansing.

Obj. 2. Further, A gloss on Apoc. xxi. 1, *I saw a new heaven,* etc., says: *There can be no doubt that the transformation of the air and earth will be caused by fire; but it is doubtful about water, since it is believed to have the power of cleansing itself.* Therefore at least it is uncertain that all the elements will be cleansed.

Obj. 3. Further, A place where there is an everlasting stain is never cleansed. Now there will always be a stain in hell. Since, then, hell is situated among the elements, it would seem that the elements will not be wholly cleansed.

Obj. 4. Further, The earthly paradise is situated on the earth. Yet it will not be cleansed by fire, since not even the waters of the deluge reached it, as Bede says (*Comm. in Exod.* v.), as is stated in ii. *Sent.* D. 7. Therefore it would seem that the elements will not all be wholly cleansed.

On the contrary, The gloss quoted above (A. 5, *Obj.* 1) on 2 Pet. iii. 12 declares that *this fire will engulf the four elements.*

I answer that, Some* say that the fire in question will rise to the summit of the space containing the four elements: so that the elements would be entirely cleansed both from the stain of sin by which also the higher parts of the elements were infected (as instanced by the smoke of idolatry which stained the higher regions), and again from corruption, since the elements are corruptible in all their parts. But this opinion is opposed to the authority of Scripture, because it is written (2 Pet. iii. 7) that those heavens are *kept in store unto fire,* which were cleansed by water; and Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei,* xx.) that *the same world which perished in the deluge is reserved unto fire.* Now it is clear that the waters of the deluge did not rise to the summit of the space occupied by the elements, but only 15 cubits above the mountain tops; and moreover it is known that vapours or any smoke whatever rising from the earth cannot pierce the entire sphere of fire so as to reach its summit; and so the stain of sin did not reach the aforesaid space. Nor can the elements be cleansed from corruptibility by the removal of something that might be consumed by fire: whereas it will be possible for the impurities of the elements arising from their mingling together to be consumed by fire. And these impurities are chiefly round about the earth as far as the middle of the air: wherefore the fire of the final conflagration will cleanse up to that point, since the waters of the deluge rose to a height which can be approximately calculated from the height of the mountains which they surpassed in a fixed measure.

We therefore grant the *First Objection.*

Reply Obj. 2. The reason for doubt is expressed in the gloss,

* S. Bonaventure, iv. *Sent.* D. 47, A. 2, Q. 3.

because, to wit, water is believed to have in itself the power of cleansing, yet not such a power as will be competent to the future state, as stated above (A. 5; A. 2, *ad* 2).

Reply Obj. 3. The purpose of this cleansing will be chiefly to remove all imperfection from the abode of the saints; and consequently in this cleansing all that is foul will be brought together to the place of the damned: so hell will not be cleansed, and the dregs of the whole earth will be brought thither, according to Ps. lxxiv. 9, *The dregs thereof are not emptied, all the sinners of the earth shall drink.*

Reply Obj. 4. Although the sin of the first man was committed in the earthly paradise, this is not the place of sinners, as neither is the empyrean heaven: since from both places, man and devil were expelled forthwith after their sin. Consequently that place needs no cleansing.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION IS TO FOLLOW THE JUDGMENT?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment. For Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.) gives the following order of the things to take place at the judgment, saying: *At this judgment we have learnt that the following things will occur. Elias the Thesbite will appear, the Jews will believe, Antichrist will persecute, Christ will judge, the dead shall rise again, the good shall be separated from the wicked, the world shall be set on fire and shall be renewed.* Therefore the burning will follow the judgment.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*ibid.*): *After the wicked have been judged, and cast into everlasting fire, the figure of this world will perish in the furnace of worldly flames.* Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3. Further, When the Lord comes to judgment He will find some men living, as appears from the words of 1 Thess. iv. 16, where the Apostle speaking in their person,

says: *Then we who are alive, who remain unto the coming of the Lord.** But it would not be so, if the burning of the world were to come first, since they would be destroyed by the fire. Therefore this fire will follow the judgment.

Obj. 4. Further, It is said that our Lord will come to judge the earth by fire, and consequently the final conflagration would seem to be the execution of the sentence of Divine judgment. Now execution follows judgment. Therefore that fire will follow the judgment.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xcvi. 3): *A fire shall go before Him.*

Further, The resurrection will precede the judgment, else every eye would not see Christ judging. Now the burning of the world will precede the resurrection, for the saints who will rise again will have spiritual and impassible bodies, so that it will be impossible for the fire to cleanse them, and yet the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 47) quotes Augustine (*De Civ. Dei,* xx.) as saying that whatever needs cleansing in any way shall be cleansed by that fire. Therefore that fire will precede the judgment.

I answer that, The fire in question will in reality, as regards its beginning, precede the judgment. This can clearly be gathered from the fact that the resurrection of the dead will precede the judgment, since according to 1 Thess. iv. 13-16, those who have slept *shall be taken up . . . in the clouds . . . into the air . . . to meet Christ* coming to judgment. Now the general resurrection and the glorification of the bodies of the saints will happen at the same time; for the saints in rising again will assume a glorified body, as evidenced by 1 Cor. xv. 43, *It is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory:* and at the same time as the saints' bodies shall be glorified, all creatures shall be renewed, each in its own way, as appears from the statement (Rom. viii. 21) that *the creature . . . itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.* Since then the burning of the world is a disposition to the aforesaid renewal,

* Vulg.,—*who are left, shall be taken . . . to meet Christ*—the words *who remain,* etc., are from *verse* 14.

as stated above (AA. 1, 4); it can clearly be gathered that this burning, so far as it shall cleanse the world, will precede the judgment, but as regards a certain action thereof, whereby it will engulf the wicked, it will follow the judgment.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking not as one who decides the point, but as expressing an opinion. This is clear from his continuing thus: *That all these things are to happen is a matter of faith, but how and in what order we shall learn more then by experience of the things themselves than now by seeking a definite conclusion by arguing about them. Methinks, however, they will occur in the order I have given.* Hence it is clear that he is speaking as offering his opinion. The same answer applies to the *Second Objection.*

Reply Obj. 3. All men shall die and rise again: yet those are said to be found alive who will live in the body until the time of the conflagration.

Reply Obj. 4. That fire will not carry out the sentence of the judge except as regards the engulfing of the wicked: in this respect it will follow the judgment.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THAT FIRE WILL HAVE SUCH AN EFFECT ON MEN AS IS DESCRIBED?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that this fire will not have such an effect on men as is described in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 47). For a thing is said to be consumed when it is reduced to naught. Now the bodies of the wicked will not be reduced to naught, but will be kept for eternity, that they may bear an eternal punishment. Therefore this fire will not consume the wicked, as stated in the text.

Obj. 2. Further, If it be said that it will consume the bodies of the wicked by reducing them to ashes; on the contrary, As the bodies of the wicked, so will those of the good be brought to ashes: for it is the privilege of Christ alone that His flesh see not corruption. Therefore it will consume also the good who will then be found.

Obj. 3. Further, The stain of sin is more abundant in the elements, as combining together to the formation of the human body wherein is the corruption of the fomes* even in the good, than in the elements existing outside the human body. Now the elements existing outside the human body will be cleansed on account of the stain of sin. Much therefore will the elements in the human body whether of the good or of the wicked need to be cleansed, and consequently the bodies of both will need to be destroyed.

Obj. 4. Further, As long as the state of the way lasts the elements act in like manner on the good and the wicked. Now the state of the way will still endure in that conflagration, since after this state of the way death will not be natural, and yet it will be caused by that fire. Therefore that fire will act equally on good and wicked; and consequently it does not seem that any distinction is made between them as to their being affected by that fire, as stated in the text.

Obj. 5. Further, This fire will have done its work in a moment as it were. Yet there will be many among the living in whom there will be many things to be cleansed. Therefore that fire will not suffice for their cleansing.

I answer that, This fire of the final conflagration, in so far as it will precede the judgment, will act as the instrument of Divine justice as well as by the natural virtue of fire. Accordingly, as regards its natural virtue, it will act in like manner on the wicked and good who will be alive, by reducing the bodies of both to ashes. But in so far as it acts as the instrument of Divine justice, it will act differently on different people as regards the sense of pain. For the wicked will be tortured by the action of the fire; whereas the good in whom there will be nothing to cleanse will feel no pain at all from the fire, as neither did the children in the fiery furnace (Dan. iii.); although their bodies will not be kept whole, as were the bodies of the children: and it will be possible by God's power for their bodies to be destroyed without their suffering pain. But the good, in whom matter

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXIII., A. 3; Q. XCI., A. 6.

for cleansing will be found, will suffer pain from that fire, more or less according to their different merits.

On the other hand, as regards the action which this fire will have after the judgment, it will act on the damned alone, since the good will all have impassible bodies.

Reply Obj. 1. Consumption there signifies being brought, not to nothing, but to ashes.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the bodies of the good will be reduced to ashes by the fire, they will not suffer pain thereby, as neither did the children in the Babylonian furnace. In this respect a distinction is drawn between the good and the wicked.

Reply Obj. 3. The elements that are in human bodies, even in the bodies of the elect, will be cleansed by fire. But this will be done, by God's power, without their suffering pain.

Reply Obj. 4. This fire will act not only according to the natural power of the element, but also as the instrument of Divine justice.

Reply Obj. 5. There are three reasons why those who will be found living will be able to be cleansed suddenly. One is because there will be few things in them to be cleansed, since they will be already cleansed by the previous fears and persecutions. The second is because they will suffer pain both while living and of their own will: and pain suffered in this life voluntarily cleanses much more than pain inflicted after death, as in the case of the martyrs, because *if anything needing to be cleansed be found in them, it is cut off by the sickle of suffering,* as Augustine says (*De Unic. Bap.* xiii.), although the pain of martyrdom is of short duration in comparison with the pain endured in purgatory. The third is because the heat will gain in intensity what it loses in shortness of time.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THAT FIRE WILL ENGULF THE WICKED?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that that fire will not engulf the wicked. For a gloss on Mal. iii. 3, *He shall purify the sons of Levi,* says that *it is a fire consuming the wicked and refining the good ;* and a gloss on 1 Cor. iii. 13, *Fire shall try every man's work,* says: *We read that there will be a twofold fire, one that will cleanse the elect and will precede the judgment, another that will torture the wicked.* Now the latter is the fire of hell that shall engulf the wicked, while the former is the fire of the final conflagration. Therefore the fire of the final conflagration will not be that which will engulf the wicked.

Obj. 2. Further, That fire will obey God in the cleansing of the world: therefore it should receive its reward like the other elements, especially since fire is the most noble of the elements. Therefore it would seem that it ought not to be cast into hell for the punishment of the damned.

Obj. 3. Further, The fire that will engulf the wicked will be the fire of hell: and this fire was prepared from the beginning of the world for the damned; hence it is written (Matth. xxv. 41): *Depart . . . you cursed . . . into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil,* etc., and (Isa. xxx. 33): *Thopheth is prepared from yesterday, prepared by the king,* etc., where a gloss observes: *From yesterday—i.e., from the beginning—Thopheth—i.e., the valley of hell.* But this fire of the final conflagration was not prepared from the beginning, but will result from the meeting together of the fires of the world. Therefore that fire is not the fire of hell which will engulf the wicked.

On the contrary are the words of Ps. xcvi. 3, where it is said of this fire that it *shall burn His enemies round about.*

Further, It is written (Dan. vii. 10): *A swift stream of fire issued forth from before Him ;* and a gloss adds, *to drag sinners into hell.* Now the passage quoted refers to that fire of which we are now speaking, as appears from a gloss which observes

on the same words: *In order to punish the wicked and cleanse the good.* Therefore the fire of the final conflagration will be plunged into hell together with the wicked.

I answer that, The entire cleansing of the world and the renewal for the purpose of cleansing will be directed to the renewal of man: and consequently the cleansing and renewal of the world must needs correspond with the cleansing and renewal of mankind. Now mankind will be cleansed in one way by the separation of the wicked from the good: wherefore it is said (Luke iii. 17): *Whose fan is in His hand, and He will purge His floor, and will gather the wheat, i.e.* the elect, *into His barn, but the chaff, i.e.* the wicked, *He will burn with unquenchable fire.* Hence it will be thus with the cleansing of the world, so that all that is ugly and vile will be cast with the wicked into hell, and all that is beautiful and noble will be taken up above for the glory of the elect: and so too will it be with the fire of that conflagration, as Basil says in Ps. xxviii. 7, *The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of fire,* because whatever fire contains of burning heat and gross matter will go down into hell for the punishment of the wicked, and whatever is subtle and lightsome will remain above for the glory of the elect.

Reply Obj. 1. The fire that will cleanse the elect before the judgment will be the same as the fire that will burn the world, although some say the contrary. For it is fitting that man, being a part of the world, be cleansed with the same fire as the world. They are, however, described as two fires, that will cleanse the good, and torture the wicked, both in reference to their respective offices, and somewhat in reference to their substance: since the substance of the cleansing fire will not all be cast into hell, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. This fire will be rewarded because whatever it contains of gross matter will be separated from it, and cast into hell.

Reply Obj. 3. The punishment of the wicked, even as the glory of the elect, will be greater after the judgment than before. Wherefore, just as charity will be added to the higher creature in order to increase the glory of the elect,

so too whatever is vile in creatures will be thrust down into hell in order to add to the misery of the damned. Consequently it is not unbecoming that another fire be added to the fire of the damned that was prepared from the beginning of the world.

QUESTION LXXV.

OF THE RESURRECTION.

(*In Three Articles.*)

In the next place we must consider things connected with and accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be considered will be the resurrection itself; the second will be the cause of the resurrection; the third its time and manner; the fourth its term *wherefrom;* the fifth the condition of those who rise again.

Under the first head there will be three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body? (2) Whether it is universally of all bodies? (3) Whether it is natural or miraculous?

First Article.

WHETHER THERE IS TO BE A RESURRECTION OF THE BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is not to be a resurrection of the body: for it is written (Job xiv. 12): *Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again till the heavens be broken.* But the heavens shall never be broken, since the earth, to which seemingly this is still less applicable, *standeth for ever* (Eccles. i. 4). Therefore the man that is dead shall never rise again.

Obj. 2. Further, Our Lord proves the resurrection by quoting the words: *I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead but of the living* (Matth. xxii. 32; Exod. iii. 6). But it is clear that when those words were uttered, Abraham, Isaac, and

Jacob lived not in body, but only in the soul. Therefore there will be no resurrection of bodies but only of souls.

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle (1 Cor. xv.) seemingly proves the resurrection from the reward for labours endured by the saints in this life. For if they trusted in this life alone, they would be the most unhappy of all men. Now there can be sufficient reward for labour in the soul alone: since it is not necessary for the instrument to be repaid together with the worker, and the body is the soul's instrument. Wherefore even in purgatory, where souls will be punished for what they did in the body, the soul is punished without the body. Therefore there is no need to hold a resurrection of the body, but it is enough to hold a resurrection of souls, which consists in their being taken from the death of sin and unhappiness to the life of grace and glory.

Obj. 4. Further, The last (state) of a thing is the most perfect, since thereby it attains its end. Now the most perfect state of the soul is to be separated from the body, since in that state it is more conformed to God and the angels, and is more pure, as being separated from any extraneous nature. Therefore separation from the body is its final state, and consequently it returns not from this state to the body, as neither does a man end in becoming a boy.

Obj. 5. Further, Bodily death is the punishment inflicted on man for his own transgression, as appears from Gen. ii., even as spiritual death, which is the separation of the soul from God, is inflicted on man for mortal sin. Now man never returns to life from spiritual death after receiving the sentence of his damnation. Therefore neither will there be any return from bodily death to bodily life, and so there will be no resurrection.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xix. 25-26): *I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and I shall be clothed again with my skin,* etc. Therefore there will be a resurrection of the body.

Further, The gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as appears from Rom. v. 15. Now death was brought in by sin, for if sin had not been, there had been no death.

Therefore by the gift of Christ man will be restored from death to life.

Further, The members should be conformed to the head. Now our Head lives and will live eternally in body and soul, since *Christ rising again from the dead dieth now no more* (Rom. vi. 8). Therefore men who are His members will live in body and soul; and consequently there must needs be a resurrection of the body.

I answer that, According to the various opinions about man's last end there have been various opinions holding or denying the resurrection. For man's last end which all men desire naturally is happiness. Some have held that man is able to attain this end in this life: wherefore they had no need to admit another life after this, wherein man would be able to attain to his perfection: and so they denied the resurrection. But this opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by the changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the human body, the imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all of which are hindrances to the perfection of happiness, as Augustine argues at the end of *De Civ. Dei* (xix. 3). Hence others maintained that after this there is another life wherein, after death, man lives according to the soul only, and they held that such a life sufficed to satisfy the natural desire to obtain happiness: wherefore Porphyrius said as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei,* xxi.): *The soul, to be happy, must avoid all bodies:* and consequently these did not hold the resurrection. This opinion was based by various people on various false foundations. For certain heretics asserted that all bodily things are from the evil principle, but that spiritual things are from the good principle: and from this it follows that the soul cannot reach the height of its perfection unless it be separated from the body, since the latter withdraws it from its principle, the participation of which makes it happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold corporeal things to have been created or fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of the body. The falsehood of this principle has been shown at the beginning of the Second Book (ii. *Sent.* D. 4, qu. 1, *A.* 3).*

* Cf. P. I., Q. XLIX., A. 3.

Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses his ship: wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if happiness is attained by the soul alone, man would not be baulked in his natural desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection. But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation (*De Anima*, ii.), where he shows that the soul is united to the body as form to matter. Hence it is clear that if man cannot be happy in this life, we must of necessity hold the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 1. The heavens will never be broken as to their substance, but as to the effect of their power whereby their movement is the cause of generation and corruption of lower things: for this reason the Apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 31): *The fashion of this world passeth away.*

Reply Obj. 2. Abraham's soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham himself, but a part of him (and the same as regards the others). Hence life in Abraham's soul does not suffice to make Abraham a living being, or to make the God of Abraham the God of a living man. But there needs to be life in the whole composite, *i.e.* the soul and body: and although this life were not actually when these words were uttered, it was in each part as ordained to the resurrection. Wherefore our Lord proves the resurrection with the greatest subtlety and efficacy.

Reply Obj. 3. The soul is compared to the body, not only as a worker to the instrument with which he works, but also as form to matter: wherefore the work belongs to the composite and not to the soul alone, as the Philosopher shows (*De Anima*, i.). And since to the worker is due the reward of the work, it behoves man himself, who is composed of soul and body, to receive the reward of his work. Now as venial offences are called sins as being dispositions to sin, and not as having simply and perfectly the character of sin, so the punishment which is awarded to them in purgatory is not a retribution simply, but rather a cleansing, which is wrought separately in the body, by death and by its being reduced to ashes, and in the soul by the fire of purgatory.

Reply Obj. 4. Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than outside the body, because it is a part of the whole composite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is not simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed to God when it has all that the condition of its nature requires, since then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection. Hence the heart of an animal is more conformed to an immovable God when it is in movement than when it is at rest, because the perfection of the heart is in its movement, and its rest is its undoing.

Reply Obj. 5. Bodily death was brought about by Adam's sin which was blotted out by Christ's death: hence its punishment lasts not for ever. But mortal sin which causes everlasting death through impenitence will not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will be everlasting.

Second Article.

Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection will not be for all without exception. For it is written (Ps. i. 5): *The wicked shall not rise again in judgment.* Now men will not rise again except at the time of the general judgment. Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise again.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Dan. xii. 2): *Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake.* But these words imply a certain restriction. Therefore all will not rise again.

Obj. 3. Further, By the resurrection men are conformed to Christ rising again; wherefore the Apostle argues (1 Cor. xv. 12, *seqq.*) that if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again. Now those alone should be conformed to Christ rising again who have borne His image, and this belongs to the good alone. Therefore they alone shall rise again.

Obj. 4. Further, Punishment is not remitted unless the fault be condoned. Now bodily death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore, as original sin is not forgiven to all, all will not rise again.

Obj. 5. Further, As we are born again by the grace of Christ, even so shall we rise again by His grace. Now those who die in their mother's womb can never be born again: therefore neither can they rise again, and consequently all will not rise again.

On the contrary, It is said (Jo. v. 28, 25): *All that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, . . . and they that hear shall live.* Therefore the dead shall all rise again.

Further, It is written (1 Cor. xv. 51): *We shall all indeed rise again,* etc.

Further, The resurrection is necessary in order that those who rise again may receive punishment or reward according to their merits. Now either punishment or reward is due to all, either for their own merits, as to adults, or for others' merits, as to children. Therefore all will rise again.

