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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA



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TREATISE ON HABITS

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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART

QUESTION XLIX.

OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the First Part (Q. LXXVII. *seqq.*), it remains for us to consider habits. In the first place we shall consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts.

Concerning habits in general there are four points to be considered: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another.

Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether habit is a quality? (2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality? (3) Whether habit implies an order to an act? (4) Of the necessity of habit.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER HABIT IS A QUALITY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 73): *This word*

'habit' is derived from the verb 'To have.' But *To have* belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as *having* quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.

Obj. 2. Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the *Book on the Predicaments* (*Categor.* vi.). But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality.

Obj. 3. Further, *every habit is a disposition*, as is stated in the *Book on the Predicaments* (*ibid.*). Now disposition is *the order of that which has parts*, as stated in *Metaph.* v., text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament *Position*. Therefore habit is not a quality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says, in the *Book on the Predicaments* (*Categor.* vi.) that *habit is a quality which it is difficult to change.*

I answer that, This word *habitus* (*habit*) is derived from *habere* (*to have*). Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; A in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to *have* something; B in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation (*se habet*) either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.

A Concerning the first, we must observe that *to have*, as said in regard to anything that is *had*, is common to the various predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts *to have* among the post-predicaments, so called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and suchlike. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the *haver* and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or a passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned

or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v., text. 25) that *a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had;* as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the predicament of *habit:* of which the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v., *ibid.*) that *there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed.*

But if *to have* be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v., *loc. cit.*) that *habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit.* And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say that habit is a quality.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes *to have* in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3. Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say (*ibid.*): namely, *either as to place, or as to power, or as to species. In saying this,* as Simplicius observes in his *Commentary on the Predicaments, he includes all dispositions:—bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'* and this belongs to the predicament *Position,* which is the order of parts in a place:—*when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness,* such as inchoate science and virtue:—*and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits,* such as perfected science and virtue.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER HABIT IS A DISTINCT SPECIES OF QUALITY?

We thus proceed to the Second Article :—

It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said (A. 1), habit, in so far as it is a quality, is *a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill.* But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says in the *Book on the Predicaments* (*Categor.* vi.), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality.

Obj. 3. Further, *difficult to change* is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion. Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but *differences should be proper to a genus,* as the Philosopher says in *Metaph.* vii., text. 42. Therefore, since habit is *a quality difficult to change,* it seems not to be a distinct species of quality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the *Book on the Predicaments* (*Categor.* vi.) that *one species of quality is habit and disposition.*

I answer that, The Philosopher in the *Book of Predicaments* (*Categor.* vi.) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. Now Simplicius, in his *Commentary on the Predicaments,* explains the difference of these species as follows. He says *that some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter,* i.e., those which are adventitious, *are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality: while others regard a thing*

which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an animated being. But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the more natural is always first.

Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* iv. 3), *is that which a measure determines:* wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the material potentiality (*potentia materiæ*) is determined to its substantial being, is called quality, which is a difference affecting substance, so that, in accordance with which the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (*Metaph.* v., text. 19).

Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to action and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory.

But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. And therefore in both, we take into

account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end.

On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (*Phys.* vii., text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that they are *dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature.* And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why a thing is made (*Phys.* ii., text. 23), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (*Metaph.* v., text. 25) defines habit, *a disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill;* and in *Ethic* ii. 4, he says that by *habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions.* For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.

Reply Obj. 1. Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality except in relation to something else. And if we add *well or ill,* which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and colour, according to

their suitability to the nature of a thing, concern beauty: while heat and cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species of quality. Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his *Commentary on the Predicaments.*

Reply Obj. 3. This difference, *difficult to change,* does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of habit (*Metaph.* v., text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g., sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g., sciences and virtues. And in this sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that he has the science. From this it is

clear that the word *habit* implies a certain lastingness: while the word *disposition* does not.

Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion and movement, and not to the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are designated.

Third Article.

whether habit implies order to an act?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii., text. 8), that *when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than before learning.* Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put in the definition of power, as we read in *Metaph.* v., text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of quality.

Obj. 3. Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Bono Conjug.* xxi.) that *habit is that whereby something is done when necessary.* And the Commentator says (*De Anima* iii.) that *habit is that whereby we act when we will.*

I answer that, To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end. Whence also it is stated (*Metaph.* v., text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something else, that is to the end.

But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the nature of the thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a principle of act. Wherefore every habit which is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act.

Reply Obj. 1. Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as is explained in *De Anima* ii., text. 5.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not of the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.

Reply Obj. 3. Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so

far as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*De Hist. Animal.* x. 1), that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, *when he can perform the operation of a healthy man.* And the same applies to other habits.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HABITS ARE NECESSARY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity for habits.

Obj. 2. Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits.

Obj. 3. Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.

On the contrary, Habits are perfections (*Phys.* vii., text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the nature of an end. Therefore it was necessary that there should be habits.

I answer that, As we have said above (AA. 2, 3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary. The first condition is that that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance is its own operation, which

itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case in God.

The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the First Part (Q. LVI., A. 2), there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.

The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, but *simple qualities:* but we call dispositions or habits, such things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v., text. 24, 25) that *habit is a disposition:* and disposition is *the order of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species,* as we have said above (A. 1, *ad* 3). Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their relative adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary.

Reply Obj. 1. By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is limited to one fixed operation,

no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits.

Reply Obj. 2. Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation.

Reply Obj. 3. The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on (Q. LIV., A. 3): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined to good.

QUESTION L.

OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is a habit in the body? (2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power? (3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit? (4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect? (5) Whether there is a habit in the will? (6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS A HABIT IN THE BODY?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (*De Anima* iii.), *a habit is that whereby we act when we will.* But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body.

Obj. 2. Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition can be a habit.

Obj. 3. Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the *Book of Predicaments* (*De Categor.* vi.) that health of the body and incurable disease are called habits.

I answer that, As we have said above (Q. XLIX., AA. 2 *seqq.*), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said (Q. XLIX., A. 4) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion to their operations: whence *by like acts like habits are formed* (*Ethic.* ii. 1, 2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the soul.

If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and suchlike are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.

On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his *Commentary on the Predicaments,* Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dis-

positions. But this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in *Physic.* vii., text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will.

Reply Obj. 2. Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is *as a habit*, as we read in the Greek.* On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.

Reply Obj. 3. Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species, in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some *becoming* and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his *Commentary* disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third.

Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (*ibid.*), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being

* ἴσως ἕξιν (*Categor.* viii.).

heated, and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity of disposition. But Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore we must say otherwise that, as was explained above (Q. XLIX., A. 2, *ad* 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves.

Second Article.

Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above (Q. XLIX., A. 2). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers.

Obj. 2. Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of accident, as we have said in the First Part

(Q. LXXVII., A. 1, *ad* 5). Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers.

Obj. 3. Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.

I answer that, As we have said above (Q. XLIX., AA. 2, 3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul—that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body.—But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Peter i., *that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature*: thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (Q. CX., A. 4).

On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above (Q. XLIX., A. 4). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers.

Reply Obj. 1. The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed.

Reply Obj. 2. Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject, according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident.

In this way we say that one accident is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of colour, in which sense power is the subject of habit.

Reply Obj. 3. Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation and time, as stated in *Metaph.* vii., text. 17; ix., text. 13.

Third Article.

Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part.

Obj. 2. Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above (Q. XLIX., A. 3). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers.

Obj. 3. Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so is virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 10) that *some virtues,* namely, temperance and fortitude, *belong to the irrational part.*

I answer that, The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct; secondly, according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.

Reply Obj. 1. The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in *Ethic.* i. 13.

Reply Obj. 2. The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 36): *We find the most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we say that they are tame and gentle.* But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no habits in them.

Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in

De Anima iii., text. 57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (*De Memor. et Remin.* ii.) that *custom conduces much to a good memory:* the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.

On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptive of habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ANY HABIT IN THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above (A. 1). But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in *De Anima* i., text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the intellect is not an act of the body (*De Anima* iii., text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form

without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the *conjunctum*, which is composed of soul and body.

Obj. 3. Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (*Metaph.* v. text. 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (*De Anima* ii., text. 94) that *we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted.* Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of the body.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 2, 3, 10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul.

I answer that, Concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one *possible** intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single *possible* intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one another, could not be in the *possible* intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in various men.

Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (*Ethic.* i. 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (*De Anima* iii., text. 8, 18), that when the *possible* intellect *is thus identified with each thing,* that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the in-

* See First Part, Q. LXXIX., A. 2, *ad.* 2.

telligible species, *then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the intellect can act of itself*, i.e., by considering: *and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way as before learning and discovering.* Therefore the *possible* intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, so to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the habit. But to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect itself.

Reply Obj. 1. Some said, as Simplicius reports in his *Commentary on the Predicaments*, that, since every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation of the *conjunctum*, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* i., text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in the *conjunctum*. And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is not cogent. For habit is not a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object.

Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in *De Anima* i., text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (*De Anima* iii., text. 3, 39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the *possible* intellect is the subject of habit: for that is a competent subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the *possible* intellect. Wherefore the *possible* intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.

Reply Obj. 2. As potentiality to sensible being belongs

to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the *possible* intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the *possible* intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.

Reply Obj. 3. Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the *possible* intellect, therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body co-operates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the *possible* intellect.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY HABIT IS IN THE WILL?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit.

Obj. 2. Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the *possible* intellect, because the former is an active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 1). Therefore there is no habit in the will.

Obj. 3. Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will.

On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is *a habit whereby men will and do that which is just* (*Ethic.* v. 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.

I answer that, Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must

admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch as habit *is that which one uses when one wills*, as stated above (A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive power, there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above (Q. VI., A. 4; Q. XXII., A. 2). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.

Reply Obj. 2. The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved (*De Anima* iii., text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 3. The will from the very nature of the power is inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more promptly.

Sixth Article.

whether there are habits in the angels?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.), says: *It is not proper to suppose that there are*

intellectual (i.e., spiritual) *powers in the divine intelligences* (i.e., in the angels) *after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them.* But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iv.): *The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other things, in God's goodness.* But that which is of itself (*per se*) is prior to and more powerful than that which is by another (*per aliud*). Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: *For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of itself.*

Obj. 3. Further, habit is a disposition (*Metaph.* v., text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is *the order of that which has parts.* Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.) that the angels of the first hierarchy are called: *Fire-bearers and Thrones and Out-pouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits.*

I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: *Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, through the absence of matter in them.* And Simplicius says the same in his *Commentary on the Predicaments: Wisdom which is in the Soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself.*

Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said (Q. XLIX., A. 4) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that there is no

material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind, so neither are the respective habits of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his *Commentary on the Predicaments* that: *The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in itself.*

However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said in the First Part (Q. LV., A. 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in *De Causis:* and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.

But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier.* vii.) that their habits are *godlike*, that is to say, that by them they are made like to God.

But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.

Reply Obj. 1. This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents.

Reply Obj. 2. As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits.

Reply Obj. 3. In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things.

QUESTION LI.

OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether any habit is from nature? (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts? (3) Whether a habit can be caused by one act? (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY HABIT IS FROM NATURE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But habit *is that which we use when we will,* as the Commentator says on *De Anima* iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.

Obj. 2. Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.

Obj. 3. Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above (Q. XLIX., A. 4). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.

On the contrary, In *Ethic.* vi. 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.

I answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments.—Again, in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.

Thus then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.

But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q. L., A. 2), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature:—in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it

happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we said in the First Part (Q. LV., A. 2; Q. LXXXIV., A. 3).

There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part—this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the *Posterior Analytics* shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.

But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.

In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the *nurseries of virtue*. The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers.

But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or suchlike.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man.

Reply Obj. 2. Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself to be of itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.

Reply Obj. 3. Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY HABIT IS CAUSED BY ACTS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (Q. XLIX., A. 1). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather gives: it seems

impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts.

Obj. 2. Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and passive: which is impossible, as stated in *Physic.* iii. 8.

Obj. 3. Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 1, 2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.

I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed, as is stated in *Ethic.* ii. 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive

powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions.

Reply Obj. 1. The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.

Reply Obj. 2. The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, as is proved in *Phys.* viii., text. 28, 29.

Reply Obj. 3. The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than the science of conclusions.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CAUSED BY ONE ACT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act.

Obj. 2. Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication, so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit.

Obj. 3. Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can cause a habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 7): *As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring : so neither*

does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy. But *happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue* (*Ethic.* i., *ibid.*, 10, 13). Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act.

I answer that, As we have said already (A. 2), habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.

But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the *possible** intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (*De Anim.* iii., text. 20) calls *passive,* and is the *particular reason,* that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the *possible* intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the *possible* intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need

* See First Part, Q. LXXIX., A. 2, *ad* 2.

to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (*De Memor. et Remin.* i.) that *meditation strengthens memory.* Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.

Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.

Fourth Article.

Whether any habits are infused in man by God?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.

Obj. 2. Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for *it belongs to Divine providence to preserve nature,* as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above (A. 2). Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.

Obj. 3. Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But *from those acts a like habit is caused* (*Ethic.* ii. 1, 2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this seems impossible: for two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.

On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. xv. 5): *God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding.* Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.

I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons.

The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness

of man, as stated above (Q. V., A. 5). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.

The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the First Part (Q. CV., A. 6). Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.

Reply Obj. 1. God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but, in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others.

Reply Obj. 2. That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally healthy, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.

QUESTION LII.

OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether habits increase? (2) Whether they increase by addition? (3) Whether each act increases the habit?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER HABITS INCREASE?

We proceed thus to the first Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (*Phys.* v., text. 18). But habits are not in the genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits.

Obj. 2. Further, habit is a perfection (*Phys.* vii., text. 17, 18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.

Obj. 3. Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in *Phys.* vii., text. 15, 17. Therefore habits cannot increase.

On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (Luke xvii. 5): *Lord, increase our faith.* Therefore habits increase.

I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on account of the natural connection of

the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore *in things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better*, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi. 8).

Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be *little* or *great:* for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be *more* or *less:* for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.

In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius relates in his *Commentary on the Predicaments.* For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material, and so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them (*qualia*) are said to be more or less, in respect of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the *Predicaments* (*Categor.* vi.). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held

that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.

In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, that in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* viii., text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness and other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation to something else; and much more so, substance, which is *per se* being. But those things which receive their species from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and none the less they remain in the same species, on account of the one-ness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the one-ness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* x. 2, 3): *Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health.*

Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less.—Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or decrease in itself, and how it cannot.

But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are susceptive of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is *per se* being. And therefore every form which is participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (*Phys.* vii., text. 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect of their participation by the subject.

Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* viii., text. 10) that, *as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance,* that is, in respect of its participation of the specific form: *but in so far as substance may be with matter,* i.e., in respect of material dispositions, *more and less are found in substance.*

Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more and less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.

This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the *Predicaments* (*Categor.* vi.), where, in explaining why figures are not susceptible of more or less, he says: *Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles:* to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the notion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.

It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (*Phys.* vii., text. 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility.

We shall say further on (Q. LXVI., A. 1) how it is with the virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. As the word *great* is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the word *growth*, the term of which is something great.

Reply Obj. 2. Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term

giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptive of more or less.

Reply Obj. 3. Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to science and virtue (*Phys.* viii., text. 20).

Second Article.

whether habit increases by addition?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word *increase*, as we have said, is transferred to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (*De Gener.* i., text. 31) it is said that *increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing.* Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition.

Obj. 2. Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition.

Obj. 3. Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Phys.* iv., text. 84): *That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot, that was not hot, when the thing was less hot.*

Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.

I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have said above (A. 1). For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in *Metaph.* vii., text. 32, so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though something were added to the form.

For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated (A. 1) that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of colour is changed when a thing from being pale becomes white.—If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say that cold increases in a man who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing.

Since, however, as stated above (A. 1), certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the same on account

of the one-ness of the term. Yet movement increases in intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e., in so far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or readily.—In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions.

As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them.

How this question affects virtues we shall state further on (Q. LXVI., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in *Phys.* iv., text. 63.

Reply Obj. 2. The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further.

Reply Obj. 3. What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY ACT INCREASES ITS HABIT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of habits, as stated above (Q. LI., A. 2). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied.

Obj. 2. Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike (*Ethic.* ii. 1, 2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it.

Obj. 3. Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases its habit.

On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to *Ethic.* ii. 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit.

I answer that, Like acts cause like habits (*Ethic.* ii. 1, 2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as is stated in *Physic.* v., text. 52.

But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (Q. L., A. 5); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal.

For not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size, as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.

From this it is clear how to solve the objections.

QUESTION LIII.

HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted? (2) Whether it can be diminished? (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CORRUPTED?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains.

Obj. 2. Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its subject: since *the intellect*, which is its subject, *is a substance that is incorruptible* (*De Anima* i., text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (*Metaph.* vii., text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.

Obj. 3. Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved

indirectly through the movement of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* i. 10), *virtue is more lasting than learning.*

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Long. et Brev. Vitæ* ii.) that *forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science.* Moreover, by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (*Ethic.* ii. 2).

I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits—for instance, health and sickness.—But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject: such is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the *possible* intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above (Q. L., A. 3, *ad* 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the *possible* intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.

We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the *possible* intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the *possible*

intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (*Ethic.* vi. 5) that *it cannot be lost by being forgotten.*—There is, however, in the *possible* intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions which are the starting-point of the reason: for the assertion *Good is not good* is contrary to the assertion *Good is good* (*Peri Hermen.* ii.). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that *deception is the corruption of science.* As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 1: and to these applies what we have said of science and opinion.—Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated in *Ethic.* vii. 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.

Reply Obj. 2. Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but

only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted.—Nevertheless when it is said that *virtue is more lasting than learning*, this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER A HABIT CAN DIMINISH?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish.

Obj. 2. Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in *De Anima* i., text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.

On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.

I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained (Q. LII., A. 1). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase.

Reply Obj. 1. A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.

Reply Obj. 3. No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject: for *whiteness* is *that whereby a thing is white.* Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz., the genus; but we give it the second place, which is that of the difference: thus we say that *simitas* is *a curvature of the nose.* But if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident: for *a white thing* is *something that has whiteness.* Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a *simum* is

a *snub-nose*.—Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained (Q. LII., A. 2).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A HABIT IS CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED THROUGH MERE CESSATION FROM ACT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than passion-like qualities, as we have explained above (Q. XLIX., A. 2 *ad* 3; Q. L., A. 1). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.

Obj. 2. Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.

Obj. 3. Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De Long. et Brev. Vitæ* ii.) that not only *deception,* but also *forgetfulness, is*

the corruption of science. Moreover he says (*Ethic.* viii. 5) that *want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship.* In like manner other habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.

I answer that, As stated in *Phys.* vii., text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit. For it has been stated (A. 1) that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act.—The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.

Reply Obj. 1. Even heat would be destroyed through

ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were to increase.

Reply Obj. 2. Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive to corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles thereto, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3. The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (*Phys.* iv., text. 117) that time makes us forget.

QUESTION LIV.

OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether many habits can be in one power? (2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? (3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad? (4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MANY HABITS CAN BE IN ONE POWER?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power.

Obj. 2. Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power.

Obj. 3. Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many

habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at the same time in one power.

On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLIX., A. 4), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits. Thus, if we take the humours as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e., the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject.

If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above (Q. LI., A. 2): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above (*ibid.*). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power.

Reply Obj. 1. Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as stated in *Metaph.* v., text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in *Ethic.* vi. 1, that *those objects that differ generically belong to different departments of the soul*); while specific difference of objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and powers.

Reply Obj. 2. Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power.

Reply Obj. 3. A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure, For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time *actually;* and yet it can know several things at the same time *habitually.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER HABITS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR OBJECTS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the

same habit of science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically distinct.

Obj. 2. Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in *Phys.* ii., text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by their objects.

Obj. 3. Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects.

On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above (Q. XVIII., A. 5). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects.

I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species.—Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order: viz., to nature, and to an operation consequent to nature.

Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.

Reply Obj. 1. In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we

must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction, yet they are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.

Reply Obj. 2. The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g., by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g., by the movement of heavy bodies towards the centre, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is *a syllogism producing science*, as stated in *Poster.* i., text. 5, depends on the mean. And consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (*Phys.* ii., text. 89; *Ethic.* vii. 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does.—Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said (Q. XVIII., A. 6; Q. XIX., A. 2 *ad* 1; Q. XXXIV., A. 4).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER HABITS ARE DIVIDED INTO GOOD AND BAD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards contraries, as was stated above (A. 2, *Obj.* 1). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad.

Obj. 2. Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares (*Topic.* iv.). Again,

evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.

Obj 3. Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher clearly states (*Ethic.* vii. 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad.

On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are distinct specifically. Therefore habits are divided specifically into good and bad habits.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.

Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher nature.

Reply Obj. 1. The same habit may be about contraries, in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of

aspect. Accordingly habits are divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being about something good, and another about something bad.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz., the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature.

Reply Obj. 3. Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE HABIT IS MADE UP OF MANY HABITS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little, out of several acts, as stated above (Q. LI., A. 3). Therefore one habit is made up of several.

Obj. 2. Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude, temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.

Obj. 3. Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many.

On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple

form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made up of many.

I answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so far as they have something in common, i.e., some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above (AA. 2, 3).

If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed of several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.

Reply Obj. 1. That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities.

Reply Obj. 2. The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q. LVII., A. 6 *ad* 4; II.-II., Q. XLVIII.).

Reply Obj. 3. In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are co-ordinate, and one flows from another.

QUESTION LV.

OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE.

(In Four Articles.)

WE come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said (Q. LIV., A. 3), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.

Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether human virtue is a habit? (2) Whether it is an operative habit? (3) Whether it is a good habit? (4) Of the definition of virtue.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A HABIT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is *the limit of power* (*De Cœlo* i., text. 116). But the limit of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* ii.)* that *virtue is good use of free-will.* But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.

Obj. 3. Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even

* *Retract.* ix.; *cf. De Lib. Arb.* ii. 19.

while asleep. But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*De Moribus Eccl.* xv.) that *virtue is the order of love*, and (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 30) that *the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use.* Now order, or ordering, denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation.

Obj. 5. Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither therefore are human virtues habits.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Categ.* vi.) that science and virtue are habits.

I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.

Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. XLIX., A. 4). Therefore human virtues are habits.

Reply Obj. 1. Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When therefore we say that *virtue is the limit of power*, virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue: for instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue* is put

* In English we should say *strength*, which is the original signification of the Latin *virtus:* thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-*power*, to indicate its *strength*.

at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power.