I answer that, Those things, the reason of which comes from the nature of a species, must needs be found likewise in all the members of that same species. Now such is the resurrection: because the reason thereof, as stated above (A. 1), is that the soul cannot have the final perfection of the human species, so long as it is separated from the body. Hence no soul will remain for ever separated from the body. Therefore it is necessary for all, as well as for one, to rise again.

Reply Obj. 1. As a gloss expounds these words, they refer to the spiritual resurrection whereby the wicked shall not rise again in the particular judgment. Or else they refer to the wicked who are altogether unbelievers, who will not rise again to be judged, since they are already judged.*

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine (*De Civ. Dei,* xx.) explains *many* as meaning *all:* in fact, this way of speaking is often met with in Holy Writ. Or else the restriction may refer to the

* John iii. 18.

children consigned to limbo who, although they shall rise again, are not properly said to awake, since they will have no sense either of pain or of glory, and waking is the unchaining of the senses.

Reply Obj. 3. All, both good and wicked, are conformed to Christ, while living in this life, as regards things pertaining to the nature of the species, but not as regards matters pertaining to grace. Hence all will be conformed to Him in the restoration of natural life, but not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone.

Reply Obj. 4. Those who have died in original sin have, by dying, discharged the obligation of death which is the punishment of original sin. Hence, notwithstanding original sin, they can rise again from death: for the punishment of original sin is to die, rather than to be detained by death.

Reply Obj. 5. We are born again by the grace of Christ that is given to us, but we rise again by the grace of Christ whereby it came about that He took our nature, since it is by this that we are conformed to Him in natural things. Hence those who die in their mother's womb, although they are not born again by receiving grace, will nevertheless rise again on account of the conformity of their nature with Him, which conformity they acquired by attaining to the perfection of the human species.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE RESURRECTION IS NATURAL?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection is natural. For, as the Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii.), *that which is commonly observed in all, marks the nature of the individuals contained under it.* Now resurrection applies commonly to all. Therefore it is natural.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* xiv.): *Those who do not hold the resurrection on the principle of obedience ought certainly to hold it on the principle of reason. For what does the world every day but imitate, in its elements, our resurrection?*

And he offers as examples the light which *as it were dies . . . and is withdrawn from our sight . . . and again rises anew, as it were, and is recalled—the shrubs which lose their greenery, and again by a kind of resurrection are renewed—and the seeds which rot and die and then sprout and rise again as it were :* which same example is adduced by the Apostle (1 Cor. xv. 36). Now from the works of nature nothing can be known save what is natural. Therefore the resurrection is natural.

Obj. 3. Further, Things that are against nature abide not for long, because they are violent, so to speak. But the life that is restored by the resurrection will last for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

Obj. 4. Further, That to which the entire expectation of nature looks forward would seem to be natural. Now such a thing is the resurrection and the glorification of the saints according to Rom. viii. 19. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

Obj. 5. Further, The resurrection is a kind of movement towards the everlasting union of soul and body. Now movement is natural if it terminate in a natural rest (*Phys.* v., text. 59): and the everlasting union of soul and body will be natural, for since the soul is the body's proper mover, it has a body proportionate to it: so that the body is likewise for ever capable of being quickened by it, even as the soul lives for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

On the contrary, There is no natural return from privation to habit. But death is privation of life. Therefore the resurrection whereby one returns from death to life is not natural.

Further, Things of the one species have one fixed way of origin: wherefore animals begotten of putrefaction are never of the same species as those begotten of seed, as the Commentator says on *Phys.* viii. Now the natural way of man's origin is for him to be begotten of a like in species: and such is not the case in the resurrection. Therefore it will not be natural.

I answer that, A movement or an action stands related to nature in three ways. For there is a movement or action

whereof nature is neither the principle nor the term: and such a movement is sometimes from a principle above nature as in the case of a glorified body; and sometimes from any other principle whatever; for instance, the violent upward movement of a stone which terminates in a violent rest. Again, there is a movement whereof nature is both principle and term: for instance, the downward movement of a stone. And there is another movement whereof nature is the term, but not the principle, the latter being sometimes something above nature (as in giving sight to a blind man, for sight is natural, but the principle of the sight-giving is above nature), and sometimes something else, as in the forcing of flowers or fruit by artificial process. It is impossible for nature to be the principle and not the term, because natural principles are appointed to definite effects, beyond which they cannot extend. Therefore the action or movement that is related to nature in the first way can nowise be natural, but is either miraculous if it come from a principle above nature, or violent if from any other principle. The action or movement that is related to nature in the second way is simply natural: but the action that is related to nature in the third way cannot be described as natural simply, but as natural in a restricted sense, in so far, to wit, as it leads to that which is according to nature: but it is called either miraculous or artificial or violent. For, properly speaking, natural is that which is according to nature, and a thing is according to nature if it has that nature and whatever results from that nature (*Phys.* ii.). Consequently, speaking simply, movement cannot be described as natural unless its principle be natural. Now nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, although resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For nature is the principle of movement in the thing wherein nature is,—either the active principle, as in the movement of heavy and light bodies and in the natural alterations of animals,—or the passive principle, as in the generation of simple bodies. The passive principle of natural generation is the natural passive potentiality which always has an active principle corresponding to it in nature, according to *Met.* ix., text. 10: nor as to this

does it matter whether the active principle in nature correspond to the passive principle in respect of its ultimate perfection, namely the form; or in respect of a disposition in virtue of which it demands the ultimate form, as in the generation of a man according to the teaching of faith, or in all other generations according to the opinions of Plato and Avicenna. But in nature there is no active principle of the resurrection, neither as regards the union of the soul with the body, nor as regards the disposition which is the demand for that union: since such a disposition cannot be produced by nature, except in a definite way by the process of generation from seed. Wherefore even granted a passive potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to its union with the soul, it is not such as to suffice for the conditions of natural movement. Therefore the resurrection, strictly speaking, is miraculous and not natural except in a restricted sense, as we have explained.

Reply Obj. 1. The Damascene is speaking of those things that are found in all individuals and are caused by the principles of nature. For supposing by a divine operation all men to be made white, or to be gathered together in one place, as happened at the time of the deluge, it would not follow that whiteness or existence in some particular place is a natural property of man.

Reply Obj. 2. From natural things one does not come by a demonstration of reason to know non-natural things, but by the induction of reason one may know something above nature, since the natural bears a certain resemblance to the supernatural. Thus the union of soul and body resembles the union of the soul with God by the glory of fruition, as the Master says (ii. *Sent.* D. 1): and in like manner the examples, quoted by the Apostle and Gregory, are confirmatory evidences of our faith in the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument regards an operation which terminates in something that is not natural but contrary to nature. Such is not the resurrection, and hence the argument is not to the point.

Reply Obj. 4. The entire operation of nature is subordinate

to the Divine operation, just as the working of a lower art is subordinate to the working of a higher art. Hence just as all the work of a lower art has in view an end unattainable save by the operation of the higher art that produces the form, or makes use of what has been made by art: so the last end which the whole expectation of nature has in view is unattainable by the operation of nature, and for which reason the attaining thereto is not natural.

Reply Obj. 5. Although there can be no natural movement terminating in a violent rest, there can be a non-natural movement terminating in a natural rest, as explained above.

QUESTION LXXVI.

OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must next consider the cause of our resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ's resurrection is the cause of our resurrection? (2) Whether the sound of the trumpet is? (3) Whether the angels are?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST IS THE CAUSE OF OUR RESURRECTION?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection of Christ is not the cause of our resurrection. For, given the cause, the effect follows. Yet given the resurrection of Christ the resurrection of the other dead did not follow at once. Therefore His resurrection is not the cause of ours.

Obj. 2. Further, An effect cannot be unless the cause precede. But the resurrection of the dead would be even if Christ had not risen again: for God could have delivered man in some other way. Therefore Christ's resurrection is not the cause of ours.

Obj. 3. Further, The same thing produces the one effect throughout the one same species. Now the resurrection will be common to all men. Since then Christ's resurrection is not its own cause, it is not the cause of the resurrection of others.

Obj. 4. Further, An effect retains some likeness to its cause. But the resurrection, at least of some, namely the

wicked, bears no likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Therefore Christ's resurrection will not be the cause of theirs.

On the contrary, In every genus that which is first is the cause of those that come after it (*Met.* ii., text. 4). Now Christ, by reason of His bodily resurrection, is called *the firstfruits of them that sleep* (1 Cor. xv. 20), and *the first-begotten of the dead* (Apoc. i. 5). Therefore His resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of others.

Further, Christ's resurrection has more in common with our bodily resurrection than with our spiritual resurrection which is by justification. But Christ's resurrection is the cause of our justification, as appears from Rom. iv. 25, where it is said that He *rose again for our justification*. Therefore Christ's resurrection is the cause of our bodily resurrection.

I answer that, Christ by reason of His human nature is called the mediator of God and men: wherefore the Divine gifts are bestowed on men by means of Christ's humanity. Now just as we cannot be delivered from spiritual death save by the gift of grace bestowed by God, so neither can we be delivered from bodily death except by resurrection wrought by the Divine power. And therefore as Christ, in respect of His human nature, received the firstfruits of grace from above, and His grace is the cause of our grace, because *of His fulness we all have received . . . grace for grace* (John i. 16), so in Christ has our resurrection begun, and His resurrection is the cause of ours. Thus Christ as God is, as it were, the equivocal cause of our resurrection, but as God and man rising again, He is the proximate and, so to say, the univocal cause of our resurrection. Now a univocal efficient cause produces its effect in likeness to its own form, so that not only is it an efficient, but also an exemplar cause in relation to that effect. This happens in two ways. For sometimes this very form, whereby the agent is likened to its effect, is the direct principle of the action by which the effect is produced, as heat in the fire that heats: and sometimes it is not the form in respect of which this likeness is observed, that is primarily and directly the principle of that action, but the principles of that form. For instance,

if a white man beget a white man, the whiteness of the begetter is not the principle of active generation, and yet the whiteness of the begetter is said to be the cause of the whiteness of the begotten, because the principles of whiteness in the begetter are the generative principles causing whiteness in the begotten. In this way the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection, because the same thing that wrought the resurrection of Christ, which is the univocal efficient cause of our resurrection, is the active cause of our resurrection, namely the power of Christ's Godhead which is common to Him and the Father. Hence it is written (Rom. viii. 11): *He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies.* And this very resurrection of Christ by virtue of His indwelling Godhead is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection: since the Divine operations were wrought by means of Christ's flesh, as though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene instances as an example (*De Fide Orthod.* iii.) the touch of His body whereby he healed the leper (Matth. viii. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. A sufficient cause produces at once its effect to which it is immediately directed, but not the effect to which it is directed by means of something else, no matter how sufficient it may be: thus heat, however intense it be, does not cause heat at once in the first instant, but it begins at once to set up a movement towards heat, because heat is its effect by means of movement. Now Christ's resurrection is said to be the cause of ours, in that it works our resurrection, not immediately, but by means of its principle, namely the Divine power which will work our resurrection in likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Now God's power works by means of His will which is nearest to the effect; hence it is not necessary that our resurrection should follow straightway after He has wrought the resurrection of Christ, but that it should happen at the time which God's will has decreed.

Reply Obj. 2. God's power is not tied to any particular second causes, but that He can produce their effects either immediately or by means of other causes: thus He might

work the generation of lower bodies even though there were no movement of the heaven: and yet according to the order which He has established in things, the movement of the heaven is the cause of the generation of the lower bodies. In like manner according to the order appointed to human things by Divine providence, Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours: and yet He could have appointed another order, and then our resurrection would have had another cause ordained by God.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument holds when all the things of one species have the same order to the first cause of the effect to be produced in the whole of that species. But it is not so in the case in point, because Christ's humanity is nearer to His Godhead, Whose power is the first cause of the resurrection, than is the humanity of others. Hence Christ's Godhead caused His resurrection immediately, but it causes the resurrection of others by means of Christ-man rising again.

Reply Obj. 4. The resurrection of all men will bear some resemblance to Christ's resurrection, as regards that which pertains to the life of nature, in respect of which all were conformed to Christ. Hence all will rise again to immortal life; but in the saints who were conformed to Christ by grace, there will be conformity as to things pertaining to glory.

Second Article.

WHETHER THE SOUND OF THE TRUMPET WILL BE THE CAUSE OF OUR RESURRECTION?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the sound of the trumpet will not be the cause of our resurrection. For the Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iv.): *Thou must believe that the resurrection will take place by God's will, power, and nod.* Therefore since these are a sufficient cause of our resurrection, we ought not to assign the sound of the trumpet as a cause thereof.

Obj. 2. Further, It is useless to make sounds to one who

cannot hear. But the dead will not have hearing. Therefore it is unfitting to make a sound to arouse them.

Obj. 3. Further, If any sound is the cause of the resurrection, this will only be by a power given by God to the sound: wherefore a gloss on Ps. lxvii. 34, *He will give to His voice the voice of power*, says,—*to arouse our bodies*. Now from the moment that a power is given to a thing, though it be given miraculously, the act that ensues is natural, as instanced in the man born blind who, after being restored to sight, saw naturally. Therefore if a sound be the cause of resurrection; the resurrection would be natural: which is false.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. iv. 15): *The Lord Himself will come down from heaven . . . with the trumpet of God; and the dead who are in Christ shall rise.*

Further, It is written (John v. 28) that they *who are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and* (*verse* 25) *they that hear shall live.* Now this voice is called the trumpet, as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 43). Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Cause and effect must needs in some way be united together, since mover and moved, maker and made, are simultaneous (*Phys.* viii.). Now Christ rising again is the univocal cause of our resurrection: wherefore at the resurrection of bodies, it behoves Christ to work the resurrection at the giving of some common bodily sign. According to some this sign will be literally Christ's voice commanding the resurrection, even as He commanded the sea and the storm ceased (Matth. viii. 26). Others say that this sign will be nothing else than the manifest appearance of the Son of God in the world, according to the words of Matth. xxiv. 27: *As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be.* These rely on the authority of Gregory* who says that the sound of the trumpet is nothing else *but the Son appearing to the world as judge.* According to this, the visible presence of the Son of God is called His voice, because as soon as He appears all nature will obey His command in restoring human bodies: hence He is described

* *Moral.* xxxi. as quoted by Albert the Great, iv. *Sent.* D. 42, A. 4.

as coming *with commandment* (1 Thess. iv. 15). In this way His appearing, in so far as it has the force of a command, is called His voice: which voice, whatever it be, is sometimes called a cry,* as of a crier summoning to judgment; sometimes the sound of a trumpet,† either on account of its distinctness, as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 43), or as being in keeping with the use of the trumpet in the Old Testament: for by the trumpet they were summoned to the council, stirred to the battle, and called to the feast; and those who rise again will be summoned to the council of judgment, to the battle in which *the world shall fight . . . against the unwise* (Wis. v. 21), and to the feast of everlasting solemnity.

Reply Obj. 1. In those words the Damascene touches on three things respecting the material cause of the resurrection: to wit, the Divine will which commands, the power which executes, and the ease of execution, when he adds *bidding*, in resemblance to our own affairs: since it is very easy for us to do what is done at once at our word. But the ease is much more evident, if before we say a word, our servants execute our will at once at the first sign of our will, which sign is called a nod: and this nod is a kind of cause of that execution, in so far as others are led thereby to accomplish our will. And the Divine nod, at which the resurrection will take place, is nothing but the sign given by God, which all nature will obey by concurring in the resurrection of the dead. This sign is the same as the sound of the trumpet, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. As the forms of the Sacrament have the power to sanctify, not through being heard, but through being spoken: so this sound, whatever it be, will have an instrumental efficacy of resuscitation, not through being perceived, but through being uttered. Even so a sound by the pulsation of the air arouses the sleeper, by loosing the organ of perception, and not because it is known: since judgment about the sound that reaches the ears is subsequent to the awakening and is not its cause.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument would avail, if the power

* Matth. xxv. 6. † 1 Cor. xv. 52; 1 Thess. iv. 15.

given to that sound were a complete being in nature: because then that which would proceed therefrom would have for principle a power already rendered natural. But this power is not of that kind but such as we have ascribed above to the forms of the Sacraments (iv. *Sent.* D. 1; P. iii., Q. LXII., AA. 1, 4).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ANGELS WILL DO ANYTHING TOWARDS THE RESURRECTION?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels will do nothing at all towards the resurrection. For raising the dead shows a greater power than does begetting men. Now when men are begotten, the soul is not infused into the body by means of the angels. Therefore neither will the resurrection, which is reunion of soul and body, be wrought by the ministry of the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, If this is to be ascribed to the instrumentality of any angels at all, it would seem especially referable to the virtues, to whom it belongs to work miracles. Yet it is referred, not to them, but to the archangels, according to the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 43). Therefore the resurrection will not be wrought by the ministry of the angels.

On the contrary, It is stated (1 Thess. iv. 15) that *the Lord . . . shall come down from heaven . . . with the voice of an archangel . . . and the dead shall rise again.* Therefore the resurrection of the dead will be accomplished by the angelic ministry.

I answer that, According to Augustine (*De Trin.* ii.) *just as the grosser and inferior bodies are ruled in a certain order by the more subtle and more powerful bodies, so are all bodies ruled by God by the rational spirit of life :* and Gregory speaks in the same sense (*Dial.* iv.). Consequently in all God's bodily works, He employs the ministry of the angels. Now in the resurrection there is something pertaining to the transmutation of the bodies, to wit the gathering together of the mortal remains and the disposal thereof for the restoration

of the human body; wherefore in this respect God will employ the ministry of the angels in the resurrection. But the soul, even as it is immediately created by God, so will it be reunited to the body immediately by God without any operation of the angels: and in like manner He Himself will glorify the body without the ministry of the angels, just as He immediately glorifies man's soul. This ministry of the angels is called their voice, according to one explanation given in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 43).

Hence the *Reply* to the *First Objection* is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 2. This ministry will be exercised chiefly by one Archangel, namely Michael, who is the prince of the Church as he was of the Synagogue (Dan. x. 13, 21). Yet he will act under the influence of the Virtues and the other higher orders: so that what he shall do, the higher orders will, in a way, do also. In like manner the lower angels will co-operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual to whose guardianship they were appointed: so that this voice can be ascribed either to one or to many angels.

QUESTION LXXVII.

OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the end of the world? (2) Whether that time is hidden? (3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time? (4) Whether it will happen suddenly?

First Article.

WHETHER THE TIME OF OUR RESURRECTION SHOULD BE DELAYED TILL THE END OF THE WORLD?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together. For there is more conformity between head and members than between one member and another, as there is more between cause and effect than between one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head, did not delay His resurrection until the end of the world, so as to rise again together with all men. Therefore there is no need for the resurrection of the early saints to be deferred until the end of the world, so that they may rise again together with the others.

Obj. 2. Further, The resurrection of the Head is the cause of the resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of certain members that desire nobility from their being closely connected with the Head was not delayed till the end of the

world, but followed immediately after Christ's resurrection, as is piously believed concerning the Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist.* Therefore the resurrection of others will be so much nearer Christ's resurrection, according as they have been more conformed to Him by grace and merit.

Obj. 3. Further, The state of the New Testament is more perfect, and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the state of the Old Testament. Yet some of the fathers of the Old Testament rose again when Christ rose, according to Matth. xxvii. 52: *Many of the bodies of the saints, that had slept, arose.* Therefore it would seem that the resurrection of the Old Testament saints should not be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together.

Obj. 4. Further, There will be no numbering of years after the end of the world. Yet after the resurrection of the dead, the years are still reckoned until the resurrection of others, as appears from Apoc. xx. 4, 5. For it is stated there that *I saw . . . the souls of them that were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God,* and further on: *And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years.* And *the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were finished.* Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed until the end of the world, that all may rise together.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xiv. 12): *Man when he is fallen asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken, he shall not wake, nor rise out of his sleep,* and it is a question of the sleep of death. Therefore the resurrection of men will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavens shall be broken.

Further, It is written (Heb. xi. 39): *All these being approved by the testimony of faith received not the promise, i.e.* full beatitude of soul and body, since *God has provided something better for us, lest they should be consummated, i.e.* perfected, *without us,—in order that,* as a gloss observes, *through all rejoicing each one might rejoice the more.* But the resurrection will not precede the glorification of bodies, because *He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His*

* *Ep. de Assump. B.V.*, cap. ii., among S. Jerome's works.

glory (Phil. iii. 21), and the children of the resurrection will be *as the angels . . . in heaven* (Matth. xxii. 30). Therefore the resurrection will be delayed till the end of the world, when all shall rise together.

I answer that, As Augustine states (*De Trin.* iii.) *Divine providence decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should be ruled in a certain order by the more subtle and powerful bodies:* wherefore the entire matter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according to the movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would be contrary to the order established in things by Divine providence if the matter of lower bodies were brought to the state of incorruption, so long as there remains movement in the higher bodies. And since, according to the teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men to immortal life conformably to Christ Who *rising again from the dead dieth now no more* (Rom. vi. 9), the resurrection of human bodies will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavenly movement will cease. For this reason, too, certain philosophers, who held that the movement of the heavens will never cease, maintained that human souls will return to mortal bodies such as we have now,—whether, as Empedocles, they stated that the soul would return to the same body at the end of the great year, or that it would return to another body; thus Pythagoras asserted that *any soul will enter any body,* as stated in *De Anima,* i., text. 53.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the head is more conformed to the members by conformity of proportion (which is requisite in order that it have influence over the members) than one member is to another, yet the head has a certain causality over the members which the members have not; and in this the members differ from the head and agree with one another. Hence Christ's resurrection is an exemplar of ours, and through our faith therein there arises in us the hope of our own resurrection. But the resurrection of one of Christ's members is not the cause of the resurrection of other members, and consequently Christ's resurrection had to precede the resurrection of others who have all to rise again at the consummation of the world.

Reply Obj. 2. Although among the members some rank higher than others and are more conformed to the Head, they do not attain to the character of headship so as to be the cause of others. Consequently greater conformity to Christ does not give them a right to rise again before others as though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as we have said in reference to Christ's resurrection: and if it has been granted to others that their resurrection should not be delayed until the general resurrection, this has been by special privilege of grace, and not as due on account of conformity to Christ.

Reply Obj. 3. Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption,* seems to be doubtful of this resurrection of the saints with Christ, namely as to whether, having been witnesses to the resurrection, they died again, so that theirs was a resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died again) rather than a resurrection such as will be at the end of the world,—or really rose again to immortal life, to live for ever in the body, and to ascend bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says on Matth. xxvii. 52. The latter seems more probable, because, as Jerome says (*ibid.*), in order that they might bear true witness to Christ's true resurrection, it was fitting that they should truly rise again. Nor was their resurrection hastened for their sake, but for the sake of bearing witness to Christ's resurrection: and that by bearing witness thereto they might lay the foundation of the faith of the New Testament: wherefore it was more fitting that it should be borne by the fathers of the Old Testament, than by those who died after the foundation of the New. It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel mentions their resurrection before Christ's, we must take this statement as made in anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history. For none rose again with a true resurrection before Christ, since He is the *firstfruits of them that sleep* (1 Cor. xv. 20), although some were resuscitated before Christ's resurrection, as in the case of Lazarus.

Reply Obj. 4. On account of these words, as Augustine

* *Ep. x. ad Paul. et Eustoch.*, now recognized as spurious.

relates (*De Civ. Dei*, xx.), certain heretics asserted that there will be a first resurrection of the dead that they may reign with Christ on earth for a thousand years; whence they were called *chiliasts* or *millenarians*. Hence Augustine says (*ibid.*) that these words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the spiritual resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their sins to the gift of grace: while the second resurrection is of bodies. The reign of Christ denotes the Church wherein not only martyrs but also the other elect reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in glory as regards all, special mention being made of the martyrs, because they especially reign after death who fought for the truth, even unto death. The number of a thousand years denotes not a fixed number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign with Christ, because the number 1,000 designates universality more than the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a cube resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for $10 \times 10 = 100$, and $100 \times 10 = 1{,}000$. Again in Ps. civ. 8, *The word which He commanded to a thousand, i.e.* all, *generations*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE TIME OF OUR RESURRECTION IS HIDDEN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when we know exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly, since *all things are measured by a certain period* (*De Generat.* ii.). Now the beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its end can also be known exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection and judgment. Therefore that time is not hidden.

Obj. 2. Further, It is stated (Apoc. xii. 6) that *the woman who represents the Church had a place prepared by God, that there she might feed* (Vulg.,—*they should feed her*) *a thousand two hundred sixty days*. Again (Dan. xii. 11), a certain fixed number of days is mentioned, which apparently signify years,

according to Ezech. iv. 6: *A day for a year, yea a day for a year I have appointed to thee.* Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly from Holy Writ.

Obj. 3. Further, The state of the New Testament was foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Now we know exactly the time wherein the state of the Old Testament endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time wherein the state of the New Testament will endure. But the state of the New Testament will last to the end of the world, wherefore it is said (Matth. xxviii. 20): *Behold I am with you . . . to the consummation of the world.* Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly.

On the contrary, That which is unknown to the angels will be much more unknown to men: because those things to which men attain by natural reason are much more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made to men save by means of the angels as Dionysius asserts (*Cœl. Hier.* iv.). Now the angels have no exact knowledge of that time, as appears from Matth. xxiv. 36: *Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of heaven.* Therefore that time is hidden from men.

Further, The apostles were more cognizant of God's secrets than others who followed them, because they had *the firstfruits of the spirit* (Rom. viii. 23),—*before others in point of time and more abundantly,* as a gloss observes. And yet when they questioned our Lord about this very matter, He answered them (Acts i. 7): *It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power.* Much more, therefore, is it hidden from others.

I answer that, As Augustine says (83 *Quæst. qu.* lviii.) *as to the last age of the human race, which begins from our Lord's coming and lasts until the end of the world, it is uncertain of how many generations it will consist: even so old age, which is man's last age, has no fixed time according to the measure of the other ages, since sometimes alone it lasts as long a time*

as all the others. The reason of this is because the exact length of future time cannot be known except either by revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous as stated above (A. 1). And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to happen at a fixed time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible from the movement of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is circular, it is for this very reason able by its nature to endure for ever: and consequently the time between this and the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason. Again it cannot be known by revelation, so that all may be on the watch and ready to meet Christ: and for this reason when the apostles asked Him about this Christ answered (Acts i. 7): *It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power,* whereby, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei,* xviii.): *He scatters the fingers of all calculators and bids them be still.* For what He refused to tell the apostles, He will not reveal to others: wherefore all those who have been misled to reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to be untruthful; for some, as Augustine says (*ibid.*), stated that from our Lord's Ascension to His last coming 400 years would elapse, others 500, others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is evident, as will likewise be the falseness of those who even now cease not to calculate.

Reply Obj. 1. When we know a thing's beginning and also its end it follows that its measure is known to us: wherefore if we know the beginning of a thing the duration of which is measured by the movement of the heaven, we are able to know its end, since the movement of heaven is known to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly movement is God's ordinance alone, which is unknown to us. Wherefore however much we may know its beginning, we are unable to know its end.

Reply Obj. 2. The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in the Apocalypse (*loc. cit.*) denote all the time during which the Church endures, and not any definite

number of years. The reason whereof is because the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted three years and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of days as the aforesaid number. Again the number of days appointed by Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the end of the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of Antichrist's preaching and the duration of his persecution.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the state of the New Testament in general is foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testament it does not follow that individuals correspond to individuals: especially since all the figures of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xviii.) answers certain persons who wished to liken the number of persecutions suffered by the Church to the number of the plagues of Egypt, in these words: *I do not think that the occurrences in Egypt were in their signification prophetic of these persecutions, although those who think so have shown nicety and ingenuity in adapting them severally the one to the other, not indeed by a prophetic spirit, but by the guess-work of the human mind, which sometimes reaches the truth and sometimes not.* The same remarks would seem applicable to the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means of such conjectures about the future foretold some things that were true, and in others was deceived.

Third Article.

whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection will not be at night-time. For the resurrection will not be *till the heavens be broken* (Job xiv. 12). Now when the heavenly movement ceases, which is signified by its breaking, there will be no time, neither night nor day. Therefore the resurrection will not be at night-time.

Obj. 2. Further, The end of a thing ought to be most per-

fect. Now the end of time will be then: wherefore it is said (Apoc. x. 6) that *time shall be no longer*. Therefore time ought to be then in its most perfect disposition and consequently it should be the daytime.

Obj. 3. Further, The time should be such as to be adapted to what is done therein: wherefore (John xiii. 30) the night is mentioned as being the time when Judas went out from the fellowship of the light. Now, all things that are hidden at the present time will then be made most manifest, because when the Lord shall come He *will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts* (1 Cor. iv. 5). Therefore it ought to be during the day.

On the contrary, Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Now Christ's resurrection was at night, as Gregory says in a homily for Easter (xxi. *in Ev.*). Therefore our resurrection will also be at night-time.

Further, The coming of our Lord is compared to the coming of a thief into the house (Luke xii. 39, 40). But the thief comes to the house at night-time. Therefore our Lord will also come in the night. Now, when He comes the resurrection will take place, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 2). Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time.

I answer that, The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 43). Nevertheless some assert with sufficient probability that it will be towards the twilight, the moon being in the east and the sun in the west; because the sun and moon are believed to have been created in these positions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether completed by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said that Christ arose at such an hour.

Reply Obj. 1. When the resurrection occurs, it will not be time but the end of time; because at the very instant that the heavens will cease to move the dead will rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be in the same position as they occupy now at any fixed hour: and accordingly it is said that the resurrection will be at this or that hour.

Reply Obj. 2. The most perfect disposition of time is said to be midday, on account of the light given by the sun. But then the city of God will need neither sun nor moon, because the glory of God will enlighten it (Apoc. xxii. 5). Wherefore in this respect it matters not whether the resurrection be in the day or in the night.

Reply Obj. 3. That time should be adapted to manifestation as regards the things that will happen then, and to secrecy as regards the fixing of the time. Hence either may happen fittingly, namely that the resurrection be in the day or in the night.

Fourth Article.

Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the resurrection will not happen suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection of the dead is foretold (Ezech. xxxvii. 7, 8) where it is written: *The bones came together . . . and I saw and behold the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin was stretched out over them, but there was no spirit in them.* Therefore the restoration of the bodies will precede in time their reunion with the souls, and thus the resurrection will not be sudden.

Obj. 2. Further, A thing does not happen suddenly if it require several actions following one another. Now the resurrection requires several actions following one another, namely the gathering of the ashes, the refashioning of the body, the infusion of the soul. Therefore the resurrection will not be sudden.

Obj. 3. Further, All sound is measured by time. Now the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 2). Therefore the resurrection will take time and will not happen suddenly.

Obj. 4. Further, No local movement can be sudden as stated in *De Sensu et Sensato,* vii. Now the resurrection requires local movement in the gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xv. 51, 52): *We shall all indeed rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye.* Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.

Further, Infinite power works suddenly. But the Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iv.): *Thou shalt believe in the resurrection to be wrought by the power of God*, and it is evident that this is infinite. Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.

I answer that, At the resurrection something will be done by the ministry of the angels, and something immediately by the power of God, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 3). Accordingly that which is done by the ministry of the angels will not be instantaneous, if by instant we mean an indivisible point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by instant we mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done immediately by God's power will happen suddenly, namely at the end of the time wherein the work of the angels will be done, because the higher power brings the lower to perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. Ezechiel spoke, like Moses, to a rough people, and therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days, in order that the uncultured people might be able to understand, although all things were made together according to Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* iv.), so Ezechiel expressed the various things that will happen in the resurrection, although they will all happen together in an instant.

Reply Obj. 2. Although these actions follow one another in nature, they are all together in time: because either they are together in the same instant, or one is in the instant that terminates the other.

Reply Obj. 3. The same would seem to apply to that sound as to the forms of the sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect in its last instant.

Reply Obj. 4. The gathering of the ashes which cannot be without local movement will be done by the ministry of the angels. Hence it will be in time though imperceptible on account of the facility of operation which is competent to the angels.

QUESTION LXXVIII.

OF THE TERM *WHEREFROM* OF THE RESURRECTION.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the term *wherefrom* of the resurrection; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether death is the term *wherefrom* of the resurrection in every case? (2) Whether ashes are, or dust? (3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER DEATH WILL BE THE TERM WHEREFROM OF THE RESURRECTION IN ALL CASES?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that death will not be the term *wherefrom* of the resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but shall be clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord *will come to judge the living and the dead.* Now this cannot refer to the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this distinction must refer to the previous time, and consequently all will not die before the judgment.

Obj. 2. Further, A natural and common desire cannot be empty and vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. v. 4) it is a common desire that *we would not be unclothed but clothed upon.* Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the resurrection.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Enchir.* cxv.) that the four last petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present

life: and one of them is: *Forgive us our debts* (Douay,—*trespasses*). Therefore the Church prays that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the Church's prayer cannot be void and not granted: *If you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it you* (Jo. xvi. 23). Therefore at some time of this life the Church will receive the remission of all debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound by the sin of our first parent is that we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time God will grant to the Church that men be born without original sin. But death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the world there will be some men who will not die: and so the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 4. Further, The wise man should always choose the shortest way. Now the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living to be transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them to die first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality. Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who shall be found living.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xv. 36): *That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die first,* and he is speaking of the resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.

Further, It is written (*ibid.* 22): *As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive.* Now all shall be made alive in Christ. Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from death.

I answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may be seen in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 43). However, the safer and more common opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and this for three reasons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent, that all who by the act of nature derive their origin from him should contract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors of death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture which foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not predicted properly except of that *which*

has fallen and perished, as the Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iv.). Thirdly, because it is more in harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature has incurred the defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality save by means of death. It is also in keeping with the order of nature for another reason, because, as it is stated in *Phys.* viii., text. 1, *the movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature*, just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the whole body: wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to move, so when the heavenly movement ceases nothing can remain living with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement. Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven comes to a standstill must depart from this life.

Reply Obj. 1. This distinction of the dead and the living does not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole preceding time, since all who are to be judged were living at some time, and dead at some time: but it applies to that particular time which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs of the judgment shall begin to appear.

Reply Obj. 2. The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void; but nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the desire whereby we would not be *unclothed*, but *clothed upon*, namely if that be possible: and this desire is called by some a *velleity*.

Reply Obj. 3. It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ is conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men.* Nor can it be said that they needed not this redemption, because it was

* See Editor's note at the beginning of Part III., Second Number.

granted to them that they should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was vouchsafed,—either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be healed in them (because so long as that sin remained they were unable to beget without communicating original sin),—or to nature itself which was healed. Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot be delivered from an evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in themselves the fruit of the Lord's prayer, unless all were born debtors and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it follow, if it can be asserted without error that some die not, that they are born without original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because God can of His mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by a past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punishment (Jo. viii.): and in like manner He can deliver from death those who have contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And thus it does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without original sin.

Reply Obj. 4. The shortest way is not always the one to be chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the end. It is not so here, as is clear from what we have said.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL WILL RISE AGAIN FROM ASHES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to Ps. xv. 10; Acts ii. 27, 31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.

Obj. 2. Further, The human body is not always burnt.

Yet a thing cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burnt. Therefore not all will rise again from ashes.

Obj. 3. Further, The body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death, according to the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 43), namely those who will be found living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.

Obj. 4. Further, The term *wherefrom* corresponds to the term *whereto*. Now the term *whereto* of the resurrection is not the same in the good as in the wicked: *We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed* (1 Cor. xv. 51). Therefore the term *wherefrom* is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes.

On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rom. v. 10, *For if when we were enemies*): *All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence: Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go.* Now all who shall rise again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb. Therefore all will rise again from ashes.

Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.

I answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown (A. 1) that all rise again from death prove also that at the general resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as holy writ foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of bodies (Phil. iii. 21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of the body, as appears from Gen. iii. 19, *Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go.**

* Vulg.,—*Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return.*

Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it first be dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure elements.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours as to the term *whereto*, but not as to the term *wherefrom*.

Reply Obj. 2. By ashes we mean all the remains that are left after the dissolution of the body,—for two reasons. First, because it was the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead, and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes* whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, in order to be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved into its primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by fire it is said to be reduced to ashes; wherefore the name of ashes is given to those things into which the human body is dissolved.

Reply Obj. 3. The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their prejacent matter.

Reply Obj. 4. Movement does not take its species from its term *wherefrom* but from its term *whereto*. Hence the resurrection of the saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term *whereto*, and not in respect of the term *wherefrom*. And it often happens that the term *whereto* is not the same, whereas the term *wherefrom* is the same,—for instance, a thing may be moved from blackness to whiteness and to pallor.

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXII., A. 3.

Third Article.

WHETHER THE ASHES FROM WHICH THE HUMAN BODY WILL BE RESTORED HAVE ANY NATURAL INCLINATION TOWARDS THE SOUL WHICH WILL BE UNITED TO THEM?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the ashes from which the human body will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the soul, they would stand in the same relation to that soul as other ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is to be united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from others: and this is false.

Obj. 2. Further, The body is more dependent on the soul than the soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad Lit.* xii.). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Job xx. 11): *His bones shall be filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in the dust.* But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.

On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into the very elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since then in the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine (*Enchir.* lxxxviii.): *The human body, although changed into the substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will in an instant return to that soul*

which erstwhile animated it, making it a living and growing man.

Further, To every natural inclination there corresponds a natural agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid ashes cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore there is not in them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.

I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this reason have a natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.

Hence the *Reply* to the *First Objection* is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul separated from the body remains in the same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the body, and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. These words of Job do not mean that the vices actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for the sins committed.

QUESTION LXXIX.

OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY.

(*In Three Articles.*)

IN the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern the good and wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those which concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality: and we shall inquire (1) about their identity; (2) about their integrity; (3) about their quality.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same? (2) Whether it will be the selfsame man? (3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the same parts in which they were before?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE RESURRECTION THE SOUL WILL BE REUNITED TO THE SAME IDENTICAL BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the same identical body at the resurrection, for *thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain* (1 Cor. xv. 37). Now the Apostle is there comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore the same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the resurrection.

Obj. 2. Further, To every form some matter is adapted

according to its condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now the body is compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to agent. Since then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the heavenly life to which it adhered while living in the world, or will be cast down into the life of the brutes, if it lived as a brute in this world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body, but either a heavenly or a brutish body.

Obj. 3. Further, After death, as stated above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 3), the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental parts into which the human body has been dissolved do not agree with the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as any other elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be described as identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the selfsame body if it be restored from these parts.

Obj. 4. Further, There cannot be numerical identity where there is numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the mixed body, which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its form, cannot be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where there is distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being, is differentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death, since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities from which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not return in identity.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xix. 26): *In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour* (Vulg.,—*my God*), where he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection, as appears from the preceding words: *In the last day I shall rise out of the earth.* Therefore the selfsame body will rise again.

Further, The Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iv.): *Resurrection is the second rising of that which has fallen.* But the body which we have now fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically.

I answer that, On this point the philosophers erred and certain modern heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways. First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as to the body to which it was reunited, for they held that this second union was not with the selfsame body that was laid aside in death, but with another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species. Of a different species when the soul while existing in the body had led a life contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after death from the body of a man into the body of some other animal to whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for instance into the body of a dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on account of robbery and violence, and so forth,—and into a body of the same species when the soul has led a good life in the body, and having after death experienced some happiness, after some centuries began to wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a human body. But this opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved,* or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being infused into the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it is united to various bodies. The second is that they held intellect not to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sensitive power is more acute in him on account of the excellence of his bodily complexion; and hence it was possible for them to assert that man's soul passes into the soul of a brute animal,

* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXVI., A. 1.

especially when the human soul has been habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are refuted by the Philosopher (*De Anima*, ii.), and in consequence of these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.

In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople, in his exposition of Job xix. 26, *In my flesh I shall see my God*, etc. Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to the same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which after death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.

Reply Obj. 1. A comparison does not apply to every particular, but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain that is born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition, since it was first sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the body will rise again identically the same, but of a different condition, since it was mortal and will rise in immortality.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul rising again and the soul living in this world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which is an accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising again differs, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls.

Reply Obj. 3. That which is understood as though it were in matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when that which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of *Physics* and in *De Substantia Orbis*, in the matter of things subject to generation

and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions, by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of the substantial form from matter, these dimensions still remain the same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions, whatever form it receive, is more identified with that which was generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any form whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the human body will be the same as that body's previous matter.

Reply Obj. 4. Even as a simple quality is not the substantial form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is in need of the form. Now the human body has no substantial form besides this form of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any previous substantial form, this would give it substantial being, and would establish it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be united to a body already established in the genus of substance, and thus the soul would be compared to the body as artificial forms are to their matter, in respect of their being established in the genus of substance by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philosophers refuted by the Philosopher (*De Anima*, ii., text. 4 *seq.*; i., text. 52). It would also follow that the human body and each of its parts would not retain their former names in the same sense, which is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher. Therefore since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental forms does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated in a previous reply (*ad* 2).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT WILL BE IDENTICALLY THE SAME MAN THAT SHALL RISE AGAIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that it will not be identically the same man that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (*De Gener.* ii.): *Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not repeated identically.* Now such is man's substance in his present state. Therefore after the change wrought by death the selfsame man cannot be repeated.