Reply Obj. 2. Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (*ad* 1); that is to say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will.

Reply Obj. 3. We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.

Reply Obj. 4. When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love is set in order by virtue.

Reply Obj. 5. Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we have said.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS AN OPERATIVE HABIT?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (*Tuscul.* iv.) that as health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the Philosopher (*De Cælo* i.), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to act, but also to being.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*Phys.* vii., text. 17)

that virtue *is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best.* Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (*De Moribus Eccl.*, 3, 6, 14), to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6) that *the virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good.*

I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above (A. 1). Wherefore, since power* is of two kinds, namely power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act.

Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.

Reply Obj. 1. Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered

* The one Latin word *potentia* is rendered *potentiality* in the first case, and *power* in the second.

disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation.

Reply Obj. 2. Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man.

Reply Obj. 3. As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above (Q. III., A. 2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A GOOD HABIT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But there is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. xv. 56: *The virtue* (Douay,—*strength*) *of sin is the Law.* Therefore virtue is not always a good habit.

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to Is. v.: *Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness.* Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. xii. 9): *Virtue* (Douay,—*Power*) *is made perfect in infirmity.* But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Moribus Eccl.* vi.): *No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good:* and the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6): *Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.*

I answer that, As we have said above (A. 1), virtue implies

a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (*De Cælo* i.). Now the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* ii.) that every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (*Metaph.* v., text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to evil things: so that the *virtue of sin* is said to be the law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility.

Reply Obj. 2. The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be *made perfect in infirmity*, not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers.

Fourth Article.

whether virtue is suitably defined?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: *Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no*

one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us. For virtue is man's goodness, since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a *good quality.*

Obj. 2. Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore *good* should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.

Obj. 3. Further, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 3): *When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it is something appertaining to the mind.* But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality *of the mind.*

Obj. 4. Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is therefore unsuitable to put *righteous* in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that *by which we live righteously.*

Obj. 5. Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that *pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them.* It is untrue, therefore, *that no one can make bad use of virtue.*

Obj. 6. Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on Jo. xv. 11: *He shall do greater things than these,* says:* *He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee.* It is therefore unsuitable to say that *God works virtue in us, without us.*

On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine, from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in *De Libero Arbitrio* ii. 19.

I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the

* *Tract.* xxvii. *in Joan. : Serm.* xv. *de Verb. Ap.*, 11.

above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as *a good quality:* for *quality* is the genus of virtue, and the difference, *good.* But the definition would be more suitable if for *quality* we substitute *habit,* which is the proximate genus.

Now virtue has no matter *out of which* it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter *about which* it is concerned, and matter *in which* it exists, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality *of the mind.*

The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed, that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words *by which we live righteously:* and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, *of which no one makes bad use.*

Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words *which God works in us without us.* If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.

Reply Obj. 1. That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that one-ness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this

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is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or one-ness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.

Reply Obj. 2. Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) *that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.*

Reply Obj. 3. Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (*Ethic.* i. 13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.

Reply Obj. 4. Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q. LX., A. 2; II.-II., Q. LVIII., A. 8). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above (Q. XIX., A. 4), is common to all virtues.

Reply Obj. 5. One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance, by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g., by hating it, or by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.

Reply Obj. 6. Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, *which God works in us without us.* As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.

QUESTION LVI.

OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE.

(In Six Articles.)

WE now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers? (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue? (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue? (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue? (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE IS A POWER OF THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* ii. 19) that *virtue is that by which we live righteously.* But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not in a power, but in the essence of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6) that *virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.* But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above (Q. LV., A. 4):

and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue.

On the contrary, Virtue is the limit of power (*De Cœlo* ii.). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul.

I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of virtue, which implies perfection of a power: for perfection is in that which it perfects.—Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above (Q. LV., A. 2): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power.—Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. *To live* may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes *to live* is taken for the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions.

Reply Obj. 2. Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power.

Reply Obj. 3. One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident inheres to substance by means of another, as colour to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of colour. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue.

Second Article.

whether one virtue can be in several powers?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various ways from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: *to know, to will, and to work steadfastly.* But *to know* belongs to the intellect, and *to will* belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers.

Obj. 3. Further, prudence is in the reason, since it is *the right reason of things to be done* (*Ethic.* vi. 5). And it is also in the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (*ibid.*, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers.

On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul.

I answer that, It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from another.

Reply Obj. 1. One act cannot belong to several powers

equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various degrees.

Reply Obj. 2. *To know* is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue is essentially in the appetite.

Reply Obj. 3. Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further on (A. 3; Q. LVII., A. 4).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (*De Moribus Eccl.* xv.) that all virtue is love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. LV., A. 3). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, but the appetitive power.

Obj. 3. Further, virtue is that *which makes its possessor good*, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6). But the habit which perfects the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue.

On the contrary, The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given, of virtue (Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue.

I answer that, As we have said above (Q. LV., A. 3), virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance,

by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man always to speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.

And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that *which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise,* these latter habits are called virtuous simply; because they make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian, or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are called virtues (*Ethic.* vi. 2).

Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 3) holds that science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. 'But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will.' And the reason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q. IX., A. 1; Q. XVII., AA. 1, 5; P. I., Q. LXXXII., A. 4): and therefore if man do well actually,

this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved by the will.

Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for *no man believeth, unless he will.** But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.

Reply Obj. 1. The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every such virtue is love simply: but that it depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above (Q. XXV., AA. 1, 2, 3; Q. XXVII., A. 4; P. I, Q. XX., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2. The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection considers virtue simply so called.

* Augustine: *Tract.* xxvi. *in Joan.*

Fourth Article.

WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE POWERS ARE THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we have said in the First Part (Q. LXXXI., A. 2).

Obj. 2. Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's body: for the Apostle says (Rom. vii.): *I know that good does not dwell in my flesh.* Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine proves (*De Moribus Eccl.* v.) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: *For instance, if my coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me.* But just as the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now *virtue is that by which we live rightly*, as we have said above (Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers.

Obj. 4. Further, *the principal act of moral virtue is choice* (*Ethic.* viii. 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above (Q. XIII., A. 2). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason.

On the contrary, Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii. 10) says that *these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul.*

I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues.

For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act,

inasmuch as being moved by reason, we *yield our members to serve justice;* so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the 'fomes': whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, the good of reason is begotten in them.

Reply Obj. 3. The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: whence the Philosopher says (*Polit.* i. 3) that the *soul rules the body with a despotic command* as the master rules his slave: wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher says (*ibid.*) that the *reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command* such as that by which free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act.

Reply Obj. 4. In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (*Ethic.* vi. 2, 5). But that the irascible and concupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of those powers. And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE POWERS OF APPREHENSION ARE THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory* act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension.

Obj. 3. Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (*De Invent. Rhetor.* ii.) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension.

On the contrary, All virtues are either intellectual or moral (*Ethic.* ii. 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from *Ethic.* vi. 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension.

I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the Philosopher says (*De Memoria* ii.), that *in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second nature.* Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his *Rhetoric* (*loc.*

* *Cf.* P. I., Q. LXXVIII., A. 4.

cit.) that *it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason.* Yet, in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above (Q. L., A. 4 *ad* 3).

Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be called virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these are rather in the intellect or reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colours to sight (*De Anima* iii., text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason.

And thus is made clear the Reply to the second objection.

Reply Obj. 3. Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii., text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his *Rhetoric*, is a *habit like a second nature in accord with reason.* Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (*Ethic.* i., 13; ii. 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.

Obj. 3. Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the subject of virtue.

On the contrary, Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers.

I answer that, Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose.

Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above (Q. XIX., A. 3), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbour, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbour are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and suchlike.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said (Q. XXXV., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2. Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation, but *the appetitive power altogether*, i.e., in its entirety (*Ethic.* i., 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on (Q. LXII., A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3. Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.

QUESTION LVII.

OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues? (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science, and understanding? (3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue? (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art? (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man? (6) Whether *eubulia, synesis* and *gnome* are virtues annexed to prudence?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HABITS OF THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT ARE VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above (Q. LV., A. 2). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e., operative matter. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for *happiness is the reward of virtue* (*Ethic.* i. 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore suchlike habits cannot be called virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, as the Philosopher proves in *Topic.* iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues.

On the contrary, The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues.

I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above (Q. LV., A. 3); a habit, as we have already observed (Q. LVI., A. 3), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated (*ibid.*), belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.

Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz., the consideration of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge:—that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (*Moral.* vi.) that the *contemplative life has greater merit than the active life.*

Reply Obj. 1. Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior.

Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.

Reply Obj. 2. Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word *whereby* indicates the efficient cause or object of complete happiness, i.e., God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation.—Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated (Q. III., A. 7).

Reply Obj. 3. Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE ONLY THREE HABITS OF THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT, VIZ., WISDOM, SCIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz., wisdom, science and understanding. Because a species should not be condivided with its genus. But wisdom is a kind of science, as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the intellectual virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of these objects, as we have already explained (P. I., Q. LXXVII., A. 3.) Therefore diversity of habits is taken,

not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions.

Obj. 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, science and understanding.

I answer that, As already stated (A. 1), the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration,—as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a *principle,* and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called *understanding,* which is the habit of principles.

On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and is as a *term.* This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since *things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature* (*Phys.* i., text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is *wisdom,* which considers the highest causes, as stated in *Metaph.* i. 1, 2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and

universal judgment that is not based on the first causes.—But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is *science* that perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom.

Reply Obj. 1. Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz., to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.

Reply Obj. 2. When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both colour, and light, which is the formal aspect under which colour is seen, and is seen at the same time as the colour. On the other hand, the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Again, they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.

Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of

the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. LV., AA. 3, 4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referrible to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 3, they are not intellectual virtues.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL HABIT, ART, IS A VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* ii. 18, 19) that *no one makes bad use of virtue.* But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But *there is a virtue of art,* according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 5). Therefore art is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 3, 4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul.

I answer that, Art is nothing else but *the right reason about certain works to be made.* And yet the good of these things depends, not on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work.

Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the proper of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.

Reply Obj. 1. When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A. 2, *ad* 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although there cannot be a good use without the art.

Reply Obj. 2. In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.

Reply Obj. 3. Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g., the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to suchlike works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but *liberal* arts, in order to distinguish them

from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free (*liber*). On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any suchlike work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them.

Fourth Article.

whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both *about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they are* (*Ethic.* vi. 4, 5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be called an art.

Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to prudence, *to be of good counsel* (*Ethic.* vi. 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 3, e.g., in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from art.

On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (*Ethic.* vi., 5).

I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above (A. 1; Q. LVI., A. 3) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the mere aptness for good work; since it

does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof.

The reason for this difference is that art is the *right reason of things to be made;* whereas prudence is the *right reason of things to be done.* Now *making* and *doing* differ, as stated in *Metaph.* ix., text. 16, in that *making* is an action passing into outward matter, e.g., *to build, to saw,* and so forth; whereas *doing* is an action abiding in the agent, e.g., *to see, to will,* and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to suchlike human actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward makings: since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which reason argues; just as we have said above (A. 2 *ad* 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in *Ethic.* vii. 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good of things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art.—Accordingly it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.

Reply Obj. 1. The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3. Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counsellors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A VIRTUE NECESSARY TO MAN?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right reason about these things, as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither therefore is prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become virtuous.

Obj. 2. Further, *It is by prudence that we are of good counsel,* as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 5. But man can act not only from his own, but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the counsels of prudent men.

Obj. 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does

not seem to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis. ix. 14): *The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.* Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written (Wis. viii. 7) of Divine Wisdom: *She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.*

I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things; namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.

Reply Obj. 1. The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good of prudence

is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (A. 4). Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g., that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man.

Reply Obj. 2. When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in *Ethic.* vi. 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things.—On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with a right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz., art, as regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER "EUBULIA, SYNESIS AND GNOME"* ARE VIRTUES ANNEXED TO PRUDENCE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that εὐβουλία, σύνεσις and γνώμη are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For εὐβουλία is *a habit whereby we take good counsel* (*Ethic.* vi. 9). Now it *belongs to prudence to take good counsel*, as stated (*ibid.*, 5). Therefore εὐβουλία is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself.

Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to the higher to judge of the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is judgment. Now σύνεσις enables us to judge well. Therefore σύνεσις is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no need, besides σύνεσις, of the virtue of γνώμη.

Obj. 4. Further, Cicero (*De Invent. Rhet.* iii.) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz., *memory of the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of the future.* Moreover, Macrobius (*Super Somn. Scip.* i.) mentions yet others: viz., *caution, docility*, and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.

On the contrary stands the authority of the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 9, 10, 11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.

I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is

* *εὐβουλία, σύνεσις, γνώμη.*

counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which perfects the command, viz., prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz., εὐβουλία, which perfects counsel; and σύνεσις and γνώμη, which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall speak further on (*ad* 3).

Reply Obj. 1. Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz., εὐβουλία.

Reply Obj. 2. Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of what has to be done.

Reply Obj. 3. Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, whereas there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects.—Σύνεσις and γνώμη differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for σύνεσις judges of actions according to the common law;

while γνώμη bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II.-II., Q. LI., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 4. Memory, understanding, and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence.—There are, moreover, subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g., domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first named are, in a fashion, potential parts of prudence: because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (II.-II., Q. XLVIII., *seqq.*).

QUESTION LVIII.

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

(*In Five Articles.*)

We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue? (2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue? (3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue? (4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue? (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?

First Article.

WHETHER EVERY VIRTUE IS A MORAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin *mos*, i.e., custom. Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6) that moral virtue is *a habit of choosing the rational mean.* But every virtue is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some way,

as we shall explain further on (Q. LXIV., AA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Cicero says (*De Invent. Rhet.* ii.) that *virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason.* But since every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good *consists in that which agrees with his reason,* as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 13): *When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober.* Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above (Q. LVII., A. 2). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.

I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word *mos ;* for thus we shall be able to discover what a *moral* virtue is. Now *mos* has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts xv. 1): *Except you be circumcised after the manner* (*morem*) *of Moses, you cannot be saved.* Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. i. 11) that *rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions,* they slew them :* and the word is used in the same sense in Ps. lxvii. 7, where we read: *Who maketh men of one manner* (*moris*) *to dwell in a house.* For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word *ethos* is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes with a short *e.*

Now *moral* virtue is so called from *mos* in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of *mos,* i.e., *custom,* is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the

* *Leonum more,* i.e., as lions are in the habit of doing.

powers to their acts, as explained above (Q. IX., A. 1). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes *mos* in the sense of *custom.*

Reply Obj. 2. Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty (Q. XIII., A. 1). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e., a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.

Reply Obj. 3. *Nature is the principle of movement* (*Phys.* ii., text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the appetitive faculty.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MORAL VIRTUE DIFFERS FROM INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* iv. 21) *that virtue is the art of right conduct.* But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.

Obj. 2. Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a *science or habit regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold;* and holiness as *a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God.* Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Soliloq.* i. 6) that *virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason.* But this belongs to

the intellectual virtues, as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

Obj 4. Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6) that *moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.* Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

On the contrary, It is stated in *Ethic.* i. 13 that *there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some, moral.*

I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (*Polit.* i. 3) that *the soul rules the body like a despot,* i.e., as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said *every virtue is a kind of prudence,* as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 13. Hence he maintained that as long as a man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance.

Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (*Polit.* i. 3) that *reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power,* whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence

Augustine says on Ps. cxviii. (*serm.* 8) that *sometimes we understand* (what is right) *while desire is slow, or follows not at all,* in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.

Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine usually applies the term *art* to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that *virtue is the art of right conduct,* this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by prudence.

Reply Obj. 2. All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we have said about art (*ad* 1).

The same applies to the Third Objection.

Reply Obj. 4. Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of prudence.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER VIRTUE IS ADEQUATELY DIVIDED INTO MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (*Ethic.* vi. 3, 5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on (Q. LXI., A. 1). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.

Obj. 2. Further, continency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

Obj. 3. Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz., science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above (Q. LVII., AA. 2, 3, 5). Neither are they moral virtues: since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 1) that *virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral.*

I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz., the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in *De Anima* iii., text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas

if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.

Reply Obj. 1. Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (Q. LVII., A. 4). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. Continency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it conformable to reason. Continency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e., the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and persevering man.—Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive appetite, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue.—And for this reason, continency, desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (*Ethic.* vii. 1, 9).

Reply Obj. 3. Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL WITHOUT INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (*De Invent. Rhet.* ii.), is *a habit like a second nature in accord with reason.* Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.

Obj. 3. Further, moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxii.) that *the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues.* But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Q. LVII., A. 5). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.

I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e., making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in

accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above (Q. LVII., AA. 5, 6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.

Reply Obj. 1. The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Matth. x. 16: *Be ye therefore prudent* (Douay,—*wise*) *as serpents, and simple as doves.*

Reply Obj. 3. The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it *according to right reason*, in so far as it inclines man to that which is,

according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained;* but also it needs to be *joined with right reason*, as Aristotle declares (*Ethic.* vi. 13).

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE INTELLECTUAL WITHOUT MORAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it.

Obj. 2. Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtues, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin to the moral virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, prudence is *a virtue whereby we are of good counsel* (*Ethic.* vi. 9). Now many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.

On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence *to sin willingly* (*Ethic.* vi. 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.

I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason demands

* *Cf.* Plato, *Meno*, xli.

principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz., the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because *such as a man is, such does the end seem to him* (*Ethic.* iii. 5). Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz., prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.

Reply Obj. 2. It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.

Reply Obj. 3. Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.

QUESTION LIX.

OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ according to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether moral virtue is a passion? (2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion? (3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue? (4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion? (5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MORAL VIRTUE IS A PASSION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.

Obj. 2. Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above (Q. XXXV., A. 8). Now *Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a*

virtue, as Augustine states in *De Civ. Dei* ix. 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.

On the contrary, It is stated in *Ethic.* ii. 5 that *passions are neither virtues nor vices.*

I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q. XXII., A. 3): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit.—Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referrible both to good and to evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referrible to good alone, as stated above (Q. LV., A. 3).—Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referrible to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (*Ethic.* ii. 6) states that it is *a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.*

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between passions.

Reply Obj. 2. If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e., an act of virtue, in so far as *that movement of the soul is obedient to reason*; viz., *when pity is bestowed without violating right*,

as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven, as Augustine says (*ibid.*). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.

Second Article.

Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (*Topic.* iv.) that *a gentle man is one who is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way.* The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral virtues are without passion.

Obj. 2. Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is of the body, as stated *Phys.* vii., text. 17: wherefore *virtue is a kind of health of the soul,* as Cicero says (*Quæst. Tuscul.* iv.). But the soul's passions are *the soul's diseases,* as he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vi. 5) that *pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence :* and Sallust says (*Catilin.*) that *when they,* i.e., the soul's passions, *interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth.* Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 6): *If the will is perverse, these movements,* viz., the passions, *are perverse also : but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.* But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them.

I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (*De Civ. Dei* ix. 4). For the

Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (*ibid.*), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.

This difference, as Augustine observes (*ibid.*), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e., the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius,* quoted by Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* ix., *loc. cit.*), *it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow,* in so far as *these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto.*

Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (*Ethic.* ii. 3) that *some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified:* they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions *that are not as they should be as to manner and time.*

* *Noct. Attic.* xix. 1.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher rejects this opinion (*Ethic.* ii., *loc. cit.*), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion.—It may be said, however, that when he says that *a gentle man is not passionate,* we are to understand this of inordinate passion.

Reply Obj. 2. This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in *De Tuscul. Quæst.* iv. take the passions in the sense of inordinate emotions.

Reply Obj. 3. When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.

Third Article.

Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. viii. 7: *She,* i.e., Divine wisdom, *teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude.* Now the *conversation* of wisdom *hath no bitterness,* as we read further on (*verse* 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also.

Obj. 2. Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* vii. 13; x. 5). But a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (*Tusc. Quæst.* iv.). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it.

On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there

was sorrow in Him, for He said (Matth. xxvi. 38): *My soul is sorrowful even unto death.* Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three εὐπάθειαι, i.e., *three good passions,* in place of the three disturbances: viz., instead of covetousness, *desire;* instead of mirth, *joy;* instead of fear, *caution.* But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.

First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow.—Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to 1 Jo. i. 8: *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.*—A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to 2 Cor. vii. 10: *The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.*—Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason.

Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind

resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6, 7).—Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.

Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2. Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.

Reply Obj. 3. Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the present state of life.

Fourth Article.

Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 3) that *moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow.* But

pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 4; Q. XXXI., A. 1; Q. XXXV., AA. 1, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.

Obj. 2. Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* i. 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (Q. XXII., A. 3). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.

Obj. 3. Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 6, 10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.

On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in *Ethic.* v. 1, *seqq.*

I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (Q. XXII., A. 3). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.

Reply Obj. 1. The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the words quoted, adds, *if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows,* viz., as about something that results from virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.

Fifth Article.

Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion.

Obj. 2. Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom. vii. 5) they are called *passions of sins.* Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion.

Obj. 3. Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (*De Morib. Eccl.* vi., xi., xiii.). But God does all things without passion. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion at all.

On the contrary, No man is just who rejoices not in just deeds, as stated in *Ethic.* i. 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot be without passion: and still less can the other virtues be.

I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions.—But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily

limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.

Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (Q. XVII., A. 7; Q. XXIV., A. 3). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.

Reply Obj. 2. It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.

Reply Obj. 3. The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help.

QUESTION LX.

HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue? (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions? (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations? (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions? (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE MORAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz., prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.

Obj. 2. Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz., the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.

On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q. LVI., A. 2). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXX., A. 2; Q. LXXXI., A. 2). Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LVIII., AA. 1, 2, 3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (Q. LIV., A. 2). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire.—Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter.

Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does

not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (*Ethic.* i. 13). Consequently, objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only.

Reply Obj. 1. The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.—On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power.

Reply Obj. 2. This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3. Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MORAL VIRTUES ABOUT OPERATIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE THAT ARE ABOUT PASSIONS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions. For the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 3) that moral virtue is *an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow.* Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (Q. XXXI., A. 1; Q. XXXV., A. 1). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit.

Obj. 2. Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations also.

Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations.

Obj. 3. Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions.

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude, and gentleness, about passions (*Ethic.* ii. 3, 7; v. 1, *seqq.*).