Obj. 2. Further, Where there is a distinction of human nature there is not the same identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are two men and not one man, since each has his own distinct human nature. Now the human nature of one who rises again is distinct from that which he has now. Therefore he is not the same identical man. The minor can be proved in two ways. First, because human nature which is the form of the whole is not both form and substance as the soul is, but is a form only. Now suchlike forms pass away into complete nonentity, and consequently they cannot be restored. Secondly, because human nature results from union of parts. Now the same identical union as that which was heretofore cannot be resumed, because repetition is opposed to identity, since repetition implies number, whereas identity implies unity, and these are incompatible with one another. But resurrection is a repeated union: therefore the union is not the same, and consequently there is not the same human nature nor the same man.

Obj. 3. Further, One same man is not several animals: wherefore if it is not the same animal it is not the same identical man. Now where sense is not the same, there is not the same animal, since animal is defined from the primary sense, namely touch. But sense, as it does not remain in the separated soul (as some maintain), cannot be resumed in identity. Therefore the man who rises again will not

be the same identical animal, and consequently he will not be the same man.

Obj. 4. Further, The matter of a statue ranks higher in the statue than the matter of a man does in man: because artificial things belong to the genus of substance by reason of their matter, but natural things by reason of their form, as appears from the Philosopher (*Phys.* ii., text. 8, *seq.*), and again from the Commentator (*De Anima*, ii.). But if a statue is remade from the same brass, it will not be the same identically. Therefore much less will it be identically the same man if he be reformed from the same ashes.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xix. 27): *Whom I myself shall see . . . and not another*, and he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection. Therefore the same identical man will rise again.

Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* viii.) that *to rise again is naught else but to live again.* Now unless the same identical man that died return to life, he would not be said to live again. Therefore he would not rise again, which is contrary to faith.

I answer that, The necessity of holding the resurrection arises from this,—that man may obtain the last end for which he was made; for this cannot be accomplished in this life, nor in the life of the separated soul, as stated above (Q. LXXV., AA. 1, 2): otherwise man would have been made in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was made. And since it behoves the end to be obtained by the selfsame thing that was made for that end, lest it appear to be made without purpose, it is necessary for the selfsame man to rise again; and this is effected by the selfsame soul being united to the selfsame body. For otherwise there would be no resurrection properly speaking, if the same man were not reformed. Hence to maintain that he who rises again is not the selfsame man is heretical, since it is contrary to the truth of Scripture which proclaims the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by movement or natural change. For he shows the difference between the recurrence that occurs in generation and corrup-

tion and that which is observed in the movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven by local movement returns to the beginning of its movement, since it has a moved incorruptible substance. On the other hand, things subject to generation and corruption return by generation to specific but not numerical identity, because from man blood is engendered, from blood seed, and so on until a man is begotten, not the selfsame man, but the same specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from air water, from water earth, whence fire is produced, not the selfsame fire, but the same in species. Hence it is clear that the argument, so far as the meaning of the Philosopher is concerned, is not to the point. We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul. For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the being which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share that being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and the being of the soul in the body are not distinct from one another, otherwise the union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently there has been no interruption in the substantial being of man, as would make it impossible for the selfsame man to return on account of an interruption in his being, as is the case with other things that are corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether, since their form remains not, and their matter remains under another being. Nevertheless neither does the selfsame man recur by natural generation, because the body of the man begotten is not composed of the whole body of his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct, and consequently his soul and the whole man.

Reply Obj. 2. There are two opinions about humanity and about any form of a whole. For some say that the form of the whole and the form of the part are really one and the same: but that it is called the form of the part inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and the form of the whole inasmuch as the whole specific nature results therefrom. According to

this opinion humanity is really nothing else than the rational soul: and so, since the selfsame rational soul is resumed, there will be the same identical humanity, which will remain even after death, albeit not under the aspect of humanity, because the composite does not derive the specific nature from a separated humanity. The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna's, according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of a part only, nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing both within itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or quiddity. Since then at the resurrection there will be the selfsame body, and the selfsame rational soul, there will be, of necessity, the same humanity. The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct form supervening form and matter; which is false: and the second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because union implies action or passion, and though there be a different union, this cannot prevent the identity of humanity, because the action and passion from which humanity resulted are not of the essence of humanity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a distinction of humanity: for it is clear that generation and resurrection are not the selfsame movement. Yet the identity of the rising man with the begotten man is not hindered for this reason: and in like manner neither is the identity of humanity prevented, if we take union for the relation itself: because this relation is not essential to but concomitant with humanity, since humanity is not one of those forms that are composition or order (*Phys.* ii., text. 13), as are the forms of things produced by art, so that if there be another distinct composition there is another distinct form of a house.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument affords a very good proof against those who held a distinction between the sensitive and rational souls in man: because in that case the sensitive soul in man would not be incorruptible, as neither is it in other animals; and consequently in the resurrection there

would not be the same sensitive soul, and consequently neither the same animal nor the same man. But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this question, because animal is defined from sense, i.e. the sensitive soul as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i.e. the sensitive power, we know its definition as from an accidental form that contributes more than any other to our knowledge of the quiddity (*De Anima*, i., text. 2). Accordingly after death there remains the sensitive soul, even as the rational soul, according to its substance: whereas the sensitive powers, according to some, do not remain. And since these powers are accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the animal's parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in fire.

Reply Obj. 4. A statue may be considered in two ways, either as a particular substance, or as something artificial. And since it is placed in the genus of substance by reason of its matter, it follows that if we consider it as a particular substance, it is the selfsame statue that is remade from the same matter. On the other hand, it is placed in the genus of artificial things inasmuch as it has an accidental form which, if the statue be destroyed, passes away also. Consequently it does not return identically the same, nor can the statue be identically the same. But man's form, namely the soul, remains after the body has perished: wherefore the comparison fails.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ASHES OF THE HUMAN BODY MUST NEEDS, BY THE RESURRECTION, RETURN TO THE SAME PARTS OF THE BODY THAT WERE DISSOLVED INTO THEM?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem necessary for the ashes of the human body to return, by the resurrection, to the same parts that were dissolved into them. For, according to the Philosopher, *as the whole soul is to the whole body, so is a part*

of the soul to a part of the body, as sight to the pupil (*De Anima*, ii., text. 9). Now it is necessary that after the resurrection the body be resumed by the same soul. Therefore it is also necessary for the same parts of the body to return to the same limbs, in which they were perfected by the same parts of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, Difference of matter causes difference of identity. But if the ashes return not to the same parts, each part will not be remade from the same matter of which it consisted before. Therefore they will not be the same identically. Now if the parts are different the whole will also be different, since parts are to the whole as matter is to form (*Phys.* ii., text. 3). Therefore it will not be the selfsame man; which is contrary to the truth of the resurrection.

Obj. 3. Further, The resurrection is directed to the end that man may receive the meed of his works. Now different parts of the body are employed in different works, whether of merit or of demerit. Therefore at the resurrection each part must needs return to its former state that it may be rewarded in due measure.

On the contrary, Artificial things are more dependent on their matter than natural things. Now in artificial things, in order that the same artificial thing be remade, from the same matter, there is no need for the parts to be brought back to the same position. Neither therefore is it necessary in man.

Further, Change of an accident does not cause a change of identity. Now the situation of parts is an accident. Therefore its change in a man does not cause a change of identity.

I answer that, In this question it makes a difference whether we ask what can be done without prejudice to identity, and what will be done for the sake of congruity. As regards the first it must be observed that in man we may speak of parts in two ways: first as of the various parts of a homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh, or the various parts of bone; secondly, as of various parts of various species of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone and flesh. Accordingly if it be said that one part of matter

will return to another part of the same species, this causes no change except in the position of the parts: and change of position of parts does not change the species in homogeneous wholes: and so if the matter of one part return to another part, this is nowise prejudicial to the identity of the whole. Thus is it in the example given in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 44), because a statue, after being remade, is identically the same, not as to its form, but as to its matter, in respect of which it is a particular substance, and in this way a statue is homogeneous, although it is not according to its artificial form. But if it be said that the matter of one part returns to another part of another species, it follows of necessity that there is a change not only in the position of parts, but also in their identity: yet so that the whole matter, or something belonging to the truth of human nature in one is transferred to another; but not if what was superfluous in one part is transferred to another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the identity of the whole is removed, if we speak of essential parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts, such as hair and nails, to which apparently Augustine refers (*De Civ. Dei*, xxii.). It is thus clear how the transference of matter from one part to another destroys the identity, and how it does not.

But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts will retain their position at the resurrection, especially as regards the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such as nails and hair.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers organic or heterogeneous parts, but not homogeneous or like parts.

Reply Obj. 2. A change in the position of the parts of matter does not cause a change of identity, although difference of matter does.

Reply Obj. 3. Operation, properly speaking, is not ascribed to the part but to the whole, wherefore the reward is due, not to the part but to the whole.

QUESTION LXXX.

OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein? (2) Whether the hair and nails will? (3) Whether the humours will? (4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human nature will rise again? (5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN BODY WILL RISE AGAIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that not all the members of the human body will rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair the means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing useless is done in the Divine works, and since the use of certain members is not fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the use of the genital members, for then they *shall neither marry, nor be married* (Matth. xxii. 30), it would seem that not all the members shall rise again.

Obj. 2. Further, The entrails are members: and yet they will not rise again. For they can neither rise full, since thus they contain impurities, nor empty, since nothing is

empty in nature. Therefore the members shall not all rise again.

Obj. 3. Further, The body shall rise again that it may be rewarded for the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a thief has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since the punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of the man. Therefore the members will not all rise again with man.

On the contrary, The other members belong more to the truth of human nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the resurrection according to the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 44). Much more therefore does this apply to the other members.

Further, *The works of God are perfect* (Deut. xxxii. 4). But the resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade perfect in all his members.

I answer that, As stated in *De Anima,* ii., *the soul stands in relation to the body not only as its form and end, but also as efficient cause.* For the soul is compared to the body as art to the thing made by art, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic. Magn.* vii. 11), and whatever is shown forth explicitly in the product of art is all contained implicitly and originally in the art. In like manner whatever appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally and, in a way, implicitly in the soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not be perfect, if its product lacked any of the things contained in the art, so neither could man be perfect, unless the whole that is contained enfolded in the soul be outwardly unfolded in the body, nor would the body correspond in full proportion to the soul. Since then at the resurrection it behoves man's body to correspond entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again except according to the relation it bears to the rational soul, it follows that man also must rise again perfect, seeing that he is thereby repaired in order that he may obtain his ultimate perfection. Consequently all the

members that are now in man's body must needs be restored at the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 1. The members may be considered in two ways in relation to the soul: either according to the relation of matter to form, or according to the relation of instrument to agent, since *the whole body is compared to the whole soul in the same way as one part is to another* (*De Anima*, ii., text. 9). If then the members be considered in the light of the first relationship, their end is not operation, but rather the perfect being of the species, and this is also required after the resurrection: but if they be considered in the light of the second relationship, then their end is operation. And yet it does not follow that when the operation fails the instrument is useless, because an instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show its virtue. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue of the soul's powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even though they never proceed to action, so that the wisdom of God be thereby glorified.

Reply Obj. 2. The entrails will rise again in the body even as the other members: and they will be filled not with vile superfluities but with goodly humours.

Reply Obj. 3. The acts whereby we merit are not the acts, properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man; even as the work of art is ascribed not to the instrument but to the craftsman. Therefore though the member which was cut off before a man's repentance did not co-operate with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet man himself merits that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his whole being serves God.

Second Article.

Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again in the human body. For just as hair and nails

result from the surplus of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will not rise again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and nails.

Obj. 2. Further, Of all the superfluities that are produced from food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again in the human body. Much less therefore will hair and nails.

Obj. 3. Further, Nothing is perfected by a rational soul that is not perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails are not perfected by a sensitive soul, for we do not feel with them according to *De Anima*, iii., text. 66. Therefore since the human body rises not again except because it is perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke xxi. 18): *A hair of your head shall not perish.*

Further, Hair and nails were given to man as an ornament. Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise again with all their adornment. Therefore they ought to rise again with the hair.

I answer that, The soul is to the animated body, as art is to the work of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to its instruments: wherefore an animated body is called an organic body. Now art employs certain instruments for the accomplishment of the work intended, and these instruments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal instruments, and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus the art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body, some are directed to the accomplishment of the soul's operations, for instance the heart, liver, hand, foot; while others are directed to the safe-keeping of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are in man for the protection of other parts. Consequently, although they do not belong to the primary perfection of the human body, they belong to the secondary

perfection: and since man will rise again with all the perfections of his nature, it follows that hair and nails will rise again in him.

Reply Obj. 1. Those superfluities are voided by nature, as being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of the human body. It is not so with those superfluities which nature reserves for the production of hair and nails which she needs for the protection of the members.

Reply Obj. 2. Seed is not required for the perfection of the individual, as hair and nails are, but only for the perfection of the species.

Reply Obj. 3. Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it is clear that they share in some operation, which would not be possible unless they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that they are perfected by the rational soul, although not so far as to share in the operation of sense, as neither do bones, and yet it is certain that these will rise again and that they belong to the integrity of the individual.

Third Article.

whether the humours will rise again in the body?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the humours will not rise again in the body. For it is written (1 Cor. xv. 50): *Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God.* Now blood is the chief humour. Therefore it will not rise again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and much less in others.

Obj. 2. Further, Humours are intended to make up for waste. Now after the resurrection there will be no waste. Therefore the body will not rise again with humours.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is in process of generation in the human body is not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the humours are still in process of generation because they are potentially flesh and bone. Therefore they are not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the human body

is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humours will not rise again.

On the contrary, Whatever enters into the constitution of the human body will rise again with it. Now this applies to the humours, as appears from the statement of Augustine (*De Spir. et Anima,* xv.) that *the body consists of functional members; the functional members of homogeneous parts; and the homogeneous parts of humours.* Therefore the humours will rise again in the body.

Further, Our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of Christ. Now in Christ's resurrection His blood rose again, else the wine would not now be changed into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar. Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in like manner the other humours.

I answer that, Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in those who take part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to the integrity of human nature must needs rise again in man. Now there is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the perfection of the individual,—either because it is on the way to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat, matter, and so forth,—or because it is directed by nature to the preservation of the species in some individual, either by the act of the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None of these humidities will rise again, because they do not belong to the perfection of the person rising again.

The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is directed thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the body, for instance the blood and the other humours which nature has directed to the members that are produced or nourished therefrom: and yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the body, and consequently will rise again

with the other parts of the body: while another kind of humidity is in transition from form to form, namely from the form of humour to the form of member. Humidities of this kind will not rise again, because after the resurrection each part of the body will be established in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Wherefore this humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a twofold state,—either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus it is called *ros*, namely the humidity that is found in the cavities of the smaller veins,—or as in the course of transformation and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it is called *cambium :* but in neither state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity is that which has already reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has already undergone transformation and become incorporate with the members. This is called *gluten*, and since it belongs to the substance of the members it will rise again just as the members will.

Reply Obj. 1. In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood do not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and blood, which are either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say with Augustine in his letter to Consentius (*Ep.* cxlvi.) that *flesh and blood here s gnify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and blood ;* wherefore the Apostle's words continue: *Neither shall corruption possess incorruption.*

*Reply Obj.*2. Just as the members that serve for generation will be after the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, and not for the operation accomplished now by them, so will the humours be in the body not to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity of human nature and to show forth its natural power.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as the elements are in the course of generation in relation to mixed bodies, because they are their matter, yet not so as to be always in transition when in the mixed body, so too are the humours in relation to the

members. And for this reason as the elements in the parts of the universe have definite forms, by reason of which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the perfection of the universe, so too the humours belong to the perfection of the human body, just as the other parts do, although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the other parts do, and although the elements have not perfect forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfection from God, not equally, but each one according to its mode, so too the humours are in some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as the more perfect parts.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHATEVER IN THE BODY BELONGED TO THE TRUTH OF HUMAN NATURE WILL RISE AGAIN IN IT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the truth of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is changed into the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of other animals will also rise again: which is inadmissible.

Obj. 2. Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human nature in him, as ours does in us. But Adam's rib will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since she was made from that rib. Therefore whatever belonged in man to the truth of human nature will not all rise again in him.

Obj. 3. Further, It is impossible for the same thing from different men to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in different men to belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a man were to partake of human flesh which would be changed into his substance. Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever belonged in him to the truth of human nature.

Obj. 4. Further, If it be said that not all the flesh partaken of belongs to the truth of human nature, and that consequently some of it may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other,—on the contrary: That which is derived from one's parents would especially seem to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of nothing but human flesh were to beget children, that which his child derives from him must needs be of the flesh of other men partaken of by his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves (*De Gen. Animal.* i.). Therefore what belongs to the truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human nature in other men of whose flesh his father had partaken.

Obj. 5. Further, If it be said that what was changed into seed was not that which belonged to the truth of human nature in the flesh of the men eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human nature,—on the contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely on embryos in which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the truth of human nature, since whatever is in them is derived from the parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that which belonged to the truth of human nature in the embryos—and after these have received a rational soul, the resurrection applies to them—must needs belong to the truth of human nature in the child begotten of that seed. And thus, since the same cannot rise again in two subjects, it will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise again in both of them.

On the contrary, Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by the rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in each one.

Further, If anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be taken from his body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now all imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection, especially in the elect, to whom it was promised (Luke xxi. 18) that not a hair of their head

should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him.

I answer that, Everything is related to truth in the same way as to being (*Met.* ii.), because a thing is true when it is as it appears to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna (*Met.* ii.) says that *the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably attached thereto.* Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth of human nature, because it belongs properly to the being of human nature, and this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true gold is what has the true form of gold whence gold derives its proper being. In order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on that question. For some have maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature, and that whatever belongs to the truth of human nature, all of it belonged to the truth of human nature when this was created; and that this multiplies by itself, so that it is possible for the seed whereof the child is begotten to be detached therefrom by the begetter, and that again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on; and that thus was the whole human race multiplied. Wherefore according to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment, although it seem to have the appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth of human nature.

Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation of which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the preservation and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human nature of the individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they assert that the truth of human nature, first and foremost, consists in the radical humour, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human

race was originally fashioned: and that what is changed from food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to the truth of human nature in this particular individual, but secondarily: and that nevertheless this can belong principally to the truth of human nature in another individual who is begotten of the seed of the former. For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either mingled with something belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the begetter, according to some, or without any such admixture, as others maintain. And thus the nutrimental humour in one becomes the radical humour in another. The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction in the human body does not require that any signate material part must needs remain throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one may take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to the species in it, albeit as regards what is material therein it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humour is not distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be called radical when it reaches the term of generation by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental, when it has not yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment. These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the Second Book (ii. *Sent.* D. 30); wherefore there is no need for repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is concerned. It must accordingly be observed that this question requires different answers according to these opinions. For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human nature, both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the due quantity of each individual, without taking into account that which is produced from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural

heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. Wherefore since at the resurrection it behoves human nature to be restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend to destroy the natural humour, there will be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity by being detached and multiplied. The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however, but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not belong to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires it for the perfection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humour is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this order, that what first belonged to the substance of a man's body, will all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly, and so on, as much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two reasons. First, because that which was added was intended to restore what was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to the truth of human nature to the same extent as that which came first. Secondly, because the addition of extraneous humour to the first radical humour results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher instances as an example (*De Gener.* i.) the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the wine becomes watery: so that although the second water be drawn

into the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to the wine. Even so that which is secondly changed from food into flesh does not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will rise again, but not the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.

The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature, because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing, that belongs to the truth of human nature merely on account of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that all the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated belong to the truth of human nature, as regards what they have of the species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of matter, since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while others take their place: wherefore the parts of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally, since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame. In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.

On the other hand, the third opinion agrees with the

second, because it holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently the third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again, not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two opinions agree.

Reply Obj. 1. A natural thing is what it is, not from its matter but from its form: wherefore, although that part of matter which at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The second opinion, however, grants this argument.

Reply Obj. 2. That rib did not belong to the perfection of the individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the species. Hence it will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten.

Reply Obj. 3. According to the first opinion it is easy to reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will rise again in the latter but not in the former. But according to the second and third opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of the species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in that wherein he was first, because in that he first was directed to the resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth of human

nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise again in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second its place is taken either by something of that which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any other food than human flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so far as the perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die before the perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither does the ebb and flow of parts.

Reply Obj. 4. According to the first opinion this argument is easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the surplus food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed whereof the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence, according to the rule already laid down (*ad* 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person born of the seed; while the remaining matter will rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product.