I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow, which are passions, as stated above (Q. LIX., A. 4 *ad* 1).

Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter.—On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in suchlike operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude, and the like.

It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice

is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions, for the reason given above.

Third Article.

Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations.

Obj. 2. Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v. 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and again in distributions, as is set down in *Ethic.* v. 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations.

On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations.

I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in the one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is established, as we have stated (A. 2), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice.—But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favour already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: e.g., *Religion* whereby we pay our debt to God; *Piety,* whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; *Gratitude,* whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1. Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (*De Inv.* ii.) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good of his country.—But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz., the common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by

that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on (II.-II., Q. LXI., A. 1).

Fourth Article.

Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz., love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz., joy or sorrow, as we stated above (Q. XXV., AA. 1, 2, 4; Q. XXVII., A. 4). Therefore there is but one moral virtue about all the passions.

Obj. 2. Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions.

Obj. 3. Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 4). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz., temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about different passions.

On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 6, 10; iv. 5.

I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 1).

On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g., between black and white.—Secondly, because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz., the attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow.—On the other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about suchlike passions: e.g., temperance, about the concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.

Reply Obj. 1. All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice for the unity of moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates.

Reply Obj. 3. Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same virtue.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER IN POINT OF THE VARIOUS OBJECTS OF THE PASSIONS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according to the objects of those passions.

Obj. 2. Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions.

Obj. 3. Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same

reason so do all fearful objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions.

Obj. 4. Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and *eutrapelia** about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be different virtues about fears of evils.

On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and *eutrapelia* about pleasures in games.

I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of the reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above (A. 4); and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e.g., pleasure.

And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above (A. 4); therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues,—for instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain.—Moreover since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence, one single object of the passions,

* εὐτραπελία.

according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.

Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of *temperance.* As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, *like art, is about difficult things* (*Ethic.* ii. 3).

On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honour; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is *liberality:* but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is *magnificence.** With regard to that good which we call honour, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we

* μεγαλοπρέπεια.

have a virtue called *philotimia*,* i.e., *love of honour*: while if we consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have *magnanimity*. Wherefore liberality and *philotimia* seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.

As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behaviour towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz., that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (*Ethic.* ii. 7) calls *friendship*,† and may be rendered *affability*. Secondly, one man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (*Ethic.* iv. 7) he calls *truthfulness*.‡ For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher calls εὐτραπελία (*Ethic.* iv. 8).

It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz., fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, *philotimia*, gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and *eutrapelia*, all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add *justice*, which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.

Reply Obj. 1. All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.

Reply Obj. 2. Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above.

* φιλοτιμία. † φιλία. ‡ αλήθεια.

Reply Obj. 3. More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason.

Reply Obj. 4. Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement, save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring.—On the other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.

QUESTION LXI.

OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES.

(*In Five Articles.*)

WE must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues? (2) Of their number. (3) Which are they? (4) Whether they differ from one another? (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES SHOULD BE CALLED CARDINAL OR PRINCIPAL VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For *the opposite members of a division are by nature simultaneous* (*Categor.* x.), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the genus *virtue*. Therefore none of them should be called principal.

Obj. 2. Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.

Obj. 3. Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated above (Q. LVIII.,

A. 3). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues.

On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, *Blessed are the poor in spirit* (Luke vi. 20) says: *We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz., temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude.* But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.

I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (Q. LVI., A. 3), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for suchlike virtue not only confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (Q. LVII., A. 4). Consequently, those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. When an univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue into the various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things.

Reply Obj. 2. The theological virtues are above man, as

stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 3 *ad* 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but *super-human* or godlike virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. LVIII., A. 4). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in *Ethic.* vi., 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral.* ii.): *The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues.*

I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.

For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good can be considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called *Prudence.*—Secondly, according as the reason puts its order

into something else; either into operations, and then we have *Justice;* or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason; and then the passions need a curb, which we call *Temperance.* Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, *e.g.*, through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is *Fortitude.*

In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz., the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by *Prudence;* and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of *Justice,* the concupiscible faculty, subject of *Temperance,* and the irascible faculty, subject of *Fortitude.*

Reply Obj. 1. Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.

Reply Obj. 2. That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle.

Third Article.

whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal in any genus. Now *magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues* (*Ethic.* iv. 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a principal virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for Gregory says (*Hom.* iv. *in Ev.*) that *he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind.* Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to James i. 4: *Patience hath a perfect work.* Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue.

On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (*De Invent. Rhet.* ii.).

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q. LVII., A. 6). Again, good as defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz., in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.

Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operations, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many,

both holy doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under them.—Wherefore all the objections fail.

Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death.—Thus again do the objections fail: because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.

Fourth Article.

whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (*Moral.* xxii. 1): *There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance.* But this would not be so, if the above four virtues were distinct from one another: since the different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.

Obj. 2. Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (*De Offic.* xxxvi.): *Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is not weakened and*

bent by any enticement. And of temperance he says (*ibid.*, xliii., xlv.) that it *safeguards the manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say.* Therefore it seems that these virtues are not distinct from one another.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all *that a man should have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness and steadfastness.* But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i.e., choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz., firmness and steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from one another.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Moribus Eccl.* xv) that *there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love,* and he applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby man does what he ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous

habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a *habit*, should be accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a *virtue*, it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a *moral virtue* partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and moral virtue.

Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken as stated above (A. 3). In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above.—It may also be said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be

temperate. Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (*De Offic.* i.), *it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered by toil.*

From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, —either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3. These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CARDINAL VIRTUES ARE FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SOCIAL VIRTUES, PERFECTING, PERFECT, AND EXEMPLAR VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (*Super Somn. Scip.* i.), *the exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God.* Now the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* x. 8) that *it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God.* Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar.

Obj. 2. Further, the *perfect* virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (*ibid.*) that *in a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows*

nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them. Now it was stated above (Q. LIX., A. 5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as *perfect* virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, he says (Macrobius,—*ibid.*) that the *perfecting* virtues are those of the man *who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God.* But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (*De Offic.* i.): *I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz., power and office.* Therefore there are no *perfecting* virtues.

Obj. 4. Further, he says (Macrobius,—*ibid.*) that the *social* virtues are those *whereby good men work for the good of their country and for the safety of the city.* But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* v. 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called *social.*

On the contrary, Macrobius says (*ibid.*) *: Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says : 'The four kinds of virtue are fourfold. In the first place there are social* virtues ; secondly, there are perfecting† virtues ; thirdly, there are perfect‡ virtues ; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Moribus Eccl.* vi.), *the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue : this something is God : if we follow Him we shall live aright.* Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of *exemplar* virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on

* *Cf.* Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself. . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common weal."

† *Virtutes purgatoriæ,* literally, *cleansing virtues.*

‡ *Virtutes purgati animi,* literally, *virtues of the clean soul.*

Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (*cf.* Macrobius,—*ibid.*).

Again, since man by his nature is a social* animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called *social* virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.

But since it behoves man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in *Ethic.* x. 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us,—for instance: *Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect* (Matth. v. 48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called *perfecting* virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone;—temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed.—Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the *perfect virtues*.—Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such are the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance,

* See note on p. 144.

justice, about buying and selling, fortitude, about fear, temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.

Reply Obj. 2. Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (*cf.* Macrobius,—*loc. cit.*) that *the social virtues check the passions*, i.e., they bring them to the relative mean; *the second kind*, viz., the perfecting virtues, *uproot them; the third kind*, viz., the perfect virtues, *forget them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind*, viz., the exemplar virtues.—It may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.

Reply Obj. 3. To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: *Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority.* This agrees with what Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix. 19): *The love of truth demands a hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity.*

Reply Obj. 4. Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* v. 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz., towards the household, or even towards one individual.

QUESTION LXII.

OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are any theological virtues? (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? (3) How many, and which are they? (4) Of their order.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE ANY THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to *Phys.* vii., text. 17, *virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature.* But that which is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.

Obj. 2. Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Q. LXI., A. 5), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.

Obj. 3. Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of

virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written (*Ecclus.* ii. 8, *seqq.*): *Ye that fear the Lord believe Him,* and again, *hope in Him,* and again, *love Him.* Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues.

I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Q. V., A. 7). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (*ibid.*, A. 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. i. 4) that by Christ we are made *partakers of the Divine nature.* And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without the Divine assistance. Such-like principles are called *theological virtues:* first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

Reply Obj. 1. A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker.

Reply Obj. 2. These virtues are called Divine, not as

though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because by them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINCT FROM THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine (*De Moribus Eccl.* xv.) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the *order of love.* Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.

On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as

clearly shown above (Q. LVIII., A. 3). Therefore they are distinct from one another.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LIV., A 2 *ad* 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature: the theological virtues, supernaturally.

Reply Obj. 2. The wisdom which the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 3, 7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q. XXVII., A. 4; Q. XXVIII., A. 6 *ad* 2; Q. XLI., A. 2 *ad* 1).—If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q. LXV., AA. 2, 4; II.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 7).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY ARE FITTINGLY RECKONED AS THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz., the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one theological virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 13): *Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason.

But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to 1 Cor. ii. 9: *The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.* Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith.—Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to the movement of intention, which tends to that end as something attainable,—and this pertains to hope,—and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end,—and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.

Reply Obj. 2. Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to 1 Cor. i. 25: *The weakness of God is stronger than men.*

Reply Obj. 3. Two things pertain to the appetite, viz., movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FAITH PRECEDES HOPE, AND HOPE CHARITY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Ephes. iii. 17: *Being rooted and founded in charity.* Therefore charity precedes the others.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* i.): *A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping.* Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope.

Obj. 3. Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A. 2 *ad* 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a passion, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. 2). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope.

On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. xiii. 13): *Now there remain faith, hope, charity.*

I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity.—In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order

of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their respective acts.

But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on (II.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 8).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not already possessed, but which he hopes to possess.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. XL., A. 7), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz., the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved.—Hope also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him.

QUESTION LXIII.

OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature? (2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation? (3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion? (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER VIRTUE IS IN US BY NATURE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 14): *Virtues are natural to us and are equally in all of us.* And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: *If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature, it is virtuous.* Moreover, a gloss on Matth. iv. 23, *Jesus went about,* etc., says: *He taught them natural virtues, i.e., chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally.*

Obj. 2. Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above (Q. LV., A. 4 *ad* 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in man by nature.

Obj. 3. Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written (Job xxxi. 18): *From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb.* Therefore virtue is in man by nature.

On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv.). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.

I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, who upheld the theory of *latent forms.** Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from some separate cause.—Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent.

In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists.—Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active intellect, as Avicenna maintained.—Others said that sciences and virtues are in us by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (*Ethic.* ii. 1), and is nearer the truth.

To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect

* Anaxagoras; *cf.* P. I., Q. XLV., A. 8; Q. LXV., A. 4.

of his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul.

In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively,—but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances.

It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings.—The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY VIRTUE IS CAUSED IN US BY HABITUATION?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that virtues cannot be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine,* commenting on Rom. xiv. 23, *All that is not of faith is sin*, says: *The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin : and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people.* Now faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to Eph. ii. 8: *By grace you are saved through faith.* Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.

Obj. 2. Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, according to Wis. viii. 21: *I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it.* Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.

Obj. 3. Further, actions which lead towards virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.

I answer that, We have spoken above (Q. LI., AA. 2, 3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above (Q. LV., AA. 3, 4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in *mode, species, and order*, as Augustine states (*De Nat. Boni* iii.), or in *number, weight, and measure*, as expressed in Wis. xi. 21, man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now

* *Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi* cvi.

this rule is twofold, as stated above (Q. XIX., AA. 3, 4), viz., human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.

It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established.—On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, *which God works in us without us* (*Super Ps.* cxviii., *Serm.* xxvi.). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good.

Reply Obj. 2. Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated above (Q. XLIX., A. 3): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason.—There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later (Q. CIX., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (A. 1; Q. LI., A. 1), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science

of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results through the appetite partaking of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human virtues.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY MORAL VIRTUES ARE IN US BY INFUSION?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iv.), *it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean.* Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion.

Obj. 2. Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God.

Obj. 3. Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss on Heb. i.* Therefore it is unfitting for him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. viii. 7): *She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude.*

I answer that, Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated (A. 1; Q. LI., A. 1): instead of which natural principles, God

* *Cf.* Jerome on Gal. i. 15, 16.

bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated (Q. LXII., A. 1). Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to those virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e., to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.

Reply Obj. 3. The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER VIRTUE ACQUIRED BY HABITUATION BELONGS TO THE SAME SPECIES AS INFUSED VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said (A. 3), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz., to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.

Obj. 3. Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species.

On the contrary, Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, *which God works in us without us,* as stated above (Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.

I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above (Q. LIV., A. 2; Q. LVI., A. 2; Q. LX., A. 1), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in suchlike concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to the Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behoves man to *chastise* his *body, and bring it into subjection* (1 Cor. ix. 27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues.

The other specific difference among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective

healths are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (*Polit.* iii. 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their being *fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household* (Douay,—*domestics*) *of God* (Eph. ii. 19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.

Reply Obj. 1. Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective acts are not identical.

Reply Obj. 3. God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.

QUESTION LXIV.

OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean? (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean? (3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean? (4) Whether the theological virtues do?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MORAL VIRTUES OBSERVE THE MEAN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in *De Cœlo* i. that *virtue is the limit of power.* Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean.

Obj. 2. Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance magnanimity to very great honours, and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 2, 3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.

Obj. 3. Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but on the contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are per-

fected by tending to something extreme; thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6) that *moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean.*

I answer that, As already explained (Q. LV., A. 3), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the good of things made by art is that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason.—Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the mean.

Reply Obj. 1. Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which it has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity, But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6) that *virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state,* in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: *but it is an extreme in reference to the "best" and "the excellent"* viz. as to its conformity with reason.

Reply Obj. 2. In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. *where* it is right, *when* it is right, and for an *end* that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum *when* it is not right, or *where* it is not right, or for an undue *end*; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto *where* one ought, and *when* one ought. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (*Ethic* iv. 3) that the *magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action.*

Reply Obj. 3. The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e., according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this be done in an undue manner, i.e., out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty.

Second Article.

Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists in its observing the mean. Now, good,

as stated in *Metaph.* ii., text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real mean.

Obj. 2. Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

Obj. 3. Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of justice, as stated in *Ethic.* v. 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 6) that *moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason.*

I answer that, The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean.—Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated (A. 1), moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason.

But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above (Q. LX., A. 2): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit, as justice gives to each one his due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions, wherein the right cannot be established in the same way, since men

are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the passions.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice.

Third Article.

Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean.

Obj. 2. Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in *Ethic.* ii. 6, that *virtue observes the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it.* If therefore intellectual virtues also observe the mean, this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (*Metaph.* x., text. 22, 23). But there seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.

On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue (*Ethic.* vi. 3); and yet there is a mean in art (*Ethic.* ii. 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes the mean.

I answer that, The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may happen to be excessive or deficient,

as stated above (A. 1). Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above (Q. LVI., A. 3). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (*Ethic.* vi. 2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity with a right appetite.

Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect, as stated in *Metaph.* x., text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something were, which in reality is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is.

The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things.—But if we consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence,—of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases.

Reply Obj. 1. Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure.

Reply Obj. 2. There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another kind of virtue, but things themselves.

Reply Obj. 3. The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other: nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end of *Peri Hermeneias*. For though *to be* and *not to be* are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we have *being* and on the other we have simply *non-being;* yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something positive in both cases. Hence *to be* and *not to be* are contradictory: but the opinion stating that *good is good* is contrary to the opinion stating that *good is not good:* and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean.

Fourth Article.

whether the theological virtues observe the mean?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean.

Obj. 2. Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above (Q. LXII., A. 3). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean.

Obj. 3. Further, Hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (*De Duab. Natur.* vii.): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of

two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue observes the mean.

On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written (*Ecclus.* xliii. 33): *Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise.* Therefore theological virtue does not observe the mean.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit.

The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us.

Reply Obj. 1. The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean by reason of conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and

rule; whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. —In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above.

QUESTION LXV.

OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES.

(*In Five Articles.*)

We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another? (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity? (3) Whether charity can be without them? (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity? (5) Whether charity can be without them?

First Article.

WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in *Ethic.* ii. 1, 2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another.

Obj. 2. Further, Magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iv. 2, 3) that *a poor man cannot be magnificent*, and yet he may have other virtues; and (*ibid.*) that *he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous.* Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another.

Obj. 3. Further, As the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another.

Obj. 4. Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another.

On the contrary, Ambrose says on Luke vi. 20: *The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several:* and Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi. 4) that *the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another:* and Gregory says (*Moral.* xxii. 1) that *one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect:* and Cicero says (*Quæst. Tusc.* ii.): *If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all.*

I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity.

But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected, as nearly all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corre-

sponding to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above (Q. LXI., AA. 3, 4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (*Moral.* xxii. 1) that *a virtue cannot be perfect* as a virtue, *if isolated from the others:* for *there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude:* and he continues to speak in like manner of the other virtues (*cf.* Q. LXI., A. 4, Obj. 1). Augustine also gives the same reason (*De Trin.* vi. 4).

Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for their connection (*Ethic.* vi. 13). Because, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 4), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is *right reason about things to be done*, and the starting-point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.

Reply Obj. 1. Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things

which have to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, if prudence be lacking.

But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues,—provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (*Phys.* ii., text. 56): *That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all.*

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3. The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions

have their rise in certain initial passions, viz., love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz., pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.

Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 1; Q. LVIII., A. 5 *ad* 1).

Reply Obj. 4. Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, *A whole is greater than its part*, he cannot acquire the science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion.—Moreover, things *done* are related to one another, but not things *made*, as stated above (*ad* 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MORAL VIRTUES CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue can be without charity. For it is stated in the *Liber Sentent. Prosperi* vii.,

that *every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad.* But *charity can be in none except the good,* as stated in the same book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity.

Obj. 2. Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 1, 2, whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, according to Rom. v. 5: *The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.* Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity.

Obj. 3. Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Eph. iii. 19: *The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.* Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and can be without it.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jo. iii. 14): *He that loveth not, abideth in death.* Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is *by them* that *we lead a good life,* as Augustine states (*De Lib. Arb.* ii. 17, 19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXIII., A. 2), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles.—But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Suchlike moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above (A. 1; Q. LVIII., AA. 4, 5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards

his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, that *contradictories cannot both be true at the same time.* It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine* on the words, *All that is not of faith is sin* (Rom. xiv. 23), says: *He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good.*

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, *it makes its possessor good,* and consequently cannot be in the wicked.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral virtues.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE WITHOUT MORAL VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of

* *Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi* cvi.

virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. xiii. 4, *seqq.* : *Charity is patient, is kind*, etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.

Obj. 2. Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own sake: hence *pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit* (*Ethic.* ii. 3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says (on Luke xvii. 10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues.

On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written (Rom. xiii. 8): *He that loveth his neighbour, hath fulfilled the Law.* Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in *Ethic.* v. 1, 2. Therefore he that has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (*Epist.* clxvii.),* that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.

I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with

* *Cf. Serm.* xxxix. and xlvi. *de Temp.*

charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work.

It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity.

Reply Obj. 2. It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain contrary dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.

Reply Obj. 3. Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues.

Fourth Article.

WHETHER FAITH AND HOPE CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity.

Obj. 2. Further, *no man believes unwillingly* as Augustine says (*Tract.* xxvi. *in Joan.*). But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above (Q. LXII., A. 3). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Enchiridion* viii.) that *there can be no hope without love.* But love is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.

On the contrary, A gloss on Matth. i. 2 says that *faith begets hope, and hope, charity.* Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity.

I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.

Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion

without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (*Ethic.* ii. 6).

Reply Obj. 1. Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this is not without charity.

Fifth Article.

whether charity can be without faith and hope?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.

Obj. 2. Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Ephes. iii. 17: *Rooted and founded in charity.* Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope, and the other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain further on (P. III., Q. VII., AA. 3, 4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. xi. 6): *Without faith it is impossible to please God;* and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to Prov. viii. 17: *I love them that love me.* Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above (Q. LXII., A. 4). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.

I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in *Ethic.* viii. 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 Jo. iv. 16: *He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him,* and from 1 Cor. i. 9, where it is written: *God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.* Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in,

or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope.

Reply Obj. 1. Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope.

Reply Obj. 2. Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, as stated above (Q. LXII., A. 4), and so charity is impossible without them.

Reply Obj. 3. In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension *: so that in Him was perfect charity.

* See above, Q. IV., A. 3.

QUESTION LXVI.

OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES.

(*In Six Articles.*)

We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another? (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal? (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue. (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another. (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another. (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.

First Article.

WHETHER ONE VIRTUE CAN BE GREATER OR LESS THAN ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written (Apoc. xxi. 16) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is *the limit of power* as the Philosopher states (*De Cœlo* i., text. 116); and Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* ii. 19) that *virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose.* Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another.

Obj. 3. Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another.

On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and increase: for it is written (Matth. v. 20): *Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven:* and (Prov. xv. 5): *In abundant justice there is the greatest strength* (*virtus*). Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another.

I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said (Q. XVIII., A. 5; Q. LXI., A. 2) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in *Ethic.* vii. 6.

The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was said above (Q. LII., A. 1), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it great or little, according to the things to which it extends. Now whoever has a virtue, e.g., temperance,

has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his *Commentary on the Predicaments*, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum.

If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one *according to the measure of the giving of Christ*, as stated in Ephes. iv. 9.—And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several archers aim at a fixed target.

Reply Obj. 1. This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on (A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2. This *limit* which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something *more* or *less* good, in the ways explained above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.

Reply Obj. 3. God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures of virtue, according to Ephes. iv. 7: *To every one of you* (Vulg., *us*) *is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THE VIRTUES THAT ARE TOGETHER IN ONE MAN, ARE EQUAL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 7): *Everyone hath his proper gift from God ; one after this manner, and another after that.* Now one gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

Obj. 2. Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised for different virtues; e.g., Abraham for faith (Rom. iv.), Moses for his meekness (Num. vii. 3), Job for his patience (Tob. ii. 12). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: *There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High,** since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

Obj. 3. Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi. 4) that *those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance,* and so on. Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.

I answer that, As explained above (A. 1), the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another,

* See *Lesson* in the Mass *Statuit* (Dominican Missal).

for example, charity, than faith and hope.—Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.

Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above (Q. LXV., A. 1) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this way virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality (*De Trin.* vi. 4) when he says: *If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude, since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all in the same way.*

The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters (Q. LXV., AA. 1, 2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above (Q. LXV., A. 1). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of virtue.

But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God.

Reply Obj. 1. This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all of them equal in the one same subject.—We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.

Reply Obj. 2. One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE BETTER THAN THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, is better. Now the moral virtues are *more lasting even than the sciences* (*Ethic.* i.) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, virtue is defined as *that which makes its possessor good.* Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to *Ethic.* vi. 12, *moral virtue gives right inten-*

tion of the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means. Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.

On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially rational part, as stated in *Ethic.* i. 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.

I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g., *learning than riches,* and yet not better relatively, i.e., *for one who is in want.** Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as explained above (Q. LIV., A. 2; Q. LX., A. 1). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite.

But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other powers to act, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 1), is more excellent.—And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 1. The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the life of the community. Yet it is evident

* Aristotle, *Topic.* iii.

that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action.—That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above (Q. III., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2. The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above (Q. LVI., A. 3). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively.

Reply Obj. 3. Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence, as stated in *Ethic.* ii. 6; vi. 13.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER JUSTICE IS THE CHIEF OF THE MORAL VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice.

Obj. 2. Further, the chief quality in a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to James i. 4, *Patience hath a perfect work.* Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice.

Obj. 3. Further, *Magnanimity has a great influence on*

every virtue, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. Therefore it is greater than justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v. 1) that *justice is the most excellent of the virtues.*

I answer that, A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above (A. 1). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above (Q. VIII., A. 1; Q. XXVI., A. 1): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence *justice is the most excellent of virtues* (*Ethic.* v., *loc. cit.*).—Among the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says (*Rhetor.* i.) that *those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honoured more than others; because the former*, i.e., fortitude, *is useful in war, and the latter*, i.e., justice, *both in war and in peace.*—After fortitude comes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, viz., in matters of food and of sex.—And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence also.

A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is

more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being.

Reply Obj. 1. The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for *a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own* (*Polit.* ii. 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between *meum* and *tuum :* whereas justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice.

Reply Obj. 2. Patience is said to have *a perfect work,* by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter.—It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 3. There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WISDOM IS THE GREATEST OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence seems to

command wisdom, for it is stated in *Ethic.* i. 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (*Ethic.* vi. 8), *orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what extent.* Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.

Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is *the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best,* as stated in *Phys.* vii., text. 17. Now prudence is *right reason about things to be done,* whereby man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Obj. 3. Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (*De Trin.* xii. 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job xxvi. 26: *Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge.* Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Obj. 4. Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wisdom.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vi. 7) that wisdom is *the head* among the intellectual virtues.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the *Metaphysics.* And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all.

Reply Obj. 1. Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, *unless*, as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 7, *man were the greatest thing in the world.* Wherefore we must say, as stated in the same book (*ibid.*), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because *the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is judged of no man* (1 Cor. ii. 15). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to wisdom, viz., how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.

Reply Obj. 2. Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz., the Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (*De Anima* i., text. 1), *one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain.* Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be the greater which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (*De Cœlo* ii., text. 60) that *it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning;* and again (*De Part. Animal.* i. 5) that *it is better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean things.*—Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man,

especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this *belongs to God alone* (*Metaph.* i. 2): and yet this little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.

Reply Obj. 4. The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.

Sixth Article.

Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above (Q. LXII., A. 3). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.

Obj. 2. Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (*Enchirid.* viii.), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity.

Obj. 3. Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Matth. i. 3 says that *faith begets hope, and hope charity.* Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 13): *Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object.—Now, since the three theological virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written (1 Jo. iv. 16): *He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.*

Reply Obj. 1. Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it

only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to Ephes. iii. 19: *The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge.*

Reply Obj. 2. Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as stated above (Q. LXII., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 3. An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other.

QUESTION LXVII.

OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life? (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain? (3) Whether faith remains? (4) Whether hope remains? (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope? (6) Whether charity remains.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, according to Matth. xxii. 30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels,* as stated in *Ethic.* x. 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life.

Obj. 2. Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says (*Moral.* iv. 18): *The works of the active life pass away with the body.* Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this life.

Obj. 3. Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* iii. 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since

* *Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods* (*Ethic.* x. 8).

they are acts of bodily organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. i. 15) that *justice is perpetual and immortal.*

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv. 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine says (*ibid.*), *in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others.* Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in the future life, but after a different manner.

In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according to a certain mode:—and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason.

Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element, they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (*ibid.*) that *prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection.* As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be its act in that life, viz. *to be subject to*

God: because even in this life subjection to a superior is part of justice.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards *commutations and distributions;* of fortitude, as to *matters of terror and danger;* of temperance, in respect of *lewd desires.*

The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of the virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXVII., A. 8). Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q. LXIII., A. 1). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice is it specially said that it is *perpetual and immortal;* both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because its act will not change, as stated.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 8, 9) that *knowledge shall be destroyed,* and he states the

reason to be because *we know in part.* Now just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Categor.* vi.) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life, since *the soul understands nothing without a phantasm* (*De Anima* iii., text. 30); and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life.

On the contrary, The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to Luke xvi. 25: *Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things.* Much more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal and necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues.

I answer that, As stated in the First Part (Q. LXXIX., A. 6), some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands; and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, according to this opinion, neither science nor any other intellectual

virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted.

But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (*De Anima* iii., text. 8) that *the possible intellect is in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually.*—It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the *possible* intellect immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence the *possible* intellect is called *the abode of the species* (*De Anima* iii.) because it preserves the intelligible species.

And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7; Q. LXXXV., A. 1 *ad* 5), cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species, which are in the *possible* intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, but not as regards their material element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues (A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding; because, to wit, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the phantasms.

Reply Obj. 2. Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, which are in the *possible* intellect.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the First Part (Q. LXXXIX., A. 1), the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues (A. 1).

Third Article.

whether faith remains after this life?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after this life, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore faith remains also.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (1 Cor. iii. 11): *Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus*, i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the foundation is removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other virtue remains.

Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differs as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be *evening* and *morning* knowledge;* and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with the knowledge of glory.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. v. 6, 7): *While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight.* But those who are in glory are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory.

I answer that, Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect of contrary forms; thus in colours we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when a thing from being less hot is made more hot (*Phys.* v.,

* *Cf.* P. I., Q. LVIII., A. 6.

text. 19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time.

Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; even as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially.

Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith being defined as *the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not* (Heb. xi. 1). Wherefore Augustine says (*Tract.* xl. *in Joan.*): *What is faith? Believing without seeing.* But it is an imperfect knowledge that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same.

But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject. The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the *morning* and *evening* knowledge of the angels: for the "morning" knowledge is about things according to the being which they have in the Word, while

the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being.—On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium.—On the part of the subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls short of science in so far as it lacks vision.

Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil.—In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same object or in the same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium.—Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject. Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz.

that the Blessed see that which makes them happy, as stated above (Q. III., A. 8). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are incompatible in one and the same subject.

Reply Obj. 1. Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of faith is incompatible.

Reply Obj. 2. Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be perfected also.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HOPE REMAINS AFTER DEATH, IN THE STATE OF GLORY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (*De Trin.* xiv. 9). Much more then does hope remain.

Obj. 2. Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life:—in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever—in the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain.

Obj. 3. Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (*Gen. ad. lit.* xii. 35); and for the glory of the soul, according to Ecclus. xxiv. 29: *They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst,* and 1. Pet. i. 12: *On Whom the angels desire to look.* Therefore it seems that there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. viii. 24): *What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?* But the Blessed see that

which is the object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they do not hope.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is *the act of that which is in potentiality as such* (*Phys.* iii.): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases; for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q. XL., AA. 1, 2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope.

Reply Obj. 1. Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is in our actual possession.

Reply Obj. 2. Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on (II.-II., Q. XIX., A. 2). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility of being punished.—Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain. Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to Prov. i. 33: *He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils.* Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 2; Q. XL., A. 1), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there can be fear of punish-

ment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past nor future, but only the present. —And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q. XLII., A. 2), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost will have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear.

Reply Obj. 3. As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the reason already given (*ad* 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated above (Q. XL., A. 1): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire it.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYTHING OF FAITH OR HOPE REMAINS IN GLORY?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there remains what is common; thus it is stated in *De Causis* that *if you take away rational, there*

remains living, and when you remove living, there remains being. Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.

Obj. 2. Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to Ephes. i. 17, 18: *The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of* God; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light of glory, of which it is written (Ps. xxxv. 10): *In Thy light we shall see light.* Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory.

Obj. 3. Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain.

On the contrary, Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above (A. 3), it seems that it is withdrawn entirely.

I answer that, Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement.

But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely

impossible. Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of colour does not remain identically the same, as though the identical colour were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus: the genus denotes the whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect.

It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus, if the difference be removed, the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the same, but only generically.

Reply Obj. 1. If *rational* be withdrawn, the remaining *living* thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. The imperfection of candle-light is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject: whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and

regard the same subject. Consequently they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air.

Reply Obj. 3. He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose.

Sixth Article.

whether charity remains after this life, in glory?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to 1 Cor. xiii. 10, *when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part,* i.e. that which is imperfect, *shall be done away.* Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained.

Obj. 2. Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same in both cases.

Obj. 3. Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 8): *Charity never falleth away.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth,

and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same.

Reply Obj. 1. The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, charity itself is not done away.

Reply Obj. 2. The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself.

Reply Obj. 3. The reason why the charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in *Ethic.* ix. 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we love Him.

QUESTION LXVIII.

OF THE GIFTS.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE now come to consider the Gifts: under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues? (2) Of the necessity of the Gifts. (3) Whether the Gifts are habits? (4) Which, and how many are they? (5) Whether the Gifts are connected? (6) Whether they remain in heaven? (7) Of their comparison with one another. (8) Of their comparison with the virtues.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GIFTS DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on Job i. 2, *There were born to him seven sons,* says (*Moral.* i. 12): *Seven sons are born to us, when through the conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us:* and he quotes the words of Isaias (xi. 2, 3): *And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him,* etc. where the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine commenting on Matth. xii. 45, *Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits,* etc., says (*De Quæst. Evang.* i., qu. 8): *The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost,* i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called.

Obj. 3. Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; for each gift is *a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life,* etc.* Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is *an unreturnable giving,* according to the Philosopher (*Topic.* iv. 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one another.

Obj. 4. Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above (Q. LVII., A. 2), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety is a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* i. 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three daughters. He also distinguishes (*Moral.* ii. 26) the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house.

I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between them. Because the word *virtue* conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word *gift* refers to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated (Q. LXIII., A. 3) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues.—But there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned virtues.

Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be

* *Cf.* Q. LV., A. 4.

held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections. If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason.

Others observing that Gregory says (*Moral.* ii. 26) that *the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift,* said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation. —But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written (Cant. viii. 7): *Many waters cannot quench charity.*

Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to Isa. xi. 2, 3, said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendour.—Yet neither does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in humility and meekness, according to Matth. xi. 29: *Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart,* and in charity, according to Jo. xv. 12: *Love one another, as I have loved you.* Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion.

Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we find there that the term employed is *spirit* rather than *gift*. For thus it is written (Isa. xi. 2, 3): *The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him*, etc.: from which words we are clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above (Q. IX., AA. 4, 6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter *On Good Fortune* (*Ethic. Eudem.* vii. 8).

Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according to Isa. l. 5: *The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back.* Even the Philosopher says in the chapter *On Good Fortune* (*Ethic. Eudem., loc. cit.*) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Sometimes these gifts are called virtues,

in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of *heroic* or *divine* virtue,* in respect of which some men are called *divine.*

Reply Obj. 2. The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose light flows from God.

Reply Obj. 3. This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, *whereby we lead a good life* as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the promptings of God.

Reply Obj. 4. Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues.

Second Article.

Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary standard of virtue;

* ἀρετη ἡρωϊκή καὶ θεία.

because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

Obj. 2. Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's behaviour to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behaviour towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* ii. 26) that *the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dulness, counsel against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride.* But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of wisdom it is written (*Wis.* vii. 28): *God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom;* and of fear (Ecclus. i. 28): *He that is without fear cannot be justified.* Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary for salvation.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is, in consequence, need for a gift.

Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above (Q. LXII., A. 1). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that

anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from him.

Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 14, 17: *Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also:* and Ps. cxlii. 10: *Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land,* because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1. The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle.

Reply Obj. 2. By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given.

Reply Obj. 3. Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dulness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE HABITS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as *a quality difficult to remove*, as stated in the *Predicaments* (*Categor.* vi.). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in Isa. xi. 2, 3. Moreover, it is written (Jo. i. 33): *He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth ;* on which words Gregory comments as follows (*Moral.* ii. 27): *The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful ; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator.* Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.

Obj. 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.

Obj. 3. Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit: for *the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets,* as Gregory states (*Hom.* i. *in Ezechiel*). Neither, therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost habits.

On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples (Jo. xiv. 17): *He shall abide with you, and shall be in you.* Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from what has been already said (Q. LVI., A. 4; Q. LVIII., A. 2), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory solves this objection (*ibid.*) by saying that *by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts.* Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit.

Reply Obj. 3. Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the comparison fails.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEVEN GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to justice, viz., piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz., the gift of fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.

Obj. 2. Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.

Obj. 3. Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included.

Obj. 4. Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three.

Obj. 5. Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.

On the contrary stands the authority of Holy Writ (Isa. xi. 2, 3).

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are of virtues; and such powers are the reason and appetite.

Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected by *understanding;* the practical reason, by *counsel.* In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by *wisdom;* the practical reason by *knowledge.*—The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to another, is perfected by *piety;* in matters touching himself, it is perfected by *fortitude* against the fear of dangers; and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by *fear,* according to Prov. xv. 27: *By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil,* and Ps. cxviii. 120: *Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments.*—Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend.

Reply Obj. 1. The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made (*Ethic.* vi. 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly

speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God.

Reply Obj. 2. Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei* x. 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety.

Reply Obj. 3. The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved by the craftsman, unless there be contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope, and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.

Reply Obj. 4. Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.

Reply Obj. 5. Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.

Fifth Article.

WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST ARE CONNECTED?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. xii. 8): *To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit.* Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv. 1) that *many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith.* But some of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the same man.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* i.) that wisdom *is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless if it be not based upon wisdom. . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto, . . . and fortitude is very weak if it be not supported by counsel. . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety, . . . and piety is very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge, . . . and assuredly, unless it has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action:* from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.

On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: *It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons, that by turns they feed one another.* Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.

I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated (A. 3) that as the powers of appetite are

disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. v. 5: *The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us*, even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity.

Reply Obj. 1. Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the *word* of wisdom and the *word* of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (*Obj.* 1): hence he is referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: *For it is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge.*

Reply Obj. 3. Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by another, as stated above (Q. LXV., A. 1); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the

gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed that *each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend its support to another.* We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.

Sixth Article.

Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (*Moral.* ii. 26) that by means of His sevenfold gift the *Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations.* Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to Isa. xi. 9: *They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain.* Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in heaven.

Obj. 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above (A. 3). But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory says (*Moral.* i. 15) that *understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard, . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly, . . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity, . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy,* all of which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory.

Obj. 3. Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (*Moral.* vi.). Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Spiritu Sancto* i. 20): *The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose out-*

pouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue.

I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be *all in all* (1 Cor. xv. 28), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues (Q. LXVII., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 2. Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in the future state. For he says that *wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things;* of which two, hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says *that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness,* of which, hearing passes away, since *they shall teach no more every man . . . his brother* (Jerem. xxxi. 3, 4); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it *prevents us from being impetuous,* which is necessary in the present life; and also that *it makes the mind full of reason,* which is necessary even in the future state.—Of fortitude he says that it *fears not adversity,* which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it *sets before us the viands of confidence,* which remains also in the future life. With

regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that *she overcomes the void of ignorance*, which refers to the present state. When, however, he adds *in the womb of the mind*, this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future state.—Of piety he says that *it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy*. These words taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbour, signified by *the inmost heart*, belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy.—Of fear he says that *it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things*, which refers to the present state, and that *it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future*, which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to the future state, as regards being *strengthened* for things we hope for here, and obtain there.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be works of the active life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly bliss.

Seventh Article.

Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Deut. x. 12): *And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?* and (Malach. i. 6): *If . . . I be a master, where is My fear?* Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.

Obj. 2. Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says (1 Tim. iv. 8): *Piety* (Douay,—

Godliness) *is profitable to all things.* Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift.

Obj. 3. Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it.

Obj. 4. Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i. 4): *It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these* (of which we read in Matth. v. 3); *but there is a difference of order, for there* (viz. in Isaias) *the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, with the lower gifts.*

I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above (A. 4). Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as

justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude temperance.—But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters.—Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their matter.

Reply Obj. 1. Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for *the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom* (Ps. cx. 10; Ecclus. i. 16), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. xvi. 16), before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts.

Reply Obj. 2. In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with *bodily exercise*, of which he had said that it *is profitable to little.*

Reply Obj. 3. Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (*Ethic.* iii. 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.

Reply Obj. 4. The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE VIRTUES ARE MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE GIFTS?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (*De Trin* xv. 18) while speaking of charity: *No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing.* But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for Gregory says (*Moral.* ii. 26) that *the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues* (viz. the gifts), *so as against folly to bestow wisdom; against dulness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against pride, fear* Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* ii. 19) that *the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose.* But it is possible to make evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (*Moral.* i. 18): *We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair.* Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage

quoted (*Obj.* 2), so that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.

I answer that, As was shown above (Q. LVIII., A. 3; Q. LXII., A. 1), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion.

Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* i. 12) that *the seven sons,* i.e. the seven gifts, *never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all that they do be done in faith, hope, and charity.*

But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect than the virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts.

Reply Obj. 2. There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes love of our neighbour: and in this

way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbour precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God.

Reply Obj. 3. Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which *dealeth not perversely* (1 Cor. xiii. 4). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say.

QUESTION LXIX.

OF THE BEATITUDES.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues? (2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life? (3) Of the number of the beatitudes. (4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BEATITUDES DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES AND GIFTS?

We thus proceed to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, i. 4) assigns the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v. 3, *seqq.*) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke vi. 20, *seqq.*, ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

Obj. 2. Further, there are but two rules of the human will;—the reason and the eternal law, as stated above (Q. XIX., A. 3; Q. XXI., A. 1). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, as is clear from what has been said (Q. LXVIII., AA. 1, 3, *seqq.*). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them.

Obj. 3. Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace. Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. II., A. 7; Q. III., A. 1), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 9) that *children are said to be happy because they are full of hope;* and the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 24): *We are saved by hope.* Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit from habit, but as act from habit.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above (Q. LXVIII., A. 8). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.

Reply Obj. 3. Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might seem to be virtues, they are never-

theless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him, as stated above (Q. LXVIII., A. 2).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE REWARDS ASSIGNED TO THE BEATITUDES REFER TO THIS LIFE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because they hope for a reward, as stated above (A. 1). Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come.

Obj. 2. Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes, Luke vi. 25, where we read: *Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep.* Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job xxi. 13: *They spend their days in wealth.* Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes refer to this life.

Obj. 3. Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix.).* Again, abundant fulness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps. xvi. 15: *I shall be filled* (Douay,—*satisfied*) *when Thy glory shall appear.*—Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 Jo. iii. 2: *We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.* Therefore these rewards refer to the future life.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i. 4): *These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can*

* *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte,* i. 1.

express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us after this life.

I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (*Super Luc.* v.), hold that all these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (*loc. cit.*) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (*In Matth.* xv.) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life.

In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to, future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.

Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.

Reply Obj. 1. Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that end, according to Ps. xxvii. 7: *In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped.*

Reply Obj. 2. Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence Augustine says (*Conf.* i.): *Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord,—that the disordered mind should be its own punishment.* The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (*Ethic.* ix. 4) that *their soul is divided*

against itself, . . . one part pulls this way, another that; and afterwards he concludes, saying: *If wickedness makes a man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice.*—In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to Matth. xix. 29, and Mark x. 30: *Ye shall receive a hundred times as much* even *in this time.*

Reply Obj. 3. All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this life. Because the *kingdom of heaven*, as Augustine says (*loc. cit.*), can denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as *the spirit* begins to reign in men.—The *possession* of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance, signified by *the land.*—They are *comforted* in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the *Paraclete*, i.e. the Comforter.—They *have their fill*, even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said (Jo. iv. 34): *My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me.*—Again, in this life, men *obtain* God's *mercy.*—Again, the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, *see God.*—Likewise, in this life, those who are the *peacemakers* of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called *the children of God.*—Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven.

Third Article.

whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.

Obj. 2. Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seem to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently indicated.

Obj. 3. Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.

Obj. 4. Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written (Job v. 17): *Blessed is the man whom God correcteth;* and (Ps. i. 1): *Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly;* and (Prov. iii. 13): *Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom.* Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.

Obj. 5. *On the other hand,* it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are indicated.

Obj. 6. Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matth. v. are too many.

I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life.* Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition to future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof.

And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness.

* See Q. III.

For a life of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honours; from which man is withdrawn,—by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation,—and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: *Blessed are the poor in spirit*, which may refer either to the contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honours, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn,—by a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason,—and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: *Blessed are the meek.* From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn,—by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation,—and by a gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice of sorrow;* hence the third beatitude is: *Blessed are they that mourn.*

Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbour, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former we are disposed,—by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbour, which pertains to justice;—and by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: *Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice.* With regard to spontaneous favours we are perfected,—by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality,—and by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Luke xiv. 12, 13): *When thou makest a*

* *Cf.* Q. XXXV., A. 3.

dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, etc. . . . *but . . . call the poor, the maimed,* etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: *Blessed are the merciful.*

Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: *Blessed are the clean of heart.* But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in relation to his neighbour, the effect of the active life is peace, according to Isaias xxxii. 17: *The work of justice shall be peace:* hence the seventh beatitude is: *Blessed are the peacemakers.*

Reply Obj. 1. The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of gifts pertaining to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to *see God* corresponds to the gift of understanding; and to be like God by being adopted *children of God,* corresponds to the gift of wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2. In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* ii. 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and mercy in respect of counsel.

Reply Obj. 3. In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In

this way all the first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Luke vi. 22: *It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,* fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world.

Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. i. 18: *He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow* (Vulg.,—*labour*). The principal motive for hungering after the works of justice, is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to Dan. iv. 24: *Let my counsel be acceptable to the king* (Vulg.,—*to thee, O king*): *and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor.*—It is thus that Augustine assigns them (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i. 4).

Reply Obj. 4. All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, *Blessed is the man whom the Lord correcteth,* we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, *Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly,* we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read, *Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom,* this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that can be adduced.

Reply Obj. 5. The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit,

meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.

Reply Obj. 6. Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude (vi. 17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: *Blessed are ye poor.*—The second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place: *Blessed are ye that hunger.* The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside by saying: *Blessed are ye that weep now.* The fourth is the outward favour of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: *Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you.* And as Ambrose says on Luke vi. 20, *poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude.*

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE REWARDS OF THE BEATITUDES ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.

Obj. 2. Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same ground, it should have been assigned to all.

Obj. 3. Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i. 4): whereas the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to *possess the land* is less than to possess *the kingdom of heaven*. Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.

On the contrary stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards.

I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness indicated above (A. 3). For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and honours, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.

Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbour: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede from acts of

justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery.

The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God.—Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.

Reply Obj. 1. As Chrysostom says (*Hom.* xv. *in Matth.*), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to the merits to which those rewards are assigned.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to Ambrose (*Super Luc.* v.), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of the body.

Reply Obj. 3. The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is

accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son.

QUESTION LXX.

OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts? (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes? (3) Of their number? (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST WHICH THE APOSTLE ENUMERATES (GAL. V.) ARE ACTS?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. v. 22, 23), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is written (Wis. iii. 15): *The fruit of good labour is glorious*, and (Jo. iv. 36): *He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting.* Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.

Obj. 2. Further, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* x. 10), *we enjoy* the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them.* But our will should not rest in our actions for their own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.

Obj. 3. Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness,

* *Fruimur*, from which verb we have the Latin *fructus* and the English *fruit.*

faith, and chastity. Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above (Q. LV., A. 1). Therefore the fruits are not actions.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xii. 33): *By the fruit the tree is known;* that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.

I answer that, The word *fruit* has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation—to the tree that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word *fruit* in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers.

Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.

If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine seed, for it is written (1 Jo. iii. 9): *Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him.*

Reply Obj. 1. Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are referred to the end which is

eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. xxiv. 23): *My flowers are the fruits of honour and riches.*

Reply Obj. 2. When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression *for the sake of* be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last end. Secondly, so that it express the formal cause; and in this way a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else.—Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (*De Parad.* xiii.) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because *they refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight.*

Reply Obj. 3. Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (*Tract.* xl. *in Joan.*): *Faith is to believe what thou seest not;* and (*De Doctr. Christ.* iii. 10): *Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbour.* It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FRUITS DIFFER FROM THE BEATITUDES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above (Q. LXIX., A. 1 *ad* i.). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2. Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.

Obj. 3. Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above (Q. III., A. 1; Q. IV., A. 1). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another.

On the contrary, Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes.

I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the virtues, as already stated (Q. LXIX., A. 1, *ad* 1).

Reply Obj. 1. This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.

Reply Obj. 2. The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.

Reply Obj. 3. More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FRUITS ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED BY THE APOSTLE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. v. 22, 23). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to Rom. vi. 22: *You have your fruit unto sanctification.* Moreover it is written (Isa. xxvii. 9): *This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away.* Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.

Obj. 2. Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A. 1). But Our Lord mentions (Matth. xiii. 23) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. *hundredfold, sixtyfold* and *thirtyfold.* Therefore one should not reckon twelve fruits.

Obj. 3. Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated.

Obj. 4. *On the other hand,* It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated (A. 2) that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve fruits of which it is written (Apoc. xxii. 2): *On both sides of the river was the tree of life bearing twelve fruits.* Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set

in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it.

Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as stated above (Q. XXVII., A. 4). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon *charity*, wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence it is written (Rom. v. 5): *The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.*—The necessary result of the love of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence of God Whom it loves, according to 1 Jo. iv. 16: *He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him:* wherefore the sequel of charity is *joy*. Now the perfection of joy is peace, in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written (Ps. cxviii. 165): *Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block*, because, to wit, external things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, *peace* is given the third place.—In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to *patience;* secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed; which

belongs to *long suffering*, since *to lack good is a kind of evil* (*Ethic.* v. 3).

Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbour, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs *goodness*.—Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs *benignity*, for the benign are those in whom the salutary flame (*bonus ignis*) of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbour. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbour inflicts on him. To this belongs *meekness*, which curbs anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbour not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit. To this pertains *faith*, if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that is his, to God.

Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by *modesty*, whereby we observe the *mode* in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by *continency* and *chastity*: whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, continency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away by them.

Reply Obj. 1. Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.

Reply Obj. 2. The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus continency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the continency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal continency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy men

distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and its end.

Reply Obj. 3. The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in.—And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: *Faith, which is certainty about the unseen.*

Reply Obj. 4. As Augustine says on Gal. v. 22, 23, *the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many* (either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit) *there are; but to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after.* Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy, and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.

Fourth Article.

Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. v. 19, *seqq.*). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to them.

Obj. 2. Further, one thing has one contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the

Spirit. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another.

Obj. 3. Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh, are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the works of the flesh.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (*ibid.* 17) that *the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.*

I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit.

Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this way they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A. 3 *ad* 4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal.—However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on Gal. v. 22, 23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus *to fornication, which is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and*

goodness, to forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, continency.

Reply Obj. 1. That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called fruits, but not so works of vice.

Reply Obj. 2. *Good happens in one way, evil, in all manner of ways,* as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.): so that to one virtue many vices are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

QUESTION LXXI.

OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect of sin.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue? (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature? (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act? (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue? (5) Whether every sin includes action? (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (*Contra Faust.* xxii.): *Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law.*

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in *Metaph.* x., text. 17. Now sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of any things whatever.

Obj. 2. Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Cicero says (*De Quæst. Tusc.* iv.) that *virtue is the soul's health.* Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Perfect. Justit.* ii.) that *vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil.* But *virtue is a quality which makes its subject good,* as was shown above (Q. LV., AA. 3, 4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue,—the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies *directly* a disposition whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (*Phys.* vii., text. 17) that *virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its nature.* That which virtue implies *consequently* is that it is a kind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature.—That to which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above (Q. LVI., A. 3).

Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is *sin,* which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an inordinate and due act:—in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is *malice*:—while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is *vice*: because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii.): *Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice.*

Reply Obj. 1. These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.

Reply Obj. 2. Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason for this is because a thing operates

according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. As Cicero says (*De Quæst. Tusc.* iv.), *disease and sickness are vicious qualities,* for in speaking of the body *he calls it* disease *when the whole body is infected,* for instance, with fever or the like; he call it sickness *when the disease is attended with weakness;* and vice *when the parts of the body are not well compacted together.* And although at times there may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; *yet, in the soul,* as he says, *these two things are indistinguishable, except in thought.* For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since *a tree is known by its fruit,* i.e. man by his works, according to Matth. xii. 33. But *vice of the soul,* as Cicero says (*ibid.*), *is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life:* and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease: even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (*Phys.* vii., text. 17). Consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q. LXIII., AA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

Obj. 2. Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus *a stone never*

becomes habituated to upward movement (*Ethic.* ii. 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

Obj. 3. Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Matth. vii. 13): *Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat.* Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

Obj. 4. Further, Sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above (A. 1). Now sin is defined as *a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God,* as Augustine shows (*Contra Faust.* xxii. 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 13): *Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above (A. 1). Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing *vituperated,* which word is derived from *vice* according to Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 14).

But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now *man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason,* as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the virtues are not caused by

nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (*De Inv. Rhet.* ii.) that *virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second nature:* and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature.

Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as *being against nature* is contrary to *being from nature:* and not in so far as *being against nature* is contrary to *being in accord with nature,* in which latter sense virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature.

Reply Obj. 3. There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason.

Reply Obj. 4. Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 6) that *every nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the Divine art whereby it was made.*

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER VICE IS WORSE THAN A VICIOUS ACT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting

a good is, the better it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

Obj. 2. Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

Obj. 3. Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness.

On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious habit.

I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in *Metaph.* ix. 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since *the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so.*

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit

is more lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain respect.

Reply Obj. 2. A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e., virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness.

Reply Obj. 3. Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN IS COMPATIBLE WITH VIRTUE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, therefore, can sin.

Obj. 3. Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (*Phys.* ii., text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the seed, as stated in *Phys.* ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ii. 2, 3) that *virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes.* Now one virtuous act does not cause a virtue, as stated above (Q. LI., A. 3): and, consequently, one sinful act does not

corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject.

I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by one act, as stated above (Q. LXIII., A. 2 *ad* 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled *as virtues.* And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.

Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired.

Reply Obj. 1. Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but not with the habit, of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts of virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY SIN INCLUDES AN ACTION?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 18):* *So true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.* Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies an act.

Obj. 3. Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.

On the contrary, It is written (James iv. 17): *To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin.* Now *not to do* does not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.

I answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior;—interior, as when a man wills *not to go to church,* when he is

* *Cf. De Vera Relig.* xiv.

bound to go:—exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.

Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills *not to go to church:* while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church.

If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills *not to go to church,* because it is too much trouble; and in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the

will bears directly on something else, which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church,—or precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention. and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental (*Phys.* ii., text. 49, 50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.

Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins.

Reply Obj. 1. More things are required for good than for evil, since *good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results from each single defect,* as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv.): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act.

Reply Obj. 2. The term *voluntary* is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 5. Hence even *not to will* may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in his power to will, and not to will.

Reply Obj. 3. The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act.

Sixth Article.

WHETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DEFINED AS A WORD, DEED, OR DESIRE CONTRARY TO THE ETERNAL LAW?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: *Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law.* Because *word, deed,* and *desire* imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore this definition does not include every sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De duab. anim.* xii.): *Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids.* Now will is comprised under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: *Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law,* nor was there need to add *word* or *deed.*

Obj. 3. Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the end, as explained above (Q. I. A. 3; Q. XVIII., AA. 4, 6; Q. XX., AA. 2, 3): wherefore, Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.* i.) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that *sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things:* and again he says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 30) that *all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use.* Now the definition in question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.

Obj. 4. Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God.

Obj. 5. Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above (A. 1). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Therefore it would have been better to say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law.

On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices (*Contra Faust.* xxii. 27).

I answer that, As was shown above (A. 1), sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above (Q. I., A. 1), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (*loc. cit.*) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says, *word, deed, or desire;* the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, *contrary to the eternal law.*

Reply Obj. 1. Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus *relation*, as Augustine states (*De Trin.* v. 6, 7): and so *word* and *deed* denote equally what is said and what is not said, what is done and what is not done.

Reply Obj. 2. The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external action.

Reply Obj. 3. The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, *contrary to the eternal law*, he includes aversion from the end and all other forms of inordinateness.

Reply Obj. 4. When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely because it is inordinate.

Reply Obj. 5. The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offence against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being *contrary to the eternal law*, more fittingly than with reference to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith.

QUESTION LXXII.

OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS.

(In Nine Articles.)

WE must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects? (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins. (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes? (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against? (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment? (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission? (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages? (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency? (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SINS DIFFER IN SPECIES ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECTS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above (Q. I., A. 3; Q. XVIII., AA. 4, 6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 1), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects.

Obj. 2. Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ

specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their objects.

Obj. 3. Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material, as Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxiv. 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects.

On the contrary, Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law. Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above (Q. XVIII., A. 2). Therefore sins also differ in species according to their objects.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 6), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for *no one acts intending evil,* as Dionysius declares (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according to their objects, as was proved above (Q. XVIII., A. 1). Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects.

Reply Obj. 1. The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends.

Reply Obj. 2. Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to the objects of their acts rather than according

to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above (Q. LX., A. 5).

Reply Obj. 3. In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things adapted to human use.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SPIRITUAL SINS ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED FROM CARNAL SINS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. v. 19): *The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts,* etc., from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.

Obj. 2. Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in Rom. viii. 13: *If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.* Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.

Obj. 3. Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to Eph. iv. 23: *Be renewed in the spirit of your mind,* where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on (Q. LXXIV., A. 7). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and

consequently they should not be distinguished from one another.

Obj. 4. Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against his own body. But, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. vi. 18), *every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body.* Therefore fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph. v. 3) reckons covetousness with the carnal sins.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi. 17) says that *of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q. XXXI., A. 3), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure.

Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. vii. 1): *Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit.*

Reply Obj. 1. As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 2, 3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3. Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are named, is carnal pleasure.

Reply Obj. 4. As the gloss says (*ibid.*), *in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning it can think of nothing else:* whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason.—It may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man said specially to sin against his body. While covetousness, which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife.—Again, it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory says (*loc. cit.*) that it is a spiritual sin.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY IN REFERENCE TO THEIR CAUSES?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they differ specifically in reference to their causes.

Obj. 2. Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference to their other causes.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. lxxix. 17, *Things set on fire and dug down,* says that *every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us*

to undue ardour. For it is written (1 Jo. ii. 16) that *all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or* (Vulg.,—*and*) *the concupiscence of the eyes, or* (Vulg.,—*and*) *the pride of life.* Now a thing is said to be in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (*Tract.* ii. *in Joan.*). Gregory, too (*Moral.* xxxi. 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes.

On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus. x. 15) that *pride is the beginning of all sin,* and (1 Tim. vi. 10) that *the desire of money is the root of all evils.* Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes.

I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the *formal* and the *material* cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form, both in species and in genus.—The *agent* and the *end* regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue ardour. Hence it

is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above (Q. I., A. 3; Q. XVIII., AA. 4, 6) that human acts take their species from the end.

Reply Obj. 1. The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (*Metaph.* ix., text. 15, 16), and consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end.

Reply Obj. 2. Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter *about which ;* but, in relation to the interior act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as the matter *about which,* they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (*Phys.* v., text. 4; *Ethic.* x. 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has the character of end.

Reply Obj. 3. These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SIN AGAINST GOD, AGAINST ONESELF, AND AGAINST ONE'S NEIGHBOUR ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbour, and against oneself. For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is *against God's law,* as stated above (Q. LXVI., A. 6). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin

are not opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbour, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three.

Obj. 3. Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbour are external to us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.

On the contrary, Isidore (*De Summo Bono*), in giving the division of sins, says that *man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbour.*

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXI., AA. 1, 6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man:—one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason:—another order is in relation to the rule of the Divine law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice.—But since man is naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in *Polit.* i. 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbour, we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbour; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbour, he is said to

sin against his neighbour, as appears in the thief and the murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbour, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from what has been said (Q. LXII., AA. 1, 2, 3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his neighbour.

Reply Obj. 1. To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin.

Reply Obj. 2. When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers three and four.

Reply Obj. 3. Although God and our neighbour are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it as its object.

Fifth Article.

Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is divided into *mortal* and *venial.* For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal

sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Deut. xxv. 2: *According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.* Therefore venial and mortal sin are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species.

Obj. 2. Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species,* as murder and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species,* as an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sin differ specifically.

Obj. 3. Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (A. 1 *ad* 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment.

On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin, as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment.

I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference:—the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be found save in different species, e.g. *rational* and *irrational, animate* and *inanimate*:—the other difference is consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same species; thus *white* and *black* are consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man.

We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference in respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes

* *Ex genere,* genus in this case denoting the species.

a species; and what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (*Phys.* ii., text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.

Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humours; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation (*Ethic.* vii. 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the

nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.

Reply Obj. 1. Mortal and venial sin are infinitely apart as regards what they *turn away from*, not as regards what they *turn to*, viz. the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species *adultery* the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2. From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in things of the same species, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.

Sixth Article.

Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For *offence* and *sin* are condivided with one another (Eph. ii. 1), where it is written: *When you were dead in your offences and sins*, which words a gloss explains, saying: "*Offences*," *by omitting to do what was commanded, and* "*sins*," *by doing what was forbidden.* Whence it is evident that *offence* here denotes sins of omission; while *sin* denotes sins of commission. Therefore they differ

specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species.

Obj. 2. Further, It is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said (Q. LXXI., A. 6). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, against which is the sin of commission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically.

Obj. 3. Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, since negation has no species; for *there is neither species nor difference of non-being,* as the Philosopher states (*Phys.* iv., text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species.

On the contrary, Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically.

I answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically according to the natural species.—Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species.—But if we refer to the formal species in sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because they are directed to the same end,

and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold.

Reply Obj. 1. This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to material species, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not, of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various precepts of the Law.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SINS ARE FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SINS OF THOUGHT, WORD, AND DEED?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augus-

tine (*De Trin.* xii. 12) describes three stages of sin, of which the first is *when the carnal sense offers a bait*, which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached *when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought;* and the third stage, *when consent is given to the deed.* Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory (*Moral.* iv. 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is *a fault hidden in the heart;* the second, *when it is done openly;* the third, *when it is formed into a habit;* and the fourth, *when man goes so far as to presume on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair:* where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.

Obj. 3. Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.

On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on Ezech. xliii. 23, says: *The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed.*

I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways:—first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically:—secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* x. 4); and the same can apply to the generation of animals.—Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz., sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the

consummation of the deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin.

Reply Obj. 1. All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.

Reply Obj. 2. Sins of word and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (*loc. cit.*) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome (*loc. cit.*) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man.

Reply Obj. 3. Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement.

Eighth Article.

whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins.

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and less. Now *more* and *less* do

not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.

Obj. 2. Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude of reason.

Obj. 3. Further, *one species cannot be made out of two*, as Porphyry declares.* Now excess and deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful—illiberality being a sin by deficiency, and prodigality, by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.

On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for *contrariety is a difference of form*, as stated in *Metaph.* x., text. 13, 14. Now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically.

I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, as stated above (A. 1), but on the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins by deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.

Reply Obj. 1. Although *more* and *less* do not cause diversity

* *Isagog.*; *cf.* Arist., *Metaph.* i.

of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* viii. 1) that *those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by insufficient proof.* In this way to exceed reason or to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the *boaster,* who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the *cheat,* who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.

Reply Obj. 3. One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal* in taking what one ought not, and prodigal in giving what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY IN RESPECT OF DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that vices and sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.), *evil results from each single*

* *Cf.* II.-II. Q. CXIX, A. 1 *ad* 1.

defect. Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above (Q. XVIII., A. 10). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted.

Obj. 3. Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse:

Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.

Now these pertain to various circumstances, for *hastily* means sooner than is right; *too much*, more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according to the various circumstances.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 7, iv. 1) that *every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not*; and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 8), wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on with the other circumstances, since he does this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species.

Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humours; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure

in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances entails different species of sins.

Reply Obj. 1. Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the things of which the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above (A. 1), but from turning to the object of the act.

Reply Obj. 2. A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive.

Reply Obj. 3. In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated.

QUESTION LXXIII.

OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER.

(*In Ten Articles.*)

WE must now consider the comparison of one sin with another; under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another? (2) Whether all are equal? (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object? (4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed? (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins? (6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes? (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances? (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues? (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against? (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL SINS ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written (James ii. 10): *Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all.* Now to be guilty of transgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (*De Parad.* viii.), *sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments.* Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all.

Obj. 2. Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown

above (Q. LXV., A. 1). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. But whoever lacks a virtue, has its opposite vice. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins.

Obj. 3. Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above (Q. LXV., AA. 1, 2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as Augustine declares (*De Civ. Dei*, xiv. 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has one, has them all.

On the contrary, Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* ii. 8). But contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another.

I answer that, The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above (Q. LXV., A. 1). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many.

Reply Obj. 1. James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns, and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated above (Q. LXXII., A. 1), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that whoever *offends in one point, is become guilty of all*, for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 4), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction of which entails the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue is possible, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 4; Q. LXV., A. 1). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. Nevertheless it does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices or sins—first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 1). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins.

Reply Obj. 3. The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of God, are connected

together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected together.

Second Article.

whether all sins are equal?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.

Obj. 2. Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal.

Obj. 3. Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (*Paradox.* iii.). Therefore all sins are equal.

On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate (Jo. xix. 11): *He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin,* and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is greater than another.

I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on *Paradoxes* (*loc. cit.*), was that all sins are equal: from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation

admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in *being* corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Suchlike privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade shutting out all the light.—There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite habit; it consists in *becoming* corrupted rather than in *being* corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due commensuration of the humours, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness of deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humours or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in *Ethic.* iv. 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal.

Reply Obj. 1. To commit sin is unlawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation.

Reply Obj. 3. Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above (Q. LXVI., AA. 1, 2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not.

Third Article.

whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects.

Obj. 2. Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects.

Obj. 3. Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one another, as is proved in *Phys.* vii., text. 30, *seqq.* Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects.

On the contrary, Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above (Q. LXXII., A. 1). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity of sins varies according to their objects.

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said (Q. LXXI., A. 5), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain commensuration of the humours, in keeping

with an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the humours, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or from some neighbouring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above (Q. LXXII., A. 3, *ad* 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g. unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or a lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above (Q. LXXII., A. 3, *ad* 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above (Q. LXXII., A. 6; Q. XVIII., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2. From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to which man turns.

Reply Obj. 3. All the objects of human acts are related

to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another.

Fourth Article.

Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, so that, to wit, the graver sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to Prov. xv. 5, *In abundant justice there is the greatest strength.* Now, as Our Lord says (Matth. v. 20, *seqq.*), abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, it is stated in *Ethic.* ii. 3 that *virtue is about the difficult and the good:* whence it seems to follow that the greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (1 Cor. xiii. 13). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Ethic.* viii. 10) that the *worst is opposed to the best.* Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.

I answer that, A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways:—first, principally and directly; that sin, to wit, which is about the same object: because contraries are about the

same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above (Q. LX., A. 5; Q. LXXII., A. 1). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in the same genus.—Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor sins.

Reply Obj. 2. The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome by the difficulty.

Reply Obj. 3. Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred of God, which is the most grievous of all sins.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CARNAL SINS ARE OF LESS GUILT THAN SPIRITUAL SINS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: for it is written (Prov. vi. 30, 32):

The fault is not so great when a man has stolen, . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul. Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than spiritual sins.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus* that *the devil rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry.* But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (*Ethic.* vii. 6) that *it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger.* But anger is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi. 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than spiritual sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral.* xxxiii. 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins.

I answer that, Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a *turning to* something, and for that reason, implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a *turning from* something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason it involves greater guilt.—A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, than God and his neighbour, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently

* The quotation is from *De Civ. Dei* ii. 4 and iv. 31.

spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.—A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we shall state further on (A. 6). Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.