Reply Obj. 5. The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been added to the seminal substance from the substance of food, since the child is nourished in the mother's womb. Consequently on the supposition that a man partook of such food, and that some one were begotten of the surplus thereof, that which was in the seminal substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that seed; unless it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced, for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly rise again

in the first, the Divine power supplying deficiences in both. The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food: but there are many other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second Book (ii. *Sent.* D. 30; P. I., Q. CXIX., A. 2).

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHATEVER WAS MATERIALLY IN A MAN'S MEMBERS WILL ALL RISE AGAIN?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xxii.) quoted in the text (iv. *Sent.* D. 44). Much more therefore whatever was materially in the other members will all rise again.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. But the human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species but also the parts of matter will all rise again.

Obj. 3. Further, The body derives its totality from the same cause as it derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is quantity in respect of which it is divided. Therefore totality is ascribed to the body in respect of its parts of matter. If then all the parts of matter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise again: which is inadmissible.

On the contrary, The parts of matter are not permanent in the body but ebb and flow, as stated in *De Gener.* i. If, therefore, all the parts of matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body of one who rises again will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in quantity.

Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to partake of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to rise again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which belongs to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd.

I answer that, What is in man materially, is not directed to the resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human nature, because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed to the truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but not all, if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end would surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states, which opinion seems to me more probable than the others. Wherefore the whole of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality of matter. The second and first opinions, however, do not make this distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state that what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of totality of matter: while they differ in this that the first opinion maintains that nothing will rise again of that which was engendered from food, whereas the second holds that something, but not all, thereof will rise again, as stated above (A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1. Just as all that is in the other parts of the body will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and this is reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species, since it occupies another place and position in the body, and is under other parts of dimension: and there accrues something which does not cause growth, but serves to make up for waste by nourishing; and this is not reckoned as another part of the whole con-

sidered in relation to the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the body than that which was occupied by the part that has passed away: although it may be reckoned another part if we consider the totality of matter. The same applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the body; wherefore it must needs rise again, not however as regards the quantity of hair, lest it should be immoderate, but it will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when something will be lacking to the other parts, for then it will be possible for this to be supplied from the surplus of hair.

Reply Obj. 2. According to the third opinion parts of species are the same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not make this distinction (*De Gener.* i.) in order to distinguish different parts, but in order to show that the same parts may be considered both in respect of species, as to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the rational soul except in so far as it is under such a form, and consequently by reason thereof it is directed to the resurrection. But the first and second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of species and parts of matter say that although the rational soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts of species, wherefore they are not equally directed to the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 3. In the matter of things subject to generation and corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before the reception of the substantial form. Consequently division which is made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form; wherefore division that is made in reference to definite quantity regards the species especially when definite position of parts belongs to the essence of the species, as in the human body.

QUESTION LXXXI.

OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must now consider the quality of those who rise again. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether all will rise again in the youthful age? (2) Whether they will be of equal stature? (3) Whether all will be of the same sex? (4) Whether they will rise again to the animal life?

First Article.

WHETHER ALL WILL RISE AGAIN OF THE SAME AGE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that all will not rise again of the same, namely the youthful age. Because God will take nothing pertaining to man's perfection from those who rise again, especially from the blessed. Now age pertains to the perfection of man, since old age is the age that demands reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again of a youthful age.

Obj. 2. Further, Age is reckoned according to the length of past time. Now it is impossible for past time not to have passed. Therefore it is impossible for those who were of greater age to be brought back to a youthful age.

Obj. 3. Further, That which belonged most to the truth of human nature in each individual will especially rise again in him. Now the sooner a thing was in man the more would it seem to have belonged to the truth of human nature, because in the end, through the strength of the species being weakened the human body is likened to watery

wine according to the Philosopher (*De Gener.* i.). Therefore if all are to rise again of the same age, it is more fitting that they should rise again in the age of childhood.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. iv. 13): *Until we all meet . . . unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ.* Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of thirty years, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei,* xxii.). Therefore others also will rise again of a youthful age.

Further, Man will rise again at the most perfect stage of nature. Now human nature is at the most perfect stage in the age of youth. Therefore all will rise again of that age.

I answer that, Man will rise again without any defect of human nature, because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will He restore it without defect. Now human nature has a twofold defect. First, because it has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection. Secondly, because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfection. The first defect is found in children, the second in the aged: and consequently in each of these human nature will be brought by the resurrection to the state of its ultimate perfection which is in the youthful age, at which the movement of growth terminates, and from which the movement of decrease begins.

Reply Obj. 1. Old age calls for reverence, not on account of the state of the body which is at fault; but on account of the soul's wisdom which is taken for granted on account of its being advanced in years. Wherefore in the elect there will remain the reverence due to old age on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but the defect of old age will not be in them.

Reply Obj. 2. We speak of age not as regards the number of years, but as regards the state which the human body acquires from years. Hence Adam is said to have been formed in the youthful age on account of the particular condition of body which he had at the first day of his formation. Thus the argument is not to the point.

Reply Obj. 3. The strength of the species is said to be more perfect in a child than in a young man, as regards the ability to transform nourishment in a certain way, even as it is more perfect in the seed than in the mature man. In youth, however, it is more perfect as regards the term of completion. Wherefore that which belonged principally to the truth of human nature will be brought to that perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humours have not yet reached their ultimate disposition.

Second Article.

Whether all will rise again of the same stature?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that all will rise again of the same stature. For just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by the quantity of time. Now the quantity of time will be reduced to the same measure in all, since all will rise again of the same age. Therefore the dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the same measure in all, so that all will rise again of the same stature.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (*De Anima*, ii. 41) that *all things of the same nature have a certain limit and measure of size and growth.* Now this limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity as well as all the other accidents ought to agree. Therefore since all men have the same specific form, there should be the same measure of quantity in respect of matter in all, unless an error should occur. But the error of nature will be set right at the resurrection. Therefore all will rise again of the same stature.

Obj. 3. Further, It will be impossible for man in rising again to be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power which first formed his body; for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater quantity by the power of nature will never rise again of a greater quantity, which is false. Therefore that quantity must needs be proportionate to the

power which will restore the human body by the resurrection, and to the matter from which it is restored. Now the selfsame, namely the Divine, power will restore all bodies; and all the ashes from which the human bodies will be restored are equally disposed to receive the action of that power. Therefore the resurrection of all men will bring them to the same quantity: and so the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, Natural quantity results from each individual's nature. Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the resurrection. Therefore neither will its natural quantity. But all are not of the same natural quantity. Therefore all will not rise again of the same stature.

Further, Human nature will be restored by resurrection unto glory or unto punishment. But there will not be the same quantity of glory or punishment in all those who rise again. Neither therefore will there be the same quantity of stature.

I answer that, At the resurrection human nature will be restored not only in the selfsame species but also in the selfsame individual: and consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not only to the specific but also to the individual nature. Now the specific nature has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor fails without error, and yet this quantity has certain degrees of latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure; and each individual in the human species aims at some degree of quantity befitting his individual nature within the bounds of that latitude, and reaches it at the end of his growth, if there has been no error in the working of nature, resulting in the addition of something to or the subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity: the measure whereof is gauged according to the proportion of heat as expanding, and of humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the same power. Therefore all will not rise again of the same quantity, but each one will rise again of that quantity which would have been his at the end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed: and the Divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking in man.

Reply Obj. 1. It has already been explained (A. 1, *ad* 2) that all are said to rise again of the same age, not as though the same length of time were befitting to each one, but because the same state of perfection will be in all, which state is indifferent to a great or small quantity.

Reply Obj. 2. The quantity of a particular individual corresponds not only to the form of the species, but also to the nature or matter of the individual: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3. The quantity of those who will be raised from the dead is not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter does not belong to the power of the body, —nor to the ashes, as to the state in which they are before the resurrection,—but to nature which the individual had at first. Nevertheless if the formative power on account of some defect was unable to effect the due quantity that is befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply the defect at the resurrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by immoderate size have exceeded the due bounds of nature.

Third Article.

whether all will rise again of the male sex?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all will rise again of the male sex. For it is written (Ephes. iv. 13) that we shall all meet *unto a perfect man*, etc. Therefore there will be none but the male sex.

Obj. 2. Further, In the world to come all pre-eminence will cease, as a gloss observes on 1 Cor. xv. 24. Now woman is subject to man in the natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in the male sex.

Obj. 3. Further, That which is produced incidentally and beside the intention of nature will not rise again, since all error will be removed at the resurrection. Now the female sex is produced beside the intention of nature, through a fault in the formative power of the seed, which is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male form: wherefore

the Philosopher says (*De Animal.* xvi., i.e. *De Generat. Animal.* ii.) that *the female is a misbegotten male.* Therefore the female sex will not rise again.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei,* xxii.): *Those are wiser, seemingly, who doubt not that both sexes will rise again.*

Further, At the resurrection God will restore man to what He made him at the creation. Now He made woman from the man's rib (Gen. ii. 22). Therefore He will also restore the female sex at the resurrection.

I answer that, Just as, considering the nature of the individual, a different quantity is due to different men, so also, considering the nature of the individual, a different sex is due to different men. Moreover, this same diversity is becoming to the perfection of the species, the different degrees whereof are filled by this very difference of sex and quantity. Wherefore just as men will rise again of various stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And though there be difference of sex there will be no shame in seeing one another, since there will be no lust to invite them to shameful deeds which are the cause of shame.

Reply Obj. 1. When it is said: We shall all meet *Christ unto a perfect man,* this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of soul which will be in all, both men and women.

Reply Obj. 2. Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty of nature, as regards both vigour of soul and strength of body. After the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the begetting of a woman is beside the intention of a particular nature, it is in the intention of universal nature, which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will any defect result from sex as stated above (*ad* 2).

Fourth Article.

Whether all will rise again to animal life?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that they will rise again to the animal life, or in other words that they will make use of the acts of the nutritive and generative powers. For our resurrection will be conformed to Christ's. But Christ is said to have ate after His resurrection (John xxi., Luke xxiv). Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in like manner beget.

Obj. 2. Further, The distinction of sexes is directed to generation; and in like manner the instruments which serve the nutritive power are directed to eating. Now man will rise again with all these. Therefore he will exercise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers.

Obj. 3. Further, The whole man will be beatified both in soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 7), consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must needs be that all the powers of the soul and all the members should have their respective acts after the resurrection. And so the same conclusion follows as above.

Obj. 4. Further, After the resurrection there will be perfect joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since *happiness* according to Boëthius *is a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods* (*De Consol.* iii.), and the perfect is that which lacks nothing. Since then there is much pleasure in the act of the generative and nutritive powers it would seem that such acts belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in others, who will have less spiritual bodies.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxii. 30): *In the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married.*

Further, Generation is directed to supply the defect resulting from death, and to the multiplication of the human race: and eating is directed to make up for waste, and to increase quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the

human race will already have the number of individuals preordained by God, since generation will continue up to that point. In like manner each man will rise again in due quantity; neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man. Therefore the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void of purpose.

I answer that, The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of those things that belong to his nature, since man can attain to this in his present state of life by the action of natural causes; but the necessity of the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate perfection, which consists in his reaching his ultimate end. Consequently those natural operations which are directed to cause or preserve the primary perfection of human nature will not be in the resurrection: such are the actions of the animal life in man, the action of the elements on one another, and the movement of the heavens; wherefore all these will cease at the resurrection. And since to eat, drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life, being directed to the primary perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 1. When Christ partook of that meal, His eating was an act, not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the resurrection, but of power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with His disciples. There will be no need of such proof at the general resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence Christ is said to have ate by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that a *dispensation is a relaxation of the general law:* because Christ made an exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2. The distinction of sexes and the difference of members will be for the restoration of the perfection of human nature both in the species and in the individual.

Hence it does not follow that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal operations.

Reply Obj. 3. The aforesaid operations do not belong to man as man, as also the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* x. 7), wherefore the happiness of the human body does not consist therein. But the human body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is man, inasmuch as the body will be subject to reason.

Reply Obj. 4. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 12, x. 5), the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are applied to man for the removal of weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so far as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they were real pleasures: just as a man whose taste is vitiated delights in things which are not delightful to the healthy. Consequently it does not follow that such pleasures as these belong to the perfection of beatitude, as the Jews and Turks maintain, and certain heretics known as the Chiliasts asserted; who, moreover, according to the Philosopher's teaching, would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none but spiritual pleasures are pleasures simply, and to be sought for their own sake; wherefore these alone are requisite for beatitude.

QUESTION LXXXII.

OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again, and (1) the impassibility of their bodies: (2) their subtlety: (3) their agility: (4) their clarity. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether at the resurrection the saints will rise again impassible in body? (2) Whether all will be equally impassible? (3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies insensible? (4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BODIES OF THE SAINTS WILL BE IMPASSIBLE AFTER THE RESURRECTION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be impassible after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible. But man, after the resurrection, will be *a mortal rational animal,* for such is the definition of man, which will never be dissociated from him. Therefore the body will be passible.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is in potentiality to have the form of another thing is passible in relation to something else; for this is what is meant by being passive to another thing (*De Gener.* i.). Now the bodies of the saints will be in potentiality to the form of another thing after the resurrec-

tion; since matter, according as it is under one form, does not lose its potentiality to another form. But the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common with the elements, because they will be restored out of the same matter of which they are now composed. Therefore they will be in potentiality to another form, and thus will be passible.

Obj. 3. Further, According to the Philosopher (*De Gener.* i.), contraries have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore they will be passible.

Obj. 4. Further, In the human body the blood and humours will rise again, as stated above (Q. LXXX., AA. 3, 4). Now, sickness and suchlike passions arise in the body through the antipathy of the humours. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be passible after the resurrection.

Obj. 5. Further, Actual defect is more inconsistent with perfection than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely potential defect. Since then there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they were in Christ, it would seem that their perfections will not suffer, if we grant their bodies to be passible.

On the contrary, Everything passible is corruptible, because increase of passion results in loss of substance.* Now the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the resurrection, according to 1 Cor. xv. 42, *It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption.* Therefore they will be impassible.

Further, The stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is written (1 Cor. xv. 43): *It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power.* Therefore they will be impassible.

I answer that, We speak of a thing being *passive* in two ways.† First in a broad sense, and thus every reception is called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to the

* Aristotle, *Topic.* vi. 1. † Cf. I.-II., Q. XXII., A. 1.

receiver and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. The glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the removal of this kind of passion, since nothing pertaining to perfection is to be removed from them. In another way we use the word *passive* properly, and thus the Damascene defines passion (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 22) as being *a movement contrary to nature.* Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its operation. The reason of this is that whatever is patient is drawn to the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to itself, so that, therefore, the patient as such is drawn beyond its own bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly taking passion in its proper sense there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the saints after resurrection; wherefore they are said to be impassible.

The reason however of this impassibility is assigned differently by different persons. Some ascribe it to the condition of the elements, which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the elements will remain then, as to substance, yet that they will be deprived of their active and passive qualities. But this does not seem to be true: because the active and passive qualities belong to the perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored without them in the body of the man that rises again, they would be less perfect than now. Moreover since these qualities are the proper accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be removed. Wherefore others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of their proper activities, the Divine power so doing for the preservation of the human body. This however would seem to be untenable, since the action and passion of the active and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according as one or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ in their respective complexions, and this must apply to the bodies of those who rise again, for they will contain flesh and bones and like parts, all of

which demand different complexions. Moreover, according to this, impassibility could not be one of their gifts, because it would not imply a disposition in the impassible substance, but merely an external preventive to passion, namely the power of God, which might produce the same effect in a human body even in this state of life. Consequently others say that in the body itself there will be something preventing the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth* or heavenly body, which they maintain enters into the composition of a human body, to the effect of blending the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for the rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account of the preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth body will predominate, so that the human body will be made impassible in likeness to the heavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human body, as was proved above (ii. *Sent.* D. 12, Q. I., A. 1). Moreover it is absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly body, should endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the impassibility of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to Christ's power the transformation of the human body, because *such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly* (1 Cor. xv. 48), and *He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto Himself* (Phil. iii. 21). And again, a heavenly nature cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its elemental nature which is passible by reason of its essential constituents. Consequently we must say otherwise that all passion results from the agent overcoming the patient, else it would not draw it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome patient except through the weakening of the hold which the form

* The other four being the elements. This fifth element was known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which they held heavenly bodies to be formed.

of the patient has over its matter, if we speak of the passion which is against nature, for it is of passion in this sense that we are speaking now: for matter is not subject to one of two contraries, except through the cessation or at least the diminution of the hold which the other contrary has on it Now the human body and all that it contains will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will be impossible for the glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to the disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul; and consequently those bodies will be impassible.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Anselm (*Cur Deus Homo*, ii. 11), *mortal is included in the philosophers' definition of man, because they did not believe that the whole man could be ever immortal,* for they had no experience of man otherwise than in this state of mortality. Or we may say that since, according to the Philosopher (*Met.* vii., viii.), essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes employ accidental differences in order to signify essential differences from which the accidental differences result. Hence *mortal* is put in the definition of man, not as though mortality were essential to man, but because that which causes passibility and mortality in the present state of life, namely composition of contraries, is essential to man, but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul over the body.

Reply Obj. 2. Potentiality is twofold, tied and free: and this is true not only of active but also of passive potentiality. For the form ties the potentiality of matter, by determining it to one thing, and it is thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible things form does not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so as to prevent it from sometimes receiving a disposition contrary to the form through some passion. But in the saints after the resurrection, the soul will have complete dominion over the body, and it will be altogether impossible for it to lose this dominion, because it will be immutably subject to God, which was not the case in the state of innocence. Consequently

those bodies will retain substantially the same potentiality as they have now to another form; yet that potentiality will remain tied by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it will never be realized by actual passion.

Reply Obj. 3. The elemental qualities are the instruments of the soul, as stated in *De Anima*, ii., text. 38, *seq.*, for the heat of fire in an animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the soul's power. When, however, the principal agent is perfect, and there is no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument, except in accordance with the disposition of the principal agent. Consequently in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection, no action or passion will result from the elemental qualities that is contrary to the disposition of the soul which has the preservation of the body in view.

Reply Obj. 4. According to Augustine (*Ep. ad Consent.* cv.) *the Divine power is able to remove* whatever qualities He will *from this visible and tangible body, other qualities remaining.* Hence even as in a certain respect *He deprived the flames of the Chaldees' furnace of the power to burn, since the bodies of the children were preserved without hurt, while in another respect that power remained, since those flames consumed the wood, so will He remove passibility from the humours while leaving their nature unchanged.* It has been explained in the Article how this is brought about.

Reply Obj. 5. The scars of wounds will not be in the saints, nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs of the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake of justice and faith: so that this will increase their own and others' joy (cf. P. III., Q. LIV., A. 4, *ad* 3). Hence Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xxii. 20): *We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall see them, for this will not make them less comely but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue.* Nevertheless those martyrs who have been maimed and deprived of their

limbs will not be without those limbs in the resurrection of the dead, for to them it is said (Luke xxi. 18): *A hair of your head shall not perish.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL WILL BE EQUALLY IMPASSIBLE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a gloss on 1 Cor. xv. 42, *It is sown in corruption,* says that *all have equal immunity from suffering.* Now the gift of impassibility consists in immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible.

Obj. 2. Further, Negations are not subject to be more or less. Now impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore it cannot be greater in one subject than in another.

Obj. 3. Further, A thing is more white if it have less admixture of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible.

On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since impassibility is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in others.

Further, Impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the latter will not be equal in all, according to 1 Cor. xv. 41. Therefore neither will impassibility be equal in all.

I answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself, since it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. On the other hand, if we consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable enjoyment of God. Consequently in one

who enjoys God more perfectly, there is a greater cause of impassibility.

Reply Obj. 1. This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself and not in relation to its cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Although negations and privations considered in themselves are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to increase and diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is said to be more darksome from having more and greater obstacles to light.

Reply Obj. 3. Some things increase not only by receding from their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases. Consequently impassibility also is greater in one subject than in another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one.

Third Article.

Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (*De Anima*, ii., text. 118), *sensation is a kind of passion.* But the glorified bodies will be impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation.

Obj. 2. Further, Natural alteration precedes spiritual* alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. Now glorified bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will not be subject to natural alteration. Therefore they will not be subject to spiritual alteration which is requisite for sensation.

Obj. 3. Further, Whenever actual sensation is due to a new perception, there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no new judgment, because *our thoughts will not then be changeable*, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv. 16). Therefore there will be no actual sensation.

* *Animalem*, as though it were derived from *animus*—the mind. Cf. P. I.-II., Q. L., A. 1, 3m; Q. LII., A. 1, 3m.