Reply Obj. 1. Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on Eph. v. 5, *No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person,* etc.; so that adultery is so much the more grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more than his chattels.

Reply Obj. 2. The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty be withdrawn from it. *For the desire of pleasure is insatiable,* as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* iii. 12).

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher himself says (*ibid.*), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger, is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (*Ethic.* iii. 10) that *sins of intemperance are most worthy of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational animals:* hence, by these sins man is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (*loc. cit.*) that they are more shameful.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF A SIN DEPENDS ON ITS CAUSE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause.

Obj. 2. Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on Rom. vii. 7, *For I had not known concupiscence,* says: *The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils.* Now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished by the greatness of its cause.

Obj. 3. Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause.

On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin.

I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on Matth. vii. 18, *A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit:* and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin.

The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a suchlike cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end.—Other causes incline the will to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or

which weaken the free movement of the will (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes the sin, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater the concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE AGGRAVATES A SIN?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance.

Obj. 2. Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice.

On the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven (*Ethic.* iii. 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (*Ethic.* ii. 1, 2), *it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it.* Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. —Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (*Paradox.* iii.) that *in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic.*—Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the sin

of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.

Reply Obj. 1. Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above (Q. XVIII., A. 10). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance.

Reply Obj. 2. A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance.

Reply Obj. 3. Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right reason.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF ITS CAUSING MORE HARM?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above (Q. XX., A. 5). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.

Obj. 2. Further, harm is inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbour. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, according to Job xxxv. 6, 8: *If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee.* If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbour are more grievous than sins against God or oneself.

Obj. 3. Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 14): *Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of nature.* Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more harm.

I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin.—Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to sin, that

a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not wish simply.—Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follows directly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.

But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Suchlike harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin.

Reply Obj. 1. As we have already stated (Q. XX., A. 5), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the harm done aggravates a sin,

it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbour, that such sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found in sins which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself.—Moreover we might say that although no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavour to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins.—Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some anxiety.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument does not prove, for two reasons:—first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbours; whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not harm but pleasure;—secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF THE CONDITION OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM IT IS COMMITTED?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being scanda-

lized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin.

Obj. 2. Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, because, as Cicero says (*Paradox.* iii.) *The man who kills his slave sins once : he that takes his father's life sins many times.* But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than another's horse, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* v. 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

Obj. 3. Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to Wis. vi. 7: *The mighty shall be mightily tormented,* and Luke xii. 47: *The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did* it *not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes.* Therefore, in like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man, since *there is no respect of persons with God* (Col. iii. 25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (3 Kings xix. 14): *They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword.*—Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Mich. vii. 6: *The son dishonoureth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother.*—Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written (Job xxxiv. 18): *Who saith to the king : " Thou art an apos-*

tate"; who calleth rulers ungodly. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin.

I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above (A. 3) that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbour: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered on the part of these three.

First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God, according to Zach. ii. 8: *He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye.* Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station.—On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to Ecclus. xiv. 5: *He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?*—On the part of his neighbour, a man sins the more grievously, according as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited (Exod. xxii. 28): *The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse.* In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people.

Reply Obj. 1. He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous

person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer.

Reply Obj. 2. The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, however, things belonging to our neighbour are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of injuries done to suchlike things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbour be willing, or give his approval.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EXCELLENCE OF THE PERSON SINNING AGGRAVATES THE SIN?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to God, according to Ecclus. xxv. 13: *How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord.* Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written (2 Paral. xxx. 18, 19): *The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified.* Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.

Obj. 2. Further, *there is no respect of persons with God*

(Rom. ii. 11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.

Obj. 3. Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning.

On the contrary, Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* ii. 18): *A sin is deemed so much the more grievous, as the sinner is held to be a more excellent person.*

I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and suchlike sins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow us to escape altogether.—But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins are all the more imputed to a man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said (Luke xii. 47) that the *servant who knew the will of his lord, . . . and did* it *not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes.*—Secondly, on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according to Wis. vi. 7: *The mighty shall be mightily tormented.*—Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity.—Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; because, as Gregory says (*Pastor.* i. 2): *Sin becomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honoured for his position:* and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont to bear them with more indignation.

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.

Reply Obj. 2. God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3. The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof.

QUESTION LXXIV.

OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN.

(*In Ten Articles.*)

We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin? (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin? (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin? (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin? (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin? (6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason? (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason? (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin? (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin? (10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?

First Article.

WHETHER THE WILL IS A SUBJECT OF SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *evil is outside the will and the intention.* But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will.

Obj. 2. Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that the will wishes the good, it does not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will.

Obj. 3. Further, the same thing cannot be both subject

and efficient cause of sin: because *the efficient and the material cause do not coincide* (*Phys.* 2., text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (*De Duabus Anim.* x., 10, 11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Retract.* i. 9) that *it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously.*

I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above (Q. LXXI., AA. 1, 6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. *to cut* and *to burn*: and suchlike acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (*Phys.* iii., text. 18) that *movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover.*—On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. *to desire* and *to know*: and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated above (Q. I., A. 1; Q. XVIII., A. 6), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore it follows that sin is in the will as its subject.

Reply Obj. 1. Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense sin is in the will.

Reply Obj. 2. If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.

Second Article.

whether the will alone is the subject of sin?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (*De Duabus Anim.* x. 10) that *no one sins except by the will.* Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.

Obj .2. Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the sole will. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 18),* *so true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.* Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.

On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are the subject of virtues, as stated above (Q. LVI.). Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin.

I answer that, As was shown above (A. 1), whatever is a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q. VI., A. 4) in treating of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject.

Reply Obj. 1. We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will.

* *Cf. De Vera Relig.* xiv.

Reply Obj. 2. Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason.

Reply Obj. 3. The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in *Polit.* i. 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE SENSUALITY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now the sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality.

Obj. 2. Further, *no man sins in what he cannot avoid,* as Augustine states (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 18). But man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since *the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore it is signified by the serpent,* as Augustine declares (*De Trin.* xii. 12, 13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now *that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we do with the deliberation of reason,* as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. vii. 19): *The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do:* which words Augustine explains (*Contra Julian.* iii. 26; *De Verb. Apost.* xii. 2, 3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality can be voluntary, in so far as the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.

Reply Obj. 1. Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4). In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.

Reply Obj. 2. The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the 'fomes,' which is never completely destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the 'fomes' does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient of them, for instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently a man cannot avoid all such movements, on

account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.

Reply Obj. 3. Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER MORTAL SIN CAN BE IN THE SENSUALITY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.

Obj. 2. Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* iii. 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A. 3 *ad* 3), mortal sin can be there also.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Retract.* i. 23): *The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even be in those who are in a state of grace*, in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a mortal sin.

I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above (Q. LXXII., A. 5). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason.

Reply Obj. 2. An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as just stated (*ad* 1).

Reply Obj. 3. A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes:—for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science:—sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire:—sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN CAN BE IN THE REASON?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.

Obj. 2. Further, the primary subject of sin is the will, as stated above (A. 1). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.

Obj. 3. Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason.

I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown (AA. 1, 2, 3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing a truth; the other is the act of the reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know:—secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen.—If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and the

defect is imputed to him as a sin.—The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. XVII., A. 1), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason being the principle of the will's act.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (*ad* 1).

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SIN OF MOROSE DELECTATION IS IN THE REASON?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above (Q. XXXI., A. 1). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not in the reason.

Obj. 2. Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing is said to be morose* through taking a length of time. But length of time is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 12) that *if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the*

* From the Latin *mora*,—delay.

mere thought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit. Now *the woman* denotes the lower reason, as he himself explains (*ibid.*). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.

I answer that, As already stated (A. 5), sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust:—secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell (*immoratur*) upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been stated above (A. 1), viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles.

Reply Obj. 2. Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells (*immoratur*) thereon, and fails to drive it away, *deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind,* as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 12).

Seventh Article.

WHETHER THE SIN OF CONSENT TO THE ACT IS IN THE HIGHER REASON?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (Q. XV., A. 1): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.

Obj. 2. Further, *the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law,** as Augustine states (*De Trin.* xii. 7). But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason.

Obj. 3. Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures or other passions. But *consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason,* as Augustine states (*De Trin.* xii. 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.

Obj. 4. Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 12): *If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the*

* *Rationes æternæ, cf.* P. 1, Q. XV., AA. 2, 3, where, as in similar passages *ratio* has been rendered by the English *type,* because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine *idea* as the archetype of the creature. Here the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal law (*cf.* A. 8, *Obj.* 1; A. 9).

bodily senses, so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden fruit to her husband.

I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above (Q. XIX., A. 4). Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.

Reply Obj. 1. Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above (Q. XV., A. 3). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing

is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.

Reply Obj. 2. The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 12), *the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed.*

Reply Obj. 3. The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason.

Reply Obj. 4. The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly be imputed to it.

Eighth Article.

whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the

lower reason, which does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning away from the Divine law, as is evident from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (Q. LXXI., A. 6). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now *the cause of anything being such is yet more so*, or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* x. 3, 5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation.

Obj. 4. Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally.

Obj. 5. Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of fornication.

Obj. 6. Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts

(*Enchirid.* lxxviii.). Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (*De Trin.* xii. 12) that *this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: "Forgive us our trespasses."* Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin.

On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: *Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them.* But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin.

I answer that, There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in *Ethic.* x. 4, and again, that since every delectation has an object, it follows that every delectation may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself,

secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true.

But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains.

Reply Obj. 1. Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above (A. 7). Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins. in so far as the direction of the higher reason fails in directing hem according to the eternal types.

Reply Obj. 2. Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to take pleasure in a useless thought about

fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object.

Reply Obj. 4. The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also.

Reply Obj. 5. The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder.

Reply Obj. 6. The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin.

Ninth Article.

Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a sinful act. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 7) that the *higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal law.* But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the higher reason.

Obj. 2. Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal.

Obj. 3. Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law.

On the contrary, Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above (A. 7). But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason.

I answer that, As Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 7), the higher reason *is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law;* it contemplates it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2. Disease of the heart is twofold:—one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and such a disease is always mortal:—the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial.

Reply Obj. 3. Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the Divine law.

Tenth Article.

Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.

Obj. 2. Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.

Obj. 3. Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously: just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.

On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as such.

I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are

directed by the higher reason. For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.

With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple *intuition*, and *deliberation*, in respect of which it again consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he has thus apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin mortally by giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus.

Reply Obj. 1. A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. In matters of action, the simple intuition

of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.

Reply Obj. 3. One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above.

QUESTION LXXV.

OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sin has a cause? (2) Whether it has an internal cause? (3) Whether it has an external cause? (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN HAS A CAUSE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 6). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Therefore sin has no cause.

Obj. 2. Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.

Obj. 3. Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for *a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit* (Matth. vii. 18). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause.

On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to Job v. 6, *nothing upon earth is done without a cause.* But sin is something done; since it is a *word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God.* Therefore sin has a cause.

I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of removing the cause is the removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will.

Reply Obj. 1. Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained.

Reply Obj. 2. If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is

sufficient and not impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in *Metaph.* vi., text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN HAS AN INTERNAL CAUSE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 3, iv. 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Duabus Anim.* x. 10, 11; *Retract.* i. 9) that *the will is the cause of sin.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal

cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain further on (Q. LXXVII., A. 1). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason and will; the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.

But since we have said above (A. 1 *ad* 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.

Reply Obj. 3. That which causes sin, as a power produces

its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN HAS AN EXTERNAL CAUSE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause.

Obj. 2. Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause.

Obj. 3. Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Num. xxi. 16): *Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?* Therefore something external can be a cause of sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 6; Q. X., A. 4), none can move the will inwardly save God alone, Who

cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q. LXXIX., A. 1). Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being accomplished.

Reply Obj. 1. From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3. If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being voluntary and in our power.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE SIN IS A CAUSE OF ANOTHER?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since *evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless*, as Dionysius declares

(*Div. Nom.* iv.). The material and formal cause seems to have no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause.

Obj. 2. Further, *to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing*, as stated in *Meteor.* iv. 2.* But sin is essentially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.

Obj. 3. Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another.

On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (*Hom.* xi.): *A sin that is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin.*

I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes.—First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts.—Secondly, after the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together.—Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of

* *Cf. De Anima* ii.

theft.—And since the end gives the form to moral matters, as stated above (Q. I., A. 3; Q. XVIII., AA. 4, 6), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material while the latter is formal.

Reply Obj. 1. Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another sin.—A sin has matter, not *of which* but *about which* it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so that there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is not caused by another sin.

QUESTION LXXVI.

OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above (A. 2), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin? (2) Whether ignorance is a sin? (3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether? (4) Whether it diminishes sin?

First Article.

WHETHER IGNORANCE CAN BE A CAUSE OF SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a *turning to* something, as was stated above (Q. LXXV., A. 1). Now ignorance seems to savour of *turning away* from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Nat. et Grat.* lxvii.) *that some sin through ignorance.*

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (*Phys.* viii. 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of sin, in so far as it directs human acts.

Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not *through ignorance* but *in ignorance,* as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* iii. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment.

Reply Obj. 2. As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.

Reply Obj. 3. The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IGNORANCE IS A SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is *a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law*, as stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 5). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a sin, but rather a result of sin.

Obj. 4. Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed

by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin.

Obj. 5. Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.

On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to 1 Cor. xiv. 38: *If any man know not, he shall not be known.* Therefore ignorance is a sin.

I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (*Cœl. Hier.* vii.). On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of suchlike things is called *invincible,* because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason suchlike ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible

ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 6, *ad* 1), when we say that sin is a *word, deed* or *desire*, we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have.

Reply Obj. 2. Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favour.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin.

Reply Obj. 4. Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin.

Reply Obj. 5. Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge that he ought to have.

Third Article.

whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (*Retract.* i. 9), every sin is voluntary. Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (Q. VI., A. 8). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous.

Obj. 3. Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is a partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* iii. 18) that *some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved.* Now those things alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin.

I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated (AA. 1, 2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated in *Ethic.* iii. 1: and suchlike ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same

applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act.

On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin.—But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful;—for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, notwithstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For suchlike negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then suchlike ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every ignorance causes involuntariness,

as stated above (Q. VI., A. 8). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Reply Obj. 2. So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his sin is not accidental.

Reply Obj. 3. If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.

Fourth Article.

whether ignorance diminishes a sin?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 1) that *every evil man is ignorant.* Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

Obj. 2. Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore it does not diminish a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on Rom. ii. 4, *Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?* says: *Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not.* Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

Obj. 4. Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 5) that the *punishment is doubled for a drunken man.* Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from

1 Tim. i. 13: *I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly.* Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.

I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the sin.

Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that suchlike ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man wilfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The ignorance whereby *every evil man is ignorant,* is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin.

Reply Obj. 2. One sin added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not coincide, but are separate. It may

happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies.

Reply Obj. 3. The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice.

Reply Obj. 4. The drunken man deserves a *double punishment* for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (*ad* 2).—It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (*Polit.* ii.).

QUESTION LXXVII.

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will? (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge? (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness? (4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin? (5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 Jo. ii. 16: *Concupiscence of the eyes*, *Concupiscence of the flesh*, and *Pride of life*. (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it? (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether? (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A PASSION OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in general (*De Anima* iii., text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good

defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

Obj. 2. Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii., text. 57) that *the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another.* Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in *De Anima* iii., text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.

On the contrary, It is written (Dan. xiii. 56): *Lust hath perverted thy heart.*

I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary, through being centred on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.

Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on account

of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.

The Third Objection is solved in like manner.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE REASON CAN BE OVERCOME BY A PASSION, AGAINST ITS KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is weak and soon passes away.

Obj. 2. Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to that which

appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter,—on the contrary, if an universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g. *Every man*, and *Not every man*. Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in *Peri Herm.* ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.

Obj. 4. Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from *Poster.* i., text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that *no fornication is lawful*, knows this general proposition to contain, for example, the particular proposition, *This is an act of fornication*. Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.

Obj. 5. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Peri Herm.* i.), *words express the thoughts of the mind*. Now it often happens that man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in particular.

Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. vii. 23): *I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin*. Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had

been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* vii. 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Prov. xiv. 22): *They err that work evil.*

Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the words of Luke xii. 47: *The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes,* and of James iv. 17: *To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin.* Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 1). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows habitually, may happen through

mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained above (A. 1). Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.

Reply Obj. 1. Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason.

Reply Obj. 3. It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual knowledge about

a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.

Reply Obj. 4. He that has knowledge in universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* vii. 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passion lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.

Reply Obj. 5. Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in *Ethic.* vii. 3.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION, SHOULD BE CALLED A SIN OF WEAKNESS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (A. 1). Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should not be called a sin of weakness.

Obj. 2. Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Ps. lxxvii. 39): *He remembered that they are flesh.*

Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due to a passion.

Obj. 3. Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to Gen. iv. 7: *Thy appetite shall be under thee,* and thou shalt have dominion over it.* Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness.

On the contrary, Cicero (*De Quæst. Tusc.* iv.) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore a sin that arises from passion, should be called a sin of weakness.

I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humours and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (*De Hist. Animal.* x. 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 8) compares the incontinent man to

* Vulg.,—*The lust thereof shall be under thee.*

an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above (A. 1). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.

Reply Obj. 3. It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained (A. 1).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SELF-LOVE IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY SIN?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbour as himself (Levit. xix. 18). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 8): *Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence ;* on which words a gloss says that *the law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils,* the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from

love, as stated above (Q. III., A. 2; Q. XXIII., A. 4). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine in commenting on Ps. lxxix. 17, *Things set on fire and dug down,* says that *every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardour or to fear inducing false humility.* Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.

Obj. 4. Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbour. Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 28) that *self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon.* Now every sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXV., A. 1), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately: for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to the contempt of God, that Augustine (*loc. cit.*) reckons to be the cause of sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3. Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man either desires good things, or avoids evil things.

Reply Obj. 4. A friend is like another self (*Ethic.* ix.): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed through self-love.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE OF THE FLESH, CONCUPISCENCE OF THE EYES, AND PRIDE OF LIFE ARE FITTINGLY DESCRIBED AS CAUSES OF SIN?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that *concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life* are unfittingly described as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. vi. 10), *covetousness* is the root of all evils.* Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. xiii. 56: *Beauty hath deceived thee.* Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.

Obj. 3. Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above (Q. XXX., A. 2). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore *concupiscence of the hearing* and of the other senses should also have been mentioned.

Obj. 4. Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of evil things, as stated above (A. 4 *ad* 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are insufficiently described.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jo. ii. 16): *All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or* (Vulg.,—*and*) *concupiscence of the eyes, or* (Vulg.,—*and*) *pride of life.* Now a thing is said to be *in the world* by reason of sin: wherefore it is written (*ibid.* v. 19): *The whole world is seated in wickedness.* Therefore these three are causes of sin.

* Douay,—*The desire of money.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object to the irascible part, as stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 1). Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q. XXX., A. 3). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called *concupiscence of the flesh.* The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called *concupiscence of the eyes,* whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity, according to Augustine's exposition (*Conf.* x.); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others.

The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the *pride of life;* for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall state further on (Q. LXXXIV., A. 2; II.-II., Q. CLXII., A. 1).

It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 1. *Pride of life* is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of *avarice*, is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on (Q. LXXXIV., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2. *Concupiscence of the eyes* does not mean here the concupiscence for all things that can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.

Reply Obj. 3. The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in *Metaph.* i.: and so its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (*De Verb. Dom.*, serm. xxxiii.).

Reply Obj. 4. Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. 2; Q. XXXIX., A. 2); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN IS ALLEVIATED ON ACCOUNT OF A PASSION?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated (A. 5). Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it.

Obj. 2. Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously,

according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin.

On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (*De Civ. Dei.* iv. 12).

I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above (AA. 1, 2; Q. X., A. 3); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.

Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness.

On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else,—

accidentally, i.e. beside his intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause.

Reply Obj. 2. A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PASSION EXCUSES FROM SIN ALTOGETHER?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to Gal. v. 17: *The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would.* Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.

Obj. 2. Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above (A. 2; Q. LXXVI., A. 3). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q. VI., A. 8). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.

Obj. 3. Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul.

On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. vii. 5) speaks of the passions as *passions of sins*, for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether.

I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot

be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either *in itself*, as when the will tends towards it directly; or *in its cause*, when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk.—Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary *directly* or *indirectly;* directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not.

Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above (Q. XVII., A. 9): wherefore such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether.

Reply Obj. 1. The words, *So that you do not the things that you would* are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of Rom. vii. 19: *The evil which I will not, that I do.*—Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding

the passion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 2. The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3. Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION CAN BE MORTAL?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon (*venia*). Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.

Obj. 2. Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as stated above (Q. LXXIV., A. 4). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.

Obj. 3. Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above (AA. 1, 2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. vii. 5) that *the passions of the sins . . . work* (Vulg.,—*did work*) *in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.* Now it is proper to mortal

sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal.

I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above (Q. LXXII., A. 5), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed through passion.

Reply Obj. 1. A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon (*veniam*). Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards the first kind.

Reply Obj. 2. Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A. 6, *ad* 1): hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 3. Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal or venial.

QUESTION LXXVIII.

OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely? (2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice? (3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit? (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYONE SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. Now *every evil man is ignorant,* according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iii. 1); and it is written (Prov. xiv. 22): *They err that work evil.* Therefore no one sins through certain malice.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *no one works intending evil.* Now to sin through malice seems to denote the intention of doing evil* in sinning, because an act is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice.

Obj. 3. Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin in-

* Alluding to the derivation of *Malitia* (malice) from *malum* (evil).

definitely, which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xxxiv. 27): (*Who*) *as it were on purpose have revolted from God* (Vulg.,—*Him*), *and would not understand all His ways.* Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice.

I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.

Reply Obj. 1. Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular

moment, as when he sins through passion: and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice.

Reply Obj. 2. Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's anger, to being deprived of the pleasure.

Reply Obj. 3. The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above (Q. LXXV., A. 4 *ad* 3).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERYONE THAT SINS THROUGH HABIT, SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin

committed through certain malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice.

Obj. 2. Further, *Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed* (*Ethic.* ii. 1, 2). But the acts which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.

Obj. 3. Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to Prov. ii. 14: *Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things:* and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: because *bad men,* i.e. those who have a vicious habit, *are full of remorse* (*Ethic.* ix. 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.

On the contrary, A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to which we are inclined by habit, as stated in *Ethic.* vi. 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed through certain malice.

I answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed through habit: for it is not necessary to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being *something we use when we will,* as stated above (Q. L., A. 1). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through the uprising

of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice.

Reply Obj. 1. Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil.

Reply Obj. 2. Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion.

Reply Obj. 3. He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE WHO SINS THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE, SINS THROUGH HABIT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher

says (*Ethic.* v. 9) that *an unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it*, i.e. through choice, *unless it be done through habit.* Now to sin through certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Origen says (*Peri Archon* iii.) that *a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little.* But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit.

Obj. 3. Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as stated (Q. LXXVII., A. 3). Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain malice, he sins through habit.

Obj. 4. *On the contrary,* The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. But it happens sometimes that a man without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.

I answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to

a sin through certain malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself.—Secondly, the will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were.

It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins through habit.

Reply Obj. 1. To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit.

Reply Obj. 2. It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something is not always a habit, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else.

Reply Obj. 4. There is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfectly without the evil of fault.

Fourth Article.

WHETHER IT IS MORE GRIEVOUS TO SIN THROUGH CERTAIN MALICE THAN THROUGH PASSION?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through passion.

Obj. 2. Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion.

Obj. 3. Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice.

On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job xxxiv. 26: *He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him.* Now punishment is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.

I answer that, A sin committed through certain malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal,

a sin is all the more grievous, according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through certain malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger.—Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that who sins through malice, abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vii. 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers intermittently.—Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through passion.

Reply Obj. 1. Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 4). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.

Reply Obj. 2. The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. It is one thing to sin while choosing, and

another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained (AA. 2, 3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin *through* choosing.

QUESTION LXXIX.

OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a cause of sin? (2) Whether the act of sin is from God? (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart? (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS A CAUSE OF SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones (Rom. i. 28): *God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right* (Douay,—*convenient*), and a gloss comments on this by saying that *God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to evil.* Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Wis. xiv. 11): *The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men.* But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the First Part (Q. XLIV., A. 1), it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin.

Obj. 3. Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

Obj. 4. Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; since of this evil it is written (Isa. xlv. 7) that God creates evil, and (Amos iii. 6): *Shall there be evil in the city which God* (Vulg.,—*the Lord*) *hath not done?* Therefore it is not incompatible with God's goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. xi. 25): *Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.* Now God hates sin, according to Wis. xiv. 9: *To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful.* Therefore God is not a cause of sin.

I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely by inclining his or another's will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely by not preventing someone from sinning. Hence (Ezech. iii. 18) it is said to the watchman: *If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die'* . . . I will require his blood at thy hand.*—Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* i.): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin.—In like manner neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not

* Vulg.,—*If, when I say to the wicked, 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him.*

said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.

Reply Obj. 1. As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if we do not protect him.—The saying of Augustine (*De Grat. et Lib. Arb.* xxi., whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that *God inclines men's wills to good and evil*, is to be understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin.

Reply Obj. 2. When it is said the *creatures of God are turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men*, the preposition *to* does not denote causality but sequel;* for God did not make the creatures that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, wherefore the text goes on to say, *and a snare to the feet of the unwise*, who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were made.

Reply Obj. 3. The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first cause: thus if a servant do any thing contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause.

* This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin *factæ sunt in abominationem* admits of the translation *were made to be an abomination*, which might imply causality.

Reply Obj. 4. Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison between fault and punishment.

Second Article.

whether the act of sin is from god?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (*De Perfect. Justit.* ii.) that *the act of sin is not a thing.* Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God.

Obj. 2. Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for *no one works, intending evil,* as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q. XVIII., AA. 2, 8). Now whatever is the cause of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above (A. 1). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.

On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now *the will of God is the cause of every movement,* as Augustine declares (*De Trin.* iii. 4, 9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin.

I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (*Div. Nom.* 5.). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore

God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action.—But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from a created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.

Reply Obj. 1. In this passage Augustine calls by the name of *thing*, that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing.

Reply Obj. 2. Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. LXXII., A. 1), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE CAUSE OF SPIRITUAL BLINDNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Obj. 2. Further, Fulgentius says (*De Dupl. Prædest.* i. 19): *God does not punish what He causes.* Now God punishes the hardened heart, according to Ecclus. iii. 27: *A hard heart shall fear evil at the last.* Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.

Obj. 3. Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man, according to Wis. ii. 21: *For their own malice blinded them,* and again, according to 2 Cor. iv. 4: *The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers:* which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. vi. 10): *Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy,* and Rom. ix. 18: *He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.*

I answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to Jo. i. 9: *That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world,* even as the sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause

of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart.

These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists *discovery*, and the latter, *teaching*, hence it is that spiritual *blindness* corresponds to sight, *heaviness of the ears* to hearing, and *hardness of heart* to the affections.

Reply Obj. 1. Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER BLINDNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART ARE DIRECTED TO THE SALVATION OF THOSE WHO ARE BLINDED AND HARDENED?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. For Augustine says (*Enchir.* xi.) that *as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from every evil.* Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil

of which He Himself is the cause. Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Wis. i. 13) that *God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly.** Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.

Obj. 3. Further, *God is not a respecter of persons* (Acts x. 34). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (*De Quæst. Evang.* iii.). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded.

Obj. 4. *On the other hand,* According to Rom. iii. 8, evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of their welfare.

I answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation,—to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's damnation;—to another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (*De Nat. et Grat.* xxii.). Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouch-

* Vulg.,—*God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living.*

safed to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom *all things work together unto good* (Rom. viii. 28). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine says (*De Quæst. Evang., loc. cit.*).

Reply Obj. 1. Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.

Reply Obj. 2. God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss.

Reply Obj. 3. That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God a respecter of persons, as explained in the First Part (Q. XXIII., A. 5, *ad* 3).

Reply Obj. 4. Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.

QUESTION LXXX.

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL.

(*In Four Articles.*)

We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin? (2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly? (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity? (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?

First Article.

WHETHER THE DEVIL IS DIRECTLY THE CAUSE OF MAN'S SINNING?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. Now Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv. 12) that *the devil inspires his friends with evil desires;* and Bede, commenting on Acts v. 3, says that the devil *draws the mind to evil desires;* and Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* ii. 41, iii. 5) that the devil *fills men's hearts with secret lusts.* Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Jerome says (*Contra Jovin.* ii. 2) that *as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil.* But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the *Eudemein Ethics* (vii. 18): *There must needs be some extrinsic principle of human counsel.* Now human counsel is

not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin.

On the contrary, Augustine proves (*De Lib. Arb.* i. 11) that *nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire.* Now man does not become a slave to his desire, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's own will alone.

I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act.

Now the will, as stated above (Q. IX., AA. 3, 4, 6), can be moved by two things:—first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite:—secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than either the will itself, or God, as was shown above (*loc. cit.*). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above (Q. LXXIX., A. 1). Therefore it follows that in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin.

As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways.—First, the object itself which is proposed to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat.—Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object.—Thirdly, he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason.—Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin.—In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct

cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as stated above (Q. X., AA. 1, 2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite.

Reply Obj. 1. All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite.

Reply Obj. 2. This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.

Reply Obj. 3. God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite.

Second Article.

WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE MAN TO SIN, BY INTERNAL INSTIGATIONS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements.

Obj. 2. Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the First Part (Q. CX., A. 4).

Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived by the external senses.

Obj. 3. Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of these, because, as stated in the First Part (Q. CXI., AA. 2, 3, *ad* 2), the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the First Part (Q. CX., A. 2; Q. CXI., AA. 2, 3 *ad* 2). Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin.

On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.

I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive: and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated (A. 1; P. I., Q. CXI., A. 1) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetite to some passion or other.

The reason of this is, that as stated in the First Part (Q. CX., A. 3), the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to

the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (*De Somno et Vigil.*)* that *when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time.* Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humours can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.

In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can co-operate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (*ibid.*), *lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved.* It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can co-operate with them, even as external heat co-operates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested.

Reply Obj. 2. This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according to local movement, as explained above.

Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.

* *De Insomn.* iii., iv.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE MAN TO SIN OF NECESSITY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of the devil (Job. xli. 24) that *there is no power on earth that can compare with him.* Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the earth.

Obj. 2. Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to the imagination: because *all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm* (*De Anima* iii., text. 30, 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above (A. 2); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 12) that *this evil,* of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, *extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colours, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavour.* Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix. 4) that *there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit.* Now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above (A. 2). Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. v. 8): *Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour.* Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity.

Further, it is likewise written (James iv. 7): *Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you,* which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin.

I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above (Q. LXXVII., A. 7). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2. That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason.

Reply Obj. 3. The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.

Fourth Article.

Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that the *crowd of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others.*

Obj. 2. Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to Jo. viii. 34: *Whosoever committeth*

sin is the slave (Douay,—*servant*) *of sin.* Now *by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave* (2 Pet. ii. 19). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says (*Moral.* iv. 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion.

On the contrary, It is written (*De Eccl. Dogm.* lxxxii.): *Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will.*

I answer that, the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable.—He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (*Peri Archon* iii. 2) from the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will.

Reply Obj. 1. The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil.

Reply Obj. 3. The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man.

QUESTION LXXXI.

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN.

(*In Five Articles.*)

We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration of which will be threefold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants? (2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin? (3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation? (4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body? (5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?

First Article.

WHETHER THE FIRST SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENT IS CONTRACTED BY HIS DESCENDANTS, BY WAY OF ORIGIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech. xviii. 20): *The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.* But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.

Obj. 2. Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the First Part (Q. CXVIII., A. 2). Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.

Obj. 4. Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the soul.

Obj. 5. Further, the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 5): *No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are so through want of exercise and through carelessness.* Now those are said to be *naturally ugly*, who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. v. 12): *By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.* Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written (Wis. ii. 24): *By the envy of the devil, death came into the world.* It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin entered into the world.

I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books.*

* For instance *Retract.* i. 9; *De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.* ix.; *Contra Julian.* i. 3, iii. 1; *De Dono Persev.* xi., xii.

In endeavouring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavoured to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to child,—thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of guilt.

But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by the way of origin from parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 5), *no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him.*

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one

body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (*Prædic., De Specie*) that *by sharing the same species, many men are one man.* Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called *original,* just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called *actual.* And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a *human sin;* so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the *sin of nature,* according to Eph. ii. 3: *We . . . were by nature children of wrath.*

Reply Obj. 1. The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it:

for he that is born is associated with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually, accompanied by that guilt.

Reply Obj. 4. The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person.

Reply Obj. 5. A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But if we consider him as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account of a crime committed by one of his forbears.

Second Article.

Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to their descendants?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate parents, according to Exod. xx. 5: *I am . . . God, . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation.* Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants.

Obj. 2. Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another: thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way of origin,

the sin which he has from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself.

Obj. 3. Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to Apoc. xxii. 11: *He that is filthy, let him be filthier still.* Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent.

On the contrary, Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much less therefore are their sins.

I answer that, Augustine puts this question in the *Enchiridion,* xlvi., xlvii., and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first parent to be transmitted by the way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those that are purely personal, as stated above.

Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused

by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice, as stated in the First Part (Q. C., A. 1), was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder.—Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus,* children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul is God's immediate property, as stated in Ezech. xviii. 4. Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account, inasmuch as the child, as to its body, is part of its father.

Reply Obj. 2. A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption pertaining only to the person.

Third Article.

Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a punishment consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, will die:

* *Ep. ad Auxilium*, ccl.

since those who will be still living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered from 1 Thessal. iv. 14: *We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept.* Therefore they do not contract original sin.

Obj. 2. Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not transmit it to his children.

Obj. 3. Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares (Rom. v. 15, *seqq.*). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. v. 12): *Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned.*

I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract original sin from him; else all would not need redemption* which is through Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated (A. 1), viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his posterity, just as, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation.

Reply Obj. 1. It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the Third Part (Suppl., Q. LXXVIII., A. 1, *Obj.* 1).—If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body—*Ep.* cxix.), then we must say in reply to the objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of

* *Cf.* Translator's note inserted before P. III, Q. XXVII.

death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins.

Reply Obj. 2. Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the 'fomes,' which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal of the sin of their first parent, but also unto the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.

Fourth Article.

Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on Gen. iv. 1 says that *Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned.* But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would contract original sin.

Obj. 2. Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted. Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed.

Obj. 3. Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who might be formed out of human flesh would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin.

On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam *according to seminal virtue,* which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin, as Augustine states (*Gen. ad lit.* x. 18, *seqq.*).

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation originally derived from Adam, i.e. who are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam. Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by the man's will, but by some external mover.

Reply Obj. 1. Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends.

Reply Obj. 2. The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.

Reply Obj. 3. If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, *by way of bodily substance,** but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin.

* The expression is S. Augustine's (*Gen. ad lit.* x.). *Cf. Summa Theologica,* P. III., Q. XXXI., A. 6, Reply to First Objection.

Fifth Article.

Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. v. 12): *In whom all have sinned.* Now a man pre-exists in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's.

Obj. 2. Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is *the mother* that *provides the matter in generation* as the Philosopher states (*De Gener. Animal.* ii. 1, 4), while death and liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would contract original sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* iii. 3) that *the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin,* (of whom Christ was to be born without original sin) *purifying her.* But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. v. 12): *By one man sin entered into this world.* Now, if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father.

I answer that, The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated (A. 1) that

original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore it has been said (A. 4) that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin is contracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it.

Reply Obj. 1. The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. Consequently the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2. Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects.—This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the First Part (Q. XCVII., AA. 1, 2 *ad* 4), immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to the necessity of dying.

Reply Obj. 3. This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because it behoved the Mother of God *to shine with the greatest purity*.* For nothing is worthy to receive God unless it be pure, according to Ps. xcii. 5: *Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord.*

* *Cf.* Anselm,—*De Concep. Virg.* xviii.

QUESTION LXXXII.

OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether original sin is a habit? (2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man? (3) Whether original sin is concupiscence? (4) Whether original sin is equally in all?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS A HABIT?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (*De Concep. Virg.* ii., iii., xxvi.), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit.

Obj. 2. Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit has the nature of a fault.

Obj. 3. Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (*De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.* i. 39) that on account of original sin little children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original sin is a habit.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLIX., A. 4; Q. L., A. 1), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original sin is not a habit.—The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the *languor of nature.**

Reply Obj. 1. As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly something positive, viz. the very humours that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit.

Reply Obj. 2. Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to say that original

* *Cf.* Augustine,—*In Ps.* cxviii., *serm.* iii.

sin is a habit *infused*, or a habit *acquired* (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a habit *inborn* due to our corrupt origin.

Second Article.

whether there are several original sins in one man?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written (Ps. l. 7): *Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me.* But the sin in which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man.

Obj. 2. Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one habit, but several.

Obj. 3. Further original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown above (Q. LXXIV.). Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.

On the contrary, It is written (Jo. i. 29): *Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world :* and the reason for the employment of the singular is that the *sin of the world* is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.

I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original sin. For it has been stated (Q. LXXXI., A. 2) that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle.—The second reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is derived

from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number.—Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many.

Reply Obj. 1. The employment of the plural,—*in sins*, may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of the plural for the singular, e.g. *They are dead that sought the life of the child ;*—or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many;—or by the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth;—or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies.

Reply Obj. 3. Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man, although the various parts of the body are affected.

Third Article.

whether original sin is concupiscence?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 4, 30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.

Obj. 2. Further, through original sin *the passions of sins* are in us, according to the Apostle (Rom. vii. 5). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 4). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion.

Obj. 3. Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (A. 2, *Obj.* 3). But the intellect is the highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (*Ethic.* x. 7.). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Retract.* i. 15.): *Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin.*

I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated (A. 2) that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 1), so that the will being turned away from God, all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material

element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally.

Reply Obj. 1. Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. XXV., A. 1), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principal place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above (*ibid.*, A. 2, *ad* 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.

Reply Obj. 3. As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above (Q. LXXVII., AA. 1, 2; Q. LXXX., A. 2). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects of original sin.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS EQUALLY IN ALL?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above (A. 3). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all.

Obj. 2. Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of

the body. But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Nup. et Concup.* i. 23) that *lust transmits original sin to the child.* But the act of generation may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another.

On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too.

I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (Q. LXXIII., A. 2). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another.

Reply Obj. 1. Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption

may be greater or lesser, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause of original sin is equal in all, so that there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all.

QUESTION LXXXIII.

OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul? (2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers? (3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin? (4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS MORE IN THE FLESH THAN IN THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 23): *I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind.* Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal

virtue. Now our souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh.

Obj. 4. Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's creation and infusion.

Obj. 5. Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.

On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 18): *I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good.* Therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.

I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. v. 12): *In whom all have sinned:* whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul.

The reason for this is that, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to his posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be

observed, that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt.

Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the flesh.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*Retract.* i. 27),* the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell *in the flesh.* Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment.

Reply Obj. 2. Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it had the nature of actual sin.

Reply Obj. 3. The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it.

Reply Obj. 4. The corruption of original sin is nowise

* *Cf.* Qq. lxxxiii., qu. 66.

caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being created.—On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused.

Reply Obj. 5. The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order of things, (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the First Part (Q. XC., A. 4; Q. CXVIII., A. 3). And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, by means of grace.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL RATHER THAN IN THE POWERS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only according to the powers.

Obj. 2. Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence.

Obj. 3. Further, just as original sin is derived by the soul from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the

essence. But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.

Obj. 4. Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated (Q. LXXXII., A. 3). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also.

On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXVI., A. 6). Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.

I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the First Part (Q. LXXVI., A. 6). Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin.

Reply Obj. 1. As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem rather to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person.

Reply Obj. 3. The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 4. Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above (Q. LXXXII., A. 3).

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN INFECTS THE WILL BEFORE THE OTHER POWERS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power more than to the others.

Obj. 2. Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than in the will.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others.

On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is *rectitude of the will,* as Anselm states (*De Concep. Virg.* iii.). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will.

I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject;

and in this respect it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above (A. 2). In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (Q. LXXIV., AA. 1, 2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.

Reply Obj. 1. Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. Consequently it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of original sin reaches it first.

Reply Obj. 3. The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.

Fourth Article.

Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin.

Obj. 2. Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey reason, as stated in *Ethic.* i. 13. There-

fore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin.

Obj. 3. Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far as *it shows us how a number of things differ* (*Met.* i.). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 16, *seqq.*, 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch.

I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above (Q. LXXXI., A. 1). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected.

Reply Obj. 1. Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above (A. 3). But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.

Reply Obj. 2. The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original sin is not derived from the will of

the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than to the sight.

QUESTION LXXXIV.

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins? (2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin? (3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness? (4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS THE ROOT OF ALL SINS?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins.

Obj. 2. Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in *Ethic.* i. 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds from some deeper root.

Obj. 3. Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 10): *The desire of money is the root of all evil.*

I answer that, According to some, covetousness may be understood in different ways.—First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and thus it is a special sin.—Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above (Q. LXXII., A. 2).—Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things.

Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they *will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils.* Hence it is evident that he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to Eccles. x. 19: *All things obey money :* so that in this sense desire for riches is the root of all sins.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the immutable Good; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to Eph. iii. 17: *Rooted and founded in charity.*

Reply Obj. 2. The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since an universal good is more desirable than a particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by means of money.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PRIDE IS THE BEGINNING OF EVERY SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. x. 14): *The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy* (Douay,—*to fall off*) *from God.* But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin.

Obj. 3. Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, according to Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xiv.), *builds up the city of Babylon.* Therefore self-love, and not pride, is the beginning of every sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. x. 15): *Pride is the beginning of all sin.*

I answer that, Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin.—Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic sin.—Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason covetousness is called the *root;* whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the *beginning,* because the beginning of evil consists in turning away from God.

Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said (*loc. cit.*) *: Pride is the beginning of all sin.* For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows (*verse* 17): *God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes;* indeed this is the point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q. I., A. 1 *ad* 1; Q. XVIII., A. 7 *ad* 2; Q. XV., A. 1 *ad* 2; Q. XXV., A. 2). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is said to be the *beginning* of every sin.—On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, from this point of

view, covetousness is said to be the *root* of all evils, as stated above (A. 1).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2. Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of every sin, consisting in its turning away from God.—It may also be said that apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted up, in respect of the other species of pride.

Reply Obj. 3. In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY OTHER SPECIAL SINS, BESIDES PRIDE AND AVARICE, SHOULD BE CALLED CAPITAL?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because *the head seems to be to an animal, what the root is to a plant*, as stated in *De Anima* ii., text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called the *root of all evils*, it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.

Obj. 2. Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called capital.

Obj. 3. Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.

On the contrary, Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi. 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital.

I answer that, The word capital is derived from *caput* (*a head*). Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from *head* taken in the proper sense, and thus the name *capital* is given to a sin for which capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in which the term *capital* is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above (Q. LXXII., A. 6). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (*Moral.* xxxi. 17) compares these capital vices to the *leaders of an army.*

Reply Obj. 1. The term *capital* is taken from *caput* and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the *root,* and pride which is called the beginning, but also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins.

Reply Obj. 2. Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine (*De Natura Boni* iv.), is *the privation of mode,*

species and order. But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEVEN CAPITAL VICES ARE SUITABLY RECKONED ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above (Q. LXI., A. 2). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices.

Obj. 2. Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above (Q. LXXVII.). But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated.

Obj. 3. Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices.

Obj. 4. Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above (A. 2). But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices.

Obj. 5. Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (*Moral.* xxxi. 17).

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man's particular dispositions are infinite in number.—Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of art.

Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil.

Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honour and praise, and this good is sought inordinately by *vainglory.*—Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by *gluttony,*—or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by *lust.*—Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which *covetousness* is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.

Or again,—good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by *pride* or *vainglory*. Secondly, it implies satiety, which *covetousness* seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in *Ethic.* i. 7, x. 6, 7, 8, and this *gluttony* and *lust* pursue.

On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own good, and thus we have *sloth*, which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labour:—or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to *envy*, which is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is *anger*. Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 3. Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right to vengeance.

Reply Obj. 4. Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above (A. 2): and it

is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the *queen of them all*, as Gregory states (*Moral.* xxxi. 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).

Reply Obj. 5. These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other causes.—Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labour; for the ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 2). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should not be done that good may come of it.

QUESTION LXXXV.

OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin? (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether? (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin. (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin? (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin? (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN DIMINISHES THE GOOD OF NATURE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (*Div. Nom.* iv.). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature.

Obj. 2. Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished.

Obj. 3. Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good of his nature.

Obj. 4. Further, no accident acts on its subject; because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.

On the contrary, A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho (Luke x. 30), i.e. *to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature,* as Bede* expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature.