Obj. 4. Further, When the act of one of the soul's powers is intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will be supremely intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating God. Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation whatever.

On the contrary, It is written (*Apoc.* i. 7): *Every eye shall see Him.* Therefore there will be actual sensation.

Further, According to the Philosopher (*De Anima,* i.), *the animate is distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement.* Now there will be actual movement since they *shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds* (Wis. iii. 7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation.

I answer that, All are agreed that there is some sensation in the bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the resurrection would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible body is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described as half-life.* But there is a difference of opinion as to the mode of sensation.

For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and consequently not susceptible to strange impressions, and much less so than the heavenly bodies, because they will have actual sensations, not by receiving species from sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be a passive power as the Philosopher proves (*De Anima,* ii., text. 51, 54). Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection, were to have sensations by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a passive but an active power, and thus it would not be the same specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power bestowed on them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive power never becomes active. Consequently others say

* This is what Aristotle says: *The good and the bad are in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy* (*Ethic.* i. 13).

that the senses will be actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as now the higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower powers will then receive from the higher. But this mode of reception does not result in real sensation, because every passive power, according to its specific nature, is determined to some special active principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to which it is said to be the power. Wherefore since the proper active principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation. Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations. Consequently we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must, however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when a sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a spiritual mode of being, when, namely, the species or the intention of a quality, and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil receives the species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white. Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation, properly speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but without matter; that is to say without the material *being* which the species had outside the soul (*De Anima*, ii., text. 121). This reception transmutes the nature of

the recipient, because in this way the quality is received according to its material *being*. Consequently this kind of reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the nature of the recipient.

Reply Obj. 1. As already explained, by this passion that takes place in actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception of species, the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is perfected by a spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion.

Reply Obj. 2. Every subject of passion receives the action of the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that is naturally adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the spiritual alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If however a thing be naturally adapted to be altered only with a spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is altered naturally. For instance the air is not receptive of colour, according to its natural being, but only according to its spiritual being, wherefore in this way alone is it altered: whereas, on the contrary, inanimate bodies are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural alteration, and consequently there will be only spiritual alteration.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as there will be new reception of species in the organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common sense: but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect; such is the case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying of Augustine, that *there our thoughts will not be changeable*, refers to the thoughts of the intellectual part: therefore it is not to the point.

Reply Obj. 4. When one of two things is the type of the other, the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its attention to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not less but more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the colours of urine. And

since God is apprehended by the saints as the type of all things that will be done or known by them, their attention to perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else will nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for such an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect, one will be able to operate intensely without thereby hindering the operation of another power even as it was with Christ.

Fourth Article.

Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in act?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all the senses are not in act there. For touch is the first of all the senses (*De Anima*, ii.). But the glorified body will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of touch becomes actual by the alteration of an animal body by some external body preponderating in some one of the active or passive qualities which touch is capable of discerning: and such an alteration will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act there.

Obj. 2. Further, The sense of taste assists the action of the nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such action, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 4). Therefore taste would be useless there.

Obj. 3. Further, Nothing will be corrupted after the resurrection because the whole creature will be invested with a certain virtue of incorruption. Now the sense of smell cannot have its act without some corruption having taken place, because smell is not perceived without a volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the sense of smell is not there in its act.

Obj. 4. Further, Hearing assists teaching (*De Sensu et Sensato*, i.). But the blessed, after the resurrection, will require no teaching by means of sensible objects, since they will be filled with Divine wisdom by the very vision of God. Therefore hearing will not be there.

Obj. 5. Further, Seeing results from the pupil receiving the species of the thing seen. But after the resurrection this will be impossible in the blessed. Therefore there will be no actual seeing there, and yet this is the most noble of the senses. The minor is proved thus:—That which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a visible species; and consequently a mirror placed under the sun's rays does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil like the whole body will be endowed with clarity. Therefore it will not receive the image of a coloured body.

Obj. 6. Further, According to the science of perspective, whatever is seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply to the glorified bodies. Therefore they will not have actual sense of sight. The minor is proved thus: Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen from a greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that the angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object. Therefore if the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things within a certain distance, and that consequently it does not see a thing from a greater distance than we see now: and this would seem very absurd. And thus it would seem that the sense of sight will not be actual in glorified bodies.

On the contrary, A power conjoined to its act is more perfect than one not so conjoined. Now human nature in the blessed will be in its greatest perfection. Therefore all the senses will be actual there.

Further, The sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than the body is. But the body will be rewarded or punished on account of the merits or demerits of the soul. Therefore all the senses in the blessed will also be rewarded, and in the wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure

and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say that in the glorified bodies there will be all the sensitive powers, but that only two senses will be in act, namely touch and sight; nor will this be owing to defective senses, but from lack of medium and object; and that the senses will not be useless, because they will conduce to the integrity of human nature and will show forth the wisdom of their Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the medium in these senses is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium is the air, and this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (*De Anima,* ii., text. 76, 97). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium in contact, since taste is a kind of touch (*ibid.* text. 28, 94). Smell also which is the object of the sense of smell will be there, since the Church sings that the bodies of the saints will be a most sweet smell. There will also be vocal praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on Ps. cxlix. 6, *The high praises of God shall be in their mouth,* that *hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise God.* The same is had on the authority of a gloss on 2 Esdr. xii. 27, *With singing and with cymbals.* Wherefore, according to others we must say that smelling and hearing will be in act there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what we have said (Q. LXXXI., A. 4): unless perchance we say that there will be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some neighbouring humour.

Reply Obj. 1. The qualities perceived by the touch are those which constitute the animal body. Wherefore the body of an animal has, through its tangible qualities according to the present state of life, a natural aptitude to be affected with a natural and spiritual alteration by the object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to be the most material of the senses, since it has a greater measure of material alteration connected with it. Yet material alteration is only accidentally related to the act of sensation which

is effected by a spiritual alteration. Consequently the glorified bodies, which by reason of their impassibility are immune from natural alteration, will be subject only to spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it was with the body of Adam, which could neither be burnt by fire, nor pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such things.

Reply Obj. 2. Taste, in so far as it is the perception of food, will not be in act; but perhaps it will be possible in so far as it is cognizant of flavours in the way mentioned above.

Reply Obj. 3. Some have considered smell to be merely a volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true; which is evident from the fact that vultures hasten to a corpse on perceiving the odour from a very great distance, whereas it would be impossible for an evaporation to travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though the whole corpse were to be dissolved into vapour. This is confirmed by the fact that sensible objects at an equal distance exercise their influence in all directions: so that smell affects the medium sometimes, and the instrument of sensation with a spiritual alteration, without any evaporation reaching the organ. That some evaporation should be necessary is due to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed with humidity; wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to take place in order for the smell to be perceived. But in the glorified bodies odour will be in its ultimate perfection, being nowise hampered by humidity: wherefore it will affect the organ with a spiritual alteration, like the odour of a volatile evaporation. Such will be the sense of smell in the saints, because it will not be hindered by any humidity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences of odours, as happens with us now on account of the very great humidity of the brain, but also of the minutest differences of odours.

Reply Obj. 4. In heaven there will be vocal praise (though indeed some think otherwise), and in the blessed it will affect the organ of hearing by a merely spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for the sake of learning whereby they may acquire knowledge, but for the sake of the perfection of the

sense and for the sake of pleasure. How it is possible for the voice to give sound there, we have already stated (ii. *Sent.* D. 2; Q. II., A. 2, *ad* 5).

Reply Obj. 5. The intensity of light does not hinder the spiritual reception of the image of colour, so long as the pupil retains its diaphanous nature; thus it is evident that however much the air be filled with light, it can be the medium of sight, and the more it is illumined, the more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there be a fault through defective sight. The fact that the image of an object placed in opposition to a mirror directly opposite the sun's rays does not appear therein, is not due to the reception being hindered, but to the hindering of reflection: because for an image to appear in a mirror it must needs be thrown back by an opaque body, for which reason lead is affixed to the glass in a mirror. The sun's ray dispels this opacity so that no image can appear in the mirror. But the clarity of a glorified body does not destroy the diaphanous nature of the pupil, since glory does not destroy nature; and consequently the greatness of clarity in the pupil renders the sight keen rather than defective.

Reply Obj. 6. The more perfect the sense the less does it require to be altered in order to perceive its object. Now the smaller the angle at which the sight is affected by the visible object, the less is the organ altered. Hence it is that a stronger sight can see from a distance more than a weaker sight; because the greater the distance the smaller the angle at which a thing is seen. And since the sight of a glorified body will be most perfect it will be able to see by the very least alteration (of the organ); and consequently at a very much smaller angle than now, and therefore from a much greater distance.

QUESTION LXXXIII.

OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED.

(*In Six Articles.*)

We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body? (2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with another not glorified body? (3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place? (4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another glorified body? (5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to itself? (6) Whether a glorified body is palpable?

First Article.

WHETHER SUBTLETY IS A PROPERTY OF THE GLORIFIED BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of nature, even as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun, which is the greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety be a property of the glorified body, it would seem that the glorified body will be more subtle than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it will be more subtle than the wind and the air, which was condemned by Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he relates (*Moral.* xiv.).

Obj. 2. Further, As heat and cold are simple qualities of bodies, *i.e.* of the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and

other qualities of the elements will not be intensified in the glorified bodies any more than they are now, in fact they will be more reduced to the mean. Neither, therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now.

Obj. 3. Further, Subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity of matter, wherefore bodies that have less matter within equal dimensions are said to be more subtle; as fire in comparison with air, and air as compared with water, and water as compared with earth. But there will be as much matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will their dimensions be greater. Therefore they will not be more subtle then than now.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xv. 44): *It is sown a corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual, i.e.* a spirit-like, *body.* But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses all bodily subtlety. Therefore the glorified bodies will be most subtle.

Further, The more subtle a body is the more exalted it is. But the glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore they will be most subtle.

I answer that, Subtlety takes its name from the power to penetrate. Hence it is said in *De Gener.* ii. that *a subtle thing fills all the parts and the parts of parts.* Now that a body has the power of penetrating may happen through two causes. First, through smallness of quantity, especially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of length, because penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not an obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of matter, wherefore rarity is synonymous with subtlety: and since in rare bodies the form is more predominant over the matter, the term *subtlety* has been transferred to those bodies which are most perfectly subject to their form, and are most fully perfected thereby: thus we speak of subtlety in the sun and moon and like bodies, just as gold and similar things may be called subtle, when they are most perfectly complete in their specific being and power. And since incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, the term *subtlety* is applied to them, not only by reason of their substance, but also on account of their power. For just as a

subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason that it reaches to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect said to be subtle because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic principles and the hidden natural properties of a thing. In like manner a person is said to have subtle sight, because he is able to perceive by sight things of the smallest size: and the same applies to the other senses. Accordingly people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified bodies in different ways.

For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (*De Civ. Dei*, xiii. 12), ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances are said to be subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be transformed into a spirit, and that for this reason the Apostle describes as being *spiritual* the bodies of those who rise again (1 Cor. xv. 44). But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no community of matter between them: and Boëthius proves this (*De duab. Nat.*). Secondly, because, if this were possible, and one's body were changed into a spirit, one would not rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of a soul and body. Thirdly, because if this were the Apostle's meaning, just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural (*animale*) bodies, as being changed into souls (*animam*): and this is clearly false.

Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means of rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air or the wind, as Gregory relates (*Moral.* xiv.). But this again cannot be maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the Resurrection, as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must believe that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover the human body will rise again with flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord, according to Luke xxiv. 39, *A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have*, and Job xix. 26, *In my flesh I shall see God*, my Saviour: and the nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid rarity.

Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account of the most complete perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in relation to the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then predominant in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all the fifth essence can nowise enter into the composition of a body, as we have shown above (ii. *Sent.* D. 12, qu. 1). Secondly, because granted that it entered into the composition of the human body, it would be impossible to account for its having a greater predominance over the elemental nature then than now, unless,—either the amount of the heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were decreased, which is inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise again),—or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties of the heavenly nature through the latter's dominion over the body, and in that case a natural power would be the cause of a property of glory, which seems absurd.

Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the dominion of the glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason of which dominion the glorified body is said to be *spiritual*, as being wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its participating in its specific being, in so far as it is subject to the soul as matter to form; and secondly it is subject to the soul in respect of the other operations of the soul, in so far as the soul is a principle of movement. Consequently the first reason for spirituality in the body is subtlety, and, after that, agility and the other properties of a glorified body. Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking of spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (*Moral.* xiv.) that *the glorified body is said to be subtle as a result of a spiritual power.*

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections* which refer to the subtlety of rarefaction.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY REASON OF THIS SUBTLETY A GLORIFIED BODY IS ABLE TO BE IN THE SAME PLACE WITH ANOTHER BODY NOT GLORIFIED?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified. For according to Philip. iii. 21, He *will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His glory.* Now the body of Christ was able to be in the same place with another body, as appears from the fact that after His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, the doors being shut (John xx. 19, 26). Therefore also the glorified bodies by reason of their subtlety will be able to be in the same place with other bodies not glorified.

Obj. 2. Further, Glorified bodies will be superior to all other bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority certain bodies, to wit the solar rays, are able now to occupy the same place together with other bodies. Much more therefore is this befitting glorified bodies.

Obj. 3. Further, A heavenly body cannot be severed, at least as regards the substance of the spheres: hence it is written (Job xxxvii. 18) that *the heavens . . . are most strong, as if they were of molten brass.* If then the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, it will never be able to ascend to the empyrean,* and this is erroneous.

Obj. 4. Further, A body which is unable to be in the same place with another body can be hindered in its movement or even surrounded by others standing in its way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies. Therefore they will be able to be together in the same place with other bodies.

Obj. 5. Further, As point is to point, so is line to line, surface to surface, and body to body. Now two points can

* The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. P. I., Q. LVI., A. 3.

be coincident, as in the case of two lines touching one another, and two lines when two surfaces are in contact with one another, and two surfaces when two bodies touch one another, because *contiguous things are those whose boundaries coincide* (*Phys.* vi.). Therefore it is not against the nature of a body to be in the same place together with another body. Now whatever excellence is competent to the nature of a body will all be bestowed on the glorified body. Therefore a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together with another body.

On the contrary, Boëthius says (*De Trin.*): *Difference of accidents makes distinction in number. For three men differ not in genus, nor in species, but in their accidents. If we were to remove absolutely every accident from them, still each one has a different place; and it is quite inconceivable that they should all occupy the same place.* Therefore if we suppose two bodies to occupy the same place, there will be but one body numerically.

I answer that, It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body, unless the obstacle to its being now in the same place with another body be removed by that subtlety. Some say that in the present state this obstacle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy a place; and that this grossness is removed by the gift of subtlety. But there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. First because the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect, for instance an inordinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject to its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will rise again in the body, both as regards the matter and as regards the form. And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by reason of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of any defect of nature. For since fulness is opposed to vacancy, that alone does not fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the Philosopher (*Phys.* iv.) as being *a place not*

filled by a sensible body. And a body is said to be sensible by reason of its matter, form, and natural accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also plain that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as evidenced by the body of our Lord (Luke xxiv. 39): nor will it lack matter, or form, or natural accidents, namely heat, cold, and so forth. Hence it is evident that the glorified body, the gift of subtlety notwithstanding, will fill a place: for it would seem madness to say that the place in which there will be a glorified body will be empty. Secondly their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the co-existence of a body in the same place is more than to fill a place. For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter, those dimensions do not fill a place. Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum, said that a vacuum is a place wherein suchlike dimensions exist apart from a sensible body; and yet those dimensions hinder another body from being together with them in the same place. This is made clear by the Philosopher (*Phys.* iv.; *Met.* iii.), where he considers it impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body. Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.

Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's being now in the same place with another body can nowise be removed by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place together with another body, except something in it that requires a different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place, not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* iv.), and as is

self-evident. In like manner neither can matter cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity. Again neither does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. It remains therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying a place. Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive quantity alone. Thus take the example of a separate line, supposing there to be two such lines, or two parts of one line, they must needs occupy distinct places, else one line added to another would not make something greater, and this is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place, through being the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as Boëthius says (*De Trin.*), *we cannot possibly conceive two bodies occupying one place*, so that this distinction of individuals requires this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from another body. Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, but it will be possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of the Divine power: even as the body of Peter had the power whereby the sick were healed at the passing of Peter's shadow (Acts v. 15) not through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible for a

glorified body to be in the same place together with another body for the perfection of glory.

Reply Obj. 1. That Christ's body was able to be together with another body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but resulted from the power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as in His birth.* Hence Gregory says (*Hom.* xxvi. *in Ev.*): *The same body went into His disciples the doors being shut, which to human eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin at His birth.* Therefore there is no reason why this should be befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety.

Reply Obj. 2. Light is not a body as we have said above (ii. *Sent.* Q. XIII., A. 3; P. I., Q. LXVII., A. 2): hence the objection proceeds on a false supposition.

Reply Obj. 3. The glorified body will pass through the heavenly spheres without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by the Divine power, which will assist them in all things at will.

Reply Obj. 4. From the fact that God will come to the aid of the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they cannot be surrounded or imprisoned.

Reply Obj. 5. As stated in *Phys.* iv., *place is not befitting a point:* hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental, because the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the place corresponds to the term of the body. But it happens that two places have one term, even as two lines terminate in one point. And consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet the same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the two bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous bodies are said to coincide.

* Cf. P. III., Q. XXVIII., A. 2, *ad* 3.

Third Article.

WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE, BY A MIRACLE, FOR TWO BODIES TO BE IN THE SAME PLACE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, by a miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply that contradictions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies are one. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place, or they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions that are within the bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. Now *things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same with one another.* Therefore the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two bodies cannot have identical dimensions just as they cannot have the same whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were two. Therefore they are at the same time one and two.

Obj. 2. Further, A thing cannot be done miraculously either against the common principles,—for instance that the part be not less than the whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a direct contradiction:—or contrary to the conclusions of geometry which are infallible deductions from common principles,—for instance that the three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles. In like manner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined is to make two contradictories true at the same time. Now it is contrary to common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and to the defini-

tion of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a whole. Again it is contrary to the definition of a line that there be more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the case were two bodies in the same place, since between two given points in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines corresponding to the two bodies in that place.

Obj. 3. Further, It would seem impossible that by a miracle a body which is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for then it would have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as to every dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater, and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place; while it will have no proper place, because no given surface of the body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore it will not have a proper place.

Obj. 4. Further, Place corresponds in proportion to the thing placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is at the same time in different places, except by some kind of transformation, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it can nowise happen by a miracle that two bodies be together in the same place.

On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle. Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be together in the same place, because the body of her child when coming forth did not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity. Therefore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in the same place.

Further, This may again be proved from the fact that

our Lord went in to His disciples, the doors being shut (John xx. 19, 26).

I answer that, As shown above (A. 2) the reason why two bodies must needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires distinction in place. Wherefore we observe that when two bodies merge into one, each loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being accrues to the two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each retain its distinct being which it had hitherto, in so much as each of them was a being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this distinct being depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its proximate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first cause can preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done away, as appears from the first proposition of *De Causis,* therefore by God's power and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be without substance as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the power of God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain its distinct being from that of another body, although its matter be not distinct as to place from the matter of the other body: and thus it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be together in the same place.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument is sophistical because it is based on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the existence, between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension proper to the place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put in occupation of the place would have to be identified: because it would then follow that the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place would become one dimension, if each of them were identified with the dimension of the place. But this supposition is false, because if it were true whenever a body acquires a new place, it would follow that a change takes place in the dimensions of the place or of thing placed: since it is impossible for two things to become one anew, except one of them be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other

dimensions belong to a place than those of the thing occupying the place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the question, because according to this nothing else has been said, but that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions of the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are contained within the bounds of the place, and that the distance between the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else than that two bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue.

Reply Obj. 2. Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together in the same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or against the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of geometry. For, as stated above (A. 2), dimensive quantity differs from all other accidents in that it has a special reason of individuality and distinction, namely on account of the placing of the parts, besides the reason of individuality and distinction which is common to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter which is its subject. Thus then one line may be understood as being distinct from another, either because it is in another subject (in which case we are considering a material line), or because it is placed at a distance from another (in which case we are considering a mathematical line, which is understood apart from matter). Accordingly if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save in respect of a different placing: and in like manner neither can there be a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimensions whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to another, as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as to place. But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a

difference of points, and thus different lines described on two bodies that are in the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for the point that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from a point which is its term. In like manner the two circles described in two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account of the difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle described by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other circle described by the locating body.

Reply Obj. 3. God could make a body not to be in a place; and yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a place, because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by reason of its superficies which is described by contact with the terms of the lesser body.

Reply Obj. 4. It is impossible for one body to be miraculously in two places locally (for Christ's body is not locally on the altar), although it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same place. Because to be in several places at once is incompatible with the individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it would follow that it is divided as to place. On the other hand, to be in the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual as distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in indivision (*Met.* v.), whereas distinction from others is a result of the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several places at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a contradiction, as explained above. Hence the comparison fails.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE GLORIFIED BODY CAN BE IN THE SAME PLACE TOGETHER WITH ANOTHER GLORIFIED BODY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified body. Because where there is greater subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is more subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to a glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body.

Obj. 2. Further, Even as a glorified body will be more subtle than a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle than another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same place with a less subtle glorified body.

Obj. 3. Further, The body of heaven is subtle, and will then be glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in the same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at will to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will be able to occupy the same place.

On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated above (i. *Sent.* D. 37, Q. III., A. 3; P. I., Q. LII., A. 3). Therefore neither will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place.

Further, If two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection which will be altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be impossible for two glorified bodies to be in the same place.

I answer that, The property of a glorified body does not make it able to be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to be in the same place with a non-glorified

body. But it would be possible by the Divine power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified body. Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in the same place with another glorified body, both because a becoming order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because one glorified body will not be in the way of another. Consequently two glorified bodies will never be in the same place.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument supposes that a glorified body is able by reason of its subtlety to be in the same place with another body: and this is not true.

The same answer applies to the *Second Objection.*

Reply Obj. 3. The body of heaven and the other bodies will be said equivocally to be glorified, in so far as they will have a certain share in glory, and not as though it were becoming for them to have the gifts of glorified human bodies.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY VIRTUE OF ITS SUBTLETY A GLORIFIED BODY WILL NO LONGER NEED TO BE IN AN EQUAL PLACE?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that by virtue of its subtlety, a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place. For the glorified bodies will be made like to the body of Christ according to Phil. iii. 21. Now Christ's body is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal place: wherefore it is contained whole under the small or great dimensions of a consecrated host. Therefore the same will be true of the glorified bodies.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher proves (*Phys.* iv., text. 53, 76) that two bodies are not in the same place, because it would follow that the greatest body would occupy the smallest place, since its various parts could be in the same part of the place: for it makes no difference whether two bodies or however many be in the same place. Now a glorified body will be in the same place with another body,

as is commonly admitted. Therefore it will be possible for it to be in any place however small.

Obj. 3. Further, Even as a body is seen by reason of its colour, so is it measured by reason of its quantity. Now the glorified body will be so subject to the spirit that it will be able at will to be seen, and not seen, especially by a non-glorified eye, as evidenced in the case of Christ. Therefore its quantity will be so subject to the spirit's will that it will be able to be in a little or great place, and to have a little or great quantity at will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Phys.* iv., text. 30) that *whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to itself.* Now the glorified body will be in a place. Therefore it will occupy a place equal to itself.

Further, The dimensions of a place and of that which is in that place are the same, as shown in *Phys.* iv., text. 30, 76, 77. Therefore if the place were larger than that which is in the place the same thing would be greater and smaller than itself, which is absurd.

I answer that, A body is not related to place save through the medium of its proper dimensions, in respect of which a located body is confined through contact with the locating body. Hence it is not possible for a body to occupy a place smaller than its quantity, unless its proper quantity be made in some way less than itself: and this can only be understood in two ways. First, by a variation in quantity in respect of the same matter, so that in fact the matter which at first is subject to a greater quantity is afterwards subject to a lesser. Some have held this to be the case with the glorified bodies, saying that quantity is subject to them at will, so that when they list, they are able to have a great quantity, and when they list, a small quantity. But this is impossible, because no movement affecting that which is intrinsic to a thing is possible without passion to the detriment* of its substance. Hence in incorruptible, *i.e.* heavenly, bodies, there is only local movement, which is not according to something intrinsic. Thus it is clear that change

* Cf. I.-II., Q. XXII., A. 1.; Q. XLI., A. 1.

of quantity in respect of matter would be incompatible with the impassibility and incorruptibility of a glorified body. Moreover, it would follow that a glorified body would be sometimes rarer and sometimes denser, because since it cannot be deprived of any of its matter, sometimes the same matter would be under great dimensions and sometimes under small dimensions, and thus it would be rarefied and densified, which is impossible. Secondly, that the quantity of a glorified body become smaller than itself may be understood by a variation of place; so, to wit, that the parts of a glorified body insinuate themselves into one another, so that it is reduced in quantity however small it may become. And some have held this to be the case, saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will be able to be in the same place with a non-glorified body: and that in like manner its parts can be one within the other, so much so that a whole glorified body will be able to pass through the minutest opening in another body: and thus they explain how Christ's body came out of the Virgin's womb; and how it went into His disciples, the doors being shut. But this is impossible; both because the glorified body will not be able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same place with another body, and because, even if it were able to be in the same place with another body, this would not be possible if the other were a glorified body, as many say; and again because this would be inconsistent with the right disposition of the human body, which requires the parts to be in a certain fixed place and at a certain fixed distance from one another. Wherefore this will never happen, not even by a miracle. Consequently we must say that the glorified body will always be in a place equal to itself.

Reply Obj. 1. Christ's body is not locally in the Sacrament of the Altar, as stated above (iv. *Sent.* D. 10, Q. I., A. 1, *ad* 5; P. III., Q. LXXVII., A. 5).

Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher's argument is that for the same reason one part might permeate another. But this permeation of the parts of a glorified body into one another

is impossible, as stated above. Therefore the objection does not prove.

Reply Obj. 3. A body is seen because it acts on the sight: but that it does or does not act on the sight causes no change in the body. Hence it is not unfitting, if it can be seen when it will, and not seen when it will.* On the other hand, being in a place is not an action proceeding from a body by reason of its quantity, as being seen is by reason of its colour. Consequently the comparison fails.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GLORIFIED BODY, BY REASON OF ITS SUBTLETY, WILL BE IMPALPABLE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says (*Hom.* xxv. *in Ev.*): *What is palpable must needs be corruptible.* But the glorified body is incorruptible. Therefore it is impalpable.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is palpable resists one who handles it. But that which can be in the same place with another does not resist it. Since then a glorified body can be in the same place with another body, it will not be palpable.

Obj. 3. Further, Every palpable body is tangible. Now every tangible body has tangible qualities in excess of the qualities of the one touching it. Since then in the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not in excess but are reduced to a supreme degree of equality, it would seem that they are impalpable.

On the contrary, Our Lord rose again with a glorified body; and yet His body was palpable, as appears from Luke xxiv. 39: *Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones.* Therefore the glorified bodies also will be palpable.

Further, This is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, as Gregory states (*Moral.* xxiv.): for he said that in the glory of the resurrection our bodies will be impalpable.

* Cf. P. III., Q. LV., A. 4.

I answer that, Every palpable body is tangible, but not conversely. For every body is tangible that has qualities whereby the sense of touch has a natural aptitude to be affected: wherefore air, fire, and the like are tangible bodies: but a palpable body, in addition to this, resists the touch; wherefore the air which never resists that which passes through it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible indeed but not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a body is said to be palpable for two reasons, namely on account of its tangible qualities, and on account of its resisting that which touches it, so as to hinder it from piercing it. And since the tangible qualities are hot and cold and so forth, which are not found save in heavy and light bodies, which through being contrary to one another are therefore corruptible, it follows that the heavenly bodies, which by their nature are incorruptible, are sensible to the sight but not tangible, and therefore neither are they palpable. This is what Gregory means when he says (*loc. cit. Obj.* 1) that *whatever is palpable must needs be corruptible*. Accordingly the glorified body has by its nature those qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the touch, and yet since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it is in its power thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like manner it is competent by its nature to resist any other passing body, so that the latter cannot be in the same place together with it: although, according to its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it occupy the same place with another body, and thus offer no resistance to a passing body. Wherefore according to its nature the glorified body is palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable to a non-glorified body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says (*loc. cit.*) that *our Lord offered His flesh to be handled, which He had brought in through the closed doors, so as to afford a complete proof that after His resurrection His body was unchanged in nature though changed in glory*.

Reply Obj. 1. The incorruptibility of a glorified body does not result from the nature of its component parts; and it is on account of that nature that whatever is palpable is

corruptible, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2. Although in a way it is possible for a glorified body to be in the same place with another body: nevertheless the glorified body has it in its power to resist at will any one touching it, and thus it is palpable.

Reply Obj. 3. In the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not reduced to the real mean that is measured according to equal distance from the extremes, but to the proportionate mean, according as is most becoming to the human complexion in each part. Wherefore the touch of those bodies will be most delightful, because a power always delights in a becoming object, and is grieved by excess.

QUESTION LXXXIV.

OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed in the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile? (2) Whether they will move? (3) Whether they will move instantaneously?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GLORIFIED BODIES WILL BE AGILE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the glorified bodies will not be agile. For that which is agile by itself needs not to be carried in order to move. But the glorified bodies will, after the resurrection, be taken up by the angels (according to a gloss) in the clouds *to meet Christ, into the air* (1 Thess. iv. 16). Therefore the glorified bodies will not be agile.

Obj. 2. Further, No body that moves with labour and pain can be said to be agile. Yet the glorified bodies will move thus, since the principle of their movement, namely the soul, moves them counter to their nature, else they would always move in the same direction. Therefore they are not agile.

Obj. 3. Further, Of all the animal operations sense surpasses movement in nobility and priority. Yet no property is ascribed to glorified bodies as perfecting them in sensation Therefore neither should agility be ascribed to them as perfecting them in movement.

Obj. 4. Further, Nature gives different animals instru-

ments of different disposition according to their different powers: hence she does not give instruments of the same disposition to slow as to fleet animals. Now God's works are much more orderly than those of nature. Since then the glorified body's members will have the same disposition, shape and quantity as they now have, it would seem that it will have no agility other than it has now.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xv. 43): *It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power,* that is, according to a gloss, *mobile and living.* But mobility can only signify agility in movement. Therefore the glorified bodies will be agile.

Further, Slowness of movement would seem especially inconsistent with the nature of a spirit. But the glorified bodies will be most spiritual according to 1 Cor. xv. 44. Therefore they will be agile.

I answer that, The glorified body will be altogether subject to the glorified soul, so that not only will there be nothing in it to resist the will of the spirit, for it was even so in the case of Adam's body, but also from the glorified soul there will flow into the body a certain perfection, whereby it will become adapted to that subjection: and this perfection is called *the gift of the glorified body.* Now the soul is united to body not only as its form, but also as its mover; and in both ways the glorified body must needs be most perfectly subject to the glorified soul. Wherefore even as by the gift of subtlety the body is wholly subject to the soul as its form, whence it derives its specific being, so by the gift of agility it is subject to the soul as its mover, so that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the movements and actions of the soul.

Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the fifth, *i.e.* the heavenly essence, which will then be predominant in the glorified bodies. But of this we have frequently observed that it does not seem probable (Q. LXXXII., A. 1; Q. LXXXIII., A. 1). Wherefore it is better to ascribe it to the soul, whence glory flows to the body.

Reply Obj. 1. Glorified bodies are said to be borne by the angels and also on the clouds, not as though they needed

them, but in order to signify the reverence which both angels and all creatures will show them.

Reply Obj. 2. The more the power of the moving soul dominates over the body, the less is the labour of movement, even though it be counter to the body's nature. Hence those in whom the motive power is stronger, and those who through exercise have the body more adapted to obey the moving spirit, labour less in being moved. And since, after the resurrection, the soul will perfectly dominate the body, both on account of the perfection of its own power, and on account of the glorified body's aptitude resulting from the outflow of glory which it receives from the soul, there will be no labour in the saints' movements, and thus it may be said that the bodies of the saints will be agile.

Reply Obj. 3. By the gift of agility the glorified body will be rendered apt not only for local movement but also for sensation, and for the execution of all the other operations of the soul.

Reply Obj. 4. Even as nature gives to fleeter animals instruments of a different disposition in shape and quantity, so God will give to the bodies of the saints a disposition other than that which they have now, not indeed in shape and quantity, but in that property of glory which is called agility.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SAINTS WILL NEVER USE THEIR AGILITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MOVEMENT?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher (*Phys.* iii., text. 6, 14), *movement is the act of the imperfect.* But there will be no imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither therefore will there be any movement.

Obj. 2. Further, All movement is on account of some need, because whatever is in motion is moved for the sake of obtaining some end. But glorified bodies will have no

need, since as Augustine says (*De Spiritu et Anima*, lxiii.),* *all thou willest will be there, and nothing that thou willest not.* Therefore they will not move.

Obj. 3. Further, According to the Philosopher (*De Cœlo et Mundo*, ii.), *that which shares the Divine goodness without movement shares it more excellently than that which shares it with movement.* Now the glorified body shares the Divine goodness more excellently than any other body. Since then certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will remain altogether without movement, it seems that much more will human bodies remain so.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* xii.) that the soul being established in God will in consequence establish its body. Now the soul will be so established in God, that in no way will it move away from Him. Therefore in the body there will be no movement caused by the soul.

Obj. 5. Further, The more noble a body is, the more noble a place is due to it: wherefore Christ's body which is the most exalted of all has the highest place of all, according to Heb. vii. 26, *Made higher than the heavens*, where a gloss† says, *in place and dignity.* And again each glorified body will, in like manner, have a place befitting it according to the measure of its dignity. Now a fitting place is one of the conditions pertaining to glory. Since then after the resurrection the glory of the saints will never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because they will then have reached the final term of all, it would seem that their bodies will never leave the place assigned to them, and consequently will not be moved.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xl. 31): *They shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint;* and (Wis. iii. 7): (*The just*) *shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds.* Therefore there will be some movement in glorified bodies.

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose that the glorified bodies are moved sometimes, since even Christ's body was

* Cf. Q. LXX., A. 2, *ad* 1.

† Gloss on Heb. i. 3, *On the right hand of the majesty.*

moved in His ascension, and likewise the bodies of the saints, which will arise from the earth, will ascend to the empyrean.* But even after they have climbed the heavens, it is likely that they will sometimes move according as it pleases them; so that by actually putting into practice that which is in their power, they may show forth the excellence of Divine wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God's wisdom will shine forth with great evidence: for sense can only perceive that which is present, although glorified bodies can perceive from a greater distance than non-glorified bodies. And yet movement will nowise diminish their happiness which consists in seeing God, for He will be everywhere present to them; thus Gregory says of the angels (*Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*) that *wherever they are sent their course lies in God.*

Reply Obj. 1. Local movement changes nothing that is intrinsic to a thing, but only that which is without, namely place. Hence that which is moved locally is perfect as to those things which are within (*Phys.* viii., text. 59), although it has an imperfection as to place, because while it is in one place it is in potentiality with regard to another place, since it cannot be in several places at the same time, for this belongs to God alone. But this defect is not inconsistent with the perfection of glory, as neither is the defect whereby a creature is formed from nothing. Hence such-like defects will remain in glorified bodies.

Reply Obj. 2. A person is said to need a thing in two ways, namely absolutely and relatively. One needs absolutely that without which one cannot retain one's being or one's perfection: and thus movement in glorified bodies will not be on account of a need, because their happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we need a thing relatively when without it some end we have in view cannot be obtained by us, or not so well, or not in some particular way. It is thus that movement will be in the blessed on account of need, for they will be unable to show forth their motive

* Cf. footnote Q. LXXXIII., A. 2.

power practically, unless they be in motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind being in glorified bodies.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument would prove if the glorified body were unable even without movement to share the Divine goodness much more perfectly than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence glorified bodies will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect participation in the Divine goodness (since they have this through glory), but in order to show the soul's power. On the other hand, the movement of the heavenly bodies could not show their power, except the power they have in moving lower bodies to generation and corruption, which is not becoming to that state. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 4. Local movement takes nothing away from the stability of the soul that is established in God, since it does not affect that which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (*ad* 1).

Reply Obj. 5. The fitting place assigned to each glorified body according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental reward. Nor does it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the body is outside its place; because that place pertains to reward, not as actually containing the body located therein (since nothing flows therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does it receive splendour therefrom), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of that place, they will still continue to rejoice in it.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MOVEMENT OF THE SAINTS WILL BE INSTANTANEOUS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the movement of the saints will be instantaneous. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, lib. xxii., cap xxx.) that *wherever the spirit listeth there will the body be.* Now the movement of the will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. Therefore the body's movement will be instantaneous.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher (*Phys.* iv., text. 71, *seq.*)

proves that there is no movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something moves instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so there would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio of movements in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that take place in time must needs be proportional, since any one space of time is proportional to any other. But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified body since this can be in the same place with another body, no matter how this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body. Therefore if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously.

Obj. 3. Further, The power of a glorified soul surpasses the power of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now the non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore the glorified soul moves the body instantaneously.

Obj. 4. Further, Whatever is moved equally soon to what is near and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement of a glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is moved, the time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. *De Resurrectione, Ep.* cii., Q. 1) that *the glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, like the sun's ray.* Therefore the glorified body is moved instantaneously.

Obj. 5. Further, Whatever is in motion is moved either in time or in an instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will not be moved in time, since time will not be then according to Apoc. x. 6. Therefore this movement will be instantaneous.

On the contrary, In local movement space, movement and time are equally divisible, as is demonstrated in *Phys.* vi., text. 37, *seq.* Now the space traversed by a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore this movement will not be instantaneous.

Further, A thing cannot be at the same time wholly in

one place and partly in another place, since it would follow that the remaining part is in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is in motion is partly in a term *wherefrom* and partly in a term *whereto*, as is proved in *Phys.* vi., text. 32: while whatever has been in motion is wholly in the term whereto the movement is directed: and it is impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have been moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously is being moved and has been moved at the same time. Therefore the local movement of a glorified body cannot be instantaneous.

I answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that a glorified body passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, and that consequently it is possible for the movement of a glorified body like that of the will to be instantaneous. But this will not hold: because the glorified body will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move from one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it is directed to one place after being directed by the intention to another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to another. Hence others say that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in time, but that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass through the interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously. But this is impossible, since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as follows. Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A is not in motion; and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is past. Therefore if it is at any time in motion it must needs be neither wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is

either nowhere, or partly in A and partly in B, or wholly in some other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being in some way in the intervening space; for since B is a place distant from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z which is in B is not continuous with the part which is in A. Therefore it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C, and partly in some other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore it follows that Z does not pass from A to B unless first of all it be in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement. The same applies to any change whatever having two opposite terms, each of which is a positive entity, but not to those changes which have only one positive term, the other being a pure privation, since between affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance: wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote from affirmation, and conversely, by reason of something that causes either of them or disposes thereto: so that while that which is moved is wholly under a negation it is changed into affirmation, and *vice versa;* wherefore in such things *to be changing precedes to be changed,* as is proved in *Phys.* vi., text. 40, *seq.* Nor is there any comparison with the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear that it is altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another, unless it pass through every interval. Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together, namely in the ultimate term, and in all the intervening places, which is impossible. To this, however, they reply that, although it is the same instant

really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures the instantaneous, according to its reality and not according to our way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in a different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a different way does not make it possible for one point of place to contain things that are locally distant from one another. Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in less time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility of time, no matter how short a space we may take.

Reply Obj. 1. *That which is little lacking is as it were not lacking at all;* wherefore we say: *I do so and so at once,* when it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when he says that *wheresoever the will shall be, there shall the body be forthwith.* Or we may say that in the blessed there will never be an inordinate will: so that they never will wish their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body will be in whatever place the will shall determine.

Reply Obj. 2. Some have demurred to this proposition of the Philosopher's, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the ratio of one whole movement to another whole movement is not necessarily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting medium, but that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the ratio of retardations attending the movements on account of the resistance of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed, either fast or slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although there be no resistance on the part of the medium; as evidenced in heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet they do not move instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to

the power of the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently it is clear that even if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does not follow that it moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to the time which that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of the mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded.

But this reply, as the Commentator observes (*ibid.*), proceeds from an error in the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made.* And so there would not be the same proportion between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the retardations resulting from the resistance of the medium. This is an error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much speed as the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any retardation or acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the retardation that comes to a movement is not another part of the movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a part of the total line.

Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher's argument, as the Commentator explains (*ibid.*), we must take the whole as being one, that is we must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power, but also the resistance of the medium through which the movement takes place, and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the amount of retardation in the whole movement as being proportionate to the moving power in comparison with the resisting movable, no matter in what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something ex-

* The same applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio of $2+1$ to $4+1$ is not as 2 to 4.

trinsic. For the movable must needs always resist the mover somewhat, since mover and moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one another. Now sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a contrary movement, as appears in violent movements, or at least because it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the mover; and suchlike resistance even heavenly bodies offer their movers. Sometimes the movable resists the power of the mover, by reason only of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural movement of heavy and light things, because by their very form they are inclined to such a movement: for the form is an impression of their generator, which is the mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the part of matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to a contrary movement nor of a contrary place, since place is not due to matter except in so far as the latter, being circumscribed by its dimensions, is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no resistance save on the part of the medium, and this resistance is connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the resistance results from both, as may be seen in the movements of animals. Accordingly when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and the Philosopher's argument does not apply to these, since if there be no medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. On the other hand, in those movements where there is resistance on the part of the medium only, the measure of time is taken only according to the obstacle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be removed there will be no longer an obstacle; and so either it will move instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time through a vacuum and through a plenum, because granted that it moves in time through a vacuum, that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it moves through a plenum. Now it is possible to imagine

another body more subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled the space, and then if this body fill some other equal space it will move in as little time through that plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, since by as much as the subtlety of the medium is increased by so much is the length of time decreased, and the more subtle the medium the less it resists. But in those other movements where resistance is offered by both the movable and the medium, the quantity of time must be proportionate to the power of the mover as compared with the resistance of both movable and medium together. Hence granted that the medium be taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does not follow that the movement is instantaneous, but that the time is measured according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor will there be any inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, since the greater the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less is it naturally inclined to retard the movement. Wherefore it is possible to imagine so great a subtlety, as will naturally retard the movement less than does the resistance of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will add no retardation to the movement.

It is therefore evident that although the medium offer no resistance to the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible for them to be in the same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be instantaneous, because the movable body itself will resist the motive power, from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have said in reference to the heavenly bodies.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the power of a glorified soul surpasses immeasurably the power of a non-glorified soul, it does not surpass it infinitely, because both powers are finite: hence it does not follow that it causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power were simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous movement, unless the resistance of the movable were overcome altogether. Now although the resistance of the movable

to the mover, that results from opposition to such a movement by reason of its being inclined to a contrary movement, can be altogether overcome by a mover of infinite power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through contrariety towards the place which the mover intends by the movement cannot be overcome altogether, except by depriving it of its being in such and such a place or position. For just as white resists black by reason of whiteness, and all the more according as whiteness is the more distant from blackness, so a body resists a certain place through having an opposite place, and its resistance is all the greater, according as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take away from a body its being in some place or position, except one deprive it of its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or position: wherefore so long as it retains the nature of a body, it can nowise be moved instantaneously, however greater be the motive power. Now the glorified body will never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.

Reply Obj. 4. In the words of Augustine, the speed is said to be equal because the excess of one over the other is imperceptible, just as the time taken by the whole movement is imperceptible.

Reply Obj. 5. Although after the resurrection the time which is the measure of the heaven's movement will be no more, there will nevertheless be time resulting from the before and after in any kind of movement.

QUESTION LXXXV.

OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies? (2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye? (3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity be seen by a non-glorified body?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER CLARITY IS BECOMING TO THE GLORIFIED BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that clarity is unbecoming to the glorified body. Because according to Avicenna (*Natural.* vi. 3), *every luminous body consists of transparent parts.* But the parts of a glorified body will not be transparent, since in some of them, such as flesh and bones, earth is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies are not lightsome.

Obj. 2. Further, Every lightsome body hides one that is behind it; wherefore one luminary behind another is eclipsed, and a flame of fire prevents one seeing what is behind it. But the glorified bodies will not hide that which is within them, for as Gregory says on Job xxviii. 17, *Gold or crystal cannot equal it* (*Moral.* xviii.): *There,* that is in the heavenly country, *the grossness of the members will not hide one's mind from another's eyes, and the very harmony*

of the body will be evident to the bodily sight. Therefore those bodies will not be lightsome.

Obj. 3. Further, Light and colour require a contrary disposition in their subject, since *light is the extreme point of visibility in an indeterminate body; colour, in a determinate body* (*De Sensu et Sensato*, iii.). But glorified bodies will have colour, for as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xxii.), *the body's beauty is harmony of parts with a certain charm of colour:* and it will be impossible for the glorified bodies to lack beauty. Therefore the glorified bodies will not be lightsome.

Obj. 4. Further, If there be clarity in the glorified bodies, it will need to be equal in all the parts of the body, just as all the parts will be equally impassible, subtle and agile. But this is not becoming, since one part has a greater disposition to clarity than another, for instance the eye than the hand, the spirits* than the bones, the humours than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it would seem unfitting for those bodies to be lightsome.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xiii. 43): *The just shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father,* and (Wis. iii. 7): *The just shall shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds.*

Further, It is written (1 Cor. xv. 43): *It is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory,* which refers to clarity, as evidenced by the previous context where the glory of the rising bodies is compared to the clarity of the stars. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be lightsome.

I answer that, It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection the bodies of the saints will be lightsome, on account of the authority of Scripture which makes this promise. But the cause of this clarity is ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then predominate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we have often remarked (Q. LXXXIV., A. 1), it is better to say that this clarity will result from the overflow of the soul's glory into the body. For whatever is received into any-

* Cf. footnote, Q. LXXXII., A. 3.

thing is received not according to the mode of the source whence it flows, but according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received into the body as corporeal. And consequently according to the greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit, so too will the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle affirms (1 Cor. xv. 41). Thus in the glorified body the glory of the soul will be known, even as through a crystal is known the colour of a body contained in a crystal vessel, as Gregory says on Job. xxviii. 17, *Gold or crystal cannot equal it.*

Reply Obj. 1. Avicenna is speaking of a body that has clarity through the nature of its component parts. It is not thus but rather by the merit of virtue that the glorified body will have clarity.

Reply Obj. 2. Gregory compares the glorified body to gold on account of clarity, and to crystal on account of its transparency. Wherefore seemingly we should say that they will be both transparent and lightsome; for that a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to the fact that the clarity of that body results from the density of the lightsome parts, and density is opposed to transparency. Then, however, clarity will result from another cause, as stated above: and the density of the glorified body will not deprive it of transparency, as neither does the density of a crystal deprive crystal.

Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal, not because they are transparent, but on account of this likeness, for as much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of the soul enclosed in the glorified body will not be hidden. But the first explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity of the glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of Gregory.

Reply Obj. 3. The glory of the body will not destroy nature but will perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain the colour due to it by reason of the nature of its component parts, but in addition to this it will have clarity resulting from the soul's glory. Thus we see bodies which have

colour by their nature aglow with the resplendence of the sun, or from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic.

Reply Obj. 4. Even as the clarity of glory will overflow from the soul into the body according to the mode of the body, and is there otherwise than in the soul, so again it will overflow into each part of the soul according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not unreasonable that the different parts should have clarity in different ways, according as they are differently disposed thereto by their nature. Nor is there any comparison with the other gifts of the body, for the various parts of the body are not differently disposed in their regard.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CLARITY OF THE GLORIFIED BODY IS VISIBLE TO THE NON-GLORIFIED EYE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the clarity of the glorified body is invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the visible object should be proportionate to the sight. But a non-glorified eye is not proportionate to see the clarity of glory, since this differs generically from the clarity of nature. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will not be seen by a non-glorified eye.

Obj. 2. Further, The clarity of the glorified body will be greater than the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity of the sun also will then be greater than it is now, according to Isa. xxx. 26, and the clarity of the glorified body will be much greater still, for which reason the sun and the entire world will receive greater clarity. Now a non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on account of the greatness of its clarity. Therefore still less will it be able to gaze on the clarity of a glorified body.

Obj. 3. Further, A visible object that is opposite the eyes of the seer must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion to the eye. But the clarity of a glorified body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes is not necessarily seen by them: which is evident in the case of the disciples who saw our

Lord's body after the resurrection, without witnessing its clarity. Therefore this clarity will be invisible to a non-glorified eye.

On the contrary, A gloss on Philip. iii. 21, *Made like to the body of His glory,* says: *It will be like the clarity which He had in the Transfiguration.* Now this clarity was seen by the non-glorified eyes of the disciples. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will be visible to non-glorified eyes also.

Further, The wicked will be tortured in the judgment by seeing the glory of the just, according to Wis. v. 2. But they would not fully see their glory unless they gazed on their clarity. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Some have asserted that the clarity of the glorified body will not be visible to the non-glorified eye, except by a miracle. But this is impossible, unless this clarity were so named equivocally, because light by its essence has a natural tendency to move the sight, and sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even as the true is in relation to the intellect, and the good to the appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether incapable of perceiving a light, either this sight is so named equivocally, or else this light is. This cannot be said in the point at issue, because then nothing would be made known to us when we are told that the glorified bodies will be lightsome: even so a person who says that a dog* is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who knows no other dog than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity of a glorified body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye.

Reply Obj. 1. The clarity of glory will differ generically from the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its species. Hence just as the clarity of nature is, by reason of its species, proportionate to the sight, so too will the clarity of glory be.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as a glorified body is not passible to a passion of nature but only to a passion of the soul,† so in virtue of its property of glory it acts only by the action of the soul. Now intense clarity does not disturb the sight,

* The dog star. † Cf. Q. LXXXII., A. 1.

in so far as it acts by the action of the soul, for thus it rather gives delight, but it disturbs it in so far as it acts by the action of nature by heating and destroying the organ of sight, and by scattering the spirits* asunder. Hence, though the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the clarity of the sun, it does not by its nature disturb the sight but soothes it: wherefore this clarity is compared to the jasper-stone (Apoc. xxi. 11).

Reply Obj. 3. The clarity of the glorified body results from the merit of the will and therefore will be subject to the will, so as to be seen or not seen according to its command. Therefore it will be in the power of the glorified body to show forth its clarity or to hide it: and this was the opinion of Præpositivus.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A GLORIFIED BODY WILL BE NECESSARILY SEEN BY A NON-GLORIFIED BODY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body. For the glorified bodies will be lightsome. Now a lightsome body reveals itself and other things. Therefore the glorified bodies will be seen of necessity.

Obj. 2. Further, Every body which hides other bodies that are behind it is necessarily perceived by the sight, from the very fact that the other things behind it are hidden. Now the glorified body will hide other bodies that are behind it from being seen, because it will be a coloured body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as quantity is something in a body, so is the quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity will not be subject to the will, so that the glorified body be able to be of greater or smaller quantity. Therefore neither will the quality of visibility be subject to the will, so that a body be able not to be seen.

On the contrary, Our body will be glorified in being made

* Cf. footnote, Q. XXXII., A. 3.

like to the body of Christ after the resurrection. Now after the resurrection Christ's body was not necessarily seen; in fact it vanished from the sight of the disciples at Emmaus (Luke xxiv. 31). Therefore neither will the glorified body be necessarily seen.

Further, There the body will be in complete obedience to the will. Therefore as the soul lists the body will be visible or invisible.

I answer that, A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts on the sight. Now there is no change in a thing through its acting or not acting on an external object. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or not seen without any property pertaining to its perfection being changed. Consequently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for its body to be seen or not seen, even as any other action of the body will be in the soul's power; else the glorified body would not be a perfectly obedient instrument of its principal agent.

Reply Obj. 1. This clarity will be obedient to the glorified body so that this will be able to show it or hide it.

Reply Obj. 2. A body's colour does not prevent its being transparent except in so far as it affects the sight, because the sight cannot be affected by two colours at the same time, so as to perceive them both perfectly. But the colour of the glorified body will be completely in the power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not act on the sight. Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to hide a body that is behind it.

Reply Obj. 3. Quantity is inherent to the glorified body itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity to be altered at the soul's bidding without the glorified body suffering some alteration incompatible with its impassibility. Hence there is no comparison between quantity and visibility, because even this quality whereby it is visible cannot be removed at the soul's bidding, but the action of that quality will be suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at the soul's command.

QUESTION LXXXVI.

OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN.

(*In Three Articles.*)

We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned will rise again. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities? (2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible? (3) Whether they will be impassible?

First Article.

WHETHER THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN WITH THEIR DEFORMITIES?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a punishment for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these deformities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that they will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as the saints will rise again to final happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when the saints rise again nothing will be taken from them that can pertain to their perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to the defect or unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection. But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as deformity is a defect of the passible body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not be taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their bodies will not be agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will their deformity be taken away.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xv. 52): *The dead shall rise again incorruptible;* where a gloss says: *The dead, i.e. sinners, or all the dead in general shall rise again incorruptible, i.e. without the loss of any limbs.* Therefore the wicked will rise again without their deformities.

Further, There will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from affecting the whole body. Therefore the damned will rise again without these defects.

I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises from the lack of a limb; thus we say that a mutilated person is deformed, because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole. Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place,—which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (*Enchir.* xcii.) as the Master remarks (iv. *Sent.* D. 44). Among modern masters, however, there are two opinions on this point. For some say that suchlike deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness wherefrom no affliction should be rebated. But this would seem unreasonable. For in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection rather than to its previous condition: wherefore those who die under perfect

age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1). Consequently those who had natural defects in the body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects and deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of punishment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is about to be damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet have deformities and defects which one who is about to be damned has not, while burdened with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had deformities in this life rise again with them, while the other who had them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again without them, though deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he suffered in this world; which is absurd.

Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will wholly restore the body's nature at the resurrection. Wherefore whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever, purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away at the resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness, passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 1. Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in this temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence although the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there they will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world: but the Divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe punishment for eternity.

Reply Obj. 2. There is no parity between the good and the wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints requires that they should be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of the wicked will not exclude all good, because *if a thing be wholly evil it destroys itself*, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 5). Hence it is necessary for the good of their nature to underlie the unhappiness of the damned, which good is the work of their perfect Creator, Who will restore that same nature to the perfection of its species.

Reply Obj. 3. Slowness of movement is one of those defects which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but deformity is not, and consequently the comparison fails.

Second Article.

Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be corruptible. For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be corruptible. Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the contraries whereof they are composed even now, else they would not be the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically. Therefore they will be corruptible.

Obj. 2. Further, If the bodies of the damned will not be corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to glory. But it will not be by nature, since they will be of the same nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory, since they will lack these things altogether. Therefore they will be corruptible.

Obj. 3. Further, It would seem inconsistent to withdraw the greatest of punishments from those who are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Now death is the greatest of punishments, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* iii. 6). Therefore death should not be withdrawn from the damned,

since they are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. ix. 6): *In those days men shall seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them.*

Further, The damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment both in soul and body (Matth. xxv. 46): *These shall go into everlasting punishment.* But this would not be possible if their bodies were corruptible. Therefore their bodies will be incorruptible.

I answer that, Since in every movement there must needs be a principle of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a movable in two ways: first through absence of a principle of movement, secondly through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now corruption is a kind of change: and consequently a body which is corruptible on account of the nature of its principles may be rendered incorruptible in two ways. First by the total removal of the principle which leads to corruption, and in this way the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle of alteration in virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved thereby, it follows that at the cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any agent that can change the body by altering it from its natural property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the cessation of the heavenly movement, there will be no quality capable of altering the human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like generation, is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since living for ever they will be punished for ever. This is in keeping with the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state further on (A. 3), even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corruption of one thing another is generated.

Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was

incorruptible, because the conflicting qualities that exist in man's body were withheld by the grace of innocence from conducing to the body's dissolution: and much more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the bodies of the blessed.

Reply Obj. 1. The contraries of which bodies are composed are conducive to corruption as secondary principles. For the first active principle thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the movement of the heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent it: whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even in accordance with nature, as explained above. But the philosophers were ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly movement; and consequently they held that a body composed of contraries is without fail corrupted in accordance with nature.

Reply Obj. 2. This incorruptibility will result from nature, not as though there were some principle of incorruption in the bodies of the damned, but on account of the cessation of the active principle of corruption, as shown above.

Reply Obj. 3. Although death is simply the greatest of punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain respect, to a cessation of punishments; and consequently the removal of death may contribute to the increase of punishment. For as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 9), *Life is pleasant to all, for all desire to be. . . . But we must not apply this to a wicked or corrupt life, nor one passed in sorrow.* Accordingly just as life is simply pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too death, which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary good, namely being, with which other things are withdrawn. But in so far as it deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it is a remedy for

pains, since it puts an end to them; and consequently the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making them everlasting. If however we say that death is penal by reason of the bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will continue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in *everlasting death*, according to the Psalm (xlviii. 15): *Death shall feed upon them.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL BE IMPASSIBLE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be impassible. For, according to the Philosopher (*Topic.* vi.), *increase of passion results in loss of substance.* Now *if a finite thing be continually lessened, it must needs at length be done away* (*Phys.* i.). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be ever suffering, they will at length be done away and corrupted: and this has been shown to be false (A. 2). Therefore they will be impassible.

Obj. 2. Further, Every agent likens the patient to itself. If then the bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the fire will liken them to itself. Now fire does not consume bodies except in so far as in likening them to itself it disintegrates them. Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible they will at length be consumed by the fire, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 3. Further, Those animals, for instance the salamander, which are said to remain living in fire without being destroyed, are not distressed by the fire: because an animal is not distressed by bodily pain, unless the body in some way is hurt thereby. If therefore the bodies of the damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the fire without being corrupted, as Augustine asserts (*De Civ. Dei,* xxi.), it would seem that they will suffer no distress there: which would not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 4. Further, If the bodies of the damned be passible,

the pain resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will surpass all present bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints will surpass all present joy. Now in this life it sometimes happens that the soul is severed from the body through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those bodies will be passible, the souls will be separate from the bodies through excess of pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted: which is false. Therefore those bodies will be impassible.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xv. 52): *And we shall be changed:* and a gloss says: *We,—the good alone,—will be changed with the unchangeableness and impassibility of glory.*

Further, Even as the body co-operates with the soul in merit, so does it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the former co-operation not only the soul but also the body will be rewarded after the resurrection. Therefore in like manner the bodies of the damned will be punished; which would not be the case were they impassible. Therefore they will be passible.

I answer that, The principal cause of the bodies of the damned not being consumed by the fire will be the Divine justice by which their bodies will be consigned to everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is served also by the natural disposition, whether on the part of the passive body or on the part of the active causes; for since passiveness is a kind of receptiveness, there are two kinds of passion, corresponding to two ways in which one thing is receptive of another. For a form may be received into a subject materially according to its natural being, just as the air receives heat from fire materially; and corresponding to this manner of reception there is a kind of passion which we call *passion of nature.* In another way one thing is received into another spiritually by way of an *intention,* just as the likeness of whiteness is received into the air and in the pupil: this reception is like that whereby the soul receives the likeness of things: wherefore corresponding to this mode of reception is another mode of passion which we call *passion of the soul.* Since therefore after the resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly movement it will be impossible

for a body to be altered by its natural quality, as stated above (A. 2), it will not be possible for any body to be passive with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will be incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will still remain the passion which is after the manner of the soul, since the air will both receive light from the sun, and will convey the variety of colours to the sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified bodies, albeit they receive something, and are in a manner patient to sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, since they will receive nothing to distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned, which for this reason are said to be passible.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking of the passion whereby the patient is changed from its natural disposition. But this kind of passion will not be in the bodies of the damned, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of the agent is in the patient in two ways. First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus it is in all univocal agents, for instance a thing that is hot makes another thing hot, and fire generates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the agent, and thus it is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes that a form which is in the agent spiritually is received into the patient materially: thus the form of the house built by the craftsman is materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the craftsman. On the other hand, sometimes it is in the agent materially, but is received into the patient spiritually: thus whiteness is materially on the wall wherein it is received, whereas it is spiritually in the pupil and in the transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue, because the species which is in the fire materially is received spiritually into the bodies of the damned; thus it is that the fire will assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming them withal.

Reply Obj. 3. According to the Philosopher (*De Prop.*

Element.), *no animal can live in fire.* Galen also (*De simp. medic.*) says *that there is no body which at length is not consumed by fire;* although sometimes certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such as ebony. The instance of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since it cannot remain in the fire without being at last consumed, as do the bodies of the damned in hell. Nor does it follow that because the bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore are not tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, not only as regards its natural action of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object is duly proportionate to the sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the result when it is in excess or defect. Hence subdued colours and harmonious sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease the hearing.

Reply Obj. 4. Pain does not sever the soul from the body, in so far as it is confined to a power of the soul which feels the pain, but in so far as the passion of the soul leads to the body being changed from its natural disposition. Thus it is that we see that through anger the body becomes heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas after the resurrection it will be impossible for the body to be changed from its natural disposition, as stated above (A. 2). Consequently, however great the pain will be, it will not sever the body from the soul.

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