I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above (Q. LX., A. 1; Q. LXIII., A. 1), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature.

Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above (Q. L., A. 1). Now from the very fact that a thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue.

* The quotation is from the *Glossa Ordinaria* of Strabo.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in *being, living and understanding*, as anyone may see who reads the context.

Reply Obj. 2. Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term.

Reply Obj. 3. A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we stated when treating of the production of habits (Q. LI., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 4. An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness of the agent, we must say that suchlike inordinateness is caused by the fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above (Q. LXXVII., AA. 1, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ENTIRE GOOD OF HUMAN NATURE CAN BE DESTROYED BY SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction

be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away.

Obj. 2. Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin.

Obj. 3. Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Enchirid.* xiv.) that *evil does not exist except in some good.* But the evil of sin cannot be in the good of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it entirely.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely.

Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher says (*Phys.* i., text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it

may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before.—But this does not apply to the question at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin.

We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its root, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated above (A. 1). But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is placed against its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, in respect of which diversity of

relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other.

Reply Obj. 3. Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight.

Third Article.

Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been said above (Q. LXXVI., A. 1; Q. LXXVII., AA. 3, 5; Q. LXXVIII., A. 1). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is the act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature.

Obj. 4. Further, it has been stated (Q. LXXVII., A. 3) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.

Obj. 5. Further, Augustine (*De Nat. et Grat.* lxvii. 67) reckons *two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of*

the sinner, viz. *ignorance and difficulty*, from which arise *error and vexation*, which four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete.

On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices.*

I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (Q. LXXXI., A. 2); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature.

Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be the subject of virtue, as stated above (Q. LXI., A. 2), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order to the good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.

Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above (AA. 1, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult, and concupiscence more impetuous.

Reply Obj. 1. There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is more easily inclined to sin again.

* Reference not known.

Reply Obj. 2. Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gen. viii. 21: *Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth.**

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. LXXXII., A. 3, *ad* 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.

Reply Obj. 4. Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible.

Reply Obj. 5. The *difficulty* which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, viz. *malice, weakness* and *concupiscence,* for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. *Error* and *vexation* are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.

Fourth Article.

Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (*De Natura Boni* iii.) that *where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at all.* But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the *privation of mode, species and order,* as Augustine states (*De Natura Boni* iv.). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin.

* Vulg., *The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth.*

Obj. 3. Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of each sin.

On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to Ps. vi. 3, *Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak.* Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order. Therefore sin deprives the soul of mode, species and order.

I answer that, As stated in the First Part (Q. V., A. 5), mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its *species.* Again, any kind of form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in *Metaph.* viii. that *the forms of things are like numbers,* so that a form has a certain *mode* corresponding to its measure. Lastly, owing to its form, each thing has a relation of *order* to something else.

Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above (AA. 1, 2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes mode, species and order.

This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.

Reply Obj. 3. Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.

Fifth Article.

Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above (Q. LXXXII., A. 4). Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. v. 12): *By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.*

I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the result being that the effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and suchlike defects are beside the intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in *Phys.* viii., text. 32, that *by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon.*

In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause of death and all suchlike defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the First Part (Q. XCVII., A. 1). Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above (A. 3; Q. LXXXII., A. 3), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body.

Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments.

Reply Obj. 1. Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will be equal; but that one will move with the greater velocity, which has the greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments, some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all.

Reply Obj. 2. Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rom. viii. 11): *He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you :*

but each is done according to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's sufferings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behoves that our bodies should remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.

Reply Obj. 3. Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those defects, as original sin does.

Sixth Article.

Whether death and other defects are natural to man?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that death and suchlike defects are natural to man. For *the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically* (*Metaph.* x., text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of its corruption. But such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.

Obj. 3. Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in *De Anima* ii., text. 50, it seems that death and suchlike defects are natural to man.

On the contrary, 1. God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now *God made not death* (Wis. i. 13). Therefore death is not natural to man.

2. Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it. But death and suchlike defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore they are not natural to man.

3. Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q. II., A. 7; Q. V., AA. 3, 4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the First Part (Q. LXXV., A. 6). Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible.

I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in *De Cœlo* ii., text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which it belongs.

On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be *the Nature Who makes nature.* This force intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things are requisite: and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And although every form intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation of its own, as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since that

very form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of his form.

The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the First Part (Q. XCVII., A. 1). It is in this sense that it is said that *God made not death*, and that death is the punishment of sin.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION LXXXVI.

OF THE STAIN OF SIN

(*In Two Articles.*)

WE must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul? (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN CAUSES A STAIN ON THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (*Contra Quinque Hæreses* v.). Now the human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning.

Obj. 2. Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above (Q. LXXIV., AA. 1, 2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in *De Anima* iii., text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin.

Obj. 3. Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing can else be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or

habit; for instance, in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul.—Again, neither is it a pure privation. Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin.

On the contrary, It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. xlvii. 22): *Thou hast stained thy glory:* and it is written (Ephes. v. 27): *That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle:* and in each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin.

I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as shown above (Q. LXXI., A. 6). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul.

Reply Obj. 1. The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law.

Reply Obj. 2. The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the

will consists in a movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves inordinately, according to Osee ix. 10: *They . . . became abominable as those things were which they loved.*

Reply Obj. 3. The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE STAIN REMAINS IN THE SOUL AFTER THE ACT OF SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (A. 1, *Obj.* 3). Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 3). But the shadow does not remain when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past.

Obj. 3. Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Jos. xxii. 17): *Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in you* (Vulg.,—*us*) *to this day?*

I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that

the stain, as stated above (A. 1), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something privative, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.

Reply Obj. 2. After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and so there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3. The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting. Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed.

QUESTION LXXXVII.

OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

WE must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the punishment due to them.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin? (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another? (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity? (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment? (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin? (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin? (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT IS AN EFFECT OF SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Conf.* i.) that *every inordinate affection is its own punishment.* But punishment does not incur a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. ii. 9): *Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil.* But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words *tribulation and anguish.*

I answer that, It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which reason *hot water freezes more rapidly,* as stated in *Meteor.* i. 12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offence against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment.

Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.

Reply Obj. 1. Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this

is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment.

Reply Obj. 2. Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that *punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment, is.* Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin.

Reply Obj. 3. This punishment of the *inordinate affection* is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN CAN BE THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, as the Philosopher declares (*Ethic.* x. 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.

Obj. 2. Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (Q. LXXIV., AA. 1, 2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Hom.* xi. *in Ezech.*) that some sins are punishments of others.

I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental

thereto. Sin as such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in the First Part (Q. XLVIII., A. 5). Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.

On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above (Q. LXXIX., A. 3), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks (Rom. i. 24) when he says: *Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart*, i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the punishment of a preceding sin.—Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. v. 7: *We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity*.—Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with regard to itself.

Reply Obj. 1. Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning.—With regard to the other two ways,

it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man from sin.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the Third Objection.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice is equality: wherefore it is written (Isa. xxvii. 8): *In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it.* Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Obj. 2. Further, *punishments are a kind of medicine* (*Ethic.* ii. 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end, and *what is directed to an end, is not infinite,* as the Philosopher states (*Polit.* i. 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But *God hath not pleasure in the destruction of men* (Vulg.,—*of the living*). Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man.

Obj. 4. Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxv. 46): *These shall go into everlasting punishment;* and (Mark iii. 29): *He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin.*

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order

is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Reply Obj. 1. Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xxi. 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life,—sometimes even by death; wherein account is not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory (*Dial.* iv. 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (*ibid.*) that the *wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever.*

Reply Obj. 2. Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to Prov. xix. 25: *The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser.* Accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments, according to Ps. lix. 6: *Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered.*

Reply Obj. 3. God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.

Reply Obj. 4. Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SIN INCURS A DEBT OF PUNISHMENT INFINITE IN QUANTITY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written (Jerem. x. 24): *Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing.* Now God's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity.

Obj. 2. Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, according to Deut. xxv. 2: *According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.*

Now a sin which is committed against God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is infinite. Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore it is infinite in quantity also.

On the contrary, If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another.

I answer that, Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the *pain of loss,* which also is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment is the *pain of sense,* which also is finite.

Reply Obj. 1. It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated above (A. 3). The expression *to be brought to nothing* is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 2: *If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing.*

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers sin as turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins against God.

Reply Obj. 3. Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for as long as this remains, the debt of

punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does not incur punishment of infinite quantity.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as stated above (A. 4), is proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above (A. 4), it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment.

Obj. 2. Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (*Enchir.* xciii.) that *the lightest punishment is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone.* But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as is shown by our Lord's words (Jo. iii. 3): *Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.* Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting.

Obj. 3. Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Dial.* iv. 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished eternally.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment.

Reply Obj. 1. Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs infinitely from the things that are referred to it.

Reply Obj. 2. Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above (A. 3).

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT REMAINS AFTER SIN?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also.

Obj. 2. Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.

Obj. 3. Further, *Punishments are a kind of medicine* (*Ethic.* ii. 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Kings xii. 13, 14): *David said to Nathan : I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David : The Lord also hath taken away thy sin ; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child that is born to thee shall die.* Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment remains, when the sin has been removed.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandment, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish.

This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of punishment.

But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 1). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary (Q. VI., A. 6). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 2), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2. The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands that he should do satisfaction for his offences against God or man.

Reply Obj. 3. When the stain is removed, the wound of

sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin may be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY PUNISHMENT IS INFLICTED FOR A SIN?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written (Jo. ix. 3, 2) about the man born blind: *Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind.* In like manner we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked (Ps. lxxii. 5): *They are not in the labour of men : neither shall they be scourged like other men ;* and (Job xxi. 7): (*Why then do*) *the wicked live, are* (*they*) *advanced, and strengthened with riches* (*?*)*; and (Habac. i. 13): *Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous* (Vulg.,—*them that do unjust things*), *and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth* (Vulg.,—*devoureth*), *the man that is more just than himself?* Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.

* The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate.

Obj. 3. Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet. ii. 22) that *He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth.* And yet it is said (*ibid.*, 21) that He *suffered for us.* Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Job iv. 7, *seqq.*): *Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God;* and Augustine writes (*Retract.* i.) that *all punishment is just, and is inflicted for a sin.*

I answer that, As already stated (A. 6), punishment can be considered in two ways,—simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves.—If, however, we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently,—principally, the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result from this defect in human nature.

Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as stated in the First Part (Q. XLVIII., A. 5). Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punish-

ment, because a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since suchlike are not punishments properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause.

Reply Obj. 1. Suchlike defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of original sin, as stated above (Q. LXXXV., A. 5); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above (*ibid., ad* 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above (*ibid., ad* 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others who are admonished by their means—and also to the glory of God.

Reply Obj. 2. Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* viii.), *Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts.* The very fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (*verse* 6): *Therefore pride hath held them fast.*

Reply Obj. 3. Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins.

Eighth Article.

whether anyone is punished for another's sin?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written (*Exod.* xx. 5): *I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me;* and (Matth. xxiii. 35): *That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth.*

Obj. 2. Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.

Obj. 3. Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their parents.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. xviii. 20): *The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.*

I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above (A. 7).—If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal.—But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated (A. 7) that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have suchlike punishments inflicted on one for

another's sin, either by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it patiently.

With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore, as Augustine says (*Ep. ad Avit.*),* suchlike punishments are not inflicted on one for another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying (Ezech. xviii. 4): *All souls are mine.*

Reply Obj. 1. Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers.—Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, *Of them that hate Me*, and in the chapter quoted from Matthew (*verse* 32) we read: *Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers.* —The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone to sin through being brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents' example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways.—The text adds, *to the third and fourth generation*, because men are

* *Ep. ad Auxilium*, ccl.

wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to grieve for them.

Reply Obj. 2. The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.

Reply Obj. 3. Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.

QUESTION LXXXVIII.

OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN.

(*In Six Articles.*)

In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin? (2) Whether they differ generically? (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin? (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal? (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance? (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?

First Article.

WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS FITTINGLY CONDIVIDED WITH MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxii. 27): *Sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law.* But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. x. 31): *Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God.* Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God's glory. Consequently, since

to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.

Obj. 3. Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (*De Doctr. Christ.* i. 3, 4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (*ibid.*). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now *to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness*, as Augustine again says (*Qq.* lxxxiii., qu. 30). Therefore, since *perverseness** denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.

Obj. 4. Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Tract.* xli. *in Joan.*), that *a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not.* But a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.

I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: thus *to smile* is not opposed to *being dry;* but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial.

For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (Q. LXXI., A. 1 *ad* 3; Q. LXXII., A. 5; Q. LXXIV., A. 9 *ad* 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable

* The Latin *pervertere* means to overthrow, to destroy, hence *perversion* of God's law is a mortal sin.

defect consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above (Q. LXXII., A. 5). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end, as stated above (*ibid.*; Q. LXXXVII., A. 3): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 3), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal (*veniam*) when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 6).

Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not *against* the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts *beside* the law,

through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends.

Reply Obj. 2. This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally.

Reply Obj. 3. He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.

Reply Obj. 4. Mutable good is considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of finality.

Second Article.

Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above (Q. XVIII., A. 2). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.

Obj. 2. Further, as stated above (A. 1; Q. LXXII., A. 5; Q. LXXXVII., A. 3), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ, not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q. LXXVII., A. 8, *ad* 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.

Obj. 3. Further, it was stated above (Q. LXXIV., A. 3, *ad* 3; A. 10) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial.

On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (*De Sanctis,* serm. xli.), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic mortal sins.

I answer that, Venial sin is so called from *venia* (*pardon*). Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that *penance makes every sin venial:* and this is called venial *from the result.*—Secondly, a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned:—partially, as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial *from the cause:*—totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now.

For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object.

For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of one's neighbour, e.g. murder, adultery, and such-like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. —Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one's neighbour, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.

Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of the agent, as stated above (Q. XVIII., AA. 4, 6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically mortal becomes venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief.

Reply Obj. 1. The very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS A DISPOSITION TO MORTAL SIN?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore it is stated in *Ethic.* ii. 1, 2, that *from like acts like dispositions and habits are engendered.* But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (*Ep.* ccxi.) that *pride lies in wait for good works that it may destroy them.* Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xix. 1): *He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little.* Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away altogether into mortal sin.

I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition. For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way

of consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus.

Reply Obj. 1. Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore as an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal.

Reply Obj. 2. Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit in different ways, as stated (AA. 1, 2).

Reply Obj. 3. A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated.

Fourth Article.

whether a venial sin can become mortal?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words of Jo. iii. 36, *He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life,* says (*Tract.* xii. *in Joan.*): *The slightest,* i.e. venial, *sins kill if we make little of them.* Now a sin is called mortal through

causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.

Obj. 2. Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q. LXXIV., A. 8, *ad* 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.

Obj. 3. Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as stated above (A. 1). But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.

Obj. 4. Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated (A. 3). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.

On the contrary, Things that differ infinitely are not changed into one another. Now venial and mortal sin differ infinitely, as is evident from what has been said above (Q. LXXII., A. 5, *ad* 1; Q. LXXXVII., A. 5, *ad* 1). Therefore a venial sin cannot become mortal.

I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.

Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above (A. 2).

Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as

stated above (Q. LXXXVII., AA. 3, 5).—It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (*Hom.* xxiv. *in Matth.*).—It is also evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one another.

If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above (A. 3) with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively.

Reply Obj. 2. The very same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 4. A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.

Fifth Article.

Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin be mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (*De Sanctis*, serm. xli.) that *if anger continue*

for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins. But anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Obj. 2. Further, the Master says (2 *Sentent.*, D. xxiv.) that delectation, if morose,* is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Obj. 3. Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.

On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (Q. LXXII., A. 5, *ad* 1; Q. LXXXVII., A. 5, *ad* 1).

I answer that, As stated above (Q. VII., A. 1; Q. XVIII., A. 5, *ad* 4; AA. 10, 11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery.

* See Q. LXXIV., A. 6.

It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it has been stated above (A. 1) that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference of the moral act.

Reply Obj. 1. Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like.

We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbour, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent of reason.—If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the anger will not be a mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great scandal or something of the kind.

With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue.

That it be a venial sin, is due to some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature.

Reply Obj. 2. Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (*ad* 1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason.

Reply Obj. 3. A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above (Q. XVIII., A. 5, *ad* 4).

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A MORTAL SIN CAN BECOME VENIAL?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.

Obj. 2. Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing

it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.

Obj. 3. Further, as stated above (A. 5, *Obj.* 3), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a mortal sin become venial.

On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.

I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A. 1, *ad* 1). Now the imperfect can become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.

Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said above (A. 2). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is destroyed.

Reply Obj. 1. Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2. If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication in a state of suchlike ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (*Contra Mendacium* vii.), *those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end.* Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (*De Lib. Arb.* i. 4, 5), the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers.

QUESTION LXXXIX.

OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul? (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by *wood, hay, stubble* (1 Cor. iii. 12). (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence? (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially? (5) Whether the first movements of unbelievers are venial sins? (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAUSES A STAIN IN THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (*De Pœnit.*),* that if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof, as stated above

* *Hom.* 50 *inter L.*, 2.

(Q. LXXXVI., A. 1). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. Therefore venial sin brings a stain on to the soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. v. 27): *That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle,* on which the gloss says: *i.e. some grievous sin.* Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain in the soul.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 1), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colours, the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual, and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other, actual, like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on (II.-II., Q. XXIV., A. 10; Q. CXXXIII., A. 1, *ad* 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand, a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would not sever the soul from the embrace of its heavenly spouse.

Reply Obj. 2. In mortal sin, the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.

Reply Obj. 3. In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of

the light of grace, which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.

Second Article.

Whether venial sins are suitably designated as *wood, hay,* and *stubble*?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as *wood, hay,* and *stubble* (1 Cor. iii. 12). Because wood, hay, and stubble are said (*ibid.*) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are outside the pale of science. Therefore venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay, and stubble.

Obj. 2. Further, he who builds wood, hay, and stubble, *shall be saved yet so as by fire* (*verse* 15). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Apostle (*verse* 12) those who build *gold, silver, precious stones,* i.e. love of God and our neighbour, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay, stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbour, and do good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jo. i. 8): *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.* Therefore venial sins are not suitably designated by these three.

Obj. 4. Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. iii. 15) that the man who builds up wood, hay, stubble, *shall be saved yet so as by fire,* so that he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs

properly to venial sin, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 5). Therefore these three signify venial sins.

I answer that, Some have understood the *foundation* to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of this explanation (*De Fide et Oper.* xv.), because, as the Apostle says (Gal. v. 21), he who does the works of the flesh, *shall not obtain the kingdom of God,* which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble *shall be saved yet so as by fire.* Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal sins.

Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife, or of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God.—But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God and one's neighbour, wherefore they are designated by *gold, silver,* and *precious stones,* and consequently not by *wood, hay,* and *stubble.*

We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, and yet he is saved for ever.

Reply Obj. 1. Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because they are laid beside it; in the same sense

as it is written (Ps. cxxxvi. 1): *Upon the waters of Babylon,* i.e. *beside the waters:* because venial sins do not destroy the spiritual edifice.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay, and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build *upon* the *foundation.* And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. iii. 17: *Rooted and founded in charity.* Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.

Reply Obj. 3. Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervour of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly things remain longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the fervour of charity in order to remove them.

Reply Obj. 4. As the Philosopher says (*De Cœlo* i., text. 2), *all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, and the end.* Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to *wood,* which remains longer in the fire; *stubble,* which is burnt up at once; and *hay,* which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or less attached to them.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN COULD COMMIT A VENIAL SIN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. ii. 14, *Adam was not seduced,* a gloss says: *Having had no*

experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin. But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xi. 5): *We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked.* Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin.—In like manner, Augustine says (*ibid.*) that *man was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit.*—Again there seems to have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying (Gen. iii. 3): *Lest perhaps we die.* Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially.

On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 10). Therefore he could not commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially.

I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is a circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience,

or vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally.

The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order to the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement in the reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, as stated above (Q. LXXIV., A. 10); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order to the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q. X., AA. 1, 2, *ad* 3; Q. LXXII., A. 5). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the First Part (Q. XCV., A. 1), there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to God, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xiv. 13). Hence there could be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1. In the passage quoted, venial is not taken

in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven.

Reply Obj. 2. This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make an experiment, and, in the woman, by doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.

Reply Obj. 3. Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER A GOOD OR A WICKED ANGEL CAN SIN VENIALLY?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that a good or a wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels, in the higher part of his soul which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (*Hom.* xxix. *in Ev.*) that *man understands in common with the angels.* But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also.

Obj. 2. Further, He that can do more, can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially.

Obj. 3. Further, wicked angels seem to do certain things which are venial sins generically, by provoking man to laughter, and other like frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial, as stated above (A. 3), unless there be a special prohibition,

which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially.

On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.

I answer that, An angel's intellect, as stated in the First Part (Q. LVIII., A. 3; Q. LXXIX., A. 8), is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q. VIII., A. 2; Q. X., A. 1; Q. LXXII., A. 5), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore an angel's mind is not directed to the means, except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their actions are acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will.—This does not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them (P. I., Q. LXIII., A. 4; Q. LXIV., A. 2, *ad* 5).

Reply Obj. 1. Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3. The demons incite man to all such things which seem to be venial, that he may become used to them,

so as to lead him on to mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE SENSUALITY IN UNBELIEVERS ARE MORTAL SINS?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 1) that *there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh :* and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (ch. vii.). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins.

Obj. 2. Further, Anselm says (*De Gratia et Lib. Arb.* vii.): *Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh.* But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are mortal sins.

Obj. 3. Further, Anselm says (*ibid.*): *Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence.* Now this liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty.

On the contrary, It is stated in Acts x. 34 that *God is not a respecter of persons.* Therefore He does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to another. But He does not impute first movements to believers,

unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to unbelievers.

I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself cannot be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above (Q. LXXIX., A. 4). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins.

Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as stated above (Q. LXXIII., A. 10). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to 1 Tim. i. 13: *I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in* my *unbelief:* whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. x. 29: *How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?*

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, although the *fomes* of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.

In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 3. This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE IN ANYONE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ALONE?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 3). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins.

Obj. 2. Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without committing a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin.

On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense, as we shall state further on (Suppl., Q. LXIX., A. 6): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished for venial sin with no other than original sin.

I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore, much more does it

excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due end, as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, through not doing that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace.

Reply Obj. 1. Venial sin precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.

Reply Obj. 2. Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turn to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zach. i. 3) : *Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you.*

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